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Abstract
The paradigm of early modem European state-building is predominantly 
derived from the experience of warring states and their attempts to increase revenue 
extraction. The Swiss republic of Bern offers an illuminating counter-example. Being 
free from major wars for over two centuries (1589-1798) offered a conductive 
situation that allowed the state to run consistent budget surpluses while minimising 
the tax burden on its citizens. The thesis explores the functions which the Bemese 
republic performed in the absence of warfare. I am particularly interested in the effect 
of redistribution of resources by the government, both directly through the fiscal 
constitution of the state and indirectly through institutions such as property rights, 
regulation and economic policy.
My methodology is based on models from New Institutional Economic History 
(North 1990; Epstein 2000), fiscal history (Schumpeter 195; Komer 1981; Bonney 
1995/1999) and historical sociology (Tilly 1992; Ertman 1997). At the core of the 
thesis is an empirical analysis of fiscal redistribution, based on data from 
contemporary accounts of the state which I have collected from the archives. The 
Bemese republic is analysed in the context of a surplus state model, in which the 
following elements are mutually dependent and reinforcing: budget surpluses, low 
defence expenditure, the absence of a national debt, investments and low level of 
taxation. Overall the canton followed a niche strategy to state building which proved 
to be cost-effective compared to more coercive fiscal regimes. However, this strategy 
ultimately depended on the external effects of sustained warfare, taxation and public 
debts elsewhere in Europe.
A particular focus is on how the Bemese state used its structure as a surplus 
state to invest money on capital markets at home and abroad after 1710. I will use 
approaches from microeconomics and investor behaviour to analyse the canton’s 
portfolio investments.
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I Introduction
i-i The Puzzle: State-building without Taxation
‘No taxes, no unconstrained minister, no standing army and not the faintest sign 
of any threatening war! Can one find anything like this in any other place on earth? 
This is how the golden age has been. Ambition and riches have deprived the rest of 
the world of it.’1 The contemporary writer, scientist and politician Albrecht von 
Haller described his native Bern in 1753 with these words. Although Haller was a 
member of the ruling oligarchy and his statement therefore prone to exaggeration, the 
state he described was indeed extraordinary. It was a territorial republic that had not 
experienced major warfare for almost two centuries and had bursting coffers. Surplus 
money was invested on foreign capital markets, and the tax burden per capita was 
probably the lowest in Europe. In short, eighteenth-century Bern was a puzzle to its 
contemporaries and historians alike.
The history of European state formation and its impact on the economy has 
largely been studied from the standpoint of large territorial kingdoms. In these 
accounts of a development towards the nation state, smaller players perished and 
vanished. Paradoxically for these theories, examples of surviving ‘non-nation’ states 
are numerous; they include Bern and the other twelve republics of the Swiss 
Confederation. Analysing developments in these atypical states helps to distinguish 
between important structural changes and simple historical accidents to some extent. 
Particularly as most authors consider warfare a crucial factor of state development, 
Bern’s peaceful development has almost counterfactual potential. Therefore, the 
central research question is: What functions did an early modem state perform in the 
absence of warfare, and what impact does this have on its political economy?
At the core of the thesis is an empirical analysis of Bemese public finance, 
which is vital to understanding the economic and political impact of states. 
Justification for this approach comes from Joseph Schumpeter who with much pathos 
claimed that ‘the spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its 
policy may prepare -  all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all 
phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message here discerns the thunder of
1 Albrecht von Haller in a letter written from Gottingen in 1753, quoted in Oncken (1886): 2, 
translation from Kapossy (2002): 237.
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world history more clearly than anywhere else.’2 In the case of Bern, as I will argue, 
the fact that there was very little ‘thunder’ makes this republic such an intriguing case 
study.
The selection of a single case study, while seemingly unspectacular, draws 
validity from the fact that the available models of state-building do not accommodate 
or account for the Bemese case. Hence the challenge is in dealing with a ‘theoretical 
mismatch’. The intention is not to disqualify any grand theories by examining one 
small state, but rather to investigate how the distinctive features of the canton can be 
better understood using these models, as it would be impmdent to ignore theory and 
recount the story of eighteenth-century Bern as an ‘insular’ state where everything 
was unique. The key is to use theoretical models carefully. Even if they fail to explain 
developments in their entirety, general explanations can be useful for understanding 
certain aspects. Ideally, this case study can offer feedback to the ‘failed’ theories and 
help to improve them, though it would be an unintended consequence and not the 
main purpose of my research.
The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide the conceptional background 
and lead into the case study.3 The remainder of this section will provide definitions of 
the state and state-building, as well as an overview of my research topic. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the most important theoretical explanations about the 
state-economy nexus in Section 1-2, which covers approaches from economic history, 
historical sociology and financial history. The application of these models to the case 
of Bern and some tentative hypotheses are presented in a separate section (1-3), 
including my model of Bern as a surplus state. Section 1-4 provides a brief 
introduction to the methodology and empirical data that underlies the empirical 
analysis. The chapter ends with an overview of the organisation of my thesis.
Definitions and Scope of my Research
Max Weber defined the state as a set of centralised and differentiated 
institutions that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate violence within a
2 Schumpeter (1954): 7.
31 have limited references in this chapter to a literature overview. Footnotes in subsequent chapters 
will provide more detailed information.
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given territory.4 Numerous scholars have pointed out the limitations and pitfalls in 
this definition. Legitimacy is difficult to specify and the degree of monopolisation of 
violence can vary, particularly in early modem times where ‘membership’ to the state 
was not absolute and particular groups benefited from privileges, liberties, or 
exemptions.5 For Michael Mann, Weber’s definition is problematic because it entails 
institutional (centrally located institutions) and functional (legitimate violence) 
elements.6 Amongst the aspects of social life which are state regulated, the most 
significant in economic terms are the implementation and enforcement of property 
rights and other formal rules, including those for revenue extraction.7 Additionally, 
the state provides public goods, most notably protection. This has been acknowledged 
by Douglass North and Robert Thomas, who see the state from an economic point of 
view and primarily as ‘an institutional arrangement that sells protection and justice to 
its constituents. It does so by monopolizing the definition and enforcement of 
property rights over goods and resources and the granting of rights to the transfer of 
these assets. In return for this service, the state receives payment in the form of
O
taxes.’ They see this as a mutually advantageous trade between the governed and 
their government, as the provision of such public goods benefits from economies of 
scale.
To Weber, the constant struggle between elite groups over the type of and 
control over administration lays at the heart of state-building, even though he did not 
use this term. State-building, which some authors refer to as ‘state formation’9, is far 
less about how new states are established but rather how existing states managed to 
survive and enhance their power. In this, states competed among each other, as well 
as with competing actors from within their territory. Therefore, state-building is 
mainly a process of widening and deepening of state power relative to its subjects. In 
this, there are interesting parallels to the concept of ‘social disciplining’ by Gerhard
4 Weber, M. (1978). A similar definition is used by Charles Tilly, for whom states as ‘the word’s 
largest and most powerful organizations for more than five thousand years’ are defined as ‘coercion- 
wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority 
in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories’: Tilly (1992): 1.
5 See, for example: Mann (1988); Ertman (1997); Naf (1967); Epstein (2000).
6 Mann (1988).
7 Mann (1986-1993), Vol. 1: 26-27.
8 North/Thomas (1973): 97. Strictly speaking, the definition of North and Thomas is for government, 
which they do not distinguish from the state. See the critique by Epstein (2000), discussed below.
9 Braddick (2000) sees the difference between the two in that ‘state-building’ was purposely 
undertaken, whereas ‘state formation’ was an impersonal progress. I will use the two terms 
synonymously.
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Oesterreich who described how early modem governments imposed an ever- 
increasing discipline on their subjects.10
These definitions are highly abstract and difficult to apply to any specific 
eighteenth-century state. For my empirical analysis, the state is defined as the 
government of Bern, or more specifically, everything that was recorded in the 
accounts of this government. Accordingly, the terms government and state are used 
synonymously unless otherwise mentioned. The sociologist Michael Mann had 
justified his choice when using a similar definition for his study on English state 
finance saying that ‘what this state undertook, however, is surely not without interest 
and significance.’11 While such an institutional-cum-financial definition can be 
problematic and perhaps even tautological, it remains the best suited to an empirical 
analysis as long as its limits are acknowledged.
One of the downsides of my definition is that it discounts the distinction 
between various interest groups with a stake in the state. Despite being a republic 
with a parliament, Bern was not a Weberian Standestaat with different social groups 
represented.12 Neither did it have any territorial representation, as citizens from the 
subject territories were excluded from political participation. Furthermore, within the 
framework of my definition of the state the government is considered a unified entity 
which was not the case in practice. The Bemese political system in which 
government members were directly involved in state administration limited fractures 
between the two. However, the incentives of government and administrators were not 
always perfectly aligned and conflicts of interest prevailed. Institutional checks and 
balances were combined with rivalry and mutual distrust between government 
members.
Conflict between patricians was dwarfed by their common desire to secure 
exclusive access to highly lucrative posts in the government and state administration 
against potential new entrants. An important principle for the Bemese state was the 
militia idea that working for the res publica was a civic duty and hence only 
remunerated at a nominal rate. Although the principle had been largely undermined
10 Oesterreich (1968), discussed below.
11 Mann (1988): 74 (his epmphasis). He defined the state as everything that was recorded in the 
accounts books of the government in Westminster.
12 The term Standestaat is somewhat clumsily translated by ‘estates state’ by some authors. For the 
Standestaat: Weber, M. (1978): 1085-1087; see also Poggi (1978).
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for government offices, it still applied to some of the important positions in the state. 
It was also important to the canton’s military organisation, although the soldiers were 
almost exclusively subjects and not citizens of the republic. The canton’s 
administration was carried out by patrician government members with the support of 
local staff rather than a professional bureaucracy. In principle, Bemese patricians 
earned their living from private estates, a channel of income which allowed them to 
engage in political activities. In effect they were, to use another Weberian term, 
Honoratiores.13 This describes a group of individuals which has secured exclusive 
access to government positions through their economic ability to engage in offices 
that only pay nominal sums. However, this ceased to be the case by the eighteenth 
century as by then Bemese government offices provided a major source of income for 
mling families, some of which had become quasi-professional administrators and 
politicians.
A second constraint of this definition of the state is that the canton’s 
government only represented one layer of political activity in the eighteenth century, 
when state functions were fragmented between several institutions. The canton was 
by far the most important nexus of political power and possessed a monopoly of 
legitimate violence. Some limiting factors of sovereignty that affected other states did 
not apply to Bern. First, the church was not an independent power: it was integrated 
into the republic during the Reformation and evolved into a state church, run and 
controlled by the government. Second, local privileges existed, but their impact was 
limited. Although communal autonomy was comparatively high, it did not pose a 
threat to sovereignty. Nevertheless, the government relied on collaboration and co­
operation by its communes and, ultimately, by its subjects for many decisions. The 
counties into which the republic was divided for administrative purposes had lost any 
political power of their own.
Bern was one of thirteen cantons that formed the Swiss Confederation, a system 
of interlocking alliances between member states. The Confederation had very weak 
political institutions and relied on the cantons for administrative and military support. 
In short, it was little more than a channel through which the otherwise sovereign
13 The term is sometimes translated as ‘notables’. Weber uses the term in the context of formally 
‘democratic’ political organisations: Weber, M. (1978): 290-292.
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cantons could co-ordinate their foreign policy.14 This was at times an onerous task 
due to religious, economic and political differences. Without any military force of its 
own, the Confederation was unable to enforce solutions unless the cantons co­
operated. Bern was by far the largest of the Swiss states, covering nearly a third of 
Switzerland’s overall territory and population. This gave it the position of a primus 
inter pares which Bern assumed more by its military and financial power than by 
formal privilege. The relative effectiveness of its administration helped to make it the 
pre-eminent canton.
The time period of my analysis of the political economy of state-building in 
Bern is limited to the eighteenth century. This is more of an approximate framework 
than an exact demarcation, as I will not start with 1 January 1700. Incidentally, this 
start date would prove problematic, as under the Julian calendar that was used in the 
canton until 1701, the year started on the 25 March.15 The end of the period is clearer. 
On 5 March 1798, French troops marched into Bern, divided up its territory and 
incorporated all the Swiss states into the short-lived Helvetic Republic (1798-1803). 
In spite of several attempts to restore the old order afterwards, Bern never returned to 
its previous form. The former subject territories of Vaud and Argovia remained 
independent cantons, and the newly introduced, supposedly ‘old’ institutions were 
only caricatures of those that had disappeared with the French invasion.16
i-2 Early Modern State-Building as You Know It
To organise the overview of the literature on the political economy of European 
state-building, I have divided all publications into three broad categories of economic 
history, historical sociology and financial history. Each of these will be discussed in 
turn later in this section. The distinction is not always clear-cut, and the most 
interesting works are those which challenge and cross such arbitrary boundaries. The 
implications of the explanations discussed in this section on my hypotheses for 
eighteenth-century Bern are explained in a separate section (1-3).
14 For the concept of state sovereignty: Spruyt (1994), who casually ignores the situation in 
Switzerland, even though this would be a good testing ground for his hypotheses.
15 For the calendar reform in Bern: RQBE, vol. 9.1: 207. In Britain, the Gregorian calendar (‘new 
style’) was introduced as late as 1752.
16 See, for example: Bemisches Historisches Museum (1998).
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In embarking on the literature review the unit of comparison should be kept in 
mind. Since most of the theoretical explanations on state-building were written with 
an emphasis on the role of large monarchies, readers should note that my intention is
• 17not to compare Bern directly with the likes of Britain or France on a parity basis. 
This would be the proverbial comparison between apples and pears. The point is to 
relate the Bemese experience with a paradigm of European state-building rather than 
concrete examples. For more compatible individual comparisons, peripheral and 
smaller states would be more appropriate, but have generally been less extensively 
researched.
State and Economy in Economic History
Several major accounts of the historical development of economies have
neglected the role played by the state. For Marxists, the state was simply a defender
of the economic interests of mling classes. States as actors in the economic process
18were hardly mentioned and if they were, the arguments were not very persuasive. 
As an example, Perry Anderson’s model of state formation ended up with little more 
than geopolitical determinism and leaves limited scope for economic explanation.19 
On the opposite end of the political spectrum, neo-classical economists are reluctant 
to recognise the role of the state, except for securing property rights and providing the 
arena to enable market forces to work. Thus, the disciples of Adam Smith, who at 
times went beyond Smith’s original thoughts, either flatly ignored the state or saw it 
as an impediment to economic growth at best.20 Even though the importance of the 
modem state in economic development had been recognised by scholars including 
Alexander Gerschenkron, this was not applied to the early modem period.21 It took 
the emergence of another school of thought to reintroduce the state into political
99economy: New Institutional Economic History (NIE).
17 The situation is different for per capita comparisons, which are possible across states of a different 
size, although there are other inherent problems with per capita calculations [see Gelabert (1995) and 
the discussions in Section IV-5 below].
18 See the overview by Prak (2001).
19 Anderson (1974).
20 Smith (1976); For a Neo-Classical approach; see Barzel (2002).
21 For the modem state: Gerschenkron (1962); Sylla/Tilly/Tortella (1999).
22 The term ‘bringing the state back in’ is borrowed from political science: 
Evans/Rueschemeyer/Skocpol (1985).
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The basic concern of NIE is to investigate the impact that institutions have on 
economic growth, defined and measured as a long-run rise in per capita income. For 
Douglass North, institutions are forms of cooperation and competition between 
economic actors, accompanied by a system of enforcement of these rules that 
organise human interaction. More succinctly, institutions are ‘the rules of the 
game.’23 North, with Robert Thomas, argued in an early influential NIE book that 
efficient economic organisation was the key to economic growth. Efficient 
institutions managed to engage actors in productive activity by reducing externalities 
and transaction costs. Thus, they brought the private return of economic activities 
close to their social return. North and Thomas used this in a rather simplistic and 
teleological way to explain the ‘rise of the Western world.’24 Their reductionist 
approach seemed to present a blueprint for economic growth in the form of the Whig 
version of development in Britain and later developments in the United States of 
America. The argument goes as follows: by securing property rights, states establish 
formal markets as an institutional framework conductive to growth, as opposed to 
economic organisation through traditional societies or arbitrary governments. The 
existence of sub-optimal, inefficient solutions can be attributed to bad policy under 
predatory rulers and their rent-seeking activities. Margaret Levi, a follower of 
Douglass North, elaborated on this point and went even further. From her strict 
rational-choice point of view, rulers cannot be anything else than predatory.
Numerous critiques can be made of North and Thomas. First, it is not clear 
what efficient economic institutions look like and transaction costs are by definition 
very difficult to measure. A single set of efficient institutions applicable to every 
situation simply does not exist. Long before NIE, Gerschenkron had shown how 
substitute solutions can be suitable under conditions of economic backwardness by 
analysing and comparing latecomers to the industrialisation process. Such a 
Gerschenkronian corrective might also be applied to concepts of NIE in order to 
correct for their Whig-centred view of history. Second, North and Thomas lack a 
coherent explanation about institutional change and why inefficient economic 
institutions persist. In his more recent work, North has addressed these questions and
23 North (1990): 3.
24 North/Thomas (1973): book title. See alsoNorth/Weingast (1989), discussed later. Landes (1998) 
uses similar arguments.
25 Levi (1988).
26 Gerschenkron (1962).
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9 7integrated concepts of path dependency to his argument. Third and most relevant to 
my concerns, NIE’s concept of the state is anachronistic. North and Thomas’ view is
98that the early modem state was much like its modem counterpart. They do not 
account for differing historical circumstances in early modem states, where 
membership was neither absolute nor universal, and where jurisdictional, political 
and economic inequalities represented serious and important impediments to secure 
property rights.29 Finally, if states secure property rights with the aim of extracting
-in
revenue by taxation, this can also have adverse economic effects.
Nevertheless, stripped of its determinism, NIE remains the best and most 
coherent explanation for early modem economic growth. Its positive features are 
twofold. On one hand, NIE brings the state into consideration and makes it a central 
actor rather than an exogenous variable in explaining economic growth. The concept 
is open for adaptation to other kinds of societies and states. It can hence be brought 
beyond the scope of what its authors had in mind. One possible way of doing so is the
o i
‘improved NIE’ (my words) approach of Larry Epstein. He agrees with North and 
Thomas about the importance of secure property rights and reduced transaction costs. 
However, Epstein argues convincingly that the negative impact of the state on 
economic growth was not through excessive intervention but rather the lack and 
limitations of state sovereignty. The underlying assumption is that pre-modem growth 
is caused by market expansion, which allowed for specialisation and division of 
labour. This goes back to Adam Smith’s idea that markets emerged because of human
- 5 9
nature and its propensity to barter and trade. Such ‘Smithian’ growth is 
fundamentally different from modem, technology-driven ‘Schumpeterian’ growth.33 
By assuming Smithian growth for early modem economies, Epstein identifies 
inadequate institutional preconditions of markets as the main impediment for such 
growth. Prisoners’ dilemmas and coordination failures limited the free entry to 
markets as well as their extension. For Epstein, markets were the unintended 
consequence of expanding state sovereignty. Furthermore, states were supportive of
27 North (1990).
28 Levi (1988), who states her allegiance to Douglass North in her introduction.
29 See especially Epstein (2000): ch. 1 for this critique.
30 Brady (1991): 142.
31 He is also known as Stephan R. Epstein: Epstein (2000); Epstein (2005).
32 Smith (1976). Weber also sees markets as the most efficient form for the allocation of economic 
resources, as they are perfectly impersonal: Weber, M. (1978).
33 The term refers to Joseph Schumpeter’s work on technology (rather than his position on state finance 
discussed below); see for example: Schumpeter (1991).
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economic development because they created incentives, provided information and 
stimulated organisational as well as institutional change. It thus follows that a lack of 
centralised sovereign jurisdiction was at least as problematic as the persistence of 
predatory rulers. The main political regime barriers in early modem Europe were 
legally sanctioned monopolies that provided sources for rent-seeking, as well as 
jurisdictional fragmentation. They represented the inability to establish a unified, 
non-discriminatory fiscal and legal regime.34
Epstein also addressed the impact of republics on economic growth by referring 
to Weber’s postulate that republics were conducive to prosperity, mainly where towns 
were strong and states were weak.35 Even though this might be true for Italian city- 
republics of the late medieval and Renaissance period, the causal link between 
constitutional form and economic impact is unclear. From the point of view of many 
subjects, living in a republic was not necessarily attractive, as the politically 
empowered citizens tended to shift the burden of financing and maintaining the state 
infrastructures to their hinterland.36 The main problem with ‘republicanism’ as an 
explanation for successful economies is that early modem republics had little in 
common, apart from their political organisation. There was a broad range of states 
ranging from small urban republics in Italy or Germany to the territorial republics of 
considerable size such as Venice or the United Provinces. They all had completely 
different economic structures and paths of development. In the Swiss Confederation 
alone the diversity of republics was extraordinary. City-republics where both the 
economy and political regime depended on export industry and trade (Basel, Zurich) 
are difficult to compare with the relatively democratic rural Landsgemeinde cantons. 
The latter were controlled by local elites, some of whom had little interest in trade 
(Uri, Schwyz) while others were heavily engaged in it (Appenzell, Glams).
The literature on the state offering protection for (export-) markets has mainly 
been discussed in the context of long distance trade and textiles.37 Ulrich Pfister has 
combined the idea of states offering protection rents with the emergence of proto­
industry, defined as a ‘process of regional growth in heavily export-oriented 
industrial production, in which no role is played by increases in the productivity of
34 Epstein (2000). For the jurisdictional fragmentation, also: Olson (1982).
35 Weber, M. (1978).
36 The same is true for subjects living in the city without the right of citizenship, the so called 
Hintersassen. See Epstein (2000) and Gelabert (1995), discussed below.
37 See also the contributions of C.F. Lane, discussed in the subsequent heading.
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labour and capital through technological change.’38 While earlier explanations of 
proto-industry understated the role of the state, Pfister includes political factors in the 
form of protecting market access and a potential for monopoly rents by setting quality 
standards and controlling the production process. Two main assumptions characterise 
his model of a stylised dual economy with both a proto-industrial and an agricultural 
sector. First, total factor productivity (TFP) growth and technological change are 
impossible. Second, capital and labour inputs are not substitutes. The overall growth 
rate is therefore determined by the growth rate of the labour force and of the capital 
stock, as well as by changes in the terms of trade. The latter are defined as relative 
prices of imported foodstuffs to exported manufactures, which can be influenced by 
political action if a close relation between entrepreneurs and governments exists.
In an empirical overview of proto-industry in early modem Switzerland, Pfister 
argued as follows. Since the cantons were in no position to protect their export 
markets aggressively, they obtained access to overseas markets through privileges 
that were granted in return for mercenary services. With their bargaining position 
slipping because the terms of trade for mercenaries had been undermined by changes 
in military technology, the Swiss were unable to maintain export privileges after the 
mid-seventeenth century. The alternative strategy of securing monopoly rents through 
setting standards and controlling production processes likewise became increasingly 
unsuccessful. States were unable to control for outflows of technological know how 
through the emigration of skilled workers and failed to find effective ways to monitor 
embezzlement and manage increasing ‘overhead costs’. Both strategies for securing 
state-supported proto-industrial growth were exhausted by the mid-eighteenth 
century. This process had started at least a century before when previously centralised 
and guild-controlled production was replaced by a putting-out system, in which goods 
and semi-finished products were traded in the market.39 As a result, the cotton boom 
of the mid-eighteenth century was based on a ‘wide-ranging and efficient transaction 
system linking financial activities and well-developed postal system with industrial 
involvement.’40 By then, Swiss entrepreneurs were able to market large volumes of
38 Pfister, U. (1996a): 137. For a more detailed version: Pfister, U. (1992a): 21-32; Pfister, U. (1996b). 
For the concept of ‘proto-industry’: Mendels (1972). From the abundant literature on the topic and 
numerous critiques of Mendel’s concept, see especially the collections of Leboutte (1996) and 
Ogilvie/Cerman (1996). For the following, see Pfister, U. (1996b): 150-152.
39 Ogilvie translates this to ‘artisanal system’. The term Kaufsystem goes back to 
Kriedte/Medick/Schlumbohm (1977).
40 Pfister, U. (1996b): 152.
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products that responded to customer demand. In combination with bottle-necks in 
labour supply, this relative autonomy of the industrial sector supported the transition 
to modernisation.41
Early Modern State-building (Historical Sociology)
It is a truism to argue that the state was essential to historical analyses by 
sociologists and political scientists, since both disciplines originated in attempts to 
explain this very phenomenon. Following the pioneering works by Max Weber and 
others, state-building has become a major issue to the point that it is nearly 
impossible to provide a comprehensive overview. Given the great breath and width of 
work on the topic, I will limit my overview to specific theories that account for 
economic aspects of state-building in early modem Europe. In this context, Michael 
Mann distinguished two theoretical streams, an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ one where the role of 
states is primarily economic and domestic; and a ‘Germanic’ approach, for which the 
state is fundamentally military and international in character 42 This dichotomy has 
faded and most political sociologists have adopted a view of state formation that 
combines the two streams. Paul Kennedy, for instance, sees geopolitical power as 
merely the outcome of economic strength.43
Otto Hintze was amongst the first scholars to recognise that military conflict, 
and not class struggle was an important factor in European state-building. The result 
of geopolitical conflict was the establishment of either an absolutist-cum-bureaucratic 
regime or representative government.44 Early neo-classical research on the economic 
consequences of warfare helped to formalise these approaches. Frederic Lane 
analysed the state as a protection-providing firm, distinguishing monopoly profit 
(‘tribute’) from the ‘protection rent’ that benefited certain actors, especially 
merchants involved in international trade.45 Lane emphasized that violence could 
precipitate positive economic externalities by securing internal legal and external 
military support, if wealth was redistributed towards individuals with a higher 
propensity to invest than consume and shifted from less productive to more
41 Pfister, U. (1996b): 150-152; for the bottle-neck in labour supply: 145-150.
42 Mann (1988).
43 Kennedy (1989).
44 Hintze’s most important works were translated by Gilbert (1975).
45 Lane (1958); Lane (1979).
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productive activities.46 Richard Bean analysed the costs and consequences of different 
forms of military organisation, focusing in particular on their impact on the state’s 
power to tax 47 More recently, Philippe Contamine and others have written on the 
military impact of state-building in a comparative perspective.
Charles Tilly adopted Hintze’s view that geopolitical struggle was a major 
determinant of state formation, but questioned the link between military pressure and 
the establishment of a bureaucracy. Drawing heavily on Gabriel Ardant, he 
acknowledged that a main determinant was the state’s ability to finance its warfare 
activities by collecting taxes. A high level of economic development could provide 
easily taxable resources and thus substitute for bureaucratisation 49 In his more recent 
work, Tilly dismissed his earlier account as being too teleological. He still views state 
structure chiefly as a by-product of the ruler’s effort to acquire the means for war, but 
distinguishes three paths to state formation: coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and 
a middle way (‘capitalized coercion’).50 Other authors have followed his earlier 
approach and studied extraction regimes in more detail.51 With empirical material 
about English state finance, Michael Mann described the arrival of the ‘permanent 
war state’ in the seventeenth century, when functions of the state were largely 
military.52 To ensure their survival, states had to increase their extractive capacities to 
fund professional armies, navies, or both. Even though standing armies could be 
deployed for domestic repression, external geopolitical pressure was much more 
important in shaping early modem states. Brian Downing was mainly interested in the 
origins of liberal democracy, which he found in the representative assemblies of late 
medieval Europe. As questionable as this finding might be, his reflections on the 
financial resources of state formation are illuminating. Military modernisation led to a 
strengthening of monarchical power in countries that relied on domestic financial 
resources. Furthermore, in states where the military revolution was absent or which 
found other means for financing their armies, constitutional government was not 
destroyed. Downing does not analyse the situation in Switzerland. Even though the
46 Bullard et al. (2004): 101.
47 Bean (1973).
48 Contamine (2000).
49 Tilly (1975), see also Tilly (1992) and Ardant (1975), discussed below.
50 Tilly (1992).
51 See also Ferguson (2001).
52 Mann uses the expression ‘permanent war state’ in inverted commas: Mann (1988): 108. He claims 
that no European state was continuously at peace -  which is not the case for the Swiss Confederation 
(discussed above). See also: Mann (1986-1993).
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cantons would not fit properly into any of his categories, some of his ideas can be 
applied and used as reference points.
Early theories of state formation placed a strong emphasis on the parallel rise of 
absolutism and bureaucracy. The British situation, presented by Henry Roseveare, 
Patrick O’Brien or John Brewer shows that this combination is incomplete.54 Despite 
being a ‘constitutionalist’ state, it had a highly developed tax collecting bureaucracy, 
to the extent that it resembled a Weberian bureaucracy avant la lettre. Thomas 
Ertman has tried to account for this fact by separating regimes (absolutism) from 
infrastructures (bureaucracy). In an impressive tour de force, he tried to explain the 
outcome of early modem state-building for a number of European states (see Figure 
1- 1).
Patrimonial
Character of 
Infrastructure
Bureaucratic
Figure 1-1: Ertman’s Explanandum, or the Situation in Eighteenth-Century Europe
Source: Ertman (1997): 10, Table 1.
*) Latin Europe = France, Spain, Portugal, Tuscany, Naples, Savoy, Papal States 
States in brackets are the states that his model cannot explain properly.
To explain this outcome, Ertman introduces a historical dimension to his model, 
which makes relative timing a key determinant of the state-building process. He does 
this with explicit reference to Alexander Gerschenkron’s studies of relative economic 
backwardness, which were discussed earlier. In Ertman’s view, the causes of the 
different outcomes of state-building were the organisation of local government during 
in the late middle ages, the timing of the onset of sustained geopolitical competition,
53 Downing (1992); Downing (1988); see also Stasavage (2003). The term ‘military revolution’ was 
introduced by Michael Roberts in 1956, see: Rodgers (1995); Parker (1996).
54 Brewer (1989); O'Brien (1988); O'Brien (2001); O'Brien/Hunt (1999); Roseveare (1969); Ashworth 
(2003).
Political Regime 
Absolutist Constitutional
Latin Europe* Poland, Hungary
German Territorial 
States, (Denmark) Britain, (Sweden)
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and the independent influence of strong representative assemblies, notably on 
taxation. While this explanation works for most states in his sample, it fails to 
account for the situation in Sweden and Denmark.
The problems with his sophisticated model are twofold. First, Ertman 
concentrates heavily on large monarchies and excludes both republics and small 
states from his analysis, dismissing them as ‘nonterritorial states.’55 If Alberto 
Alesina and Enrico Spolaore have recently introduced the size of nations as a topic of 
contemporary economics, this task has not been attempted for the early modem 
period.56 Secondly, there is a strong survivor bias in Ertman’s view. By limiting his 
explanation to the formation of successful states, he cannot account for failures, such 
as Bohemia or Burgundy. Even though Ertman introduces a historical dimension in 
what could be called a ‘Gerschenkronian turn’, his model still appears teleological. It 
provides small comfort to say that most broad-bmshed sociological explanations
en
share similar faults to an even stronger degree.
Wolfgang Reihnard’s history of state power has put a strong emphasis on 
monarchs as key actors in modelling the European state.58 Other scholars have 
challenged his top-down view of the state-building process and emphasized the strong 
bargaining position of the mled in regimes based on consent. This ‘state-building 
from below’ approach was pioneered by Peter Blickle and further developed by his 
students.59 Thomas Brady has also stressed non-coercive alternatives to state-building 
with a strong emphasis on Swiss models.60 In general, research on alternative forms 
of state-building focused mainly on Southern German and Swiss states, relying on 
Dietrich Gerhard’s concept of an ‘Old Europe’ in which corporately organised 
societies continued from the high middle ages to around 1800.61 While concepts 
stressing continuity have been prominent in empirical studies, they have not reached
55 In a footnote, Ertman explains his case selection and casually defines his ‘nonterritorial states’: 
Amongst others he excludes Venice because it was only a city republic; the Dutch republic and the 
Swiss Confederation because they were federal entities, as well as the German ‘midget states’ and 
independent territories who were -  in his view -  little more than overblown private estates: Ertman 
(1997): 5 (fii. 3).
56 Alesina/Spolaore (2003).
57 Ertman (1997), with explicit reference to Gerschenkron (1962) for the historical dimension.
58 Reinhard (1999); see also Reinhard (1996a).
59 Blickle (2000); for an English summary: Blickle (1986); Holenstein (2000). See also the debates in 
Blickle (1997) and Reinhard (1996b).
60 Brady (1991) and -  although with an earlier timeframe -  Brady (1985).
61 The term Old Europe (Alteuropa) goes back to Gerhard (1981).
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the degree of conceptualisation of the ‘modernising’ visions of state-building 
epitomised in Ertman’s model.
The economic impact of early modem states has been researched by Douglass 
North and Barry Weingast, who argued in an influential paper that the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was favourable for the British economy. The country benefited 
from a new political constitution that limited the power of the crown through 
constitutional commitment. In the new parliamentary system, wealth holders with 
veto power checked for the crown’s ability to renege on public debt. In turn, 
Parliament provided sufficient tax revenue to fund the state. North and Weingast 
interpreted this as part of a broader commitment to secure property rights. As a proxy 
to test their argument, they used falling interest rates on public debt. This thesis has 
been soundly critiqued by several scholars. A comparison with data from continental 
countries makes the British performance look more like a Gerschenkronian catching 
up of a late developer in financial organisation than a significant advantage over her 
competitors. Others have argued that interest rates are not a good indicator of secure 
property rights, as they were fixed legally and not through the market.64 Another 
critique comes from Patrick O’Brien, who has shown that financial innovation 
happened to a large extent during the Civil War and cannot be attributed to the 
Glorious Revolution.65
The scepticism towards the Whig interpretation of North and Weingast is also 
tangible in a book edited by Philip Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg. Their attempt to 
link political constitutions and the ideology of state finance -  what they call ‘a new 
fiscal history’ -  concentrates on fiscal crises in England, the Netherlands, Spain and 
France. Hoffman and Norberg acknowledge the importance of fiscal policy on state- 
building, pointing to the puzzling fact that the (supposedly) freest people in Europe, 
the Dutch and the British, were taxed at the highest rates. As an explanation, they 
attribute the willingness to pay taxes to representation.66 O’Brien argues along similar
62 North/Weingast (1989). See also North (1993) and Weingast (1993). For a critique: Clark (1996). 
See also Stasavage (2003).
63 Epstein (2000): ch. 2; Sussman/Yafeh (2003).
64 Temin/Voth (2005). They emphasise credit rationing instead. For the basic idea, developed for the 
French credit market: Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000).
65 O'Brien (2001). See also O'Brien/Hunt (1999).
66 Hoffman/Norberg (1994): conclusion.
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lines when describing the origins of British ‘fiscal exceptionalism.’ The willingness 
of taxpayers to sustain the strategic, commercial, and imperial objectives of the 
government relied on a professional and relatively efficient system for the assessment 
and collection of excises.68 In addition, Britain’s revenue was to a large extent based 
on indirect taxes. Its fiscal constitution allowed less manipulation for redistribution 
towards private gain, social groups or specific regions. Compared to other European 
countries, the British fiscal system had the advantage of being efficient. It also relied 
on a broadening and widening base that was universally taxed. Such ideas of a fiscal 
absolutism in Britain are in conflict with traditional views of a dichotomy between 
continental absolutism and British constitutionalism.
The concept of absolutism, which played such an important role in early 
historical sociology, has lost most of its attraction to scholars, who have 
‘deemphasized the absolute in absolutism.’69 Great discrepancies between 
contemporary claims and the reality have been pointed out. Gianfranco Poggi, one of 
the most fervent critics, has brought this to the point in a comment on Louis XIV’s 
alleged statement L ’Etat c ’est moi, arguing that the ruler ‘probably never said it; if he 
did say it, he did not mean it that way; if he did mean it that way, then he did not 
know what he was talking about.’70 Nowhere was the difference between aspirations 
of the ‘absolutist’ state and reality larger than in fiscal matters; in France, ‘taxpayers 
remained chronically “undertaxed”.’71 From a ruler’s perspective (rather than the 
taxpayer’s), this compares unfavourably to the situation in Britain and the Dutch 
Republic, where in spite of parliamentary consent the fiscal burden was high. As a 
‘socio-historical version of absolutism’, Gerhard Oesterreich’s concept of social 
discipline [Sozialdisziplinierung] has been remarkably popular.72 Oesterreich relied 
mainly on ideas by Weber, combining them with Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault. 
In its simplest form, the concept claims that the early modem state had a fundamental 
impact in disciplining individuals, thus establishing a hierarchically organised 
society.
67 O’Brien (2001): title. See also: O'Brien (1988); O'Brien (1994); O'Brien (2001); O'Brien/Hunt 
(1999), discussed below. The English civil war offers another puzzle, namely that it was for a good 
part a tax revolt, but the winners ended up paying significantly higher taxes to be ‘free’.
68 O'Brien (2001): 25.
69 Hoffman/Norberg (1994): 303. See also: Henshall (1992).
70 Poggi (1978): 161.
71 Bonney (1995c): 433.
72 Schulze (1987); for the original concept: Oesterreich (1968).
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Most of the socio-political explanations presented so far do not investigate the 
effects of their findings on economic development. In this, they could benefit from 
the ideas of Hilton Root, who has analysed the redistributive role of governments. 
Root considered the economic efficiency of the criteria used for allocating resources 
within a state. When comparing the redistributive role of governments in Old-Regime 
France and Britain, he distinguished between cronyism and corruption. In the British 
case, the corruption of Parliament was an informal and illegal form of redistribution, 
but was open to market forces in what could be called a ‘market for corruption’. In 
contrast, France had a system of cronyism, where an institutionalised, legally 
sanctioned form of favouritism redistributed resources within the state. Although his 
dichotomy between cronyism and corruption might be overstated in Root’s empirical 
references, the basic idea has a good explanatory potential when used as a pair of 
Weberian ideal types.73
The Rise of the Fiscal State (Financial History)
For the most part, the field of financial history -  which in this context I take to 
be the history of state finance only- has been rather reluctant in adapting models from 
other disciplines and has remained predominantly descriptive. A landmark research 
project about the financial dimension of the rise of the modem state has produced a 
wealth of data for several states across six centuries throughout Europe, which was 
compiled in the European State Finance Database (ESFDB).14 However, in contrast 
to the astonishing width and depth of the data, conclusive comparisons proved 
difficult and conceptual explanations provided little more than a re-statement of older 
models.75 Joseph Schumpeter’s early attempt to introduce a combination of history 
and ‘financial sociology’ has been ignored for a long time. When it was re­
discovered, sociologists seemed to have found more fruitful approaches to its 
extension -  arguably because they found it easier to brush aside the complex issues 
that arise when comparing empirical data across a variety of states. Accordingly, 
some of the most compelling books about state finance have been written by scholars
73 Root (1991). For Weberian idal types: Weber, M. (1904): 64-66.
74 Bonney (1995b); Bonney (1999b).
75 Bonney (1995c); Komer (1995a); Komer (1995b) and Gelabert (1995). See also Bonney/Ormrod 
(1999), discussed below.
76 Schumpeter (1954), originally written in 1918.
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from other disciplines.77 Financial history has to a large extent failed to recognise its 
potential for broader contexts, such as state-building or constitutional developments. I 
will organise the discussion of the main contributions which are relevant to my own 
study by starting with evolutionary models of fiscal states, followed by issues of 
revenue and taxation, and closing with the role of public credit.
For Schumpeter, fiscal history was seen as the starting point for a sociological 
analysis of the state. In the account books, the reality of this institution could be 
investigated, stripped from the ideological burden inherent to normative sources. 
Both the causal importance of state finance and its ‘symptomatic significance’ -  the 
fact that almost every human action has its fiscal reflection -  are interesting starting
no
points for both historical and sociological examinations. This can be applied even 
further than Schumpeter’s own analysis, which remained rather teleological and 
unilinear. The starting point of his developmental model are the medieval rulers who 
had to live off their own domains.79 In addition to the direct income from crown 
lands, their income consisted of feudal rights (regalia) and revenue from judicial 
powers. Sporadic contributions from vassals and the church provided further revenue, 
but rulers had no general right to levy taxes. The fiscal economy of this domain state 
moved into crisis because of the growing expenses for warfare. Princes first incurred 
large debts, and when they could borrow no more, they turned to the estates [Stande] 
to provide taxes for common exigencies: ‘Out of the “common exigency” the state 
was bom.’80 What followed was the growth of a fiscal system based on the taxation 
of estates and the Church, which reached its peak in the late sixteenth century. As the 
state created its own institutions and became a separate power, taxes were no longer 
raised merely for extraordinary, pre-specified purposes. The concept and the 
machinery of the tax state had arrived. The political conflict then changed into one 
about control of this type of state. For Schumpeter, taxes not only helped to create the
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state, but also brought a ‘calculating spirit’ to society.
77 In particular Mann (1988). Exceptions are O'Brien (2001); Komer (1980); Komer (1981).
78 Schumpeter (1954): 7.
79 The German term Domane can be translated as ‘demesne’ [e.g. by Schumpeter (1954)] or ‘domain’ 
[e.g. by Bonney (1995b)]. For the sake of coherence, I will adopt the latter spelling consequently.
80 Schumpeter (1954): 15.
81 Schumpeter (1954): 16. In this, he is close to the Weberian account of ‘rationalisation’, which, 
however, is mainly driven by religious beliefs and cultural customs, or the famous ‘protestant work 
ethic’: Weber, M. (1978).
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The empirical content of Schumpeter’s theory about the transition from domain 
to tax state has been criticised. Even though taxes were extraordinary revenue granted 
for the common good in theory, in practice rulers had stopped living off their domain 
from the late middle ages.82 The critique of the Schumpeterian view by Bonney 
contains two main points.83 First, that the income from domains did not decline 
uniformly throughout Europe. The most striking example is Prussia, where even in 
the eighteenth century the composition of revenue did not look like that of a tax 
state.84 Second, that the administrative problems of the domain state were for the 
most part not inherent to this form of fiscal system and could be observed in other 
types of states as well. Bonney therefore opened up the definition of the domain state 
and introduced four different types thereof: (1) primitive, where rulers were obliged 
to consume in situ; (2) less primitive, where a central and local administration 
ensured collection, storage, and consumption of the rulers’ goods in kind; (3) 
entrepreneurial, where payments in kind were a safeguard against price fluctuations 
and shortages; and (4) colonial, where new territories were acquired to be integrated 
into the rulers’ domains. Another solution was adopted by Kersten Kruger, who has 
modified the Schumpeterian account by introducing an intermediate phase of 
development, in which some combination of domain revenue and taxation prevailed. 
By describing this mixed solution as a ‘finance state’ [Finanzstaat], he referred to 
Gerhard Oesterreich, who used the same term to describe a period in constitutional 
history.85 In formal terms, Kruger adds little to the Schumpeterian concept, whereas 
Bonney’s suggestions have the advantage of being suitable for typologies of fiscal 
constitutions.86 A more recent study of Richard Bonney and Mark Ormrod refined 
Kruger’s view and conceptualised his approach by presenting a developmental model 
of fiscal change in which states went through four broad stages: tribute, domain, tax,
on
and fiscal state.
Sociologists following the classic texts by Gabriel Ardant stressed the 
importance of finance for the building of states. Ardant’s voluminous studies are
82 Gelabert (1995); see also Bonney (1995a); Isenmann (1995); Komer (1994) for the ideological 
foundation of taxation.
83 Bonney (1995b). This differs from his view in Bonney/Ormrod (1999), discussed below.
84 For Pmssian state finance: Blastenbrei (1996), Braun, R. (1975).
85 Kruger (1980), Kruger (1983) and Kruger (1987); see also Buchholz (1996).
86 The same critique applies to Buchholz (1996) and Buchholz (1992). The main advantage of his 
study is the integration of the Scandinavian literature.
87 Bonney/Ormrod (1999).
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• 88mostly based on French material and sometimes lack thorough conceptualisation. 
Charles Tilly formalised Ardant’s thoughts and made them more accessible, as 
discussed earlier in this section. Ardant examined the impacts and limits of revenue 
collecting, listing the problems involved in early modem taxation. These include an 
insufficient production by largely agricultural economies with relatively low returns, 
the small size of the market sector, difficulties in tax collection, unequal distribution 
of the burdens and difficulties in tax assessment. Subsistence economies are difficult 
to tax, as revenue extraction is much simpler when goods circulate. Cities that 
depended on markets even for basic foodstuffs became easy targets for tax collectors. 
In the countryside, salt was heavily taxed, because it was a good that farmers could 
not produce themselves and therefore had to buy on markets. Other solutions to tax in 
the absence of markets were tithes, levies on stocks of wealth, approximate estimates 
(i.e. taxing whole communities instead of individuals), or flat-rate universal taxes per 
capita, such as poll taxes. Non-fiscal methods of financing included such ‘archaic 
solutions’ as confiscation and secularisation of church property, the venality of 
offices, as well as currency debasements. Maximising taxation could be made either 
with an emphasis on coercion (‘constraint’) or by obtaining compliance from 
taxpayers. Ardant’s most important point was his emphasis that economic 
development could substitute for coercive ways of extraction. According to him, 
Phyisiocrats of the eighteenth century who analysed the economic impact of tithes 
recognised that any tax on the gross product and not net revenue perpetuated
O Q
inefficient incentive structures, discouraging investments.
The impact of taxation on the economy is difficult to establish. Peter Mathias 
and Patrick O’Brien have tried to analyse this empirically for Britain and France.90 
They were criticised by Donald McCloskey, who argued that the incidence of 
taxation cannot be determined from a theoretical point of view.91 Nevertheless, 
empirical studies should be carried out with the necessary precaution in 
interpretation. For example, John Beckett and Michael Turner suggested that 
financing Britain’s aggressive foreign policy through heavy taxes produced short­
term adverse effects, while leading to longer-term economic prosperity. The burden 
of excise tended to dampen internal demand and might even have slowed the process
88 Ardant (1975); see also Ardant (1965); Ardant (1972).
89 Ardant (1975).
90 Mathias/O'Brien (1976).
91 McCloskey (1978), see the reply from Mathias/O'Brien (1978).
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of industrialisation.92 O’Brien argued that this was one of the factors that pushed 
business towards external and imperial markets. Despite the negative effect on 
internal demand, the most innovative sectors of industry, particularly textiles, 
remained lightly taxed.
The importance of non-fiscal impacts on tax revenue has also been considered 
by other scholars. Juan Gelabert, in his comparison of early modem tax burdens, 
stated that given the relatively low level of taxation in early modem economies and 
the big proportion of revenue in kind, harvest fluctuations were probably more 
important and certainly less predictable than taxes. The nature of taxation was also 
crucial: indirect taxes were relatively efficient in times of economic and population 
growth, such as in eighteenth-century Britain. In a situation of decline on the other 
hand, the reliance on pro-cyclical indirect forms of taxation could have negative 
effects, as Gelabert illustrated with reference to seventeenth-century Spain. 
Contemporary taxpayers were well aware of the regressive nature of indirect taxes, 
but in societies based on privilege this must have seemed a relatively effective 
solution. Early modem states could usually increase taxation on segments of the 
population that were already taxed. In urban republics, this was often the surrounding 
and not politically represented countryside. Only in times of acute fiscal pressure 
were there attempts to break out of fiscal constraints and to tax new resources. 
Gelabert stressed that the amount of money paid by taxpayers could be significantly 
lower than the sum obtained by the treasury because of the redistributive nature of the 
fiscal regime. France is the example of how an inefficient tax collecting system could 
distort the economic impact of taxation on an economy. Gelabert also analysed the 
impact of religion, or rather: the organisation of the church, on state finance. 
Exemption of the clergy from paying taxes and the secularisation of church property 
could have considerable fiscal effects.94
In line with the increase in taxation throughout the early modem period was the 
search for ways of funding states through borrowing, which led to innovations in 
public credit.95 In spite of its Italian antecedents, these developments were most
92 Beckett/Turner (1990).
93 O'Brien (1988); O'Brien (1994).
94 Gelabert (1995).
95 Komer (1995b).
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visible during the Dutch golden age and post-civil war Britain.96 According to James 
Tracy, financial innovations which had enabled the Dutch to finance their war of 
independence were later copied by the English.97 Peter Dickson coined the term 
‘Financial Revolution’ to describe the changes that took place in Britain’s 
government finance after the Glorious Revolution.98 The basic idea behind the 
Financial Revolution was that Parliament allowed the state to borrow on an 
unprecedented scale through securing tax revenue that was earmarked for servicing 
newly established ‘funded’ debts. This debt was issued in relatively small sums to 
private investors, either as annuities or through joint-stock companies. Since 
individual lenders could sell their financial claims on the government, this allowed 
for the establishment of a secondary market for government securities. Combined 
with innovations in the financing of long-distance trade, the national debt was thus at 
the origin of what Larry Neal calls ‘financial capitalism.’99
Douglass North specified the innovations that lowered transaction costs in early 
modem long distance trade, which corresponded to developments in government 
finance: they reduced transactions costs by increasing the mobility of capital, lowered 
information costs and transformed uncertainty into risk.100 An involvement of 
wealthy individuals or groups in financing the state, or what Weber called ‘politically 
oriented capitalism’ was not unusual in the early modem period.101 What was new in 
the Financial Revolution was that the state was now financed through the capital 
market, where its creditors were anonymous and widely dispersed. For governments, 
this financial strategy lowered the cost of servicing debts via a reduction of interest 
rates. To obtain such a discount, they had to mortgage future tax revenue for interest 
payments and abstain from a reneging on public debt. In short, both parliament and 
crown (or: government) had to commit to ‘play by the mles of the capital market.’102 
From an investor’s perspective, government bonds had the advantage of being 
relatively secure and liquid assets.
96 For the Italian antecedents: Pezzolo (2003a); Pezzolo (2003b); Molho (1995). O’Brien argues that in 
Britain, many of the important developments had in fact happened during the civil war: O'Brien 
(2001).
97 Tracy (1985). For a critical view: Fritschy (2003).
98 Dickson (1993); See also Tracy (1985); Roseveare (1991).
99 Neal (1990); Neal (2000).
100 North (1991).
101 Weber, M. (1978).
102 Neal (2000): 124, see also North/Weingast (1989), discussed above.
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Several authors have stressed the importance of financial markets for economic
t mdevelopment. The major problem with government borrowing is that it can divert 
financial resources away from a productive use (‘crowding out’).104 For early modem 
Britain, Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth recently investigated this problem with 
data from the private capital market, arguing that crowding out effects were limited in 
scale.105 The problem that remains unresolved is to determine whether public debt 
was a direct substitute for other forms of saving and investment, especially in 
activities that were more productive for the economy.
If most of the research on public finance has dealt with revenue extraction by 
the state, this neglects the impact of expenditure. For an overall consideration of the 
political economy of state-building, fiscal redistribution is cmcial. In an empirical 
study of early modem Lucerne, Martin Komer provided a detailed framework for 
analysing redistribution through state finances, in which he distinguished between 
functions o f the state, sectors o f economic activity and natures o f  transaction.106 This 
approach will be described in detail in the methodology section (1-4) below, as my 
investigation of Bernese public finances is largely based on Komer’s framework.
1-3 Analysing the Mismatch: My Hypotheses
Most of the established historiographic and theoretical approaches have major 
disadvantages. They are by definition simplifying and in focusing on a core of 
Western European monarchies, most fail to account for the considerable amount of 
variation between early modem states. If the losers in the state-building process were 
included, this would improve the quality of models considerably. Full explanatory 
power can only be claimed if an empirical test proves that these states failed because 
they did not adapt to features of the survivors. Such a test, however, is limited by the 
lack of data. States that disappeared have left fewer records, or rather the likelihood 
of their destruction is higher. Additionally, failed states have been neglected by 
historiography in general, which dwell on the old lament of history being written by 
the winners. Fortunately, some smaller states have survived. Studying these can
103 For instance: Sylla/Tilly/Tortella (1999); Levine (1998).
104 See a discussion for Britain [O'Brien (1994)] and France [Hoffinan/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000)].
105 Temin/Voth (2005).
106 Komer (1981). He used a simplified version of this approach in comparative study of expenditure in 
European state finance: Komer (1995a).
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increase the number of cases with which to test hypotheses, though it would also 
increase complexity as the emerging picture is likely to demand more specification. 
The reluctance to integrate republics in comparative historical analyses has been 
blamed by Komer amongst others, who termed them a valuable alternative to 
monarchic states and as polities that ‘possessed a real dynamism and a capacity to 
modernize.’107 Considering alternatives to the major avenues of state formation could 
help to distinguish explanatory factors from sheer accidents. To cite an example: did 
the power to tax an ever-increasing amount of resources really benefit the economy? 
Or rather: what were the necessary preconditions under which the power to tax had a 
positive impact?
What I propose for this study is an analysis of Bern’s alternative path to state 
formation. It was not a highly successful state, and it clearly does not fit most 
theoretical frameworks. I will use the explanatory models in a heuristic way: if taken 
as typologies rather than developmental models, concepts like the Schumpeterian
|  A O
domain state can be useful in describing the key features of a particular situation. 
By analysing the points where Bern runs counter to the theoretical explanations, 
knowledge about the situation of the political economy in this specific state can be 
derived.
Overall, the canton followed a niche strategy to state-building, which some 
might argue was conservative and backward. In many respects, eighteenth-century 
Bern was more akin to a medieval than to a modem state. It did not rely on a 
powerful extraction machine, which meant that the tax burden bome by its subjects 
was very moderate. Instead, it used alternative ways of extracting resources, such as 
through tithes and corvee labour for serving in the militia army. From their 
paternalistic standpoint, the patrician government were proud to offer their 
(supposedly) free subjects a state without taxation, run by prudent and frugal 
magistrates. For the most part, as illustrated by the Albrecht von Haller quote at the 
beginning of this chapter, they lauded the absence of a standing army and 
bureaucracy.109 The Bemese legitimacy approach to the fiscal constitution can be 
regarded as a cost-efficient alternative to more coercive ways of state funding. In this 
context, the term ‘legitimacy’ is used relative to other early modem states; compared
107 Komer (1995a): 394; see also Brady (1991).
108 Schumpeter (1954) or Bonney/Ormrod (1999).
109 See the quote above (p. 10).
Chapter I: Introduction 35
to modem nation states, the canton’s discriminatory ways of revenue extraction 
would not qualify as legitimate. Nevertheless, Bern certainly was not a predatory 
state, and revenue maximising was not its prime concern.
The reasons why the Swiss Confederation was not invaded or subjected to 
tribute payments by its larger neighbours were a combination of deterrence, 
Realpolitik and luck. Deterrence was maintained through its sizeable militia armies 
and mercenary troops, though their actual strength was possibly overrated by 
contemporary observers. Realpolitik kept the main powers with an interest and 
proximity to Switzerland at bay. The French crown and the Habsburg Empire 
checked each other’s influence at most times and ensured that the cost of invading 
outweighed the benefits of ruling the relatively poor Swiss Confederation. Both 
powers were happy to have a neutral, or at least relatively neutral, buffer between 
their territories.110 In this situation, both powers secured what they were most 
interested in at a relatively low cost: safe passage through the Alps, market access and 
mercenaries. Finally, luck was almost certainly the main ingredient of Swiss 
independence. The fate of the Pax Helvetica at times hung on a thin thread, 
particularly when confessional conflicts ran wild. In the end, disagreements were 
solved peacefully. The Swiss had leamt their lesson in what Martin Komer called 
‘financial solidarity’ in the sixteenth century, namely that the common interest in 
peaceful coexistence as a bi-confessional and occasionally dis-united Confederation 
offset the cost of secession.111
Thus, in geopolitical terms, Bern virtually abstained from the European power 
play in the eighteenth century. The sheer existence of such peaceful states is puzzling, 
as the omnipresence of warfare is one of the very few explanatory variables that most 
theories of early modem state-building agree upon. Some of the unintended 
consequences of warfare on the economy -  standing armies, capital markets or 
growth of the state itself -  were not entirely absent. Bern developed along the lines of 
a free rider state, profiting from public goods provided by the belligerent European 
powers. Even though Mancur Olson has specified the free rider problem with view to 
the domestic situation, it can be applied to this situation as well.112 The externalities 
that Bern profited from were technological, military and financial developments in
110 For Swiss neutrality: Suter (1998).
1,1 Komer (1980).
112 Olson (1965).
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other states. Mercenaries who fought on Europe’s battlefields were one of the most 
important export goods. They were also the price to pay for military independence 
and ‘neutrality.’ Furthermore, by investing part of its surplus abroad, Bern profited 
from the indebtedness of Britain and other powers that financed their ever-increasing 
national debt on the capital market.
The Model of Bern as a Surplus State
To describe the political economy of eighteenth-century Bern, I have used the 
concept of a surplus state. This term is slightly different from Komer’s 
entrepreneurial state and Bonney’s entrepreneurial domain state.113 The canton relied 
to a considerable part on revenue collected in kind, which could be consumed, stored 
and sold on the market. It combined this traditional domain income with engagement 
in economic activities, such as the monopoly of salt trade, grain storage, but also 
financial investments. This might initially be interpreted as a failure by the 
government to coerce its subject into contributing towards its revenue as the state was 
not funded through taxation. However, as I will proceed to argue the government did 
not need to tax its population. Instead, it was content with its traditional sources of 
revenue. This put a severe financial cap on state-building, at least as far as the 
shortfall of incomes from taxation could not be compensated.
The Bemese surplus state was in a positive equilibrium (a ‘virtuous circle’) that 
combined five interdependent and mutually reinforcing elements: low defence 
expenditure, budget surpluses, investments that generated returns, low levels of 
taxation and the absence of a national debt (see Figure 1-2). The most important 
condition for this equilibrium to work was the absence of warfare.
113 Komer (1981); Bonney (1995c): 447-463.1 use the term surplus state because Bern had other 
options than to engage in entrepreneurial activity (discussed below).
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Figure 1-2: Positive Equilibrium in Bernese State Finance (Surplus State Model)
I will briefly introduce all five elements of the surplus state model and discuss 
possible connections between them below. At this point, they should all be 
understood as hypotheses which have to be falsified by the empirical analysis 
throughout my thesis. I have limited this section to the crucial points, leaving detailed 
references to the discussion in the empirical chapters.
Low Level o f Defence Expenditure: As a member of the Swiss Confederation, 
Bern abstained from expansion -  and thus from warfare -  from the late sixteenth 
century. In spite of short civil wars, the Pax Helvetica prevailed until 1798, sparing 
the cantons from the soaring bill of defending their territory in a Europe where 
warfare had become highly capital intensive. The defence of the Bemese republic 
rested on a two-tier system combining a domestic militia with mercenary troops 
positioned abroad that worked as a virtual standing army. This was a very cost- 
effective solution to national defence, since the militia was mainly paid for in kind by 
extracting forced labour and the mercenaries were funded by foreign states.
Budget Surpluses'. With its frugal approach to state finance, the canton regularly 
spent less than its revenue. Only towards the end of the century did expenditure 
exceed revenue for several consecutive years, mainly because of the military threat 
from France. These budget surpluses accumulated in the form of ‘retained earnings’, 
cash or funds for investment.
Absence o f  a National Debt: Loans played an important part in financing 
territorial expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The resulting public debt 
was repaid through budget surpluses, tax revenue and pension payments by foreign 
powers for the use of mercenary troops. By the turn of the eighteenth century, Bern
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had been without net public debts for over a hundred years; the government had even 
started with amassing considerable funds. At first, these took the form of a cash 
reserve that served as a war chest. Its exact amount is difficult to quantify because the 
government deliberately kept no accounts or inventories about the content of its 
vaults.
Investments and Returns: As mentioned above, budget surpluses could be 
invested to generate future returns. The opportunities for this were numerous. Bern 
had rounded its territorial possessions by purchasing lands and titles, improved 
infrastructure throughout the country, engaged in economic activities and invested in 
financial claims. The latter had started with loans on the domestic market or 
neighbouring territories, which could foster dependencies and political clientelism. 
From 1710 the canton had added foreign borrowers to its loan portfolio by granting 
credit to Britain and the United Provinces. These funds were later converted to purely 
financial investments on the London capital market.
Low Level o f  Taxation: Along with other Swiss republics, Bern had one of the 
lowest levels of taxation of any European state of its time. Direct taxation on property 
had been abolished in the seventeenth century and indirect taxes were moderate. Most 
of the tax revenue came from tithes on grain and wine, which were long-standing and 
legitimate sources of revenue extraction.
Although all elements of the surplus state model were ultimately interrelated, 
some of the connections can be specified more clearly. In particular, I distinguish 
between three sub-cycles of the overall virtuous cycle, namely a militia-, investor- 
and represenation cycle (see Figure 1-3).
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Figure 1-3: Selective Connections between Elements of the Surplus State Model
The militia cycle relied on the provision of security without a standing army. 
The Bemese militia, in which in principle every able-bodied man served without 
compensation, triggered very little expenditure in cash. It was not funded by tax 
revenue, but by the extraction of labour in the form of regular training days and 
eventual days in battle. In addition, soldiers had to provide and maintain their own 
equipment. This situation had the side effect that Bemese subjects were armed, which 
limited the potential to impose tax revenue by coercion. The risk of armed tax 
rebellions was high and made any new introduction very costly from the 
government’s perspective. Instead it relied on co-operation and compliance from 
subjects and local elites, Because these were well integrated into the Bemese state 
and had considerable local autonomy, issues of internal safety were negligible. The 
small number of political riots was mainly targeted at reforming the existing order 
rather than at its complete overthrow. This in turn made the maintenance if internal 
security less costly.
The investor cycle refers to debates about the entrepreneurial state cited earlier 
and can also be called the entrepreneurial cycle. The basic idea is that accumulated 
surpluses that are not used to service debt can provide funds for productive 
investment by the state. Cameralist writers suggested that a state should invest in 
factories, mines or infrastructure. After failed attempts to build canals in the late 
seventeenth century, the Bemese state invested in its road system in the eighteenth 
century. This attracted local and foreign traffic, which in turn generated additional 
customs revenue. The canton also invested in a system of public granaries which was 
expected to stabilise grain prices and avoid starvation in years of bad harvest. This
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was part of an embryonic welfare state that included orphanages, hospitals and 
schools, although it remained at a very limited scale. From the late seventeenth 
century onwards, the state had also started to act like a bank, granting loans to private 
borrowers and entrepreneurs in order to encourage domestic economic development. 
This practice proved rather unsuccessful in the long run because there were few 
investment opportunities within the territory. The sole possibility of lending 
domestically was by mortgage credit, most of which was agricultural. The 
government had been involved in this market for a long time. When it effectively 
banned foreigners from the market, their financial claims were taken over by the 
state. As in the rest of the Swiss Confederation however, a lack of investment 
opportunities and low interest rates resulted in an oversupply of capital. This led to 
capital exports by private investors and ultimately by the state as well.
The representation cycle also relied on the returns of previous investments. It 
followed from the principle that these returns assured the government’s independence 
in two ways. First, investments which could be liquidated served as a war chest in 
combination with the cash reserve which had fulfilled this function before. The 
objective was to mobilise bullion reserves for military emergencies in the first 
instance and then sell financial assets in the medium run if necessary. In other words, 
the funds fortified the geopolitical independence of the Bemese state. Second, 
revenue that derived from investments also secured the independence of the 
government (and here, the words state and government are not used synonymously). 
Since taxing property needed the consent of taxpayers, which was usually only 
granted against political participation, the absence of direct taxes helped to make the 
government immune to any such claims. Thus, turning the slogan of the American 
Revolution on its head, the Bemese government could be said to aim for a situation of 
‘no representation without taxation.’114 As this situation would potentially mn against 
the idea of the militia cycle, the government had to walk a tight rope. A negative 
aspect was that overseas investments created new dependencies, because Bern was 
subjected to the goodwill of the states in whose national debt it had invested, Britain 
in particular.
In principle, Bern as a surplus state had other options apart from the investment 
of state funds: it could increase public consumption or lower taxation. While the
114 Of course, issues of taxation were only the tip of the iceberg of the American Revolution.
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former was not opportune, the latter was nearly impossible. Public consumption was 
strongly disliked by the frugal Bemese patricians. Their republican-cum-protestant 
ethos limited expenses for lavishing representation. Strict sumptuary laws -  which 
were not always strictly followed in practice -  were intended to maintain a social 
order in which the equality between citizens was paramount. It was combined with a 
differentiation from non-citizens, which were the majority of the canton’s population 
that were not represented in the government. Although the mling elite adapted new 
fashions throughout the eighteenth century, this was capped by internal checks. The 
limits on personal expenses also applied to public finance, in which representation 
was limited just enough to still ensure that political power remained visible and 
unquestioned. The patricians considered the state their ‘family affair’ and took a long­
term view to the sustainability of its budget accordingly. Savings and investments 
translated into a provision for future generations; to overspend would be viewed 
disapprovingly as living off them.
To lower taxation was also difficult, as paradoxical as it might sound. Limiting 
tithe collection was practically impossible without forfeiting this right completely 
because its rate was fixed historically. Tithes were highly legitimate, and the fact that 
they were levied as a proportion of revenue made them relatively easy to bear. When 
harvests were abundant, farmers could more easily spare part of their returns. In times 
of bad harvest, the government was probably more lenient in collecting tithe revenue, 
although empirical evidence on this is understandably hard to come by. All other 
taxes were comparatively low by European standards. Although the government 
could have reduced tariffs or its monopoly profit on salt sales, the scope for doing so 
was relatively small. After all, the state needed to maintain a minimal infrastructure 
of tax collection in place as a last resort for times of hardship. Since introducing new 
taxes was difficult and costly, it is most likely that the government would have had to 
rely on an increase of current forms of taxation to boost its revenue in an emergency. 
Finally, there was also an element of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ in taxation. With 
potential competitors relying on increasing funds provided by taxation, Bern was in 
danger of falling behind its competitors in geopolitical terms.
Bern’s reliance on tithes as a source of revenue induced a dependency on 
agricultural returns, which was only a partial blessing. On one hand, it made planning 
difficult, since harvests could fluctuate severely across time. On the other hand, the
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state could profit from improvements in agricultural productivity and price increases 
for agricultural products. Arguably, it could also have profited from these by taxing 
agricultural income through an income tax; its collection would almost certainly have 
been more expensive than the ‘tax at source’ solution of tithes. The reliance on the 
primary sector seems backwards and un-dynamic from a teleological perspective. 
From an eighteenth-century standpoint however, agriculture was a leading dynamic 
sector. It was natural for the government to rely on lands and their produce as the 
main source of resource extraction: they were immobile, hard to hide and easy to tax. 
The government’s stake in high agricultural returns also partly aligned the interests of 
ruling patricians and agriculturalists. Both groups aimed to generate higher 
agricultural returns. It is not surprising, therefore, that physiocratic ideas and a desire 
to improve agriculture featured prominently among government members. 
Innovations that would undermine the existing order, such as the introduction of (tax 
free) potatoes on a large scale, were deliberated reluctantly.
1-4 Methodology and Sources for Empirical Evidence
This section will outline the main methodological premises of my study, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters. In particular, I will address 
the problem of how values can be determined in non-market societies like the 
Bemese, which was only partly monetised. Finally, I will present the main types of 
empirical evidence that I have used for my thesis.
Methodology
There are two underlying premises for my research. First, it is important to 
consider both revenue and expenditure of the government and second, using 
analytical criteria is preferable to relying on categories used in the eighteenth century. 
Both approaches have been pioneered by Martin Komer and refined by his 
students.115 With respect to the first premise, by comparing the structure of revenue 
with that of expenditure, it is possible to determine how the state redistributed 
resources within an economy. This is cmcial in determining the economic effects of
115 Komer (1981); Hagnauer (1995); Hagnauer/Bartlome (1998).
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state-building. As a result of the second premise, I classify information from 
historical accounts within a framework that is based on accounting standards used in 
present-day Swiss cantons. In particular, I follow their distinction between current 
transactions and investments (to which I refer as inventory transactions).116 The 
former describe all financial activities that did not have an impact beyond the current 
budget, the latter are revenue and expenditure that affect assets of the state. They 
therefore have the character of investments or capital formation. In the context of a 
surplus state, the importance of the distinction becomes obvious. Inventory 
transactions describe all relevant revenue and expenditure connected with investing 
surpluses and provide information of how well the surplus state’s investor cycle was 
funded.
One could argue that the application of accounting categories for modem states 
cannot accommodate for the complexities of early modem states. This should not be 
used as an argument for neglecting analytical distinctions, but rather as an 
encouragement to extant present-day accounting categories in a way that is useful for 
historical research. Where necessary, I have therefore made adaptations to ensure that 
eighteenth-century circumstances are appropriately reflected. Other complexities are 
explicitly mentioned, such as the attempts to unify values, discussed under the next 
heading. Another possible objection is that using an analytical framework cannot do 
contemporary actors justice. Government members, so the argument goes, did not 
distinguish between rigid analytical categories and had often only fragmented 
information at their disposal. Whatever the case, it does not invalidate attempts to go 
beyond what contemporaries thought they were doing. It is the very essence of social 
science to explore structures that contemporaries fail to recognise. The alternative 
would be to limit research to the knowledge of contemporaries, in which case it could 
provide little more than a re-edition of primary documents. After all, the same would 
apply to all concepts of historical research, ranging from social discipline to 
absolutism -  and, of course, state-building.
Finally, some would argue that limiting the state to its financial records is an 
accountant’s view of history. There is certainly some truth in such a statement if 
government ledgers are considered the only source of information. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that finance was the vital lifeline to any form of government activity.
116 See Section III-l and Section IV-1 below.
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Budgets often reveal more about the true nature of a government than lofty policy 
statements about its intentions. An analysis of state-building should also 
accommodate for non-financial effects, however. I will discuss this briefly for the 
Bemese case in a designated section (II-6), using normative sources as 
complementary evidence.
Determining Values in Non-Market Societies
Early modem economies were to a large extent dependent on non-market 
exchange. The degree of commercialisation or ‘marketisation’ depended on several 
variables, including urbanisation, division of labour and taxation. In this situation, the 
state could not rely entirely on a monetised financial system as this would expose it to 
inflation. In years of bad harvest, when grain prices were high, the state and its 
money-earning employees would find it difficult to find grain on the market at an 
accessible price.117 As a preventive measure, the budget of early modem states often
1 |  o
included a significant component of transactions that were collected in kind. Salary 
payments were also partly paid in grain to secure their purchasing power. The 
interplay between cash transactions and transactions in kind was therefore an 
important aspect of Bemese state finance in the eighteenth century. For a coherent 
analysis however, all transactions must be converted into a single measure -  
preferably in a stable currency -  using information on relative prices. This is the only 
way to compare figures in a meaningful way. When doing so, it is important to bear 
in mind that any measure based on standardised prices is simplifying and 
anachronistic.
Collecting revenue in kind represented more than just a failure to standardise 
accounting practices. By converting minor land rents into monetary units, 
governments demonstrated that they were perfectly capable of executing such 
reforms. In addition to acting as inflation buffers, grain and wine revenue could be 
stored as contingencies in the event of a military attack. Public inventories were also 
used to limit price fluctuations; selling their contents in times of critically high prices 
during a harvest crisis should reduce prices and cover shortages. In combination with 
import and export regulations, public inventories were therefore used as a tool for
117 Persson (2002): ch. 1-3.
118 See also Bonney (1995c): 463-472.
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economic policy. As a convenient side-effect, an anti-cyclical selling strategy should 
also guarantee that grain was sold at high prices and hence generate a good return on 
storage investments.
Determining the exact value of goods in non-monetised economies is both 
difficult and complex. In general, any value can be expressed in kind, labour or 
money (see Figure 1-4).
in Labour
Value
in Money
Quality Adjusted Metric or Capacity Measures [g, ltr] 
Nutritional Value [kcal] / Man-Years
in Kind
yearly
— wage of
daily _
Current Money Metric Bullion [g] 
Currency of Account
skilled
unskilled
labourer
Figure 1-4: Determining Values in Non-Market Societies
Units are in square brackets. Abbreviations: Y = wage; p = Price; C* = Consumption
Proportions between these units are determined by prices, wages and food 
consumption. Of these, only the latter were stable. Prices and wages fluctuated and 
have to be valued with information recorded in accounts. Throughout my study, I will 
use the Bemese Batzen as currency of reference. The Batzen was a stable accounting 
currency, which means that it was not minted but related to a fixed amount of bullion. 
As a proxy, one Batzen was the equivalent of 0.7g of fine silver and 0.09g of fine 
gold (see Section VII-13 in the appendix for details). This is the best way to make 
results comparable across space and time, although some authors prefer to use non­
monetary units, such as wages, grams of quality adjusted grain or calories (kcal).119 
Once the terms of conversion are fixed, the choice of a basic unit should not alter the 
results, at least not for a short-term or cross-section analyses. For a long-term 
perspective, inflation has to be taken into consideration.
119 Strictly speaking, wages are not a measure for labour, but for the price of labour.
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While the Batzen was stable in its bullion content, its purchasing power varied 
across time. Even when inflation rates were under 1% per annum, this could make a 
considerable difference in the long run. The Batzen mainly lost value compared to 
foodstuffs (grain and dairy products); real wage inflation was lower, as were price 
increases for manufactured goods.120 The best way to face the challenge that these 
inflation rate differences pose is to calculate key figures in a variety of equivalents 
and compare them. I will do this in particular in the structural analysis (Chapter IV), 
for which good empirical price evidence is available. The downside of using the 
Batzen as a main unit for my analysis is that, again, it is an abstraction from reality. 
By neglecting complexities of the interplay between monetary and non-monetary 
transactions, it is also anachronistic. To compare values across time and space, it 
remains the best option, however.
Empirical Data and Material for Comparison
In this heading, I will briefly outline the main types of resources that I have 
used for my analysis. The documents and series will be presented in more details in 
the relevant parts of the empirical chapters. In general, I rely on a combination of 
edited information and primary research carried out in Swiss archives.
Edited empirical material about the early modem Bemese economy is scarce. 
Even the most elementary measures, such as population and GDP estimates are 
sporadic and unreliable. The figures which are available have largely been provided 
by Christian Pfister, who has written the most comprehensive study of the Bemese 
economy and complied the Bemhist database.121 I have also used Pfister’s earlier
199work on tithe revenue and grain prices. Further information on grain prices comes 
from studies by Ernst Bucher, Georges Andre Chevallaz, Erika Fltickiger Strebel and 
Patrick R. Monbaron.123 Other financial data of the canton has not been edited so far, 
except for Julius Landmann’s study on foreign capital investments.124
120 For a detailed discussion on inflation rates, see Section VII-14 in the appendix.
121 Bemhist database: http://www.bemhist.ch: see also Pfister, C. (1995) and other publications by the 
same author.
122 Pfister, C. (1975) and Pfister, C. (1984); for an English version: Pfister, C. (1978).
123 Bucher, E. (1944); Chevallaz (1949); Fliickiger Strebel (2002); I thank Dr. Monbaron for letting me 
use his data on Lausanne market prices.
124 Landmann (1903) and Landmann (1904). His text relies on the Historie der Auslandischen Stands 
Capitalien of 1776 (StABE B VII 2389).
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The most important part of my research is based on primary sources. In 
particular I have analysed accounting records of the canton in the public record 
offices of Bern, Argovia and Vaud. This data has been transcribed in the context of
1 0f\a research project carried out at the University of Bern between 2000 and 2002. For 
overseas investments by the canton, I have used archives in London, as well as 
transcripts of relevant documents or time series from other scholars.127 Qualitative 
material from my study is mainly from government reports and legal documents, 
some of which has been edited in the series Sammlung Bemischer Rechtsquellen 
(RQBE)™
Research about the impact of the state on the economy should ideally be carried 
out with a comparative approach. Differences in currency and accounting practice 
make standardisation necessary for inter-state comparison. Accounting standards, 
categories, or time periods were not universal, and the contemporary practices often 
confuse rather than clarify the situation. However, these factors should not discourage 
comparative research. While extrapolating data can surmount a number of them, the 
remaining differences have to be acknowledged to avoid painting with too broad a 
brushstroke. The European State Finance Database (ESFDB) and the two 
accompanying volumes edited by Richard Bonney provide ample empirical material
190for comparing patterns of revenue and expenditure across different states.
Comparative cases to Bern can be found in the first instance in the other states
of the Swiss Confederation. The aforementioned work by Komer about Lucerne
110remains the benchmark in extent and depth of analysis. Other Swiss cantons have
been studied by H. Btichli (Solothum), Hans Conrad Peyer (Zurich), or Artur Vettori 
111(Basel). Outside Switzerland, it is difficult to find comparative examples for early
125 Staatsarchiv Bern (StABE); Staatsarchiv Aargau (StAAG) and Archives Cantonales Vaudois 
(ACV); Burgerbibliothek Bern (BBB).
126 Forschungsprojekt BeFin: http://www.befin.hist.unibe.ch; see also Komer (1997). I was working as 
a research assistant and coordinator for the project.
127 Public Record Office, Kew (PRO); Bank of England Record Office (BERO); British Library (BL). I 
thank Nick Linder, Bela Kapossy, Larry Neal and Gary Shea for sharing their data with me. The use of 
their transcripts will be credited throughout the text.
128 Rechtsquellen des Kantons Bern [abbreviated as RQBE], several volumes and years. It is part of the 
series Sammlung Schweizerischer Rechtsquellen. Government reports are mainly from the Staatsarchiv 
Bern (StABE).
129 European State Finance Database (ESFDB): http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/: Bonney (1995b); 
Bonney (1999b). In particular, I relied on the comparative articles by Bonney (1995c); Komer (1995a) 
and Gelabert (1995).
130 Komer (1980); Komer (1981); Komer (1999).
131 Buchli (1916); Peyer (1968); Vettori (1984).
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modem states in such a fortunate financial situation. Of the major powers, only 
Pmssia managed to avoid a net national debt, at least until the end of the reign of 
Frederick II (1786).132 There might be similar comparative cases in small German 
states.133 Venice was debt-free from the seventeenth century as well.134 In addition, 
studies about surplus states of the early twenty-first century like Singapore or 
Norway, Kuwait and other oil states might share some of the conceptual problems. 
Another example for an early modem free rider strategy was the Landgrave of Hesse- 
Cassel, who sold mercenary services to Britain and invested the return on the London 
capital market in the late eighteenth century.135 The major monarchic states, Britain 
and France, for which there is ample research, can only serve as counter-examples to 
the situation in Bern.136 The same is true for the Dutch republic.137
1-5 The Organisation of my Thesis
In Chapter II, I will introduce the political organisation of the eighteenth- 
century Bemese republic. This will provide the necessary background for the 
empirical analysis that ensues in the subsequent three chapters. Chapter III presents a 
long-term overview of the government’s most important accounts. It concentrates on 
the state’s assets and draws on aggregated data. This is complemented with a 
structural analysis (Chapter IV), for which I have collected information on all 
available accounts of the Bemese state in two sample years, 1732 and 1782. The third 
empirical chapter (V) will consider the ‘crown jewel’ of Bemese state finance, the 
canton’s financial investments overseas. The conclusion (Chapter VI) will sum up the 
most important findings and discuss them further.
The main points of each section will be summarised in the last paragraph to 
provide quick orientation. All non-essential information has been organised in the 
appendix.
132 Blastenbrei (1996); Braun, R. (1975).
133 See Buchholz (1996) who focuses largely on Germany.
134 Pezzolo (2003a); Hocquet (1999).
135 Ingrao (1987). Interestingly, the Hessian ‘business model’ looks similar to that of sixteenth-century 
Swiss states: see Komer (1980) and Komer (1999).
136 The literature on these countries is abundant. For an overview, see Bonney (1999a); O'Brien/Hunt 
(1999).
137 Hart, M.t./Jonker/Zanden (1997).
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II Res Publica Bernensis
ii-1 Introduction, Chapter Overview and Historiography
In 1714, the government of Bern decided to change its official seal (see Figure
II-1). While the earlier version from 1470 had referred to the state as Communitas
138Villae Bernensis, the new version called it Respublica Bernensis.
Figure II-l: Seal of the Res Publica Bernensis
Source: Capitani (1991): 71. The seal was made in 1716/17 by Justin de Beyer after a design by 
Johann Rudolf Huber, 1716/17.
The new seal was a belated acknowledgement of the transformation that Bern 
had undergone since the late Middle Ages. It was no longer an Imperial city, but had 
become an independent, sovereign territorial state. Like its Roman predecessor, the 
Bemese republic had conquered and acquired a territory that surpassed the original 
city by far. By the eighteenth century, its area covered roughly a third of the Swiss 
Confederation. Changing the terminology of the seal also symbolised another 
transition: that political power had been gradually transferred from a community of 
citizens to the authorities of the republic, which had become increasingly aristocratic
139in nature.
138 The original text says Rei Publicae Bernensis Siglium Maius (Great Seal o f the Bemese Republic). 
A small seal with the same expression (Siglium Minus Rei Publicae Bernensis) had been ordered in 
1678 but was not used before 1716. See Bemisches Historisches Museum (1991): 375-376 and 
Capitani (1991): 70-71, with reference to Fluri (1924). According to Feller (1955): 427-428, the term 
Res Publica Bernensis was only introduced in 1722.
139 Geiser (1891): 96.
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This chapter will discuss constitutional arrangements and political outlook of 
the Bemese republic in the eighteenth century. Its aim is twofold: to explain the 
outcome of the state-building process and describe the structure within which state- 
building occurred. It presents the state largely from a functionalist perspective. The 
remainder of this section will introduce the most important aspects of the 
historiography. In the next section (II-2), I will examine characteristics of Bern as a 
state, notably its relation to competitors for political power and the absence of 
taxation. Section II-3 will present the territory and population. The nature of the 
patrician government and its administration will be analysed in Section II-4, and the 
canton’s geopolitical and military strategies in Section II-5. The role of the Bemese 
state as a provider of non-financial goods is discussed separately (Section II-6). 
Finally, Section II-7 provides a brief introduction of the republic’s fiscal constitution, 
intended as background information for the empirical chapters that follow (Chapters
III-V). The concluding remarks of this chapter (Section II-8) will attempt an overall 
assessment of Bemese mle.
Historiography
Historians referred to early modem Bern as the ‘largest city-state north of the 
Alps.’140 Although a frequently used description, it can be somewhat misleading. This 
reference to Bern as a city-state neglects the fact that it was a territorial state in which 
the city itself was relatively small. The latter’s maximum population of 15,000 by the 
mid-eighteenth century only covered a fraction of the 300,000 population that lived in 
the territory of the canton. Compared to German city-states like Hamburg, Bremen or 
Frankfurt am Main, the city of Bern was small in size. As a territorial republic, 
however, the canton was surpassed by the Dutch United Provinces.
My historiographic overview refers to selected studies that have been 
particularly useful for my research. A more systematic coverage can be found in the 
series Bibliographic der Berner Geschichte, edited since 1975.141 Amongst the
140 See Messerli/Egli (2003): Title and Pfister, C./Egli (1998): 34. This expression implies the 
comparison to the largest such polity South of the Alps, Venice, which was not a city-state in the strict 
sense either.
141 Bilbiographie der Berner Geschichte, ed. by Burgerbibliothek Bern (yearly, since 1975). Newer 
versions online [http://aleph.unibas.ch/l; see also the journals Berner Zeitschrift fur Geschichte und 
Heimatkunde and the older Blatter fur bemische Geschichte, Kunst und Altertumskunde (1905-1929); 
as well as the series Archiv des Historischen Vereins des Kantons Bern.
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historiography of early modem Bern, Richard Feller’s epic four-volume Geschichte 
Berns stands out.142 It covers the political, cultural and economic history of the 
republic before 1798. The author’s poetic writing style and the dearth of references 
make the work prone to mixing solid facts, anecdotes and florid imagination. Because 
of these stylistic challenges, some of Feller’s interpretations should be examined 
critically, in spite of a generally high degree of accuracy of his account. Anton von 
Tillier’s Geschichte des eidgenossischen Freistaates Bern from 1838 is mainly 
impressive and renowned for its outstanding coverage of archival material.143 The 
constitutional history of Ancien Regime Bern by Karl Geiser is a seminal work on the 
topic, which has been recently complemented by studies from Francis de Capitani 
and Bela Kapossy.144 Capitani has also contributed to the most recent textbook article 
about Bern in the Historical Dictionary o f  Switzerland}AS Over the past few years, a 
series of inter-disciplinary studies on Bemese history have been published, covering 
the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century; a volume for the eighteenth century is 
currently in preparation.146
The former subject territories Argovia and Vaud have been written about 
separately in monographs and specialised journals.147 For Vaud, the historiography of 
the period before 1798 has traditionally been anti-Bernese, being only rarely 
challenged by ‘revisionist’ studies.148 Today, the attitude of historians is more relaxed 
and provides a balanced account, combining positive and negative aspects of Bemese 
rule. This is best illustrated by the introduction in the most recent overview of Vaud 
before 1798, written for the bicentenary of independence.149 The Bemese period is 
less well researched for Argovia.150
142 Feller (1946); Feller (1953); Feller (1955); Feller (1960).
143 Tillier (1838-1840).
144 Geiser (1891), see also Geiser (1932); Capitani (1991); Kapossy (2002); for a more superficial 
version: Walchli (1981).
145 HLS (2002), article Bern: 253-274.
146 Beer et al. (1999); Schwinges (2003); Holenstein (2006); The eighteenth century volume is planned 
for 2008 under the title Berns goldene Zeit (Bern’s golden age).
147 More recent contributions are: Gallard (1970-87) [esp. vol 4]; Hubler (1991) or Flouck et al. (1998); 
see also the Bibliotheque Historique Vaudoise series and the journal Revue Historique Vaudoise.
148 For Vaud, classical anti-Bernese interpretations are Olivier (1837) and Verdeil (1849-1852). For a 
‘revisionist’ approach: Gaillard (1935), although with a focus on earlier centuries.
149 Monbaron (1998b).
150 Verein Forschungsprojekt Aargau 1798 (1997); HLS (2002): Article Aargau; and the journal 
Argovia.
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ii-2 Bern as a State
In the introduction, I argued that Bern can be defined as a state in the Weberian 
sense of being a set of institutions which successfully claimed the monopoly of 
legitimate violence within its territory.151 This section will investigate the relation 
between the elements of government and state more closely, which will then be used 
synonymously in the rest of my thesis. The nature of the Bemese government itself 
will be the subject of a subsequent section in this chapter; for now, it will be 
considered a ‘black box’. In this section, I will elaborate in more detail how the above 
definitions of the state match the realities of eighteenth-century Bern by first 
examining the different levels of governance. In particular, the issue of communal 
autonomy is addressed in this context. I will then discuss the Bemese approach to 
state-building more specifically by referring to one of its most distinctive features, the 
absence of direct taxation on property.
The government of the canton constituted one of several layers of state activity 
in Bern, though arguably the most important one. Before these are explained in 
greater detail, it is worth noting the absence of two factors that limited sovereignty in 
other states: the Church and nobility. In 1528, Bern had introduced the Reformation 
by government decree. To safeguard the spiritual needs of its population, Bern 
established a state church which was funded through appropriated church lands and 
titles. The latter included the right to levy tithes. The government secularised church 
administration and assumed the tasks of poverty relief, schooling and monitoring 
public morality. In practice, these costly functions were delegated to parishes and 
communes, over which the state assumed a supervisory role. Correspondingly, the 
Bemese state church quickly became an indispensable tool of administration, as 
pastors often performed official and semi-official functions on behalf of the 
government. The clergy was recruited and employed by the state based on 
recommendations by religious advisory councils.
The nobility as the other traditional rival for political power was not organised 
as an independent group in Bern. Within the city republic, noblemen were part of the 
government itself, as will be discussed below. Nobility from the territory were 
included in matters of local administration individually, often securing subordinate
151 Weber, M. (1978): 54-56. For the Bemese state in general: Geiser (1891); Feller (1955): 106-129, 
330-337,427-471; Capitani (1991).
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positions in a quasi-dynastic manner. However, they were not organised as a group 
across the canton, nor were they represented as an estate in government.
The remaining competitors of the Bemese government were found in the Swiss 
Confederation, higher up in the state hierarchy, and in counties and communes at a 
lower level (see Figure II-2).
County
Commune (Parish)
Canton of Bern
Swiss Confederation
Main Tasks:
Coordination of Foreign 
Policy
Foreign Affairs
Defence (Military Organisation) 
Finance and Taxation 
Jurisdiction and Police (partly) 
Religion (State Church) 
Economic Policy 
Welfare (subsidiarily)
(administrative units only)
Jurisdiction and Police (partly) 
Local Infrastructure 
Welfare
Agriculture (Communal Land)
Figure II-2: Levels of State Activity and Main Tasks in Eighteenth-Century Bern
1 S9Bern became a member state of the Swiss Confederation in 1353. Although it 
was by far the largest of the cantons in the Corpus Helveticum, it did not have any 
formal prerogatives and was only a primus inter pares. The Confederation was a 
complicated system of bilateral and multilateral alliances in perpetuity between the 
XIII cantons and their numerous allies. The cantons were never formally incorporated 
into a federal (or even central) state. In 1648, the Swiss were granted exemption from 
the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations and obtained formal sovereignty. In 
practice, they had been independent from as early as 1499, when they ceased to make
152 Strictly speaking, one could not ‘join’ the Swiss Confederation, as it was only a system of mutual 
alliances. Also, the year 1353 should be seen as a proxy rather than an actual date. For the term Corpus 
Helveticum: Peyer (1978): 675 (note 2). Amongst the allies of the Swiss Confederation were cities (St. 
Gallen, Miilhausen or Geneva), monarchic (principality of Neuchatel) and quasi-monarchic (prince- 
bishop of St. Gallen) states, as well as federal republics (Grisons, Valais).
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financial contributions towards the Empire. In practice, sovereignty was with the
1cantons, which also had the military means to guarantee and protect it. A fragile 
equilibrium was maintained between the different interests of Protestants and 
Catholics, as well as urban and rural republics within the Confederation. Overall, the 
existence of the Corpus Helveticum was guaranteed more through ‘balancing 
conflicts’ and a shared determination to defend a common existence, than harmony 
between its constituent parts.154
The Confederation had no central institutions except for the Federal Diet, which 
was in essence a congress of ambassadors of sovereign states. Its decisions required 
ratification by the cantonal governments. Only minor administrative matters were 
decided by majority vote.155 The Diet functioned as a court of arbitration between 
competing cantons and coordinated their foreign policy (discussed in Section II-5). 
With its military might and comparatively well-developed administration, Bern was 
clearly the most powerful Swiss state, though it was contingent on co-operation from 
its allies. The Confederation was not a serious competitor to Bern’s state-building 
process, because any delegation of state functions by the sovereign cantons was 
voluntary.
The same can be said of the counties, which by the eighteenth century had 
become pure administrative units without political power. They lacked independent 
institutions and were not represented within the government. County enquiries, in 
which subjects were asked for their opinion on specific political issues, were the 
closest Bern ever got to a Weberian Standestaat which accommodates political 
representation from different social groups.156 This form of co-operation which had 
been in regularly used in the sixteenth century went into abeyance and was organised 
for the last time in 1614.157 In the eighteenth century, county-enquiries were entirely 
absent and the counties firmly controlled by the government.
153 For the concept of sovereignty: Spruyt (1994) -  see also note 14 above.
154 Capitani (1986): 488.
155 See for the Confederation in general: Im Hof (1977) or Peyer (1978).
156 Weber, M. (1978): 1085-1087.
157 Walchli (1981): 129. See also Holenstein (2000).
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Communal Autonomy
More serious challenges to the government’s claim to a monopoly of legitimate
1 r o
violence came from the communes. In the everyday experience of Bemese 
subjects, these political units were arguably as important as the state because they 
regulated a broad range of activities.159 Peter Blickle has found that the far-reaching 
self-government of the Swiss communes of the later Middle Ages (‘communalism’) 
was better developed and remained stronger than in most of the Empire, where 
communes had been largely integrated in the administration of sovereign states.160 
Andre Holenstein has refined Blickle’s findings for sixteenth- and seventeenth- 
century Bern, for which he emphasised the importance of co-operation between 
communes and state administration.161 Unfortunately, documents about decision­
making processes at the local level are scarce and there is scant research about 
communal autonomy in the eighteenth century. Some local studies describe the 
experience of particular villages, cities or parishes.162
As their main tasks, Bemese communes had to provide lower levels of 
jurisdiction, poverty relief, schooling and infrastructure.163 In those parts of the 
canton that practiced a crop rotation system, an assembly of landowners also decided 
on how the communal lands were used.164 Furthermore, communes played an 
important role in the Bemese military system, as the militia was organised and partly 
funded at this level. The control of the troops remained entirely with the government, 
however (discussed in Section II-5). The sheer fact that subjects were armed 
illustrates how far the authorities needed to base their decisions on consent, as more 
coercive strategies would have been met with violent resistance. Bemese officials 
oversaw communal autonomy and kept it in line with the government’s interest.165
While the judicial rights of the communes were long-standing, poverty relief 
was only delegated to them as late as the seventeenth century, with the state making
158 For simplicity, I will refer to the local political units as communes. However, there were several 
levels of communality in eighteenth-century Bern: parishes, Burgergemeinden, Rechtsame- and 
Giitergemeinden, etc. See Scribner (1996): esp. 294-298 and for Bern: Pfister, C. (1995): 25-27.
159 Holenstein (2005): 262.
160 Blickle (1981); Blickle (1991); Blickle (2000).
161 Holenstein (1998).
162 Especially Schmidt, H.R. (2005) [Worb]; Bartlome (1999) [Aarberg] or Bietenhard (1988) 
[Langnau].
163 See for Worb: Holenstein (2005), who also includes fire defence as one of the commune’s tasks.
164 This is discussed in more detail in Section II-6 below.
165 See also Pfister, C./Kellerhals (1989).
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only subsidiary contributions.166 This can be considered an act of reversed state- 
building, where a government imposed an unpopular and expensive task on 
communes to deal with it on the local level. An unintended consequence of that 
action was that the need to fund these expenses provided communes with independent 
funds, thus increasing their autonomy and political bargaining position in the medium 
term.167 In rural areas, poverty relief often had the lion’s share of communal budgets. 
To raise revenue, communes had several options that were often applied 
simultaneously. They could lease out common land to the poor, distribute aid in kind, 
finance relief from their communal funds or levy specific taxes.168 Empirical evidence 
on communal tax burdens is scarce and points towards high inequalities both 
regionally and between different members of communes (see Section IV-5 below).
Legitimacy through Low Taxation
The financial situation of Bern will be discussed in more detail in the empirical 
chapters III and IV. In this context, the focus is solely on the impact of taxation -  or 
rather, the lack thereof -  on the legitimacy of political rule. It is sufficient to note that 
since the late seventeenth century, the state itself did not levy any direct taxes on 
property. The major tax revenue of the canton came from tithes, a 10% tax on 
agricultural revenue.169 It was mostly levied on former Church lands and had 
originally served the purpose of covering the costs of the local priest and poverty 
relief. Part of the former Church domain had been handed to communes or parishes 
when poverty relief was delegated to them.170 As a long-standing tax, the tithe was 
considered legitimate and never fundamentally questioned.171 In some parts of the 
canton, mainly in Alpine regions, tithes had been discharged in late-Medieval times.
The absence of direct taxation by the state was a distinctive feature of early
177 •modem Swiss republics. Although this had been a common strategy for city 
republics in late medieval times, by the late sixteenth century most found themselves
166 See also Fluckiger Strebel (2002); Fluckiger Strebel (2005). Depending on the region, it was 
delegated to communes or parishes. Both in absolute terms and relative to population growth, poverty 
seems to have increased throughout the eighteenth century.
167 Bietenhard (1988): 262.
168 The communal funds for poor relief (Armengut) usually consisted of both land and capital.
169 For tithes in Bern: Gmiir (1954) and Pfister, C. (1975). In Vaud, the actual tithe rate was only an 
eleventh: Monbaron (1998a).
170 See for example: Fluckiger Strebel (2005) [for Worb],
171 See also Gmiir (1954).
172 Komer (1999)
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11'Xdeeply in debt. In Bern, occasional taxes were imposed in the seventeenth century 
for specific purposes. In spite of moderate rates, they met with stiff resistance. When 
the government tried to introduce a 0.1% tax on property for the whole territory in 
1641, it faced organised protests which achieved that instead of the intended period of 
six years, the tax was only levied for a single year.174 The culmination of resistance
1 7Swas the peasants’ revolt of 1653 in Bern and other parts of Switzerland. Although 
this was not a tax revolt in the strict sense, it had fiscal overtones. The main cause for 
the revolutionary outbreak was currency devaluation by the government, also 
identifiable as a (debasement-) tax. The peasants formed an alliance, besieged the city 
and questioned its political legitimacy. Bemese authorities oppressed the rebellion 
with loyal troops from Vaud and support from Zurich. The revolt of 1653 was a 
mixture of religious protest, struggle for political hegemony within the Confederation 
and an uprising against political rule. Although the civil war by itself caused little 
disruption, its impact on future political developments should not be under-estimated, 
for it revealed the limits of the state’s power to modernise political structures. It made 
the Bemese authorities aware that their survival depended on co-operation by their 
subjects. Accordingly, the government rejected a project for introducing a perpetual 
tax on property in 1697.176
This absence of direct taxation played an important part in the government’s 
strategies to legitimate its rule in a paternalistic way. The statement of Albrecht von 
Haller quoted in the introduction to the previous chapter illustrates how proud
1 77Bemese patricians were to offer their subjects a state without taxation. In his 
Speech o f  a Swiss about the Happiness o f  Subjects under a Free Government, 
Alexander Ludwig von Wattenwyl went even further when he tried to convince the 
Bemese population that despite being deprived of political rights, they lived in a state
17Q »of liberty because the republic hardly depended on taxes. Although such attitudes 
seem paternalistic from today’s perspective, in the context of early-modern states 
Bemese subjects were relatively free of feudal obligations and, as will be discussed 
later, their fiscal burden was exceptionally low (see Section IV-5 below).
173 Hocquet (1995).
174 Walchli (1981): 131; Landolt (1990). A yearly tax of 0.1% on all property for defence purposes had 
been levied within the city of Bern from 1628-1634, and the Pays de Vaud paid an extraordinary tax 
from 1635 onwards after initial protests.
175 Holenstein (2004); Suter (1997).
176 Feller (1955): 500.
177 See the quote of Albrecht von Haller in Chapter I (p. 10 above).
178 Quoted from Kapossy (2002): 237.
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In summary, although the Bemese government anchored its mle on co­
operation from its subjects, it qualifies as a state wielding a near-monopoly on 
legitimate violence. Church, nobility and communes were successfully integrated into 
the state under government control. While communes had wide-ranging autonomies 
and were important institutions for subjects’ everyday lives, they were never serious 
competitors for the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence in the eighteenth century. 
Even if their privileges and liberties imposed a limit to centralised state-building, the 
situation was one of mutual dependency and co-operation. The local autonomy that 
communes enjoyed did not guarantee them any representation within the government 
of the republic. After the abolition of the county enquiries in 1614, there was no 
formal participation of subjects in the political affairs of the canton. The ruling elites 
used the absence of direct taxation as the most important element in their claim for 
legitimacy.
ii-3 Territory, Population and Economy
Eighteenth-century Bern was the largest state of the Swiss Confederation in 
land area and population. By 1798, around one in three Swiss subjects lived under 
Bemese mle. However, the territory of the canton remained fragmented legally and 
economically. This section will first give a brief outline of the territorial expansion of 
Bern and then consider its organisation in the eighteenth century. I will also briefly 
discuss population estimates and offer a general overview of the canton’s economy.
Territorial Expansion
The city of Bern was founded relatively late, in the second half of the twelfth 
century, and developed from being a local power into a sizeable territorial state in the 
late Middle Ages. Its most important conquests were Argovia (1415) and the French-
1 7 0speaking Pays de Vaud (1536). The territory of the canton remained unchanged 
from the late sixteenth century until the French invasion of 1798. Its holdings 
spanned the mountainous regions of the Oberland, the wine-growing shores of Lake
179 HLS (2002), article Bern. See also Schwinges (2003) and Feller (1946); Feller (1953) for the 
territorial expansion.
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180Geneva, as well as the grain-producing areas of the Swiss Mittelland. In spite of 
trends to unify governance and administration, political fragmentation prevailed and 
many old customs or local autonomies remained unchallenged until the end of the 
Ancien Regime. Foreign noblemen continued to claim rights and titles in boroughs 
within Bemese territory. Only in exceptional cases were they disputed and bought 
out.181 The legal code of the city was used as a subsidiary law to customary local 
codes. Although the Bemese government intensified its paternalist regulation by 
issuing an ever-increasing number of laws (‘mandates’), it never imposed a unified 
fiscal regime.183
Source: Adapted from Fluckiger Strebel (2002): 98
Eighteenth-Century Bern: Districts
1 A a ib e r g
2 Aaibuxg
3 Aaxwaxigen
4 Ag*
5 Aubonne
6 Averiches
7 Biberctein
8 Bipp
9 Bonmont
10 Buchsee
11 Biiren
12 Burgdorf
13 Castelen
14 Echallem 
13 Erlach
16 Fraubrunnen
17 Fnemsberg
18 Fmligen
19 Grandson
20 Interlaken
21 Konigsfelden
22 Landgancht
23 Landshut
24 Laupen
25 Lausenne
26 Lerdburg
27 Moiges
28 Mcrudon
29 M urten
30 Nidai
31 N yon
32 Oberhasle
33 Oberhofen
34 O ron
35 Payeme
36 Komainmotier
37 Saanen
38 Schenkenberg
39 Schwaiaenbuig
40 Signau
41 St. Johannsen
42 Stiftamt
43 Sumiswald
44 Thorberg
45 Thun
46 Trachselwald
47 U nteneen
48 Vevey
49 Wangen
50 Wimmis
51 Yverdon
52 Zweisimmen
53 Gottstatt
54 Stadtgencht
55 Brandis
56 Orbe
Figure II-3: Map of Eighteenth-Century Bern with Districts
Source: Fluckiger Strebel (2002): 98 (title added).
180 For a more detailed analysis o f the regions, see: Pfister, C./Egli (1998).
181 This happened with Sumiswald [1698], Aubonne [1700], Koniz [1729] and Kastelen [1732]: Feller 
(1955): 475. Most privately owned boroughs remained under private rule (discussed below).
182 Walchli (1981): 110; see also RQBE, passim.
183 In the German historiography, this process has been referred to as the enlargement of the ‘gute 
Policey’ (in its pre-modem spelling), which could be translated as ‘good governance’. For the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, this concept has been discussed for Bern by Holenstein (1998). See also 
Peyer (1978): 117-118.
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The political and legal fragmentation of the Bemese territory confused even its 
contemporaries. To clarify the situation, the government ordered a survey of its 
territory, which was published in the Book o f Regions of 1782.184 By then, there were 
six distinctive types of administrative units:
1. The city of Bern and its surrounding parishes, directly ruled and administered 
by the government.
2. Four Landgerichte formally governed by the guild-master of a city-quarter 
[ Venner] and administered by his subordinate.185
3. Five municipal towns with far-reaching autonomy, governed by their elected 
Mayors.
4. 50 counties, or Landvogteien, which formed the bulk of the Bemese territory. 
During a tenure of six years, a member of the government represented Bemese 
mle as bailiff and monitored the local administration.
5. Several small boroughs under private mle [Twingherrschaften]. They were 
governed by their owners, which in most cases were patrician families from the 
city; these boroughs were formally under Bemese sovereignty.
6. Four Condominiums, or Mediatamter, for which Bern shared sovereignty and 
administration with the canton of Fribourg.
There were further Condominiums administrated jointly with other Swiss 
cantons, which were not considered part of the Bemese territory. In addition, seven 
former monasteries without territory were integrated into the state as
1 87Klostervogteien.
According to the primary agricultural activity, the canton can be divided into 
three main zones or belts: first, the grain-producing plains of Argovia, Upper Argovia 
(Oberaargau), Seeand and Vaud. Second, the pre-Alpine region of Emmental was a 
zone of mixed farming. Third, cattle farming dominated in the Southern part of the 
canton, the Alps (<Oberland).188 Pockets of vineyards were scattered according to the 
climatically suitable locations, particularly in the coastal regions of Vaud. Each zone 
had specific patterns of production, but also social and cultural structures. The 
division between the regions was not always clear-cut, but followed roughly their 
geographical situation. The degree of commercialisation of the zones was inverse to
184 Walchli (1981): 124-125.
185 For an example, see Pfister, C./Kellerhals (1989).
186 Lugano, Mendrisio, Locarno, Valle Maggia; since 1712 also Baden, the Untere Freie Amter, 
Thurgau, Rheintal and Sargans. The small Condominium of Tessenberg was shared with the prince- 
bishop of Basel: Im Hof (1977): 753.
187 Beck (1923): 11.
188 For a more detailed description: Pfister, C. (1995), esp. 16-17, 28-30.
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their natural potential: in the marginal lands of the Oberland, production was 
relatively free and market-oriented, while the grain-producing regions were burdened 
by a rigid system of co-operative utilisation. They were also most heavily taxed in
1 ROtithes, as will be discussed below (Section IV-5).
Population Estimates and Demographic Trends
It is difficult to establish the total population living under Bemese mle in the 
eighteenth century. The most reliable figure is from an official census in 1764; it 
counted 323,008 people living in the canton, of which 40,276 in Argovia and 112,346 
in Vaud.190 Given the inaccuracies of eighteenth-century data collection, these should 
be considered rough estimates rather than exact figures.191 The 1798 census by the 
Helvetic authorities is even more unreliable because its authorities carried out the data 
collection inconsistently. In addition, changes of district and communal borders make 
a comparison to the Ancien Regime situation difficult. With its pre-1798 borders, the 
canton’s population was approximately 410,000.192 Based on its 1980 borders 
(mainly without Argovia and Vaud), Christian Pfister has estimated total population 
figures for Bern at 193,000 (in 1700), 200,000 (in 1764) and 231,768 (in 1798) 
respectively.193 The city itself grew from 14,219 (1700) to 15,932 (1730) inhabitants, 
form where their number fell back to 12,186 (1798).194
The Bernese Economy in Brief: Agriculture
The most relevant aspects of the Bemese economy for my study will be 
discussed more detail in the empirical chapters. Studies about the early modem 
Bemese economy are rare and mostly focus on agriculture.195 A strong emphasis on 
the primary sector is also underlying the most comprehensive study of the Bemese
189 See Pfister, C. (1995): 163.
190 This means that 175,316 lived in the rest of the canton, often referred to as Deutschbem. See HLS 
(2002), article Bern: 267 and Mesmer (1987): 158-160.
191 Pfister, C. (1995): 69-73 and 87.
192 Schluchter (1988): 49, 64. Figures for Aargau (only Aarau, Brugg, Kulm, Lenzburg, Zofingen), 
Bern and Vaud in their 1988 borders, excluding Echallens, Orbe and Grandson: total o f409,535. Other 
authors give the figure of 407,000 [Walter (1966): 239, based on an estimate from Hildebrand in 
I860]. The overall population of today’s Switzerland was 1.66m according to the 1798 census.
193 Pfister, C. (1995): 95.
194 HLS (2002), article Bern (Gemeinde).
195 For the ‘classical’ studies on Bemese agriculture and economy: Geiser (1899); Geiser (1932); 
Schmidt, G.C.L. (1932).
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economic history by Christian Pfister, who traced the origins of economic 
‘modernisation’ back to 1700.196 Pfister’s interest tracing the long-term development 
of the canton of Bern in its post-1980s borders has made him use an anachronistic 
area of study. For the Ancien Regime, the exclusion of Argovia and Vaud is a 
significant shortcoming. A second problem of Pfister’s approach is even more 
limiting in the context of my research: the state as an actor remains essentially 
unaccounted for in Pfister’s explanations. Although he acknowledges the importance 
of the government’s grain policy and the impact of Economic Patriots on agriculture, 
the two are not examined in their own right. Anton Brandenberger followed up on 
Pfister’s earlier research and investigated problems of supplies and market integration
i 197using economic theory.
The pre-eminence of agriculture in Bemese economic history can partly be 
explained by the relative weight of the sector, as most of the Bemese population was 
engaged in some type of agricultural activity or other. In Christian Pfister’s words, all 
important aspects of early modem life concentrated on land: it was an energy 
resource, production factor, source of capital investment, tax base, measure of 
political power and social esteem, as well as the unique source of social security.198 
Differences within the primary sector were large, both regionally and between 
different sized farms within the same region. For the former, the varying climatic 
conditions across the main agricultural regions have been mentioned under the 
previous heading. For the latter, large landholders had very little in common with 
small-plot farmers who often relied on secondary income from (proto-)industrial 
activity to make ends meet. Within the household economy, labour and other 
resources were allocated to subsistence- and market-oriented tasks. There were few 
cash crops: wine, flax, dairy products and -  to a lesser extent -  grain. For the latter, 
most households could only sell a surplus on the market. According to Christian 
Pfister’s estimates of harvest returns, the canton could feed its own population in
196 Pfister, C. (1995): 15. He defines ‘modernisation’ as a movement towards the ‘Western’ ideals of 
rationality; rising productivity and living standards; social and economic emancipation; efficient 
institutions and behaviour; national ‘consolidation’ and independence; democracy ‘from below’; 
participation and social discipline. Pfister’s data is edited in the database Bemhist: 
http://www.bernhist.ch. See also his contribution to the article ‘Bern’ in HLS (2002) and his earlier 
studies: Pfister, C. (1975); Pfister, C. (1978) [in English] and Pfister, C. (1984), esp. vol. 2.
197 Brandenberger (2004). See the discussion in Section U-6 below.
198 Pfister, C. (1995): 161.
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years of normal harvest and was thus ‘sub si stent, but not autarchic.’199 In years of 
crises on the other hand, grain had to be imported. This contrasts with the view of 
contemporary observers who argued -  based on faulty assumptions -  that Bern 
needed to import roughly a third of its grain. Georges Andre Chevallaz has pointed 
out that the resulting import volume of some 20,000 tonnes would be equivalent to 
the entire grain export of France.200
While dairy farming became more productive and profitable, grain agriculture 
stagnated until the mid-eighteenth century. Productivity increases were mainly 
hindered by a lack of manure. In addition, the traditional structure of decision-making 
in the three-field crop rotation system hindered a dynamic response to demographic 
change or shifts in demand. Alterations in crops, cycles or quantities depended on the 
agreement of all ‘stakeholders’, including government, landlord and commune. From 
the mid-century, agricultural improvements slowly led to an increased production, but 
the major innovations and breakthroughs occurred in the early nineteenth century.
Industry and Services
Recent scholarship has emphasized the diversity of economic activities that 
were carried out throughout the territory.202 The dominance of a dynamic agricultural 
sector created demand for related industries (building, blacksmiths, coopering) and 
services (butchers, mills). Extractive industries were limited to small pockets in the
901Western and Alpine regions. Anne Radeff, who has investigated petty trade and 
regional markets, refers to this with the rather misleading concept of economie 
globale.204 Her most important contribution is the analysis of the distributive 
structures in the Bemese economy through an examination of fairs and markets, 
which multiplied throughout the eighteenth century.205 In addition, a thriving 
economy surfaced around the export of low value-added goods.206 Specific industries
199 Pfister, C. (1995): 202-209 (quote: heading). For a critique, see Brandenberger (2004), who stresses 
the importance of grain imports.
200 Pfister, C. (1995): 207-208; Chevallaz (1949): 107.
201 Pfister, C. (1995): 173-175, 184-191.
202 For diversity: Pelet (1998); Radeff (1996).
203 Pelet (1998).
204 Radeff (1996). In Radeff s terminology, economie globale stands for an all-encompassing view of 
both domestic and export trade, and not a geographically global approach. Even though this is not be 
excluded perse , most of her analysed material is inter-regional, rather than global.
205 On Bemese markets: Kumin/Radeff (2000); Komer (1993/94).
206 For the latter, see Fliickiger/Radeff (2000).
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have been discussed in the broader context of Swiss economic history. In particular,
9 (Y1the Walter Bodmer’s work on the textile industry remains a landmark.
90RTextiles were Bern’s main export-oriented ‘proto-industry.’ They were 
mostly produced in the eastern part of the canton, using the market town of 
Langenthal as a local hub. In Vaud, the industry was clustered around Lausanne and 
well connected with Geneva merchants.209 In addition, hand-knitting and similar tasks 
were carried out throughout the canton, especially in marginal areas. The Bemese 
textile industry specialised in the relatively simple processing of linen, calicoes 
( ‘indiennes *) and knitted stockings, which required little investment and could be 
carried out by a labour force that was often working part-time.210 Knowledge- 
intensive branches of the industry, such as silk manufacturing, were virtually absent 
in Bern. In the second half of the eighteenth century, St Gallen shifted to the spinning 
and weaving of cotton and was replaced by Upper Argovia as the Swiss centre for 
linen production. The merchant-producers of eastern Switzerland left the low-value 
linen to their Bemese competitors and focused on more profitable products that could 
rely on extensive trading networks for export. Linen was less dependent on trade 
because its raw material, flax, was grown locally. While this might explain Bern’s 
advantage in the early stages of the industry, by 1760 the canton had to import several 
tonnes of flax from Alsace and Brabant to cope with an increasing demand for the 
final product.211 Merchants from other Swiss cities exported the Bemese linen, mostly 
to France. Demand for the product was high, which was partly caused by its good and 
consistent quality.212 Linen production reached its peak in the early 1780s, after 
which it dropped sharply.213
The raw materials for cotton were more expensive, so part of the production 
was organised on a credit basis. In this putting-out system, merchants provided the 
domestic producers with raw materials and collected the final product, with itinerant 
merchants (.Fergger) acting as intermediaries. The printing of calicoes was organised
207 Bodmer (1960).
208 For the concept o f ‘proto-industry’ see footnote 38 above. An overview for Switzerland is provided 
by Pfister, U. (1996b).
209 Bodmer (1960): 222; Bergier (1990): 173.
210 See Pfister, C. (1995): 455-456 and Schneider, H. (1937): 455-466. The latter were partly machine- 
produced. This technology had been introduced by a Huguenot refugee who later moved his business 
to Murten after losing production privileges in Bern.
211 Pfister, C. (1995): 34.
2,2 Bodmer (1960): 157-158.
213 See the graph in Pfister, C. (1995): 234, based on Bein (1920): 86-87.
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in centralised manufactures, both in the city of Bern and municipal towns.214 Some of 
the cotton production was controlled by merchants from Zurich and Geneva, while 
Bemese producers were putting out to neighbouring regions (Lucerne, Fricktal),
91^selling their surplus production to Zurich merchants.
Bern had several smaller proto-industries in addition to textiles, such as clock 
making in the western parts of the canton, printing in the cities of Bern and Lausanne, 
woodcarving in the Oberland, and extractive industries in Vaud.216 Although 
important locally, their impact on the canton’s economy was limited. A few ‘strategic 
industries’ were state-run, such as the production of weapons, black powder and salt; 
ironworks and mineral extraction were heavily subsidised. All these businesses were 
small in scale, except for salt production, which nevertheless remained insufficient to 
supply the domestic market. Its output was minimal compared to the amount of salt 
that the government traded as a monopoly (see Section III-5 below).
Another monopoly was on postal services, which the state farmed out to the 
patrician von Fischer family. They obtained a franchise in 1675 and subsequently past 
it on to 41 family members until 1832, with only a short intermezzo of state-mn 
postal services from 1702-1708. After this date, Bemese authorities set the franchise 
fee at 50% of net profits, though disputes erupted over the calculation of these profits 
on several occasions. The Fisher family usually paid a flat fee that was augmented 
every few years.217 The remaining service sector was not concentrated, but regional 
and small scale in character. Beat Kumin has analysed Bemese inns and taverns in
918detail, while Anne Radeff has focused mainly on itinerant merchants. Other 
services were tourism and schooling, which both targeted foreign noblemen as their 
prime clientele; they were accordingly very limited in scope. Finally, mercenaries 
serving in foreign armies can also be considered a service export from the Bemese 
economy (see Section II-5 below).
This section has given a brief overview of the fragmented nature of the Bemese 
territory in both political and economic terms. Reliable figures for population and
214 Pfister, C. (1995): 233; see also Fetscherin (1924).
2,5 Fetscherin (1924): 134-137; Bodmer (1960): 182; Schneider, H. (1937): 97-98; see also the 
contemporary account in Norrmann (1795): 480.
216 See for an overview: Pfister, C. (1995): 231-292 and for Vaud Pelet (1998).
217 See Kloti (1990) and Kellerhals-Maeder/Kloti/Konig (1991).
2,8 Kumin (1999); Kumin/Radeff(2000); Radeff (1994); Radeff (1996).
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economic indicators are rare and make conclusive statements difficult. The economy 
was dominantly agricultural, with large regional and social differences. Proto­
industrial production of linen for export was concentrated in the eastern part of the 
canton, while rural crafts were spread throughout the territory.
II-4 Government and Administration
In an anonymously published Account o f  Switzerland of 1714, attributed to the 
English ambassador Abraham Stanyan, the stability of Bern’s political system was 
compared to that of an inverted pyramid. So small was its foundation that it would 
take little movement from either within or from the outside to make the entire 
structure tumble.219 While his prediction of the stability proved inaccurate -  Bern fell 
more than eighty years after Stanyan’s statement -  the pyramidal image appears 
appropriate. The government was controlled by a narrow patrician oligarchy, whose 
rule had become quasi hereditary, even if their dominance was by custom more than 
by law. In this section, I will consider the composition of the Bemese government 
and explain its structure, discuss patricians as a social group and present 
contemporary critiques of their mle. The final part of the section will discuss the 
canton’s administrative structure.
Constitutional Arrangements and Levels of Government
The Bemese state had no written constitution, only a handwritten tome 
commonly called the Red Book which contained the government’s most important 
decisions. The government referred to itself as Schultheiss, Rat und Burger von Bern. 
This title encapsulated the three main layers of power: Mayor (Schultheiss), Senate 
(Rat) and Great Council (Burger). The latter had formerly been an assembly of 
citizens and evolved into a parliament recruited by election and co-optation. Its 
position as the supreme source of power and sovereignty was confirmed in 1682 by a 
document that also held the state accountable solely to God.220 This affirmation of the 
Council’s absolute sovereignty formally marked the end of continuous attempts by
219 Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 105. Most of his book deals with the situation in Bern; he 
was married to a Bemese. See Bucher, B. (1951); Zeerleder (1942).
220 Quoted in Geiser (1891): 97.
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the Senate to be recognised as sovereign.221 In reality though, the Senate possessed 
considerable powers by virtue of frequent meetings and exclusive access to 
information. To avoid dominance by any of the elements that comprised the 
government, the Bemese constitution possessed numerous internal checks and 
balances (see Figure II-4).
Government ("Schultheiss, Rat und Burger")
Mayors (1 plus 1)
-----------------------7--------- \ ------------------
Senate (Small Council) (27)
Secret Council (8) Vice-Mayor 
"Secretees" (2) Venner (4), 
German-T reasurer
Chamber of 
Verniers (5)
Ruling Mayor
Treasurer for Vaud (1) 
Salt-Senator (1) 
Arsenal-Senator (1) 
Senators (15)
Great Council, CC (200-299)
elect State Clerk, Court Clerk, Grand Officer, Townhall-Mayor
Chambers
(several)
'Sixteen" (16)
Bailiffs (50) 
and other Magistrates
elect
Societies (Guilds):
Venner-Guilds (4) and other Guilds (8)
elects
elects
ballots
Figure II-4: The Government of Bern
Sources: Geiser (1891); Feller (1955); Capitani (1991). See also the slightly different scheme in HLS 
(2002): article Bern. Numbers in brackets stand for the number of people in each category. 
Translations: Senate (Kleiner Rat), Vice-Mayor (Stillstehender Schultheiss), "Secretees" (Heimlicher), 
German Treasurer (Deutsch-Sackelmeister), Treasurer for Vaud (Welsch-Sackelmeister), Salt-Senator 
(<Salzherr), Arsenal-Senator (Zeugherr), State Clerk (Staatsschreiber), Court Clerk 
(Gerichtsschreiber), Grand Officer (Grossweibel), Townhall-Mayor (Ratshausammann), Bailiff 
(Landvogt), "Sixteen" (Sechzehner), Societies/Guilds (Gesellschaften). I have not translated the word 
Venner, since its original meaning as banner bearer does not describe their function in the eighteenth 
century accurately enough.
At the apex of the Bemese government pyramid were the Mayors. To guarantee 
that no single man would usurp power, the positions of Ruling Mayor and Vice-
221 In other Swiss cities, the Senate was more successful in its attempts to usurp power: Peyer (1978): 
107-116.
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Mayor were rotated annually between the two incumbents.222 While the former 
chaired the meetings of the Senate and Great Council, the latter was in charge of the 
Secret Council handling foreign affairs. With unlimited tenure, the Mayors were only 
replaced after resignation or death and vacancies were filled by a Senator, who was 
elected by the Great Council.
The next layer was the Senate, which was also called Small Council or Daily 
Council. 27 Senators (including the two Mayors) set the agenda for the sessions of the 
Great Council. Two important sub-Councils were staffed exclusively by Senators: the 
Secret Council and the Vennerkammer, or Chamber of Venners.223 The latter dealt 
with all financial matters of the state and was presided over by the (German-) 
Treasurer, who was elected for six years.224 Its other members, the Venners, had a
225four-year tenure and were designated by their respective town-quarter guilds. Of 
the remaining Senators, some had specific duties such as the Senator of the Arsenal, 
who presided over the chamber responsible for military armaments. Each Senator sat 
in several chambers or commissions, which had both governmental and 
administrative functions and combined members of Senate and Great Council.
Mayors and Senators were all formally members of the Great Council, or 
Council of the Two Hundred, which met two to three times a week. It was also called 
the CC with reference to the Latin number for 200. The power of the Great Council 
was in practice curtailed by limited access to information. For instance, although it 
decided on all financial matters regarding expenses of more than 100 Taler (3,000 
Bz), information about proposals prepared by the Vennerkammer was only 
transmitted orally.226 One important function of the Great Council was to elect all 
magistrates of the republic from amongst its members. While Mayors, Senators and 
certain positions that required particular know-how were elected, the more lucrative 
bailiff positions were balloted since 1710 to rule out simony.227 To avoid 
appropriation by office holders, all tenured positions in the government were fixed 
and non-renewable.
222 The positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor (Stillstehender Schultheiss) rotated annually between the 
two officeholders. Occasionally, the Latin word Consul was used for both.
223 The two newest elected Senators were called ‘Secretees’ ( ‘Heimlicher*).
224 The position of treasurer was split up between the (German-)Treasurer (Deutschsackelmeister) and 
the Treasurer for Vaud (Welschsdckelmeister). For the Venner chamber, see also Section II-7 below.
225 The word Venner originally described the banner bearer. The four Fewwer-guilds Pfistem, 
Schmieden, Metzgern, and Gerbem each elected a Venner amongst their Senators: Walter (1966): 237.
226 Feller (1955): 428.
227 The election of the Senators was a mixture of vote and ballot: Feller (1955): 434. Candidates had to 
be in the Council for over a decade and married or widowed. Bailiffs will be discussed below.
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Access to Government
When contemporaries referred to the Great Council as ‘the Citizens’ (Burger) 
or ‘the Two Hundred’, both were misnomers. The Council neither represented all 
citizens nor did it comprise 200 members. The Great Council had become a 
parliament with 200 members as a minimum number; in 1688, its maximum was set 
at 299. Every time the Council approached minimum occupancy, it restored its ranks 
to the maximum number from within the citizenry. In the eighteenth century, this 
happened approximately every ten years. As new government members were 
appointed by co-optation, this promoted oligarchic tendencies. The electoral body 
consisted of the Mayors, Senators, four ex officio members of the Great Council, plus 
another sixteen that were designated by their respective guild (see Figure II-4). Each 
of these 47 electors could nominate one candidate whose place was secured. Thus, of 
the circa 80 seats that would usually be free, nominees occupied more than two 
thirds. Voting for the remaining seats was open and not by secret ballot, which meant
990
that co-monitoring was possible and guaranteed the predicted outcome.
New Councillors were elected among all male citizens above 29 years. The 
number of eligible candidates was in decline as the right to citizenship had been 
closed in 1651 and new immigrants to the city were only accepted as residents or 
permanent residents at best. While the former did not have any specific rights and 
were prohibited from buying property, the latter were equal to the citizens in all but 
political participation.229 Permanent residency had been established in the sixteenth 
century to cover waiting times before admission into full citizenship; it had evolved 
into a distinct social status. At the time of the 1764 census, of the city’s total 
population of 13,681 only 3,737 were citizens. The remainder were permanent 
residents (253), residents (7,985) or foreigners (1,706).230 Compared to a total 
population of over 300,000 for the entire canton, not even 1% were citizens with full 
political rights.
228 Therefore, it was less an election than a nomination: Geiser (1891): 104; Feller (1955): 431-433.
229 Only wine trade was a privilege of citizens: Geiser (1891): 87-89; Brunner (1992).
230 Of die citizens, 1,581 were men: Walchli (1981): 145 and Walter (1966): 239.
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Parallel to the decline in numbers of eligible families was the decrease of 
families who were actually represented in government, the patricians.231 Figure II-5 
shows the number o f eligible families (citizens) and families in government 
(patricians) for the period of 1650-1795. Since 1790, a decree fixed both their 
respective numbers.
540 ■ eligible
1 500 
■ * in government
450 
■ 420 
■
377
■
330
■
........... minimum (fixed)
270
■ 243 
■
120 no
▲ A 98 88 81 88  83 77
* A * A A 76A - - -A-
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Figure II-5: Families with Bernese Citizenship, 1650-1795
Source: Geiser (1891): 95 and 110 [supplemented with Capitani (1986): 884]. Eligible families 
(citizens) are referred to as Ratsfahige or Regimentsfahige Burger, families in government (patricians) 
were im Rat vertretene Familien. From 1790 onwards, there were fixed minima for the number o f 
eligible families (236) and families in government (76), hence the dashed horizontal line: Feller 
(1955): 464 gives the figure o f 73 families in government for 1784.
The system of completion of the Great Council also resulted in concentration 
within the patrician oligarchy. Figure II-6 shows the distribution o f cumulative seats 
in the Council within families ranked by the number of occupied seats for 1691 (only 
data for the twelve largest families) and 1795. In both dates, the Council had been 
restored to the maximum number of 299. The twelve largest families held a total of 
115 seats in 1691 and 122 in 1795. By then, the number of families with a single 
seat had fallen to 12.
231 Geiser (1891): 96. Patricians describes usually those families represented in government (although 
some authors include all citizens). The term refers to the senatorial patriciate o f the Roman Republic.
232 They were not exactly the same families, however; see Geiser (1891): 96-96 and 110.
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299
Seats
250
1691
1795
200
1691
150
1795
100
Families
Figure II-6: Families in the Great Council, 1691 and 1795
Source: Geiser (1891): 96-96 and 111. X-axis: number of families in government; Y-axis: cumulative 
number o f seats (families ranked by number of seats). For 1691, only figures for the 12 largest families 
are available. The broken diagonal lines show an equal distribution amongst families for the given 
number o f families represented (1691: 76; 1795: 98). Numbers show the number of seats for the largest 
family at each point. In 1795, there were 1,628 registered members of guilds (i.e. eligible patricians): 
Walter (1966): 242.
In addition to the trend towards oligarchy, the leadership of the Bemese 
republic was burdened with gerontocracy. While most administrative offices had a 
fixed, non-renewable tenure, the most senior positions of Senator and Mayor were for 
life. Furthermore, elements of seniority favoured older government members in 
access to power. This system had changed little since late-Medieval times, when 
political institutions had been designed for a relatively high turnover of magistrates. 
Increased life expectancy coupled with fewer military and political dangers for office­
holders ossified the system.233 For individual patricians, this often meant a long 
waiting time until they could fulfil the duty for which their whole life was designed 
for: participation in the government of the Res Publica Bernensis,234
233 Im H of (1977): 764 (for all Swiss states) and Peyer (1978): 107-116. See also Steiger, C. (1954).
234 Contemporaries agreed that future politicians often made little productive use of their waiting time: 
Walchli (1981): 140. Stanyan divided the Bemese patricians into merchants, pen-men, and military 
men: Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 131-132.
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Republican Ethos and Corruption
Patrician dominance had become a status quo by the early eighteenth century, 
and though their appropriation of rule was not universally accepted, co-optation 
guaranteed its continuity. Despite its formal status as a participatory republic, Bern 
had become a de facto aristocracy in which an elite group of magistrates successfully 
monopolised their offices. In theory, access to the government was open to all 
citizens, but in reality long waiting times made this option exclusive to rentiers who 
were supported by tidy family fortunes. Government work paid well in the eighteenth 
century, yet most functions still entailed expenses that required sizeable personal
i
funds, as magistrates1 were liable with their own assets when holding an office. Thus,
Bemese patricians effectively qualify for what Max Weber described as honoratiores.
\
He defined this term as a group of office-holders who monopolised their positions
j 235based on wealth, in sjrite of a political system that was formally open.
(
Most patrician^ lived off country estates spread throughout the territory; often 
their families ownedj feudal rights. Their dependence on agricultural rents explains 
the popularity of physiocratic ideas within government members. An engagement in 
paid work -  including banking and commerce -  while not strictly prohibited was 
considered inappropriate for patricians. They argued that depending on income
i
would affect independent judgement. Interestingly, this reservation did not to apply to 
feudal income, nor to serve in foreign armies as will be discussed below. Although 
Bern had guild-like institutions with its Societies (sometimes referred to as ‘guilds’), 
their economic functions of regulating markets or professions had a very limited
i
scope beyond the capital. In particular, Bemese city guilds were not privileged with 
respect to the territory. Most members were not active in the guild’s trade, but 
belonged there by family tradition. Guilds formed the backbone of Patrician social 
life and were responsible for poverty relief to destitute members. The political 
importance of these Societies was twofold: membership was a condition for eligibility
237to the Great Council, and for certain elections guilds had secured voting quotas. 
Thus, ruled by a patrician class of magistrates and officeholders with little economic
235 Weber, M. (1978): 290-292.
236 See the critique in Brunner (1992). Wholesale commerce and wine trade within the city were 
patrician monopolies.
37 See Capitani (1991). The societies/guilds/corporations were called Gesellschaften or Ziinfte; 
Stanyan calls ihem Abbeys, based on the French term; they could also be referred to as drinking-clubs 
(describing a social group that meets in a particular tavern). For the Venner-guilds and their voting 
quotas, see note 225.
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interests except in landholding, Bern was distinctive from republics where guilds 
played an important political and economic role, as in Zurich or Basel.
Patricians were aware of how susceptible their political arrangements were to 
cronyism, nepotism and corruption. For instance, when a merger of two existing 
customs offices was debated in 1770, concerns were voiced that this position could 
become too powerful, as it would control monetary transactions worth more than Lb
150,000 (1.125m Bz). Treasurer Johann Rudolf Daxelhofer stated that ‘in republican 
governments one always has to worry that credit [here in the sense of: dependency] 
and favour will be preponderant.’239 One way of checking for these dangers was to 
attend to the republican virtue of equality. This did not imply equality among the 
whole population -  not even of all citizens -  but of patricians represented in 
government. Those with an official function were only primus inter pares. In order to 
curb overt favouritism and nepotism, strict laws regulated temporary withdrawal from 
the right to vote in matters concerning family members.240 This was part of the reason 
why ballots had been introduced in elections for lucrative government offices.241 All 
these constitutional safeguards were completed with mutual envy and distrust 
amongst rival families, which worked as an effective internal check on patricians.
Balloting was believed to represent divine judgement, which to the historian 
Hans Conrad Peyer meant that ‘favouritism was considered less dangerous than the 
random election of incompetent candidates.’242 But while equality amongst 
government members was strictly adhered to, the distinction between those in 
government and the excluded was clear.243 The ultimate sign of this equality-cum- 
distinction was reached in 1783, when all families in government were entitled to add 
the noble title ‘von’ to their names. This nullified the previous difference between 
noble and ordinary patrician families while setting them apart from ordinary citizens 
and subjects.244 Sumptuary laws were in place to secure this social order and maintain 
republican virtues. An inscription on the throne of the Mayor that referred to the 
values of Liberte & Egalite was duly painted over after these words ascribed a
238 Peyer (1978).
239 Quoted in Beck (1923): 43. Daxelhofer was Treasurer of Vaud.
240 Feller (1953); 428-429; see also RQBE, vol. 5: 695.
241 The ballot was first introduced as a trial and then extended: Feller (1953): 332. For equality also 
Walchli (1981): 139.
242 Peyer (1978): 113.
243 Bachtiger (1973/74); Bemisches Historisches Museum (1998): 20-21 and Bemisches Historisches 
Museum (1991): 79-103.
244 It is said that Frederick II of Prussia mocked this with the expression: Messieurs de Berne se sont 
deifies: quoted from Walchli (1981): 141. See also Im Hof (1977): 709.
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different meaning after the French Revolution. In Bern, as in other early modem 
states, the concept of Liberty had very little to do with individual freedom and rather 
implied privileges, exemptions and independences (‘liberties’) of certain groups 
(‘Estates’).
Factions and Criticism
Although the Bemese parliament was not organised into formal political 
parties, there were factions within the government. Families with specific interests 
included the von Erlach, who owned a mercenary regiment in France and the von 
Fischer, who ran the postal monopoly. Common interest also distinguished the larger 
families from smaller ones, who constantly ran the risk of losing their place in the 
government. At times of geopolitical crisis, each camp lobbied for its position, 
sometimes influenced by their vested interests or bribes from foreign ambassadors.
Bela Kapossy has distinguished three different groups of critics of patrician mle 
in the eighteenth century.245 The first were artisans from the city who were excluded 
from government. In 1749, some of them attempted to restore ancient freedoms and 
an equal distribution of privileges within the citizenry by coup d’etat. Their uprising 
was crushed, but news of the event echoed throughout Europe.246 The second group 
of critics were from subject territories and complained about being deprived of their 
traditional economic freedoms and other liberties.247 Rudolf Braun has described this 
as the ‘status inconsistency’ of subjects who had made fortunes in business, but could
JAQ t
not participate in political power or lead the life of a rentier. An isolated attempt m 
1723 to shake off Bemese mle of Vaud failed because it found little support within 
the local population.249 Only in the 1790s did Revolutionary tendencies become a 
serious threat, arguably because of French support. A different kind of criticism came 
from the third group, the Economic Patriots. Emanating from patrician families, they 
did not question the political system per se, but its loss of republican frugality and 
virtue. As an alternative, they promoted a return to (Neo-)Roman qualities of
245 Kapossy (2002).
246 It even inspired literary work by Lessing: See Wurgler (1995).
247 One example is the young Edward Gibbon, discussed in Kapossy (2002).
248 The term ‘status inconsistency’ was coined by Rudolf Braun, describing an inconsistency between 
economic and political status: Braun, R. (1984).
249 For Davel, see: Mercier-Campiche (1970); Capitani (1998); Capitani (1986): 492.
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geopolitical independence based on economic subsistence and self-sufficiency. 
Anabaptists could be added as a fourth group of government critics, as they 
questioned the legitimacy of any secular authority. They were heavily prosecuted in 
Bern throughout the early modem period for their refusal to serve in the militia and 
swear an oath of allegiance.
The Administration of the Canton
As in other patrimonial states, there was no strict separation between 
government and administration in eighteenth-century Bern; independent bureaucracy 
or civil service were non-existent. On the other hand, Bern did not have sinecures and 
all government positions involved clerical work. Since the second half of the 
seventeenth century, numerous chambers and committees fulfilled the function of 
advisory councils to the government. They prepared proposals for the Great Council’s 
final decision on important matters and carried out administrative tasks within then- 
own jurisdiction. Except for the Vennerkammer and the Secret Council, chambers 
were usually staffed with a combination of Senators, (Great-) Councillors and 
secretaries. The number of government chambers and committees was increased 
throughout the century from 29 (1710) to 44 (1798), covering the whole range of state 
functions from religion to finance. Figure II-7 shows the Bemese government 
chambers ranked by date of formation as an illustration of this administrative 
intensification.
250 Kapossy (2002).
251 This is also discussed in Altorfer (forthcoming).
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Figure II-7: Government Chambers in Eighteenth-Century Bern (Ranked by Date)
Source: based on material assembled by Andreas Kellerhals (unpublished PhD proposal c. 1990, 
courtesy o f Martin Komer). Kellerhals refers to his own unpublished work on proto-statistics; the 
Regimentsbiichlein; Gruner (1732) and Geiser (1891). The chambers are ranked in their order o f 
establishment; each line represents one chamber.
The first two decades of the eighteenth century saw the foundation of many 
new administrative units. The number of civil servants had increased as well, though 
it remained on a comparatively low level. The 1764 census revealed that 478 citizens 
worked in the administration, of which 307 were magistrates.252 However, most of the 
state-employed were not citizens and thus not covered by this figure. Karl Friedrich 
Walchli estimated their number at 1,500 by the mid-eighteenth century, representing 
less than 0.5% of total population. His figure includes government members as 
well as clergymen, professors, full-time military personnel and subordinate 
administrators. Although this estimate does not consider the militia and those 
employed on a part-time basis, it shows the small scale of the Bemese state. 
Administrative duties were carried out by a combination of patrician officeholders 
and their assistants, who were usually locals. As a result, in the whole Pays de Vaud, 
there were only a handful of Bemese patricians at the very top o f the administration 
as bailiffs and some as clergymen, the remaining state servants were all Vaudois. 
Against this backdrop, it is obvious that the canton was dependent on the co­
operation and compliance of its subjects. A popular saying stated that who ever obeys
252 Walter (1966): 240-241. The magistrates probably included retired members o f the CC.
253 Walchli (1991): 109.
Chapter II: Res Publica Bemensis 77
a mandate of Bern does so voluntarily (Ein Mandat von Bern: Wer es halten will, der
\  254tut es gem).
The number of senior government offices was around 60 by the mid-eighteenth 
century, depending on how broadly the term is defined. 50 bailiffs represented
r
Bemese mle in the counties for a term of six years. The Bailiwicks were ranked 
into four categories by estimated income, and strict rules determined the order in 
which they were balloted during an election.256 In addition to bailiffs, offices in the 
city included specific functions within the government and directorships for 
committees administrating salt, grain or public buildings.257 Most positions paid well, 
yet the salary embodied no indication of an office’s political importance. Since part 
of the remuneration was in kind, comparisons are difficult. The list in Table II-1 is 
based on a contemporary compilation that contains 230 positions open to citizens, 
ranging from Mayor to simple messenger.258 The most highly paid office within the 
city was that of State Clerk, who could earn up to 90,000 Bz, which was more than 
twice the salary of a Mayor (max. 36,600 Bz) and more than thrice that of the Vice- 
Mayor (26,375 Bz). However, the average bailiff earned at least as much, and the ‘top 
ten’ made up to 150,000 Bz. In comparison, a craftsman earned roughly 1% of this 
sum with his yearly salary of 1,000-1,600 Bz.259
254 Quoted from Walchli (1991): 143.
255 The bailiff was usually called Landvogt, occasionally Schultheiss (Thun), Kastlan (Frutigen), 
Hofineister (Kongisfelden), Gubemator (Aigle); the French word was Bailli: Walchli (1981): 116. See 
also Bucher, E. (1944).
256 For the ranking: RQBE, vol. 5: 460-461. The classes were reallocated in 1776: Feller (1955): 441.
257 Feller (1955): 439.
258 There are several copies of the document. I thank Myriam Chuard for giving me access to the 
archives of Armand von Ernst & Cie, Bern, where I first found this document; it is now kept at the 
Burgerbibliothek Bern (BBB Nachlass Wagner/von Ernst), along with another copy entitled: 
Besoldungen alter M.G.H. Aemteren undDiensten [...Jgesamlet von Johan Rodolph Gruner V.D.M., 
A. 1720 (BBB Mss Hist Helv VIII 53). The exact fUnction of these lists is not clear; they were 
probably used to plan careers and monitor fellow patricians. Payments in kind were capitalised in the 
list itself.
259 Calculated with daily wages for 200 days per year, based on Ebener (1999): 176-183.
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Senators: min max Great Councillors: min max
Mayor 31,600 36,600 State Clerk 75,000 90,000
Vice-Mayor 26,375 26,375 Building Supervisor 50,500 65,500
Venner 33,275 37,400 Com Supervisor 47,275 66,275
German Treasurer 24,500 25,750 Stiftschaffner 57,500 76,525
Treasurer for Vaud 41,500 42,250 Great Councillor 24,000 24,000
Senator 12,600 12,600
Salt-Senator 27,825 27,825 Bailiffs (overall Mean) 72,638 87,963
Building-Senator 31,975 34,275 Bailiffs (Top-Ten Mean) 108,625 148,563
Table II-l: Income of Most Important Government Offices (in Bz)
Source: Besoldungen aller M.G.H. Aemteren undDiensten (BBB Nachlass Wagner/von Ernst, 
courtesty Armand von Ernst & Cie, Bern), see footnote 258. Bailiffs (Top-Ten Mean) is the mean of 
the 10 best-paid bailiffs, ranked by maximum income. See also the slightly different figures in Feller 
(1955): 437-438. All figures are in Batzen (see Section VII-13 in the appendix).
In reference to these generous payments, Abraham Stanyan stated that 
bailiwicks were
profitable, and some of them so considerable, that the bailliffs [sic] may 
live splendidly during the six years of their government, and yet put in 
their pockets five and twenty, or thirty thousand crowns, which is a great 
sum in a country, where the law retrenches all superfluities in equipage, 
apparel and furniture, and where oeconomy [sic, here in the sense of: 
frugality] is so well understood and practiced.’ 60
However, as there was no strict separation between private and public income, 
it is unclear how well the real incomes of bailiffs correlated with these expected
0f\ 1revenue. We only have fragmented evidence from private patrician accounts. In 
exceptional cases, office-holders could even finish their term in debit.262 Each bailiff 
was liable with his own fortune for the administration and therefore had to nominate 
two citizens as guarantors.263 During his six years tenure, he had to live in an official 
residence on site and could profit from the revenue of the state domain. He collected 
all revenue, but was accountable to the Vennerkammer that controlled his yearly 
accounts (discussed below).
260 Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 81-82. His figures are slightly too high: Kr. 25-30,000 
over a six-year period are the equivalent of c. 105-125,000 Bz per year.
261 Feller (1955): 440 and Kupfer (1947): 77.
262 See for the case of Christoph von Graffenried: Altorfer (forthcoming); Keller (1953).
263 Ryser (1956): 14.
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A bailiffs duties covered the whole spectrum of state functions from the 
administration of state finance to maintenance of infrastructure and enforcement of 
government decrees. He was a judge who presided over trials for minor offences and 
an investigator of more serious ones. Finally, his responsibilities also included the 
supervision of the military, judicial and policing tasks of the communes.264 During his 
mandate, the bailiff was controlled by both the Venners and subjects, who had rights 
to appeal directly to the Great Council in case of malpractice. Co-monitoring between 
bailiffs of neighbouring counties, as well as reporting through clergymen, were also 
common practice. Furthermore, the country clerk functioned as an internal check on 
attempts to exploit his office too ruthlessly.265 The clerk (Landschreiber) was elected 
for life and was usually from a local elite of ‘notables’ who had held these positions 
for generations. According to the contemporary list of government positions 
discussed above, there were 18 such posts open to Bemese citizens; the rest were 
staffed locally.266 Bailiffs quite often lacked the tacit knowledge about local customs 
and were therefore dependent on the co-operation of their subordinates. Thus, 
together with the clergymen, the local clerks acted as indispensable middlemen 
between rulers and ruled. A number of minor clerks, often employed on a part-time 
basis, supported the state administration.
Based on the income estimates in the list of government positions, it is possible 
to calculate a relative income distribution of state employees in eighteenth century 
Bern. The 230 positions of the document provide information for 417 recipients of 
government salaries between 225 Bz and 150,700 Bz. The overall average income 
was 20,940 Bz, the mean (geographical average) 9,632 Bz. If the incomes are ranked 
by size and accumulated, they can be shown as a Lorenz curve (see Figure II-8).
264 For more systematic accounts of the bailiff’s duties: Bartlome (1999): 149-152; Walchli (1981): 
118-119; Walchli (1991); Bucher, E. (1944). The complete list of tasks for each county can be 
established from their oaths (StABE B V II25).
265 Bartlome (1999): 150-152.
266 BBB Nachlass Wagner/von Ernst and Mss Hist Helv VIII 53 (see footnote 258 above). In addition 
to the 18 positions in Bemese counties, the administration of Condominiums offered another three 
such positions for Bemese citizens.
Chapter II: Res Publica Bemensis 80
100%
Accumulated
Income
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
101 151 201 251 301 351 401
Figure II-8: Income Distribution of Government and Administrative Positions
Source: Burgerbibliothek Bern (BBB Nachlass Wagner/von Ernst) and Mss Hist Helv VIII 53 (see 
Table II-1). V is for the number of cases ranked by salary (N = 417); the solid line shows accumulated 
income; the dashed line an equal income distribution.
Unsurprisingly, the income distribution is heavily skewed, which means that 
income was unequally distributed. The top earners in Bemese government had 
significantly higher salaries than their peers, even if we account for inaccuracies of 
the primary data, since it is very likely that the list compared positions that required 
full-time attendance with minor duties.
Overall, Bern’s constitutional arrangements were designed to restrain the power 
of ambitious individuals. A sophisticated system of checks and balances guaranteed 
equality among those with a stake in government. However, access to the government 
was strictly limited to a select number of patrician honoratiores. With incomes from 
their country estates, they could afford to wait until being elected into a profitable 
office. Their wealth also predestined them to assume top governmental positions that 
paid less well. While they became a distinctive group from the rest of the population, 
republican equality within the patriciate was maintained. Patrician mle was often 
criticised, at times even contested, but never seriously imperilled by rivals. Limits to 
‘absolutist’ claims by the government were set by its dependency on the co-operation 
of local elites and subjects, as it lacked the coercive means to secure mle by force.
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Although the eighteenth century saw some intensification of state administration, this 
remained at a relatively low level.
II-5 Geopolitics and Military Organisation
In a report of 1715, a French ambassador described Bern as a military camp, 
which ‘has everything it needs for war, its granaries have been refilled, and the people 
are being trained by capable officers.’267 He could have added that the canton’s army 
of over 45,000 militiamen was amongst the largest in Europe at the time, albeit on a 
significantly smaller scale than the French.268 However, Bern was not an ordinary 
military state. Its standing regiments served abroad as mercenaries. Furthermore, the 
canton had not been embroiled in any major wars throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. This section will outline Bern’s geopolitical situation. I will first 
consider the canton’s foreign policy in the context of the Swiss Confederation, 
followed by an account of the incidence of wars. Finally, I will assess Bern’s foreign 
policy and military organisation, including its overseas mercenary regiments.
Bern and the Pax Helvetica
Swiss cantons of the eighteenth century showed little desire for geopolitical 
activity and were almost always at peace. For the most part of the century, the 
cantons were within the French sphere of influence, with the Emperor’s guarantee 
staving off complete subordination. Overall, the equilibrium was maintained until 
1797, when the Imperial army was defeated and ushered in the end of Swiss 
independence.269 Throughout the century, the cantons profited from the fact that all 
sides had an interest in neutralising the Corpus Helveticum. In 1688-1691, when 
France and the Empire were at war, they even agreed to jointly cover the cost for 
defending the Northern Swiss border.270 Neutrality was interpreted as a commitment 
to non-intervention. Military alliances remained consistent with this concept, as long
267 The ambassador was Charles-Fran9ois de Vintemille, Duke du Luc. Quoted in Kapossy (2002): 
233.
268 Parker (1996): 46 gives the number of 395,000 French troops under Louis XIV in 1696. By 1710, 
the number of troops simultaneously on foot in Europe is estimated at 1.3m. See also Wilson, P. 
(1999).
269 Capitani (1986): 513.
270 Im Hof (1977): 683.
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as they were defensive in character.271 In addition to a perpetual non-aggression pact 
with the Empire since 1477 (renewed in 1511), the Confederation had an alliance 
with France from 1663 to 1723 (renewed only in 1777).272 Since 1712, Bern was also 
allied with the United Provinces.273 These alliances secured military assistance 
against attacks; they also fixed the number of mercenary troops the Swiss provided to 
their allies. In addition to Swiss soldiers, loans were at times used to create and foster 
dependencies since the sixteenth century.274 By the eighteenth century, Bemese 
overseas loans had changed in character and become mainly financial investments 
(see Chapter V).
The military system of the Swiss Confederation was federally organised and 
coordinated through a treaty that regulated common border defence since 1647 
(renewed in 1668).275 Without powerful standing armies, the cantons abstained from 
geopolitical conflicts. Andreas Suter has listed numerous causes for this Tow military 
profile’ of the Swiss: their territory was small and relatively poor, authorities lacked 
the power to tax economic resources and internal antagonisms embodied great 
potential for internal conflict.276 The most important internal conflict in the eighteenth 
century was between the Protestant and Catholic states of the Confederation, although 
it was moderate compared to earlier religious conflicts.
Bern at War
After Bern’s response to an attack on Geneva by the Duke of Savoy in 1589, 
the canton was not engaged in any major geopolitical conflict till 1798. In the 
meantime, military incidents were limited to civil wars with the Catholic cantons 
(1656, 1712) and a peasant revolt (1653). All these confrontations were short and 
inexpensive; they caused few casualties and minimal economic disruption. To borrow
271 Im Hof (1977): 678; see also Suter (1998): 141-156. As such, the concept was less strict than its 
modem interpretation; it was not distinctively Swiss. See Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 4: 315- 
337 (article Neutralitat).
272 Im Hof (1977): 678. The alliance of 1663 was tenured to stop eight years after the death of Louis 
XIV (who died in 1715). Shortly before his death, the Catholic cantons had signed a separate alliance 
with France, containing a secret clause against Zurich and Bern: Im Hof (1977): 701-709.
273 See Altorfer (forthcoming) for details.
274 See Komer (1980).
275 Referred to as Defensionale: Im Hof (1977): 678-680.
276 Suter (1998): 152-156.
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an expression from Joachim Remak, they qualify as ‘very civil wars.’277 Table II-2 
shows the number of troops and casualties as far as the figures can be established. In 
addition to actual fighting, Bern also mobilised troops at several occasions to 
intervene in conflicts in allied territories and to defend its borders. Except for the
9 7 81790s, however, these incidents were on a small scale.
Bernese Troops Enemy Troops
Incident Year mobilised in battle casualties in battle casualties
First War of Villmergen 1656 c 9,000 c 8,000 573 (462) 4,900 189(300)
Second War of Villmergen 1712 35,216 8,500-9,400 206(406) c 10,000 3,700(2,700)
French Invasion 1798 c 20,000 700 c 35,000
Table II-2: Bernese Troops at War
Sources: Feller (1955): 30, 281-318; HLS (2002): article Franzoseneinfall. The figures for casualties 
show dead and wounded (in brackets).
In comparison to other European wars of the eighteenth century, these figures 
of troops deployed are negligible. Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession 
(1703-1712), over 1.2m soldiers died on the battlefield, which equals over 100,000 
deaths per year for the duration of the conflict.279 The difference is also instructive 
when looking at finances. To cover the entire expenses for the Second War of 
Villmergen in 1712, Bern withdrew approximately 13.125m Bz from its cash reserves 
and did not levy any additional taxes.280 In contrast, Britain’s national debt increased 
almost £30m (about 4bn Bz) during the War of the Spanish Succession and had to be
• 981covered by ever-increasing tax burden on its population.
277 This expression is from Remak (1993), who used it to describe the Swiss Sonderbund war of 1847 
compared to the US civil war.
278 In 1707, an army o f4,000 was levied for ten weeks during the Conflict of the Neuchatel succession: 
Feller (1955): 226-227. Bern also intervened in Geneva in 1707, 1737, 1768 and 1782, as well as in 
Fribourg 1781: Walchli (1981): 147-148
279 Ferguson (2001): 426 (appendix A) gives the figure of 104,250 death per year of conflict, based on 
Levy (1983): table 4.1.
280 Feller (1955): 318. The war was entirely paid for by the cash reserve; communal chests for military 
defence (discussed below) were not used; see also Chapter III below.
281 Dickson (1993): 10. See also O'Brien/Hunt (1999). The situation in other countries was similar: 
Hart, M.t./Jonker/Zanden (1997) [United Provinces]; Bonney (1999a) [France]; Hamilton (1947).
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Mercenaries and Militias as a Virtual Standing A rm y
For its defence the canton relied on a two-tier system of a domestic militia and 
mercenary troops that could be recalled in case of a military emergency. Thus, Bern 
had a virtual standing army, positioned abroad and financed by other states. It is 
questionable how reliable the commitment by other mlers to release their Swiss 
mercenary troops in wartime really was.
Bemese mercenary troops were owned by private military entrepreneurs from 
patrician families. They were licensed by the government and served under a contract 
(‘capitulation’), which fixed the terms of service and the yearly payments 
(‘pensions’) that their principal had to pay for the right to levy troops in Switzerland. 
While such contributions had been a cornerstone of Bemese finance in earlier 
centuries, they had lost importance in the eighteenth century. In fact, pension 
payments from France were not collected any more for political reasons and the 
Dutch levied troops without paying pensions.282 Terms of deployment stated that 
troops could be withdrawn in case of a military emergency at home and mled out 
both offensive engagements and attacks on fellow Protestants. The treaties also 
stipulated that Bemese soldiers should not be transported by sea, which was meant to 
avoid a deployment beyond Europe. In reality, these terms were often ignored 
(‘transgressed’). To the Swiss Confederation, mercenary troops formed an 
indispensable tool of foreign policy and guaranteed that rival powers -  especially 
France and the Empire -  had no interest in attacking their ‘reservoir’ of soldiers. 
For Richard Feller, they were the price to pay for neglecting Swiss border defence. 
The cantons also reaped economic benefits from the mercenary contracts by obtaining 
tariff exemptions. While the cost of this policy was financially low, it was high in 
terms of individual soldier lives. This is why the trade had been criticised on political, 
military, economic and ethic grounds since the Reformation 285
Throughout the eighteenth century, three Bemese regiments fought for the 
United Provinces and one each for France and Sardinia-Piedmont. Figure II-9 shows 
their effective number, based on company registers.
282 Discussed in Chapter V (particularly Section V-2).
283 For this expression: Pfister, W. (1983): 6.
284 Feller (1955): 237.
285 Pfister, W. (1983): 57-58.
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Figure II-9: Bernese Mercenary Troops, 1700-1797 (Effective Number)
Source: Pfister, W. (1980-84): Vol. 1: 271-274 and Vol. 2: 344-345. The graph shows the number of 
effective troops in Bemese regiments (including foreigners serving in the regiments).
The Dutch made more flexible and economic use of their foreign troops, 
discharging them in peacetime and only recruiting when necessary. At its height in 
the late 1740s, approximately 10,000 Bemese troops served abroad, of which only
7,000 were from the canton (the others were ‘foreigners’). The average throughout 
the century was around half this figure, which would be the equivalent of 1-2% of the 
total population. For all of Switzerland, it has been estimated that in the early 
eighteenth century, the equivalent of 3% of the male adult population served abroad,
n o n
some 1 -2% towards the end of the century.
The Bemese mercenary regiments were owned by patrician families and
9 o o
commanded by Bemese officers, some of whom came from Vaud. During the 
second half of the century around 200 members of mling families served as officers 
in foreign armies. While over half o f them were in the Netherlands, the rest were in 
France and Sardinia, and some in the British or Imperial armies. In addition to 
economic benefits, serving abroad provided recruits with an overseas education as
286 ‘Foreigners’ could also be non-Bernese Swiss. See the different categories in Pfister, W. (1980-84); 
see also Feller (1955): 516.
287 Capitani (1986): 450. An estimated total o f 350-500,000 served abroad throughout the whole 
century.
288 For the constant struggle about the prerogative to assign officers: Pfister, W. (1983): 36.
289 Geiser (1891): 99.
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well as excellent opportunities to create political networks and gain administrative 
experience. For the military entrepreneurs, it offered a lucrative investment 
opportunity, albeit a risky one. It has been argued that in the eighteenth century, 
mercenary services were in decline and became a political favour granted by the 
principals.290 They had certainly lost in overall importance but could still be lucrative 
for individual families. In 1677, an inquiry by the Bemese government revealed that 
one company in France had made a profit of Lb 20,000 (150,000 Bz) in six years of
901 ,war. If the sum covered the whole period of six years -  and the source is not 
entirely clear about this point -  then the profit was proportionate to salaries of well- 
paid Bemese bailiffs, who could earn as much in a single year at a significantly lower 
risk. Nevertheless, the government realised that military profits abroad might make 
magistrates susceptible to foreign influence and prohibited relatives of Senators and 
Mayors to own regiments serving for France.292
The canton also profited from its mercenary troops as a training-ground for the 
higher ranks of the domestic militia. The military modernisation elsewhere also 
impacted the Bemese army. The traditional militia of patriarchs (‘Hausvdtermiliz’) 
was constantly rejuvenated, unified and better armed. While in the seventeenth 
century only one member per family was drafted, the Bemese government slowly 
introduced general conscription. From 1768 every able bodied man aged 16 to 60 had 
to serve.293 In 1721, Bern had an Auszug of rapid units comprised of 13,200 men and 
an overall army of more than 45,000. By the end of the century, the 28,000 rapid 
units were combined with a reserve of 50-58,000 men.294 A table of 1787 reported the 
full capacity of Bemese troops to 93,688 -  a figure that included some 20,000 
‘incapables’.295 Only a fraction of this was actually available during the conflict of 
1798.
Based on my own population estimates, about 14.1% of all inhabitants served in 
the militia in 1732; fifty years later, this share had increased to 16.5% (1782).296 
Compared to the number of men aged 16-60, this is equivalent to 62% (1732) and
290 Capitani (1986): 472-475. It would be interesting to test these hypotheses with data from private 
records of families owning a regiment. The overall number of soldiers was certainly not in dramatic 
decline for Bern (see Figure II-9).
291 Feller (1955): 92.
292 Feller (1955): 196 and Pfister, W. (1983): 32.
293 Grosjean (1953): 165.
294 HLS (2002), article Bent: 266-267 and Feller (1955): 503-517.
295 StABE B I I 271.
296 See Section IV-2 for population estimates and Section IV-5 for milita costs.
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72% (1782).297 With a soldier to civilian ratio between 1:7 and 1:6.25, Bern looks 
even more militarised than Hesse-Cassel as the ‘most militarised state in Europe’ of 
the time, which had a ratio of 1:15.298 In Prussia, the ratio was 1:30. Such figures can 
be misleading, however. The Bemese troops were not well trained and their 
equipment was relatively backward. Compared to Hessians, Pmssians or French, they 
also lacked fighting practice, with the exception of the returning mercenaries in their 
ranks. In principle, communes paid for the troops while they were deployed but not 
for training; throughout the eighteenth century, the state treasury reimbursed them for 
troop deployments. Each commune had to keep a war chest in cash (Reisgeld), whose 
amount was fixed by the government. Bailiffs monitored its existence and also 
supervised the training of militias, which took place for a few days every year.
In summary, the most distinctive geopolitical feature of Bern was the absence 
of major wars for over two centuries before 1798. Overall, Swiss foreign policy 
during that period is characterised by inactivity. The Confederation as a whole 
benefited from the prevailing political equilibrium in Europe, which was the best 
guarantor for its independence. This system worked well until its collapse in 1797. 
Despite an isolated attempt to resist the approaching French troops, the events of 
1798 showed that the canton’s defence was not only inexpensive, but also ineffective. 
The combination of domestic militia and mercenary troops abroad that had 
represented Bern’s virtual standing army throughout the eighteenth century proved to 
be just that -  virtual.
ii-6 The State as Provider of Non-Financial Public Goods
While most of my research is on actions which are traceable through 
government accounts, it is crucial to acknowledge that states provide important non- 
financial public goods. These normative actions include securing property rights in 
particular. In the first part of this section, I will discuss this for the Bemese state 
based on the specific examples of cultivation rights, mortgage credit and mercantile 
law. In a second part, I will analyse the government’s economic policy, mainly with
297 Calculated with relative percentages for 1764 from Pfister, C. (1995): table 9.3 (432). I have applied 
his relative estimates for the canton in its 1980 borders to the whole territory.
298 Ingrao (1987): 132.
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respect to the textiles industry and grain markets. The role of education and spiritual 
public goods have been put aside because of a scarcity of information.
Property Rights
The importance of secure property rights is one of the cmcial components of a 
New Institutional approach to economic history (see Section 1-2 above). The basic 
idea is that agents will only engage in productive economic activity if they feel 
assured that their assets are safe. Historically, the definition and enforcement of 
property rights by the state has mostly been related to revenue extraction, with states 
securing property rights in order to tax more effectively. In the Bemese case, where 
taxation was minimal, property rights were still relatively secure, although with 
marked differences.
Cultivation rights determined the kind of agriculture that was carried out on a 
specific plot of land. In a feudal system, the landlord determined which crop was 
planted. In Bern, such feudal rights were often held by communal collectives, who 
decided on cultivation within the framework of a three-field crop rotation system. The 
degree of feudal penetration differed across regions, however. In the Alps, communal 
structures were relatively weak, and individual peasants could choose their activity 
free of constraints. As a result, Alpine agriculture specialised in cattle and dairy 
farming, selling its products on the market, often abroad. In the lower lands 
(Mittelland), feudal structures prevailed for longer. This promoted the cultivation of 
grain, which could be taxed easily in the form of tithes, whose product could then be 
stored or sold. The most visible change in cultivation rights was the division of 
communal lands (Allmenden), which were enclosed and exploited individually. In the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the enclosure movement reached the 
Mittelland, although it peaked only during the Helvetic Republic after 1798. 
Individual property rights of peasants provided a powerful incentive for more 
productive use of land. This ultimately led to an increase in potato and dairy farming 
in the sub-Alpine zones (Emmental) in the nineteenth century.299 The government did 
not actively promote enclosures, but it allowed communes to divide common lands 
after 1765 and maintained the option to regulate how divisions were carried out.300
299 Pfister, C. (1995): Chapter 4.1 and Bodmer (1973): 60-63.
300 Feller (1955): 532.
Chapter II: Res Publica Bemensis 89
This was fraught with contradiction, since the main interest of the government was to 
secure its tax (tithe) base, which was to a large extent dependent on feudal 
arrangements.
The support for securing land titles by the government was more forthcoming. 
The Bemese capital market consisted almost exclusively of mortgage contracts. 
These had the form of Gulten, which in spite of their wording as rentes had evolved 
into impersonal mortgages that could be terminated by both sides. Thus, the 
government had secured mortgage contracts as a reliable and secure form of
™ I #
investment. For many investors, mortgage credit was used as a pension, generating 
a steady stream of revenue over time. Accordingly, Gulten contracts were usually 
renewed after their expiry date. In order to protect investors, the government also 
fixed interest rates by usury laws as part of its prerogatives as a sovereign. Earlier 
mandates from 1648 and 1658 fixing the interest rate at 5% were renewed in 1731, in 
spite of discussions to lower the rate in the light of an oversupply of capital. As the 
main argument for extending the high rate, the government cited tradition and a 
desire to avoid capital exports, but also the protection of investors, which included 
widows and orphans alongside the government itself. The argument was that 
lowering interest rates would deprive investors of sufficient returns. Securing 
mortgage contracts enabled the establishment of a domestic capital market that 
allowed peasants to use land as collateral for loans. Andreas Ineichen has found that 
in the Lucerne countryside, agricultural mortgages were rarely used to fund 
productive investment, but rather to avoid dividing up lands for inheritance or even 
out financial life-cycles.303 Credit from citizens of a republic to their rural hinterland 
has also been identified as a major avenue for clientelistic relations in early modem 
Switzerland.304 This applied to Bern, where patricians were important holders of 
lands, titles and financial claims throughout the territory of the republic. Interestingly, 
in contrast to the situation in most other European states, the government of Bern was 
interested in the capital market as a lender, not a borrower.
While agricultural property rights were secured, the government’s support for 
commercial titles was far less enthusiastic. In the aftermath of a severe banking crisis
301 See also Pfister, U. (1994).
302 Quoted in Schmidt, G.C.L. (1932): vol. 2, 66 (prerogative) and 122-123 (1731 report).
303 Ineichen (1992); Ineichen (1996); it can be argued that the situation in most of the Bemese territory 
was similar.
304 Pfister, U. (1992b); Pfister, U. (1994).
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in 1720, the Great Council attempted to reform Bemese mercantile law. The new 
commercial code modernised and facilitated aspects of commercial transactions. 
Business associations, bankruptcies and bills of exchange were largely regulated 
following the model of the Geneva Reglement sur le commerce. By 1728, a final draft 
of the bill was ready; it was vetoed by the Great Council after a dispute about 
bankruptcy courts. At the heart of the matter lay the interest of city courts 
(Stadtgerichte) staffed by patricians, who were not willing to lose their income from 
bankruptcy cases to a newly established mercantile court. Nikolaus Linder interprets 
this failure to create a suitable infrastructure for business and commerce in the 
context of Gary D. Liebcap’s argument that any (re-)definition of property rights 
reflects underlying political bargaining structures.305 Applied to the Bemese case, the 
lack of a vested commercial interest of patricians -  and their interest in maintaining 
the current solution in their favour -  was an impediment to reform. A commercial 
code that would enable the accumulation of proto-industrial and commercial wealth 
might even represent a potential threat to patrician mle. The Great Council adopted a 
strategy of ‘non-regulation’ to avoid adverse redistribution effects.306
The same argument can also be used for the contrasting case of Gulten, where 
patricians had a vested interest in making these securities safe. Government members 
were willing to provide instruments for facilitating transactions because of their 
involvement in this market. In addition to the perspective on patricians as an interest 
group, from a ruler’s perspective, the government’s neglect of commercial regulation 
can be interpreted in a similar way. Since state revenue did not chiefly depend on 
taxation of industrial and commercial activities, they were not the government’s 
primary concern. This contrasts with the situation in mercantile republics, where both 
the state (through taxation) and its power elites gained from promoting commerce.
Nevertheless, in spite of the absence of a fully fledged mercantile law, Bemese 
courts were relatively efficient and fair by early modem standards. Merchants did not 
benefit from special protection, but suffered little discrimination from government 
members defending their vested commercial interests. Abuses of property rights 
through arbitrary taxation or forced loans were entirely absent. Overall, the 
government defined and secured property rights relatively well, even if the degree of
305 With reference to Liebcap (1989).
306 Linder (2004): 199-202; for the commercial code: 169-182.
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judicial fragmentation between social groups was high compared to modem legal 
systems in which all citizens share equal rights.
Economic Policy
The Bemese government adopted its first consistent economic programme in 
the late seventeenth century by introducing a Commercial Council (Kommerzienrat), 
modelled after the French Conseil de Commerce under Colbert.307 Its intentions were 
to attract manufacturing industries, mainly by encouraging the settlement of 
Huguenot refugees after the revocation of the edict of Nantes. The strategy had 
limited success, as most refugees used the canton as a temporary base before
O A O
migrating to the Netherlands or Britain. The ‘mercantilist’ spirit of Bemese 
economic policy prevailed for decades, in spite of a fading importance of the 
Commercial Council. With the manufacturing mandate of 1719, Bern had shifted 
entirely to a territorial economic policy, which granted little privilege to the capital 
over its territory. In this, the canton differed significantly from other Swiss republics 
in which mercantile elites managed to impose important protection vis a vis of their 
hinterland.309 With the exception of salt, the government avoided the control of 
commercial activities, although it set boundaries for agricultural commodities. Grain 
mandates declaring temporary export bans provided a ‘fine and flexible’ instrument
-1 1  A
for securing sufficient supplies.
Physiocratic ideas became prominent in the second half of the century; they 
centred on the Okonomische Gesellschaft of the Economic Patriots, in which 
numerous patricians were active members.311 The Gesellschaft promoted agrarian 
modernisation, considering productivity increases within the existent agricultural 
system as the solution to the canton’s autarchy. Physiocrats recognised that free grain 
trade could create incentives for higher productivity. However the Economic Patriots 
failed to see that changing the agricultural pattern of early-modem Bern also meant 
questioning the way the state was funded and legitimised. Given that their members
307 Lerch (1908); Schneider, H. (1937); Bodmer (1951) and Bodmer (1973).
308 See also Kiing (1993) on the Huguenot refugees.
309 See the comparison in Bodmer (1951) or Braun, R. (1984).
310 Bodmer (1973): 27; see his list of grain mandates in Table 1 (94-101).
311 Baeschlin (1913); Pfister, C. (1975) and Pfister, C. (1995); Kapossy (2002). The Bemese 
physiocrats did not necessarily share orthodox views on taxation [see Bonney (1995a): ch. 6.5]. I 
understand physiocracy in this context as a stream of thought that considers agriculture as the main 
economic activity and key contributor to state finance.
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were mostly from patrician families, this blindness was not a surprise. The 
enclosure of common lands went hand-in-hand with untying production, which 
implied that cultivation should be free from any feudal constraint. Therefore, in its 
ultimate consequence agricultural reforms would have undermined the state in its 
existing form. Christian Pfister argues along the lines of William Abel that the 
changing doctrine towards Physiocracy needs to be considered in the context of 
falling rents for patricians since the 1740s. Demographic stagnation or even decline 
led to a decrease in profits for large landowners and rentiers. In this situation, the 
incentives to increase production were absent because demand was not growing. This 
situation was considered dangerous for both the state and patrician families.314
While urban guilds had little influence on the state’s economic policy, they 
often held important local privileges and wielded strict control over their own trade. 
They set standards for the quantity and quality of products, regulated apprenticeships 
and settled commercial disputes. However, an important limitation to the guilds’ 
economic power was the government’s similar treatment of urban and rural 
producers. Secondly, it promoted the establishment of rural guilds in the countryside. 
These were similar to their urban counterparts, although usually even less successful 
in enforcing privileges. In practice, this led to the co-existence with a non-guild sector 
(‘Stumper’) in rural areas. It consisted of day labourers who worked in agriculture 
and industry, as well as itinerant craftsmen (‘Storarbeiter’).315
With its territorial economic policy that did not favour the capital city, the 
Bemese case provides a counter-example to Ulrich Pfister’s explanations about the 
political protection of markets outlined in the introduction.316 His model accurately 
describes the situation of the largest part of the textile industry in eastern Switzerland 
dominated by the guild-run cities of Zurich and St. Gallen, as well as the response by 
their mral competitors in Appenzell or Glams. In Bern, the absence of an urban 
merchant elite pushing for protection might explain why proto-industry only 
happened at a time when ‘ruralisation’ had already set in elsewhere. The political elite 
had no direct interest in textiles, arguably because their alternatives for obtaining 
incomes through government offices and mercenary services were profitable enough.
312 Pfister, C. (1995): 175-180.
313 See Pfister, C. (1995): 179-180, referring to Hausler (1986): 195.
314 Pfister, C. (1995): 178 -  see also Abel (1966).
315 Meier (1986); Graf-Fuchs (1940).
316 Pfister, U. (1996a); see the discussion in Section 1-2 above.
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The government supported the introduction of export industries as a way of 
generating employment and improving its negative balance of trade. Tax reasons 
were not important, since this sector was virtually untaxed. From its late start in the 
seventeenth century, the state did little more than securing the working of a domestic 
market for semi-finished and finished products and left the rest to private initiative. 
Compared to the other textile centres, Bern did not successfully transit to industrial 
production in the early nineteenth century, for which arguably a lack of marketing
' i  i  n
know-how and ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ was responsible.
The Bemese manufacturing mandate of 1719, while banning textile imports, 
stated explicitly that its production was free.318 State-employed clerks (commis) 
policed the import ban and reported the amount of domestically produced cloth to the 
Commercial Council. It is not clear for how long these reports were actually produced 
as only few have survived.319 In 1758, the government regulated the production of
9^0linen by mandate, followed by a regulation for cotton three years later. The aim 
was to secure exportability of the final product, deemed necessary for the balance of 
payments; the government did not intervene in the organisation of production as a 
belated acknowledgement of the existing market-based system. While the Bemese 
manufacturing mandates left methods and quantities unregulated, they imposed 
standards for textile products which divided them into different qualities. State- 
employed controllers (Tuchmesser) had to measure and certify all cloth sold on the 
market, for which they received duties. Based on controllers’ records, Jean-Jacques
9^9Siegrist estimated their cost at less than 1% of the final product price. As my
• 2 9 0
empirical analysis will show, they were also unimportant for Bemese state finance. 
Since duties were neither levied on the textile industry, nor on the income from this 
activity, it can be considered tax-free.324
Assuming ‘Smithian’ market expansion as the main form of economic growth 
in early modem times, the degree of market integration would be the test for the
317 Bietenhard (1988): 288-292.
318 Graf-Fuchs (1940): 189.
319 Lerch (1908): 63-67. The instruction of the commis can be found in StABE B V 4: 1-18, 79-83 and 
134-138.
320 RQBE, vol. 8/1: 614-618; 171-172; 175-179 (for cotton).
321 RQBE, vol. 8/2: 615 and 176; Bein (1920): 50.
322 Siegrist (1957): 15-18. For an analysis of production volumes based on the Tuchmesser lists, see 
footnote 213 above.
323 See Chapter IV below.
324 This was the same for textiles in Britain, see O'Brien (1994): 212; O'Brien/Hunt (1999): 64-65.
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effectiveness of the Bemese territorial economic policy. If the policies were 
successful, the level of market integration defined as the absence of arbitrage profits 
and stable transaction costs for the same good in different markets should decline 
over time. Even for the most important commodity of the time, grain, information is 
scarce; hence empirical results should be considered very carefully. Anton 
Brandenberger has found that Bemese grain markets were well integrated with each 
other, confirming earlier statements by Christian Pfister.326 Brandenberger has further 
found that the Bemese market was less well connected with grain markets in 
neighbouring countries. It is not clear to which extent the difference can be attributed 
to distance (transportation cost) or to political factors.
In summary, property rights were well defined and secured, although 
commercial rights did not benefit from particular protection. The degree of judicial 
fragmentation was certainly high by modem standards, but Bern was not an outlier in 
an eighteenth-century context. The government’s economic policy was mainly 
characterised by inactivity, leaving ample room for individual initiative, though this 
was not sufficient to create a dynamic economy. Some possible explanations for this 
failure are the lack of social and political mobility for successful entrepreneurs and 
the lack of protection in a mercantilist world, in which market access was not free. 
Also, the size of the domestic market was small, and there was little integration 
beyond the cantonal boundaries.
II-7 The Fiscal Constitution
To modem scholars, the fiscal constitution of early modem Bern was rife with 
inaccuracies. The accounting system was not transparent, responsibilities were 
ambiguous, and the distinction between official and private fortunes flawed. In short, 
it was a patrimonial structure, burdened by a long tradition of path dependent 
institutions. While the government promoted standardisation throughout the 
eighteenth century, changes were incremental and slow. The aim of this section is to 
provide the necessary background information for the empirical analysis of state
325 See Epstein (2000). For market integration also: Bateman (2006); Weir (1989); Jacks (2004).
326 Brandenberger (2004): ch. 4. Pfister had argued that grain prices of Bern and Nidau were highly 
correlated, without explicitly referring to market integration: Pfister, C. (1975): 151 (footnote 7).
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finance in subsequent chapters. It focuses on accounting practices, which can also be 
considered as an illustration of how reforming the Bemese state was ongoing and 
incomplete. While the government tried to impose some standardisation and 
transparency, it was reluctant to go the full way, for this had the potential to 
undermine its own legitimacy. I will start by briefly explaining the two-tier system of 
monetised and non-monetised transactions, then discuss the use of accounting 
techniques and auditing.
Collecting Revenue with a Partly Monetised Accounting System
As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the Bemese state did not 
have a central budget (see Section III-3 in particular). The word ‘budget’ has to be 
qualified in this context as the government did not have any explicit financial 
forward-planning; or if it had, the documents have not survived.327 In the Bemese 
accounting system, different types of accounts co-existed and their content partially 
overlapped. The Deutsch- and Welsch-Standesrechnung were the closest equivalent 
of a central account, but they did not contain all revenue and expenditure of the state. 
In particular, numerous transactions that occurred at a local level were not included. 
They were recorded in bailiff ledgers, from where an eventual surplus was transferred 
to the Standesrechnung. The system is symptomatic for the incomplete separation 
between government office and private fortunes in the patrimonial Bemese 
administration.
As explained above, each bailiff was accountable for his office with his private 
fortune. An incumbent bailiff had to purchase the inventory from his predecessor. 
This was recorded as his debt towards the state (Restanz), to which all revenue that he 
collected were added and expenditure subtracted. An eventual surplus in his account 
showed as an increased debt of the officeholder towards the state and vice versa. 
Bailiffs were the cornerstones of Bemese revenue collection. The administration 
relied on a sophisticated accounting system that combined monetised transactions 
with transactions in kind because a large number of revenue accmed in grain and 
wine. The main source of revenue in kind were tithes, which had to be delivered in 
grain and could not be paid in cash. The Bemese government auctioned off tithe
327 This was not uncommon for early modem states: Bonney (1995c): 428-431; Komer (1981): 
appendix 1.
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collection to the highest bidder in each county, following a system of checks and 
balances to ensure achieving the highest possible price.328 Tithe collectors then 
delivered a fixed amount of grain and wine to the local bailiff, regardless of the 
outcome of the harvest. As a safeguard against moral hazard, the bailiffs themselves 
were not allowed to bid for tithe collection, nor were their relatives.329
Part of the state’s revenue in grain was used directly for expenditure, ranging 
from salaries to subsidies for the poor or payments for services. In years with 
abundant harvests, part of the tithe receipts went to the public granary which the 
bailiff administered. In June and January, bailiffs received instructions from the 
Vennerkammer about the exact amount of grain they were allowed to sell on the
W(\market; selling grain without explicit permission was strictly forbidden. From 
1731, bailiffs had to record their grain sales on behalf of the government. As 
remuneration, they received a share of the proceeds, usually one fifth, seventh or 
ninth, depending on the amount sold.331 Bern thus adopted a system that was based on 
market prices and set an incentive for high prices for the bailiff. Its effects will be 
discussed in more detail in Section III-6 below.
The Use of Numbers and Tables
All Bemese accounts were kept in handwritten ledgers. They varied in format, 
size and quality, ranging from relatively simple booklets to luxurious leather-bound 
volumes illuminated with coats of arms and lavish calligraphy. In general, the more 
important the office was, the more intricate and ornate was its ledger.332 Typically for 
a patrimonial administration was the way in which accounts were written as personal 
statements (‘My account as Treasurer in year X ’ rather than ‘the accounts of the 
Treasury for year X’). The books listed revenue and expenditure by category, usually 
distinguishing between ordinary and extra-ordinary transactions.333 Ledgers finished 
with an account balance and auditing remarks by the Vennerkammer, for which the 
officeholder would leave a few blank pages. Some accounts also contained an
328 Pfister, C. (1975): 97-99. Bailiffs also did not get a commission for tithe collection.
329 StABEB V II25: §17.
330 Bucher, E. (1944): 107.
331 This was called the fifth (seventh, ninth) penny. The larger the amount sold, the smaller was the 
share. See Bucher, E. (1944): 107 and StABE B V II25: §9b.
332 For the formal aspects of the Deutsch Standesrechung: Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999).
333 Bonney (1995c): 428-431.
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appendix that specified the content of public inventories or gave details about 
transactions, such as grain sales or collected fines. Double-entry bookkeeping with T- 
style accounts was only used for offices with a commercial nature, such as salt 
ledgers, overseas investment or grain chamber accounts. Bailiff accounts and 
Standesrechnungen did not use this technique. For the former, this can be explained 
by a lack of accounting know-how by Bemese patricians. For the latter it is more 
surprising, since the Treasury used double-entry bookkeeping for its daily work, as 
evidence from a control ledger and journal for the years 1720-1733 proves. The 
booklet contains credit and debit statements for each office, listing all transactions 
between the Treasury and this office in chronological order; records were crossed out 
when counter-booked.334
Arabic numbers were been introduced into Bemese accounting in the late 
seventeenth century, which overtook the use of roman letters in the eighteenth 
century.335 Transactions were recorded in separate columns for each currency sub­
unit, of which there were normally two (see Section VII-13 in the appendix for 
details). This made adding page sums and grand totals (‘summa summarum’) easier 
and more reliable. In many cases the sums were first added by pencil for a final check 
before being written down in ink.
The list of categories in the Bemese ledgers became more standardised over 
time. Regional differences vanished, and bailiffs increasingly had to follow the same 
practice. There never was a full set of rules applied to all offices, however, and the 
change was gradual. Grain mandates had instructed bailiffs about how to look after 
public granaries for centuries. These regulations also dictated a strict separation 
between private and public grain inventories.336 In 1757, public grain policy was 
reformed and unionised throughout the canton. Grain mandates released in this year 
were more detailed than any of their predecessors. The historian Ernst Bucher has 
accused the government of ‘schematism’ and a willingness to control every minute 
detail of administration.337 However, imposing some degree of standardisation and 
consistency through enforceable accounting standards was probably the only way to 
avoid officeholders taking advantage of their powers.
334 StABE B VII440.
335 Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 177-178.
336 StABE B V II25: §7-17.
337 Bucher, E. (1944): 114.
Chapter II: Res Publica Bemensis 98
Further along the process of standardisation, the government compiled a 
consistent collection of all bailiff oaths of office in 1779.338 This gave an overview of 
their duties, which were unified in a similar fashion. Up till that time, decrees and 
instructions had been collected unsystematically in large volumes. It can be 
presumed that before the reform, most bailiffs learnt their duties either through 
custom or from relatives. They also benefited from the fact that the local clerks 
(Landschreiber) enjoyed lifelong tenure and accumulated significant practical 
knowledge. Although accounts officially were in the name of the officeholder, most 
were probably written by their clerks. Format and phrasing were usually copied from 
predecessors and therefore changed little over time. Parallel to the reformation of the 
bailiff oaths, their superiors -  the Venners -  also received new and more concise 
instructions. To make the break from previous ‘path dependent’ traditions more 
obvious, the new set of rules was organised by topics, rather than chronologically by 
simply adding new rules in the order they were issued by the Great Council.340
Since the 1760s, the Bernese administration made widespread use of tables to 
compile data. With this new system, proto-statistical surveys were made much 
easier.341 For a grain inventory enquiry in 1757 and the 1764 population census, the 
government even printed forms for bailiffs and priests to complete. Similar tools were 
later applied for collecting financial data from across the canton; I will use them for 
my long-run analysis of state finance (see below, Section III-4).342 It is not clear if 
these tables were written in retrospect or constantly updated. What matters in this 
context is the sheer existence of such compilations, which prove how the government 
tried to overcome the problems of a fractured financial organisation. This was driven 
by a desire for more transparency and the need to obtain better information for 
political decisions. The fact that this conflicted with the principle of secrecy in 
financial matters can probably explain why the ultimate reform, to introduce a central 
budget for the state, was not taken.
338 StABE B V II25 and 26.
339 StABE B V II21 and 444.
340 StABE B V II5 and 6. For example, the new version of 1778 left blank pages for later additions.
341 See also Pfister, C. (1995): 41-50 and Kellerhals (1984).
342 StABE B V II2179.
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Auditing
The Bernese accounts were formulated to be read before the Great Council as 
the ultimate institution that every officeholder was responsible to. Accordingly, the 
opening paragraph sounded similar to that of the Aarberg bailiff in 1782:
Mine, Johann Rudolff Wagner’s, bailiff of the county of Aarberg, second 
account and report of all my revenue and expenditure concerning this office, 
from new year’s day 1782 until the same time 1783.343
Before reaching the Great Council, each ledger was presented to the 
Vennerkammer for auditing in a process called passation. This took place in spring, 
usually a few weeks after the end of the financial year of an office.344 The Venners 
scrutinised each account for accuracy and calculation errors; they also made sure that 
all relevant revenue and expenditure was included. Finally, they subtracted 
expenditure from revenue and, if necessary, included previous arrears to determine 
each bailiffs new debt towards the state. If they discovered irregularities, the Venners 
made comments, which were then referred to the Great Council along with the details 
of the account. A copy of their comments was kept in the Abusen-Buch, which served 
as reference for future controls.345 For the above mentioned example of Rudolf 
Wagner’s 1782 account for Aarberg, the passation record reads as follows:
On Monday, 10th of February 1783, His Excellencies the German Treasurer 
and Venners listened to Mr Johann Rudolff Wagner’s, currently bailiff in 
Aarberg, 2nd official account, and under the usual caveat of (fraudulent) 
miscalculation, [have] passed and accepted [his account], through which, after 
[(...) minor corrections], Mr the bailiff has been gratified with some grain[;] 
then revenue [has] been compared to expenditure, and been settled, the same 
[bailiff], including his previous arrears in grain, owes to His Excellencies 669 
Crowns, 20 Mt of wheat, 20 Mt of mill com, 75 Mt of rye, 1769 Mt of spelt 
[and] 540 Mt of oats. Actum ut Supra 346
The formula for Vaud ledgers differed slightly in wording, stating the account 
was accepted as an ‘honourable and true business under the caveat of (fraudulent) 
miscalculations.’347 It ultimately contained the same disclaimers. The crucial point is
343 StABE B VII 862. For the orginal text, see Section VII-3 in the appendix.
344 See Section VII-5 in the appendix for the starting dates of the financial year.
345 StABE B V II27.
346 StABE B V II862. For the orginal text, see Section VII-3 in the appendix.
347 Moudon account 1782: ACV Bp 34/38.
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that the Venners passed the account under the caveat of good bookkeeping, which 
allowed them to turn on the officeholder if fraud was detected at a later date.
The Venners also calculated deductions for weight loss of the granary that each 
bailiff was entitled to. They were fixed at 5% for the current harvest 
(Kastenschweinung) and 2.5% of all previously stored grain (Abgang). The 1757 
grain mandate instructed bailiffs to carry out the calculations themselves. Even before 
the reform, some office holders had already deducted grain maintenance. While the 
Venners considered this fact in their calculations -  and hence did not compensate the 
bailiff twice -  the passation text occasionally mentioned a deduction. In other 
words, the text did not accurately describe the calculation but followed a formula that 
was simply copied from the previous year. There are also instances where the 
passation text mentions a deduction on a new harvest when none was recorded.349 
While this points to a copy-and-paste approach to repetitive formulas, the 
Vennerkammer rarely made mistakes in their calculations. On the other hand, taking 
these passation texts at their face value can lead to important miscalculations.
Another crucial part of the patrimonial system worth mentioning is that the 
Vennerkammer always kept some discretion to reward a bailiff rather than adhering to 
strict guidelines. As the passation of Wagner’s account mentions, some grain was left 
to him as a ‘gratification’. While the whole auditing process was scrupulous, the 
Venners were interested in keeping a veil of non-transparency over the whole process, 
which ensured some discretion in determining the exact claims that the government 
had towards its officeholders. This opaque structure opened the door for clientelistic 
relationships and support for family members that could only be checked for by the 
rivalry between different factions within the Vennerkammer.
The bailiff received a copy of the passation comments, intended as a lesson in 
good governance to avoid future mistakes. Accordingly, the comments were often
A
that certain expenses ‘will not be admitted in the future.’ Most accounts only 
triggered minor corrections by the Venners. On occasion, their concerns could be 
more severe. An example for particularly bad accountancy was Franz Ludwig Muller, 
the freshly appointed caretaker of the Mushafen, a charitable institution in the city. 
When he presented his second account in 1733, the Vennerkammer not only rectified
348 Yverdon account 1732: ACV Bp 42/33.
349 Bauherr Burger account 1732: StABE B X 47.
350 Trachselwald account 1782: StABE B V II2076.
351 StABE B ill  1158.
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his errors carefully one by one, it also included a special report containing 
observations on his lack of accuracy. Muller in turn responded with his own defence. 
As Richard Feller suggested, family relationships could be more important than 
accuracy during a passation?52 That a relatively small and unimportant charitable 
institution was scrutinised in such detail could even reflect the parsimonious nature of 
the Bernese government. However, there were numerous examples of high-standing 
officials who also found their accounts criticised in detail.
Calculation errors were remarkably rare, given that most accounts contained 
several currencies that were all non-decimal. Stephan Hagnauer found that in the four 
counties he studied for the seventeenth century, 1.4% (1630s) and 0.75% (1680s) of 
all transactions were added wrongly. On average, this affected 0.3% of the total sums 
accounted for. Intriguingly, however, he also found that mistakes which favoured the 
bailiff occurred more often than those favouring the state.354
To sum up this section on Bern’s fiscal constitution, the government relied on a 
sophisticated accounting system that reflected the patrimonial nature of the state. 
Officeholders were responsible with their own fortune. To determine their final debt 
to the state, accounting processes were tailored to the needs of recording transactions 
in kind and monetary units. The administration followed a strict set of rules, which 
seem customary in character rather than systematic. Detailed instructions for 
bookkeeping were only common towards the later part of the century, although there 
might be a tradition bias in this respect. In general, there was a trend towards more 
standardised forms of accounting. The increasingly frequent use of tables illustrates 
that magistrates of the late eighteenth century were struggling to get an overview of 
the financial situation of their state. In spite of this drive for standardisation, a number 
of old customs were left untouched, and innovations like double-entry bookkeeping 
only partially adapted. These developments mirror the characteristics of the Bernese 
government, tom between the desire to build a modem state and their adherence to 
traditional, legitimate forms of administration.
352 Feller (1955): 126. It might not be a coincidence that the above mentioned Muller came from a 
relatively unimportant family.
353 Nyon account 1782: ACV Bp 35/33.
354 Hagnauer (1995): 56-57 and 133.1 have not carried out systematic research on this in my database.
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ii-8 Conclusion: An Assessment of Patrician Rule
By the eighteenth century, Bern had been safely established as a territorial 
republic and most powerful member state of the Swiss Confederation. The 
government was staffed by an oligarchy of patrician honoratiores, who successfully 
claimed exclusive access to power. Although this government had no competitors for 
its monopoly of legitimate violence, attempts to intensify state activity -  state- 
building, in short -  were checked for by a lack of resources for coercion. In Bern, the 
scope at which state-building could happen was smaller than in other European states, 
as the empirical results will later confirm (see Section IV-5 in particular). Despite a 
tendency to unify the canton, jurisdictional fragmentation remained important, not 
only within the canton, but even more so with other states of the Swiss 
Confederation. The government depended on the co-operation of its subjects, which it 
secured in two ways. First, local elites could participate in the lower levels of 
administration and, second, the population was taxed moderately. If the state never 
imposed a coercive machinery to extract revenue from its subjects, this was on one 
hand because it did not need to; on the other hand, it did not have the means to do so. 
Thus, Bern survived at a low-level equilibrium, where small expenditure and little 
revenue went hand in hand. Such an equilibrium could only work if the state’s 
financial needs were curtailed, for which the absence of warfare was crucial. This in 
turn was secured by a combination of geopolitical inactivity (‘neutrality’) within the 
European balance of power and far-reaching co-operation with the most threatening 
rival, France. Bernese mercenary troops were an exported service that also provided 
education and investment opportunities for patricians. In addition, they contributed to 
foreign policy and were a necessary completion to the domestic militia in the canton’s 
defensive strategy. They did not generate any direct revenue for the state, however.
An advantage of patrician rule was that the heredity of government offices 
ensured that coercion was applied with moderation. Government members recognised 
their dependence on co-operation from their subjects and wanted to sustain the basis 
of their rule for future generations. Patricians were generally well prepared for 
holding office, which was their professional objective for life. For the most part, they 
were relatively well-educated, incorruptible and carried out administrative tasks 
efficiently. This was guaranteed by numerous internal checks and balances, of which 
peer-monitoring by envious fellow patricians was probably the most effective. 
Government offices were well remunerated, which limited the incentives for
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corruption -  especially since the consequences of opportunistic behaviour were an 
exclusion from future office holding for an entire family. Also, the fact that the top- 
level administration was staffed by government members resulted in an alignment of 
interests between the two, curtailing agency problems and moral hazard. In this sense, 
the Bernese administration compared favourably with the situation in monarchic 
states.
The negative aspects of patrician rule were that the system of seniority and 
lifelong office holding in top positions led to a lack of internal renewal and ossified 
political structures. Insurmountable barriers of nepotism and co-optation limited the 
access to both government and top-tier administration for all but a small fraction of 
the population. The result was a distorted selection for the manning of offices, which 
was ultimately an inefficient way of allocating talent. The exclusion of wealthy and 
well-educated subjects from important positions in the republic made them suffer 
from status inconsistency. From today’s perspective, there was also an obvious lack 
of individual freedom and political participation. However, it is not clear what the 
eighteenth-century alternative to Bernese rule was for the subject territories. Although 
independence and self-government might have been an option, it was unlikely to be 
in a more liberal and democratic state. Most subjects were probably better off living 
under a paternalistic but largely benevolent patrician rule, rather than being part of an 
absolutist monarchy or a guild-dominated city state, where political elites pursued 
their vested economic interests. This is illustrated with the provision of property 
rights, which was relatively free and fair in Bern, although mercantile contracts were 
not specifically protected.
When using Hilton Root’s distinction between cronyism and corruption, Bern’s 
political institutions tended more towards the former.355 Corruption in the form of 
bribes was relatively negligible, but the distinction between private and public 
finance of administrators was blurred. Co-monitoring and hereditary office holding 
had the effect that short-term exploitation by officeholders was curbed. Patricians had 
not become pure rent-seekers holding sinecures. In spite of securing exclusive access 
to offices, they still had to perform vital administrative tasks. As simony had been 
successfully contained, the only cost of access to office was the waiting time that 
patricians incurred. Therefore, the personal expenses that an officeholder had to cover 
during his term were significantly lower. Furthermore, the scope of private
355 For the distinction, see Root (1991), discussed in Section 1-2 above.
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appropriation was curtailed by the sheer fact that state revenue was relatively 
moderate. Bern’s fiscal constitution is indicative of the government’s half-hearted 
attempts to reform and unify administrative procedures.
When comparing these findings with the matrix of European state-building by 
Ertmann, infrastructure of the canton was patrimonial in character, since magistrates 
carried out administrative tasks without the support of a bureaucratic structure. Bern’s 
political regime can less clearly be described as either absolutist or constitutional. 
Despite being formally organised as a parliament, it had absolutist traits. The 
government was only accountable to fellow patrician government members and 
citizens, which were only a fraction of the total population. If we classify this as 
absolutist, this leaves us with the intriguing conclusion that -  still according to 
Ertman’s model -  Bern was part of ‘Latin Europe’. Based on his explanatory 
variables, with an early onset of geopolitical competition and its participative form of 
local government in the early days of state-building, the model predicts Bern to 
develop into a patrimonial-cum-constitutional state.
356 See Ertman (1997): 10 (Table 1), dicussed in Section 1-2 above.
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III Bernese State Finance in the Eighteenth Century 
(Analysis of Long-Term Developments)
in-i Chapter Content and Analytical Framework
Abraham Stanyan, writing in 1714, gave the following account of Bernese state 
finance:
The revenue of the Canton of Beme arise from five Branches. First, the 
Lands or Demesmes [sic] of the Sovereign. Secondly, The Tenths [sic] of the 
Fruits of the Lands. Thirdly, a certain Tax upon Rural Lands, which they call 
in French, Censes Fongieres. Fourthly, Duties and Customs upon 
merchandize. And Fifthly, the Revenue arising from the Sale of Salt [...].
I have not been wanting in my Endeavours, to find out what Sum these 
several Taxes may produce yearly in the Canton of Beme\ but could not get 
any Satisfactory Account, because its Revenue, consisting chiefly in the Sale 
of Com and Wine, are more or less, according to the Price those 
Commodities bear; and, as the Sovereign sells none in cheap Seasons, it 
happens, that, during some Years together, they put little or no Money into 
the Treasury, and at other times lay up in one Year the Revenue of many.357
In spite of the lack of detailed information, Stanyan’s description was accurate 
and raised the thorny issue of the collection of revenue in kind. Essentially the aim of 
my empirical analysis is to address the gaps in his account. The primary objective in 
this is to provide quantitative data underlying the concept of Bern as a Surplus State 
which was utlined in the introduction. The first part of the analysis -  this chapter -  
will discuss the long-run developments in Bernese state finance. This is followed by a 
detailed study of the state’s financial structure in two sample years in the next chapter 
(IV). Finally, Chapter V will discuss one of the most salient features of government 
finance: overseas capital investments.
The remainder of this section will provide a historiography of Bernese state 
finance. I will then present the framework that underlies my analysis. The empirical 
presentation starts in Section III-3 with an overview of the accounting system. 
Section III-4 is a discussion of the major long-run financial developments; it is mostly
357 Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 171-173 (his italics). Stanyan wrote that the state domain 
produced ‘great Quantities’ of grain and wine, which were then stored and sold at the government’s 
discretion; the tithes had to be ‘very high’ in such a rich country, and salt sales were ‘very 
considerable, because the Sovereign alone sell it by retail to the Subject, and imposes upon it what 
price he thinks proper’. The other sources of revenue were less important.
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based on so-called General-Bilanzen, which can be taken as a proxy for the overall 
state budget. A subsequent section (III-5) will examine how some of the prime 
government assets contributed to overall revenue and expenditure. The cash reserve, 
financial investments, salt trade and public granaries will all be discussed in this 
context. How government agents acted on the grain market is the topic of Section III- 
6, which will investigate this matter based on a sample from Nidau county. The main
findings of the chapter will be summarised in the conclusion.
A Brief Historiography of Bernese State Finance
The financial history of Ancien Regime Bern has not been investigated in a
comprehensive and thorough way. A number of studies discuss particular aspects of 
the topic. Early in the twentieth century, authors writing in the spirit of the German 
historical school of economics have investigated public salt trade (Guggisberg), 
customs (Beck) or overseas investment (Landmann).358 More recently, social and 
economic historians have studied refugee support (Kiing), public building activities 
(Ebener), poverty relief (Fluckiger Strebel) and economic policy (Brandenberger) 
using financial data.359 Komer has included material from Bern for his work on state 
finance in the Swiss Confederation, which was part of a larger research project on 
European state finance.360
Based on the published literature, it appears that scholarly attention to Bernese 
state finance has been inversely related to the amount of primary data available. Only 
a small percentage of the original documents stored in the archives of Bern, Argovia 
and Vaud have been edited so far. To address this situation, a research project at the 
University of Bern has compiled a database of transcripts from primary documents 
covering the canton’s finances from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, which I 
have used extensively for this study.361 The project was supervised by Martin Komer 
and ran from 1995 to 2002. Many of the recent publications on the topic spun off 
from this project.
358 Beck (1923); Guggisberg (1933); Landmann (1903); Landmann (1904).
359 Kiing (1993); Ebener (1999); Fluckiger Strebel (2002); Brandenberger (2004).
360 Komer (1999); For the overall research project: Bonney (1995b); Bonney (1999b); see also the 
European State Finance Database with empirical data: http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/.
361 Forschungsprojekt BeFin (Bemische Staatsfinanzen in der Friihneuzeit): 
http://www.befin.hist.unibe.ch. See also Komer (1997).
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In line with the approach Komer took in analysing state finance in Lucerne, 
Niklaus Bartlome and Stephan Hagnauer developed a set of analytical tools geared 
towards investigating Bemese public finance in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. To this date, the main thrust of their work is still in progress; only a 
summary article, preliminary findings and methodological issues are published. A 
number of Komer’s other students have employed this methodology to investigate 
bailiff accounts for selected counties.
Bemese financial accounts have also been used as a rich source for cultural 
history. In this respect, Adolf Fluri’s pioneering work has not been surpassed.364 
Jolanda Leuenberger-Binggeli has written about the formal aspects of treasury 
accounts without a thorough analysis of their content.365 Finally, Bela Kapossy has 
approached the topic of state finance from a non-quantitative perspective, focusing on 
ideological and political aspects. His studies of foreign capital investments and the 
Bemese agricultural-military state without taxation offer an alternative to my 
quantitative-empirical angle.366
ni-2 A Framework for Analysing Financial Developments
In this section, I will explain the basis on which I have analysed financial 
developments in eighteenth-century Bern. Parts of this discussion will be covered in 
more detail in the following chapter, when the state’s financial structure will be 
scmtinised (Section IV-1).
Martin Komer pioneered the application of analytical criteria based on the 
modem understanding of public accounting to the study of early modem state 
finance. This has been refined by Niklaus Bartlome and Stephan Hagnauer. I will 
use a similar approach with some minor adjustments. In general, my framework is
362 Hagnauer (1994); Hagnauer (1995); Hagnauer/Bartlome (1998); Bartlome/Hagnauer (2006). Both 
authors are currently working on their dissertations on Bemese state finance in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries respectively. I am indebted to them for support and advice for my own research.
363 Caminada (1990); Cardis Isely (1996); Scheuermeier-Poglajen (1992); Weber, S. (1997).
364 Fluri (1917). For cultural aspects of fmancial records also: Komer (1993).
365 Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999).
366 Kapossy (1998); Kapossy (2002).
367 Komer (1981): 389-392, who relied in particular on Wittmann (1970-74); Hagnauer (1994); 
Hagnauer (1995); Hagnauer/Bartlome (1998); Bartlome/Hagnauer (2006). Their main results are still 
unpublished and cannot be used for comparison. I have adapted their accounting plan (Kontenplan) 
slightly to suit my purposes: see Figure IV-2 and Section VII-12 in the appendix.
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based on modern-day public accounting in Switzerland. This allows a more precise 
and structured consideration of historical transactions than relying solely on 
eighteenth-century categorisation. My analytical framework can in theory be used to 
study every state and I have made a few adaptations to make it more applicable to the 
particularities of eighteenth-century Bern. Accordingly, some categories that would 
be prominent in other polities, such as the cost of keeping up a royal court, expenses 
for the standing army or income from seignorage are insignificant.369 For a 
comparative study, these aspects could very easily be accommodated by the model. 
The main disadvantage of this approach, aside from it being very labour intensive, is 
that it is anachronistic. Eighteenth-century administrators did not employ the 
analytical categories described in my thesis. However, social science has to go 
beyond this limitation in order to answer meaningful questions. For this, an 
anachronistic framework is sometimes unavoidable. The alternative would be to limit 
the analysis to pre-enlightenment methods, which would hardly be a more accurate 
way of doing research.
A further limitation is that the distinction between categories is not always 
easily established. I have tried to be consistent in my analysis, noting cases without 
proper identification as unspecified. In practical terms, my approach is constrained by 
the trade-off between the use of easily accessible, aggregated data with less accuracy 
versus the disaggregated material which would be more time consuming. To derive a 
balanced perspective and mitigate the shortcomings of the data, I have opted for a 
two-pronged approach which combines the long-term study of aggregated data (this 
chapter) with a detailed analysis for two sample years (next chapter). The first step in 
conducting a long-term analysis of Bemese state finance is the consideration of which 
account transactions were recorded in, which can be an effective proxy for the 
functions they performed. For example, if the salt trade account recorded expenditure, 
it can be reasonably assumed these were connected to the government’s 
entrepreneurial activities. The only problem with calculations on the account level is 
that transfer payments {assignations) between accounts in the sample have to be 
excluded to avoid inflating the figures.
368 This is known as the Neues Rechnungsmodell (NRM) for public accounting in Switzerland: 
Finanzverwaltung des Kantons Bern (c. 1989).
369 1 have excluded gains from seignorage completely for my analysis. These were not important any 
more in the eighteenth century, although they had played an important part earlier and led to the 
peasants’ revolt of 1653 (see Section II-2). See also Furrer (1995).
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Categorising transactions by nature is more complex. The main distinction is 
between current and inventory transactions. Current transactions embody all revenue 
and expenditure that did not have an impact beyond the accounting period, whereas 
inventory transactions were like investments, for which a future return could be 
expected. Inventory transactions can therefore be defined as capital formation that 
produces a stream of goods and services beyond its recorded period. Such 
investments in the public inventory could also be negative; they would then be 
divestments. This is illustrated in Figure IV-2 with T-style accounts, representing 
revenue on the right and expenditure on the left-hand side.
Inventory Transactions
E x p R e v
Investment Divestment
] Loans (as Lender)
| Public Debt (as Borrower)
I Investments/Divsestments: Buildings, 
Property & Titles; Inventory Goods
| Cash Reverve
Current Transactions
Exp Re v
Expenditures Revenues
Personnel Cost 
Public Consumption
Transfer Payments
........................- ......... - ,1
|-----------  ----------- ~ “i
| Taxes
• Non-entrepreneurial 
Return
! Entrepreneurial Return j
Figure III-l: Analytical Framework: Nature of Transactions
Based on Hagnauer (1995): 22-23 For a more detailed version, see Figure IV-2 and Section VII-12 in 
the appendix.
The distinction between current and inventory transactions can also be referred 
to as that between state consumption and investments.37° Using an analogy from 
corporate finance, the former is the profit and loss statement of a firm, the latter its 
balance sheet. However, unlike for a company’s balance sheet parts of the public 
inventory are not measurable.371 Any quantification of state sovereignty in particular, 
including the right to legislate and tax, is impossible. The state’s accounts only 
contain information about the relative change in the stock of public assets and 
liabilities without information about their overall value. Between different types of 
current revenue, the first distinction which should be made is between taxes and 
returns. These can come from sovereign (or non-entrepreneurial) and entrepreneurial
370 Hagnauer (1995) speaks of Verbrauchs- and Investitionsrechnung\ Komer (1981) distinguishes 
between Verbrauchs- and Vermogensrechnung.
371 Similar to a company’s balance sheet, assets o f a state would contain property in real estate and 
movables, financial assets and reserves. In addition, it would also include sovereignty and judicial 
rights.
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activities of the state. Entrepreneurial returns are incomes from previous investments. 
Current expenditure consist of personnel cost, public consumption and welfare 
transfers.372 Inventory transactions o f the state describe relative changes affecting its 
assets, such as financial claims (loans as a lender or debts as a borrower) and real 
capital (buildings, infrastructure, titles, etc.). A special form of inventory transactions 
is the withdrawal from and deposits into a cash reserve.
The distinction between the current and inventory transactions reflects the 
sustainability of a state’s financial position. If current revenue exceededs expenditure, 
a government could invest and benefit from future returns. The opposite situation 
applied when assets had to be sold to cover current expenditure (‘selling the family 
silver’). Figure III-2 shows the relation between the key figures profit, net investment 
and budget surplus with stylised T-accounts.
Current Transactions Inventory Transactions All Transactions
Profit
Budget Surplus
Net Investment
Current
Expenditure
Profit
Current
Revenue
Inventory
Expenditure
Net Investment
Inventory
Revenue
Budget Surplus
Current
Expenditure
Inventory
Expenditure
Inventory
Revenue
Current
Revenue
= Increase in Retained Earnings 
(Change in Restanzen in Kind and Monetary Restanzen)
Figure III-2: Profit, Net Investment and Budget Surplus
First, profit is defined as the difference between current revenue and current 
expenditure. It can be positive or negative. A profit can either be invested or put aside 
as a reserve (‘retained earning’). Net investment is defined as the difference between 
inventory expenditure and revenue: it describes the amount of profit used for 
investment. The remainder of the profit is a budget surplus, which is the equivalent of 
the difference between total revenue and expenditure. It is equivalent to a relative 
change in the state’s retained earnings, which in Bern had the form of financial claims
372 These are not to be confused with accounting transfers, which are excluded from the analysis (see 
above).
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towards government members (.Restanzen or arrears). These could be purely financial 
(monetary arrears) or inventories leased out to officials (grain arrears).373 For single 
accounts, Hagnauer defines the difference between current revenue and expenditure 
as the ‘skimming potential’ (Abschopfungspotential) for the government.374 I use the 
term profitability to describe the ratio of an account’s profits to its current revenue.
Hi-3 The Bernese Accounting System
This section will present different types of accounts that were used by the 
government. Instead of relying on a central budget covering all state revenue and 
expenditure, Bern followed a complex system of accounts that had grown and 
overlapped through time. I will first discuss the absence of a central account and then 
present how different ledgers were connected. Some accounting practices have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter (see Section II-7 above).
The Absence of a Central Account
The Bemese republic did not have a central budget which covered all activities 
of the state. One reason for this was the absence of a written constitution. Since the 
Bemese state had grown organically from a medieval city state, there was no clear 
division between offices and many administration problems were solved on an ad hoc 
basis. This was mirrored by a fiscal constitution in which responsibilities were not 
always clearly assigned and often overlapped. The exclusive nature of the 
government also implied a low level of transparency in state decision making 
processes. The introduction of a financial structure with clear accountability might 
have exposed the government to what it perceived as undesirable public scrutiny. 
Therefore all internal auditing was carried out behind closed doors. A strategic reason 
for such secrecy was the connection between finance and national defence, as 
budgetary information would be valuable to Bern’s opponents.
The closest Bern had to a central budget was the Deutsche Standesrechnung, 
translated literally as the Account Covering the German Speaking Canton (Estate). As
373 For a detailed discussion of Restanzen, see Section VII-5 in the appendix.
374 Hagnauer (1995): 156-158. This potential consists of the realised skimming (in the form of a 
transfer to the central government) and retained earnings within the county.
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the name implies, this only covered the German speaking territories; for French- 
speaking Vaud, the Welsche Standesrechnung was its equivalent. For simplicity, I 
will refer to them as central accounts. Contrary to their name, the Standesrechnungen 
were not all-encompassing and only recorded a limited number of state transactions. 
The rest were recorded in accounts with either limited or no connection to the central 
accounts (see below).
The Standesrechnung was also referred to as the Sackelmeister-Rechnung, 
named after its bookkeeper, the Treasurer {Sackelmeister).3 75 Each Standesrechnung 
covered a period from 26 December until the same date the following year. The 
Treasurer had to submit his accounts to the Vennerkammer for scrutiny within two 
months of the end of the financial year. From there it was passed on to the Great 
Council, who normally passed it after the Easter elections.
Since 1683, the ledger had been recorded in Arabic numbers. Prior to that year, 
Roman numerals were used, which increased the likelihood of calculation mistakes. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the sums were consecutively listed in one 
currency, with one column for each sub-unit. Until 1770, the currency was the 
Bemese Pound, after 1770 the Bemese Crown (see Section VII-13 in the appendix). 
During the first few years of this change, the ledger contained all figures in both 
currencies to avoid confusion.376
The Standesrechnung was not organised chronologically, but by content. The 
categories varied slightly over time, but generally followed the same structure. Table 
VII-1 in the appendix lists these categories for the year 1732 as an example. They can 
be grouped together into the main categories shown in Figure III-3 as a T-style 
account, with revenue on the left and expenditure on the right-hand side of the 
balance.377
375 For a list of Deutsch-Sackelmeister, see Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 158. There were 22 office 
holders in the eighteenth century.
376 Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 178.
377 There was a complete re-organisation of the Deutsch-Standesrechnung in 1796, which will not be 
considered here in detail: Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 175-176.
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Figure III-3: The Bernese Standesrechnung: Main Categories Used in Contemporary Accounts
Bailiff Arrears are debts of officeholders (see Section VII-5 in the appendix); Assignments are transfers 
from other accounts; Arrears are debts of the Treasurer to the state; Bailiff Arrears are debts by other 
officeholders.
The Welsch Standesrechung had fewer sub-categories, but followed a similar 
scheme. In addition to Figure III-3, it had numerous types of expenditure related to 
wine growing by the state. It is cmcial to note that while at a first glance this looks 
quite comprehensive, there are some conspicuously absent items, most importantly all 
the revenue and expenditure that was collected locally by bailiffs. These were not 
recorded directly, but only through the bailiffs debt to the government, their arrears 
(Restanzen). This will be analysed in more detail in the next two sections.
Types of Accounts
Revenue and expenditure of Figure III-3 can be organised according to how the 
different accounts were related to the Standesrechnung as a central account. This is 
illustrated in Figure III-4, again in a stylised T-account with revenue on the right and 
expenditure on the left-hand side. Revenue and expenditure could be either: [1] 
recorded directly in the central account; [2] transferred in total from other ledgers (= 
indirect revenue of the Standesrechnung); [3] recorded in different accounts and 
included through the debt (‘arrears’) of bailiffs; or [4] recorded in accounts entirely
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independent of the Standesrechnung, from where transfer payments (‘assignations’) 
were made. Finally, the balance of the previous year’s account, the arrear 
(Vorjahresrestanz) was also included in the ledger [5], because balances were 
summed up over the Treasurer’s tenure of five years. If the current arrear was larger 
than in the previous year, the account was in loss and vice versa [5b]. For 
expenditure, the categories are mirroring revenue.
The Bernese Standesrechnung
Direct Expenditure 
from 
Standesrechnung
Direct Revenue to 
Standesrechnung ✓
Indirect Indirect
Debt to Bailiffs 
("Passive Arrears")
Debt from Bailiffs_ 
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Transfers
("Assignations")
Transfers
("Assignations")
Arrears Previous Arrears v
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Standesrechnung
in Figure H3-5:
Recorded in accounts fully (^ ~ C account^
Balance of transactions from
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(Type D account )-------------------s
(^Type B account^Contributions from entierly independent accounts
Balance of last year's 
Standesrechnung
Negative balance = increasing 
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Figure III-4: The Bernese Standesrechnung: Types of Revenue by Nature of Account
Following this distinction, I have classified Bemese accounts into four types, 
from A to D (Figure III-5). The Deutsch- and Welsch-Standesrechnung are the only 
central accounts (Type A). Independent Type B accounts, of which there were four, 
covered the state’s major entrepreneurial activities: salt trade, salt production, 
gunpowder manufacturing and foreign capital investment. Minor activities were 
covered by Type C accounts, while Type D accounts included most government 
offices and bailiffs. Therefore, their number could change with every administrative 
reform.
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Figure III-5: Types of Bernese Accounts
For an empirical distribution of funds to these types of accounts, see below.
The contributions (‘assignations’) of Type B accounts towards the central 
budget were irregular and happened mainly to level out revenue shortfalls. For 
example, in 1782 the Vennerkammer ordered the gunpowder administrator Beat 
Fischer to transfer the content of his trading hind in excess of 30,000 Crowns to the 
Deutsch-Standesrechnung.378 In addition to such transfers to the central accounts, 
Type B accounts also contributed directly to the state’s cash reserve (see also 
Sections III-4 and III-5 below).
Type C accounts were little more than detailed ledgers containing transactions 
that would have been too voluminous for inclusion in the Standesrechnung. They 
were relatively small in number and in the sums accounted for. Most revenue and
378 StABE B II555.
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expenditure covered activities that occurred within the city that would normally count 
as communal finance, such as schools and prisons. Since the city itself was not 
organised as a separate commune, these transactions were recorded by minor 
officials, who were directly accountable to the German Treasurer. Accordingly, the 
overall total of their ledgers was integrated into the central account. Thus, Type C 
accounts added nothing to total state revenue, but specified transactions in more 
detail. One example is the account of the Stadt-Physicus, the city doctor. The gross 
sum of his ledgers appeared in the Deutsch-Standesrechnung, along with fourteen 
other Type C accounts. The Welsch-Standesrechnung for the same years contained 
only six Type C accounts.
The bulk of the canton’s finances were registered in Type D accounts, whose 
balance was transferred to the Standesrechnungen. In 1732, Bern had 52 bailiffs, plus 
32 other offices that followed the same accounting technique. The latter were 
specialised functions, such as customs or hospitals in the city. The transfer to the 
central account happened through changes in the officeholders’ debts towards the 
state (‘arrears’), which they settled at the end of tenure. This is explained in detail in 
Section VII-5 in the appendix. Changes to these debts were recorded yearly in the 
Standesrechnungen; if locally collected revenue exceeded expenditure, the bailiffs 
debt to the state would increase, which showed up in the ledger as a higher arrear.
Some accounts cannot be accurately described by this categorisation. This 
applies in particular to lower levels of administration which were accountable to a 
specific officeholder. Examples include the former monastery of Biberstein, which 
reported to the bailiff of Konigsfelden, or the city of Bern’s Kaufhaus, whose 
accounts were included in the General Customs account. The Great Hospital of the 
City also contained various smaller outlets with their own ledgers, such as the city 
mill, the former monastery on St Peter Island or the Hygiene Police (Siechenvogt). 
All these accounts covered small sums.
The Bemese state used ad hoc accounts for specific exceptional occurrences, 
such as major land purchases or military campaigns like the 1712 Villmergen war. 
Ultimately their funds came from other state accounts, usually the 
Standesrechnungen, or at times directly from the cash reserve. These ad hoc accounts 
were similar to Type B accounts in character. The difference is that they were not 
annual and only covered one-off events. Their exact number is not known, since the
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government kept no detailed lists of ad hoc accounts. However, it can be assumed 
that this method was only used in exceptional circumstances.
Hi-4 Long-Run Analysis of General-Bilanzen
Because the Bemese state did not have a regular budget which encompassed all 
its accounts, it is difficult to obtain an overview of financial developments throughout 
the eighteenth century. This is not only problematic for historians; contemporaries 
struggled with the fragmented nature of state finance as well. As a remedy, the 
Bemese government established tables with some key figures from its most important 
accounts for the time after 1764, the General Bilanzen. Although this name refers to a 
balance sheet (Bilanz), the character of this document is better described as a profit 
and loss statement or budget. The Bemese archives contain several attempts of 
compiling the information from General-Bilanzen into tables. Even though most of 
these would fail modern-day standards of methodological accuracy and consistency, 
they are proof of a desire by officials to enquire the financial situation of the 
government (as discussed in Sections II-7 and III-3 above).379
I will first discuss the nature of the data, then analyse it by account and 
category, before ending this section with some additional information from 
documents similar to the General-Bilanzen.
The Data
In addition to the Deutsch- and Welsch-Standesrechnung, accounts included in 
the General-Bilanzen covered foreign funds (AUS), salt trading (SDI), salt
- lO A
production (ROC) and gunpowder production (PUL). In other words, the General- 
Bilanzen contained information for all A- and B-Type accounts of the Bemese state. 
While this included C-Type accounts by definition, D-Type accounts were only
101
considered through the transfer of surpluses via Restanzen. The General-Bilanzen 
therefore represented rather the gross profits from administrating the canton than total
379 Examples are: StABE B V II680,2179 or 2520a.
380 They also included accounts for the mint (Miinz) for some years; these are very small quantitatively, 
however.
381 C-Type accounts were included in the General-Bilanzen by definition, although not in detail. See 
Section HI-3 above for details; for Restanzen transfers, see Section VII-5 in the appendix.
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revenue and expenditure. This distinction is important when comparing relative 
figures. Since the data only shows the difference of underlying revenue and 
expenditure, it is likely to overstate relative change. Accordingly, this chapter can 
only reasonably assert conclusions about seminal trends rather than absolute levels. 
For the latter, a detailed analysis of all Bemese accounts for two sample years in the 
following chapter will provide more accurate information.
The General Bilanzen were tables of large format, drawn on information from 
Bemese accounts, listing them by category headings.382 I have re-classified the data, 
following the empirical framework outlined in Section III-2 as closely as possible. 
The exact categories used are specified in Section VII-8 in the appendix. I have also
-lOO #
added information on salt trading that was not in the original data. The way in 
which revenue and expenditure were recorded in the General Bilanzen changed twice, 
in 1769/70 and 1775/76. The former change was related to the use of Crowns as the
384major unit of account. It also introduced the idea of real (and non-real) revenue 
and expenditure, which bears great similarity to the distinction between current and 
inventory transactions. The distinction was done away with again in 1775. As 
explained above, I have excluded all transfers between accounts in the sample to 
avoid double-counting. Different monetary units were converted using figures in 
Table VII-11 in the appendix. For the rare conversion of transactions in kind, I have 
used the most accurate price available from the ledgers, following the proceedings 
explained in Section VII-13 in the appendix.
I have also extended the General-Bilanzen back to the beginning of the century, 
drawing on the same sources. The result is a long-run series of Bemese revenue and
385expenditure by aggregated category from 1700 to 1796. The Deutsch- and Welsch- 
Standesrechnung and the salt trade accounts (SDI) were fully integrated.386 For 
foreign capital investments, I relied on data from the Historie der Auslandischen 
Stands Capitalien of 1776 and on the accounts for foreign funds (AUS), which will 
both be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.387 I have only accounted for overall 
changes in the sums invested abroad, leaving the discussion of portfolio adjustments
382 StABE B V II2179. There were between 1 and 15 headings for revenue, 1-27 for expenditure.
383 The General-Bilanzen only showed profits from salt trade. See Section VII-16 in the appendix.
384 Reale and Nicht-Reale Einnahmen (Ausgaben). Before, the distinction was between regular and 
additional transactions.
385 For the period after 1794, some accounts are missing (only DSR, AUS and SDI available).
386 See Section VII-6 in the appendix for details.
387 StABE B VII 2389 and StABE B V II2396-2473.
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for later. In addition, my database includes figures about deposits and withdrawals 
from the cash reserve that were recorded in a Treasury Ledger (Gwdlb-Buchli)
TOO
between 1750 and 1790. Information about transactions with the cash reserve after 
this date is missing. For earlier years, I relied on figures from corresponding accounts
2QQ
and anecdotal evidence. This data will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent 
section about the cash reserve itself (Section III-5). The database does not cover salt 
production (ROC) and gunpowder production (PUL) before 1764 on the basis that the 
sums involved were small, judged on their post-1764 position.390 Strictly speaking the 
data before and after 1764 is not identical. However, the differences are likely to be 
small.
Overview
As a first overview, Figure II1-2 shows total revenue and expenditure and the 
Budget Surplus Rate, which is the difference between revenue and expenditure 
expressed as a share of revenue.
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Figure 111-6: Revenue, Expenditure and Budget Surplus Rate, 1700-1796
388 StABE B VII 2388a (see Section III-5 below for more details).
389 Feller (1955): 226-227 and 318. Outflows to the Deutsch-Standesrechnung before 1750 are missing.
390 Profits from gunpowder production were occasionally recorded in the Deutsch-Standesrechnung in 
the early eighteenth century; Salt production in Roche was partly included in the salt trade accounts 
(SDI) until the late 1730s.
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Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). Data for 1764-1794 is from 
the General Bilanzen (StABE B VII 2179), the remainder from original accounts. The composition of 
the data changed in 1764 and 1794 (hence the vertical lines). The Budget Surplus Rate is calculated as 
the budget surplus expressed as a percentage of revenue.
A few things are obvious from Figure III-6. First, the Bemese state consistently 
ran budget surpluses: in 78 years of the 96 for which information is available, revenue 
exceeded expenditure. The Budget Surplus Rate was on average 11.8%, but 
fluctuated strongly from year to year.391 Second, there were remarkable peaks in both 
revenue and expenditure around 1710. As will be shown later, these was caused by 
military expenditure (1707, 1712)392 and massive loans to the Dutch and English in 
1710. Finally, with the exception of these particular years, revenue and expenditure 
increased over time.
A rough distinction between current and inventory transactions -  at least as far 
as the categories of the General-Bilanzen allow for -  is shown in Figure 111-7, with 
revenue as positive and expenditure as a negative values. Most transactions were 
current, and the fluctuations for inventory transactions were larger. This is not 
surprising, given that inventory transactions usually had a one-off character, such as 
investments or loans.
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Figure III-7: Current and Inventory Transactions, 1700-1796
391 Minimum = -48.9%, Maximum = 43.9%, Standard Deviation = 17.0%.
392 In 1707, the government also stocked up its salt inventory at a high cost (discussed below).
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Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). Expenditure shown as 
negative values. Vertical lines (1764 and 1794) are for changes in the data sample (see Figure III-6).
Some of the extraordinary events mentioned above become clearer in Figure 
III-7: in 1710, the cash reserve was depleted to cover for overseas loans, which shows 
as an increase in inventory transactions. In 1712, when the cash reserve contributed 
towards extraordinary military expenditure, this shows as an increase in inventory 
revenue and current expenditure. I will discuss the underlying categories for the 
financial developments in Figure III-7 in more detail below.
Isolating current revenue and expenditure, it is possible to establish the profit of 
Bemese administration (see Figure III-8). I have also added estimations for current 
revenue per capita, based on population estimates for 1700, 1732, 1764, 1782 and 
1798.393 The figures for revenue per capita should be considered rough estimates of a 
long-term trend rather than absolute figures.
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Figure 111-8: Current Revenue, Expenditure and Revenue per Capita, 1700-1796
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). Population estimates 
calculated as in Section II-3, with values for 1732 and 1782 based on linear trends (as explained in 
Section IV-2). Revenue per capita is calculated based on three-year moving averages for 1701, 1732, 
1764, 1782 and 1796. Vertical lines (1764 and 1794) are for changes in the data sample (see Figure 
HI-6).
393 Based on Pfister, C. (1995); HLS (2002), article Bern; Mesmer (1987) and Schluchter (1988), as 
discussed in Section II-3. Figures for 1732 and 1782 are based on the assumption of linear population 
growth (see Section IV-2).
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Between 1700 and 1796, Bern made a profit on current transactions in 84 years. 
The average yearly profit rate was 12.6%, but fluctuated highly.394 It followed a 
similar pattern to the Budget Surplus Rate from Figure III-6. Current expenditure 
markedly exceeded revenue in 1707, 1712 and 1792 only. All three peaks can be 
explained by military emergencies.
The estimates for current revenue per capita should not be taken at face value 
because the population figures for 1732 and 1782 are based on the assumption of 
linear population growth, hence the linearity of revenue per capita might be 
overstated. When measured in Batzen, current revenue per capita more than doubled 
over the century (+241% from 1701 to 1796). This is equivalent to a linear growth 
rate of 1.30% per annum. As will be explained in the next chapter, this is not 
necessarily representative of an increase of overall state revenue per capita. It might 
simply reflect the fact that more transactions were covered by the accounts included 
in the long-run database sample (see Section IV-5).395
Revenue and Expenditure by Account
The most straightforward way of analysing at the long-run database is to 
consider the accounts in which transactions were recorded. On one hand, this can 
provide further insights into the administrative organisation of the canton. It can also 
serve as a proxy for what transactions were used for, if a more accurate categorisation 
is impeded by the nature of the data. By eliminating transfers between accounts 
{assignations) from the analysis, the figures are not necessarily representative of how 
much was recorded in each account, but about where a transaction originated.
Figure III-9 shows the distribution of revenue by account. In order not to 
overload the graphs, I have used five year averages for this section. The yearly figures 
can be seen in the appendix (Section VII-7) and will be referred to throughout the 
text.
394 Minimum = -146.0%, Maximum = 48.9%, Standard Deviation = 22.2%.
395 The figure in this chapter only includes transactions from a limited number of accounts. Overall 
transactions of the state grew by 95.8% from 1732 to 1782, which is equal to a linear annual growth 
rate of 1.25% (see Section IV-2). See also the discussion in Section VII-10 in the appendix.
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Figure III-9: Revenue by Account, 1700-1796 (5-Year Averages)
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). All figures are five year 
means; the last column is for seven years (1790-96). Abbreviations: DSR = Deutsch Standesrechnung, 
WSR = Welsch Standesrechnung, AUS = foreign funds, SDI = salt trade, CAS = cash reserve, Other 
includes data from salt production (ROC), gunpowder (PUL) and minor accounts. For a yearly 
breakdown, see Figure VII-3 in the appendix.
A surprisingly small amount of revenue came from the two Standesrechnungen 
(DSR and WSR). This is partly down to the way in which transactions are 
categorised. In reality, both accounts recorded larger revenue, which mostly came 
from transfer payments from other accounts. The biggest contributors to Bemese 
revenue were accounts about salt trade (SDI). They regularly covered over half of the 
state’s income and were growing in absolute terms. After 1710, the accounts for the 
management of foreign funds (AUS) became another major source of revenue as 
well. In the period 1710-14, the cash reserve was depleted. From the yearly figures it 
becomes obvious that withdrawals occurred in 1710 and to a lesser extent in 1712.396 
This situation was repeated on a smaller scale in 1787, when a loan to the Emperor 
was covered by a cash withdrawal (see yearly figures in Section VII-7 in the 
appendix).
The situation for expenditure is shown in Figure III-10.
396 The fact that there are no contributions o f the cash reserve towards revenue between 1715 and 1750 
might also be caused by the lack of accurate data discussed above.
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Figure 111-10: Expenditure by Account, 1700-1796 (5-Year Averages)
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). All figures are five year 
means; the last column is for seven years (1790-96). For abbreviations, see Figure III-9. For a yearly 
breakdown, see Figure VII-4 in the appendix.
The share of expenditure covered by the Deutsch—Standesrechnung (DSR) is 
significantly larger than that for revenue. This illustrates the point about transfer 
payments made earlier. While it was not the ultimate origin of its funds, the Deutsch- 
Standeserchnung recorded much of the overall government expenditure. This applies 
to a lesser extent to the Welsch-Standesrechnung. As expected, the salt trading 
account was also a major source of expenditure. The peak in expenditure recorded in 
the account for foreign funds (AUS) in the 1710-14 period is uniquely down to the 
loans in 1710. After this date, the Bemese state did not increase its investments by 
sending money abroad. As will be discussed later, the increase in overseas investment 
was funded by re-investing interest payments. After 1750, the share of expenditure on 
foreign funds increased, although some of it was simply due to reallocations within 
the portfolio of foreign funds, with the noticeable exception of the Imperial loan of 
1787 (see Chapter V for details).
As I will discuss later in depth, a categorisation that relies on the account in 
which transactions were recorded can only proxy state functions (see Section IV-4). 
A more accurate picture would require a degree of detail that the aggregated 
categories of the General Bilanzen fail to offer. By the same token, a regional 
breakdown about where in the canton transactions occurred is not possible with this 
data.
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Revenue and Expenditure by Category
The further breakdown of revenue and expenditure follows the structure 
outlined in Section III-l above. The nature of the General-Bilanzen did not allow the 
detailed distinction explained above; for example, non-entrepreneurial returns were 
not recorded in separate categories. I have classified the data into the main categories 
listed in Figure III-l 1.
Expenditure Revenue
j Personnel Cost ; - Personnel Cost Salt Monopoly (Profit)
t | 
! • r Salt Purchases (Current) Salt Sales (Current); ! 
1 General j Military Expenditures Interest Revenues
j Consumption | Other Consumption Other Current Revenues
1..... i  ^ Passive Arrears to Bailiffs Arrears from Bailiffsj ! Loans (Redeemed) Loans (Granted)
! i Investments Divestmentsi Investments i -<i ; Salt Invetory: Reduction Salt Invetory: Increase
j i  ^ Cash Reserve: Deposit Cash Reserve: Withdrawal
j Entrepreneurial 
i Returns Ij----------------
| Unspecified 
i Current 
i Revenue
> i Divestments
Figure III-l 1: Categories for Analysing General-Bilanzen
See Figure IV-2 for comparison.
Some categories require further explanation. Arrears are the debts of office 
holders towards the state (.Restanzen). Passive Arrears are debts of the state towards 
its officials. They represent the profits of D-Type accounts, as will be explained in 
more detail in the next chapter (see also Section VII-5 in the appendix). For data from 
the Bernese salt trading account (SDI), I have separated current Salt Sales and 
Purchases from changes in inventory, which were categorised separately. In addition, 
I have deducted the Salt Monopoly Profit from the proceeds of salt sales and 
categorised as a distinct category. The reason for this is that the government’s 
monopoly profit on this trade has the character of an indirect tax. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter (and in Section VII-16 in the appendix). 
Other Current Revenue include production, taxes, and non-specified current revenue 
(General Einnemmen). Consumption includes all other current expenditure, notably
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the state’s payments for the maintenance of buildings and purchases of non-inventory 
goods. Strictly speaking, Military Expenditure is not a factual category, but consists 
of a combination of personnel cost and other current expenditure for ammunition or 
foodstuffs. Because of its distinct qualities and the fact that military expenditure was 
sometimes not further specified, I have classified it as a separate category.
Figure III-12 combines expenditure to five-year averages; yearly figures can be 
seen in Section VII-7 in the appendix.
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Figure 111-12: Revenue by Category, 1700-1794 (5-Year Averages)
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). All figures are five year 
means; the last column is for seven years (1790-96). For a yearly breakdown, see Figure VII-5 in the 
appendix.
The most important contributors to state revenue were proceeds from salt sales. 
Interest payments and salt monopoly profits steadily increased over time. The share 
of arrears -  the profits from administrating the counties -  was surprisingly small. 
Outflows from the cash reserve were particularly large in 1710-14, when loans were 
granted (1710) and the second war of Villmergen paid for (1712). In the second part 
of the century, revenue from the cash reserve could be considerable, but this will have 
to be qualified in comparison with inflows to the cash reserve.
Expenditure are also shown in five year averages (see Figure III-13, with yearly 
figures in Section VII-7 in the appendix).
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Figure 111-13: Expenditure by Category, 1700-1794 (5-Year Averages)
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). All figures are five year 
means; the last column is for seven years (1790-96). For a yearly breakdown, see Figure VII-6 in the 
appendix.
Current salt purchases were the single most important category. Together with 
expenditure for personnel and other state consumption, the purchase of salt increased 
steadily over time. Military expenditure was highly volatile, because particular years 
of activity denoted when Bern used its troops for civil wars or to support allied 
governments. Such deployments included the second war of Villmergen in 1710, as 
well as expeditions to prevent riots in Lucerne (1763), Fribourg (1781) or Geneva 
(1707, 1737, 1768, 1782).397 However, these interventions were usually small in their 
financial costs. In the 1790s, the threat from Revolutionary France had an important 
budgetary impact, with the cost of guarding its Western frontier showing as a 
significant expenditure. The peak in investment in 1770-1774 was mainly caused by 
the purchase of grain to alleviate the effects of a severe harvest failure in 1770. This 
crisis and the government’s reaction have been discussed in much detail by Bemese 
scholars.398 Bern mobilised resources from the cash reserve to purchase grain abroad. 
In the years after 1770/71, the cash reserve was gradually filled again, partly by the 
proceeds from selling grain at high prices. Overall, the state did not make a profit on
397 For the political background o f these deployments, see Feller (1955): 416-426 and Walchli (1981): 
147-148.
398 Brandenberger (2004); Fluckiger Strebel (2002); Pfister, C. (1975); Pfister, C. (1995); see also my 
discussion in Section III-6 below.
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its grain trade during the crisis, as will be discussed in more detail below (Section III- 
6).
For further analysing the data, we can first look at the net contributions of each 
category. This highlights relative changes and reveals how activities were financed. 
To establish net contributions, I have subtracted expenditure from revenue for each 
category. The results are net values for current transactions, arrears, investments, salt 
inventory, loans and cash reserve.399 They are represented as five year averages in 
Figure III-14, where values for revenue are positive and expenditure negative.
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Figure 111-14: Net Contributions by Category, 1700-1796 (5-Year Averages)
Sources: Long-run Database (see SectionVII-6 in the appendix for details). All figures are five year 
means; the last column is for seven years (1790-96). For a yearly breakdown, see Figure VII-7 in the 
appendix.
Current surpluses have already been discussed earlier (see Figure III-8 for 
yearly figures). The years 1710-14 are again outliers. The only net expenditure was 
for overseas loans, but the surplus of current transactions is significantly smaller than 
in other years with the exception of the 1790s. This was caused by the military 
campaign of 1712. Net investment for loans resumed from the mid-1750s, peaking 
with the Imperial loan of 1787. For the period 1770-74, using yearly figures provides 
a more accurate picture. In 1770, money from the cash reserve was used for food
399 Please note that net current transactions and net investment in this context have a different meaning 
from the way they are normally used in this thesis.
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purchases, which I classified as investment in the grain inventory. They could also be 
considered current expenditure for immediate food consumption. In 1773 and 1774, 
the cash reserve was refilled. At the same time, the salt inventory increased sharply. It 
appears that the cash reserve was used as a buffer to cover unforeseen events or large- 
scale investments, loans in particular.
Additional Data from General-Tabellen and Special-Tabellen (1785- 
1794)
Establishing General Bilanzen had been a first step by government officials to 
obtain an overview of their financial situation. They were fully aware of the 
deficiencies of this approach, in particular the fact that it left out all transactions 
within the counties. The fragmentation of the data and a lack of capacity by the 
Bemese administration were impediments to establish a more comprehensive budget. 
In a heroic attempt to overcome these issues, the government -  it is not clear which 
part or administrative unit, but presumably the Vennerkammer -  began collecting 
information from all its accounts in a standardised format, with tables. The so-called 
General-Tabellen included yearly figures for all monetary transactions by the 
government between 1785 and 1794. Other than the General Bilanzen, the tables 
covered all administrative units of the state. For a breakdown of revenue and 
expenditure, the General-Tabellen divided transactions into 12 types of revenue and 
17 types of expenditure. For my analysis, I have classified them into the broad 
categories Rents (for feudal income in general), Tithes and Production; Duties and 
Taxes; Interests and Entrepreneurial Returns. For expenditure, I distinguish between 
Personnel Costs, Military Expenditure, Transfers (welfare payments) and 
Consumption. A full list of categories is provided in Section VII-8 in the appendix. 
Unfortunately, a distinction between current and inventory transactions was not 
possible with the categories of the original documents.
The overall monetary revenue and expenditure of the Bemese state are shown 
in Figure III-15.
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Figure III-15: Monetary Revenue and Expenditure, 1785-1794 (Yearly Average)
Source: General-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2520), monetary transactions only. The figure is based on the 
yearly averages calculated in the original document. Rev is for revenue, Exp for expenditure, and 
Entrepr. for entrepreneurial returns.
Initially, the fact that there was a budget deficit seems surprising. This is 
because Figure III-15 only covers monetary revenue and not transactions in kind. By 
selling some of the proceeds from its revenue in kind, the government could easily 
cover this deficit. The relative composition is skewed towards transactions that were 
monetised, such as interest payments. On the other hand, tithes, which almost entirely 
were collected in kind, seem negligible in Figure III-15. This was not the case in 
reality, as a more detailed analysis of the figures shows.
Another set of documents, the so-called Special-Tabellen, compiled information 
about all transactions, including those in grain and wine, for all accounts in the 61 
counties of the time. It listed monetary values for each year, as well as a ten-year 
average for transactions in kind.400 It is not clear why this solution was adapted; 
presumably for administrative reasons, because adding transactions in kind for each 
type of grain was complicated and time consuming. It could not have been for the 
argument that transactions in kind fluctuated less, since tithes in particular varied 
according to the size of the harvest.401 I have capitalised all these transactions in kind 
based on yearly market prices from the city of Bern, which have been collected by 
Christian Pfister.402 By calculating figures that are based on a ten-year average and 
yearly prices, changes in the value of transactions are only indicative of grain price
400 St ABE B VII 2521. Interest revenue was also recorded in the General-Tabellen as an average figure 
for the whole decade, rather than for each single year.
401 For a discussion of tithe data, see Figure 111-20 and Pfister, C. (1975).
402 Pfister, C. (1975): table 28 /1 .1 have calculated a yearly price as the mean o f all monthly prices per 
calendar year. Wine prices were only available from January 1784 to April 1786 and from June 1792 
to December 1795; I have therefore used a single value throughout the whole period, calculated as the 
mean o f available monthly data. Where grain categories in the General Tabellen differed from 
Pfister’s, I have converted them as explained in Section V II-13 in the appendix. For unspecified grain,
I have used the overall geometrical average (mean).
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inflation, which was relatively high in this period. Given the lack of reliable price 
series, it is not clear how representative price data from the city is for the remainder 
of the territory.403 Because of the inaccuracies of converting values into Batzen and 
some imprecise recording of the source itself, the following results should only be 
taken as a rough indication of actual revenue and expenditure in the counties.
If the information from the Special-Tabellen is combined with that of the 
General-Tabellen, the result is an overview of the state’s financial situation in the 
period 1785-94 (see Figure III-16). A yearly breakdown of the data was not possible.
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Figure 111-16: Revenue and Expenditure by Category, 1784-95 (Yearly Average)
Source: General-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2520) and Special-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2521). Grain 
transactions were only recorded as 10-year averages in the General-Tabellen; I have converted them 
using an overall mean price for each type o f grain based on Pfister, C. (1975): table 28.1. Percentage 
figures below each category show the share o f monetary transactions.
The deficit observed for monetary transactions is transformed to a surplus if all 
transactions are considered. I will not discuss the relative share of categories in depth 
here, because a more detailed -  and more reliable -  analysis of the structure of 
Bemese revenue and expenditure will follow in the next chapter (IV). Percentage 
figures below the categories in Figure III-16 show how much transactions occurred in 
monetary units. Interests and taxes were monetised, rents and tithes were mostly paid 
in kind. Roughly half o f personnel expenses were paid in kind; all other expenses 
were highly monetised. Isolating the bailiff accounts, the result is remarkably 
different (see Figure III-17).
403 See also Section VII-14 in the appendix for more price data.
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Figure 111-17: Revenue and Expenditure by Category, Bailiff Accounts of Counties in Special- 
Tabellen, 1784-95 (Yearly Average)
Source: Special-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2521) for 61 counties. See Figure 111-16 for details.
In the counties, feudal rents and tithes were by far the dominant revenue 
categories; taxation and interest payments only counted for a fraction of overall 
revenue. Most of the money that the state spent through its bailiffs went towards 
salaries and the consumption of goods and services. Welfare payments and military 
expenditure were comparably small. While the former were generally unimportant in 
Bern, the latter was not recorded at a county level, except for fodder for the army’s 
horses. The difference between revenue and expenditure in Figure III-17 can be a 
proxy for the surplus of the state’s administration in the counties. This surplus was 
partly transferred to the government in the form off monetary Restanzen, or it could 
have the form of increased grain inventories for which the bailiffs were liable (grain 
Restanzen).
If we consider the data on a yearly basis, the result is shown in Figure III-18, in 
which revenue are positive, expenditure negative values (the last column is the 
equivalent of Figure III-17, rotated by 90°).
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Figure 111-18: Revenue and Expenditure by Category, Counties in Special-Tabellen, 1784-95
Source: Special-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2521); see Figure III-17 for details. Revenue is shown as 
positive, expenditure as negative values.
Yearly differences are difficult to analyse because they are prone to spurious 
results caused by the inaccurate conversion of grain transactions. This can be 
illustrated if total revenue and expenditure of the bailiff accounts are separated into a 
monetary and ‘in kind’ component (see Figure III-19).
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Figure III-19: Total Revenue and Expenditure for Counties from Special-Tabellen, 1785-1794
Source: Geneal-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2520) and Special-Tabellen (StABE B VII 2521). Grain 
transactions were only recorded as 10-year averages in the General-Tabellen; I have converted them
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using yearly price data from Pfister, C. (1975): table 28/1. The figures for 1785-95 show the original 
value from the document, converted by an overall mean price for each type of grain.
Since most of the transactions occurred in kind and were only known as 
averages, changes in revenue and expenditure were mainly driven by grain inflation. 
For tithe revenue in particular, the yearly fluctuations were high and not identical 
with prices, as work by Christian Pfister has demonstrated. For the period 1755-1796, 
the correlation between prices and tithe revenue was significant, but relatively low 
(0.48).404 Based on Pfister’s data, Figure 111-20 shows tithes collected by the Bemese 
state expressed by weight and value. The latter series was calculated using wheat 
prices for the city of Bern, which have also been collected by Pfister.405 Using a 
single price for conversion is a very crude measure; ideally, one would use local 
prices for each type of grain. Unfortunately, these figures were not available for the 
canton in the long run.
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Figure 111-20: Bernese Tithe Revenue by Weight and Value, 1755-1796
Source: Pfister, C. (1975): table 25 (tithes, value for Altbern) and table 28/1 (prices, value for Kernen). 
Values were calculated based on the price o f wheat in the city of Bern. I have converted Pfister’s 
Doppelzentner (Dz) into tonnes.
404 Pfister, C. (1975): 159 (table 20). This is significant at a 1% level. With a two-year moving average, 
the correlation improves to 0.52, showing the effects o f grain storage carry-overs.
405 Pfister, C. (1975): table 25 (tithes, value for Altbern) and table 28/1 (prices, value for Kernen). I 
have used the relative weight o f wheat to convert the original data from Bz per ms to Bz per kg.
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Compared to the figures from Special-Tabellen discussed above, tithe figures 
followed a distinctly different path in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Yearly 
fluctuations were very high for tithe revenue, both when measured by weight and by 
value. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) is 8.35% 
for the tithe series measured by weight and 32.7% for the series by value. Grain 
prices as a time series were also characterised by high volatility, with a coefficient of 
variation of 32.9%. This illustrates the difficulties of analysing revenue that was 
collected in kind. In addition, Figure 111-20 ignores regional differences, which could 
be considerable for tithe revenue as well as for prices. This will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter (IV).
Tithe revenue for the period before 1755 is available from a different series by 
Christian Pfister.406 For their monetary value, I had to use less reliable prices data 
from the bailiff accounts o f Aarberg.407 The result is shown in Figure 111-21.
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Figure 111-21: Tithe Revenue by Weight and Value (including Linear Trend), 1700-1796
Source: Pfister, C. (1984): vol. 2, table 2/7.2; values calculated with prices from gain sales by Aarberg 
bailiffs (StABE B VII 851-872; price for Kernen', missing values extrapolated by relative changes for 
the price of oats). I have converted Pfister’s Doppelzentner (Dz) into tonnes.
The same caveats for using a single price series to convert tithes into monetary 
values apply. Adding a linear trend line shows that while tithes measured by weight
406 Pfister, C. (1984): vol. 2, table 2/7.2. Values after 1755 are identical to Pfister, C. (1975): table 25.
407 Prices for grain sales by Aarberg bailiffs from StABE B VII 851-872.
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remained stable throughout the century, when measured by value they increased over 
time, showing the secular price inflation for grain.408 The volatility of both series was 
again very high, with coefficients of variation of 7.6% (by weight) and 35.7% (by 
value).
To sum up the findings of this section, a number of contemporary tables allow 
for a proximate overview of Bemese state finance throughout the century. They 
reveal that the canton ran consistent budget surpluses while revenue and expenditure 
were generally increasing over time. Yearly fluctuations could be high, and 
extraordinary events, such as the loans of 1710, had a great financial impact. The salt 
trade was the main contributor to government finance; tithes remained stable over 
time when measured by weight but increased in monetary value because of grain 
price inflation. A more detailed breakdown of the structure of revenue and 
expenditure will be provided in the following chapter (IV).
Hi-5 The State’s Assets
This section will discuss the development of the state’s most important assets 
over time. It starts with a general overview based on a contemporary document, then 
discusses the cash reserve, financial investments, salt trade and grain inventories in 
more detail. The purchases and sale of property or titles are missing from this analysis 
because there are no readily available inventories or accounts on them.
To create an overview of changes in the canton’s wealth, the government had 
compiled a table containing information about its major assets between 1750 and 
1790 409 The data was charted by decade for the 1750s and 1760s and by half decade 
from 1770 onwards. It noted the overall increase and decrease in each asset category, 
distinguishing between Cash Reserve, Foreign Funds and Domestic Investment. The 
latter includes domestic loans and purchases of landed titles.410 For Figure 111-22, I
408 See the discussion in Pfister, C. (1975): ch. 4 and Section VII-14 in the appendix.
409 StABE B VII 2520a.
410 The document distinguished between capital investments (angewendtes Capital) and the purchase 
of land titles (erkaufte Lehen, Bodenzinsen und Zehnten), but combined the two categories for 
divestments (.Abgeldst oder Verkauft). For all these categories, a distinction was made between the 
German and the French-speaking territories.
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have converted all values into yearly averages, showing divestments as negative and 
investments as positive values.
DIVESTMENT | INVESTMENT
1750-59 
1760-69 
1770-74 
1775-79 
1780-84 
1785-90
1750-90
-7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5
Figure 111-22: Investments and Divestments by Category, 1750-1790 (Yearly Average)
Source: Tabelle Staatsschatz (StABE B VII 2520a). The yearly average figures were calculated from 
data compiled by decade (1750-69) or half decade (1770-1790); the original document did not provide 
yearly data directly. Negative values (left-hand side) show divestments; positive (right-hand side) 
values investments. For the category Domestic Investments, see footnote 410.
The figures confirm what was discussed earlier: the money that filled the cash 
reserve in the early 1770s was used for the Imperial loan of 1787, which shows as an 
increase in foreign funds in the late 1780s. A decade earlier, the foreign funds also 
increased considerably. Domestic investments, on the other hand, increased mainly in 
the early 1780s. The major problem of these results is that they were only calculated 
by 5- or 10-year averages. In order to determine annual changes, the original accounts 
should be considered, as far as they have not been destroyed. My discussion begins 
with the most secretive and glamorous of Bemese assets, the cash reserve.
The Cash Reserve
The Bemese cash reserve {Staatsschatz) was legendary in the eighteenth 
century. The government kept few written records about the contents of its coffers, 
and the precise amount of the cash reserve was kept secret. Contemporary observers 
speculated about how much money the government had locked away in the vaults of
| i ^
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the city hall. It can be argued that hunger for bullion was one of the major reasons for 
the invasion of Switzerland by Napoleonic troops in 1798. The looted Bemese 
treasure, so the legend goes, was used to fund the French campaign in Egypt and sank 
with her fleet near Abukir. As with many other legends, one reason for its emergence 
is the lack of documents. The circumstances of the French invasion further promoted 
the anecdote that the axle of a chariot that a greedy French Marechal ‘requisitioned’ 
from the Bemese Mayor broke under the weight of stolen goods soon after he left the 
city.411
Early modem states commonly possessed cash reserves as war chests. This was 
necessary in an era in which short-term borrowing on capital markets was 
complicated, unreliable and slow. The origins of the Bemese cash reserve are 
unknown. They probably date back to the late sixteenth century, even though Bern 
was still borrowing money as late as 1656.412 There was no inherent contradiction 
between borrowing and hoarding a treasure at the same time, as the two were not 
perfect substitutes. Credit could not be used immediately to pay for military 
necessities, as negotiations with potential lenders needed time, whereas cash from the 
government’s vaults was instantly available. Ironically, one of the earlier propellants 
of the Bemese cash reserve had disappeared by the eighteenth century: payments by 
foreign powers for the use of mercenary troops, the so-called pensions. Its most 
important donor, the French crown, had become a political rival during the reign of 
Louis XIV. In this situation, it was not opportune to collect pension payments from 
the French ambassador and increase Bemese vulnerability to external political 
pressure.413 Mercenary troops continued to serve France, but had evolved into a 
private enterprise, controlled by patrician families (see Section II-5 above).
Numerous safety features were in place to ensure that the cash reserve could not 
be used for illicit purposes. Eight different keys were required to open the vault and 
each was kept by an important government official414 The absence of written 
inventories listing the content of the cash reserve was a further precaution, inhibiting 
any unnecessary expenditure by the government. In 1697, the Secret Council inquired 
if there was enough money in the cash reserve to support an army of 30,000 men for a 
year. Four Councillors were ordered to investigate the matter by paying a superficial
411 Landmann (1904): 20. See also Feller (1960): 699-708.
412 Landmann (1903): 16; Peyer (1968); For the sixteenth century: Komer (1980).
4,3 Feller (1955): 207.
414 Landmann (1903): 15.
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visit to the vault ‘without counting or touching the money in the treasure.’415 Their 
response to the initial question was a simple ‘no’. Based on the cost of the Second 
War of Villmergen, Julius Landmann estimated that the amount in question was 
between 3.125m and 3.25m Thl (93.75-97.5m Bz) 416 We can therefore assume from 
this episode that the content of the cash reserve was less than 90m Bz at the turn of 
the century.
This estimate also qualifies the following statement by Abraham Stanyan form
1714:
Thus much is certain, that this Canton [Bern], and that of Zurich, are the only 
two [in Switzerland], that may be properly said to have Sums of Money in 
their Coffers. Beme, in particular, has at this time 300000 pounds Sterling at 
Interest; yet that Sum, as I am credibly informed, makes not a sixth Part of 
what remains in the Treasury.417
According to Stanyan’s estimate, the cash reserve would have been worth 
£1.8m, which is the equivalent of 240m Bz. It is very unlikely that the treasure 
increased by that much between 1697 and the time of his writing, particularly since 
the Bemese government had lent 37.8m Bz to the Dutch and English in 1710 and paid 
12.75m Bz for the Second War of Villmergen from its cash reserve two years later. 
The only reliable figure available is that at the French invasion on 5 March 1798, 
Bern had cash worth 106m Bz. Of this sum, 89.9m Bz was in the cash reserve, the 
rest with government offices. The French commanders only reported part of the sum 
to Paris; the rest -  over 20m Bz (!) -  went into their pockets 418
To estimate the value of the accumulated cash reserve, I have collected all the 
information on it and subtracted the amount from the 1798 figure (see Figure 111-23). 
The sources used are only reliable for the period between 1750 and 1790, when a 
‘vault ledger’ (Gwolb Btichli) listing all deposits and withdrawals was created.419 For 
previous years, I relied on information from other accounts, notably the Welsch 
Standesrechnung and the Historie, as well as anecdotal evidence about the direct 
withdrawal of cash for military campaigns. This was the case in 1707 (Neuchatel
415 StABE B 12: 106-112 (quote: 108-109). The original words are: ‘ohne zedlung oder beruhrung defi 
gelds aufi denen schatzgewolb. ’ Again in 1723, the vault was sorted without any counting or inventory: 
Landmann (1903): 15-16.
4,6 Landmann (1903): 17 (note 1).
417 Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 173-174.
418 Landmann (1904): 18-21.
419 StABE B VII 2388a.
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Succession) and 1712 (second war of Villmgergen).420 Probably the most important 
information missing for the period before 1750 is the amount of outflows to the 
Deutsch-Standesrechnung, which was not reported as a separate category.421
For the 1790s, it is not clear if the lack of information about movements in the 
cash reserve was because they never existed or if documents are missing. The Gwolb 
Biichli stopped abruptly 422 In spite of the geopolitical pressure that Bern was under, 
according to Richard Feller the Bemese treasure remained ‘untouched’ until the 
French invasion.423 Apparently, the cash reserve was seen as a last resort to secure 
independence. In 1793, communal funds for defence (Reisgelder) worth 7.4m Bz 
were released.424 In a last desperate move in January 1798, the government had asked 
private funds and charitable institutions to send their cash to the government for the 
country’s defence. This measure was intended to avoid using money from the 
government vaults.425 Part of the Bemese overseas assets had been liquidated during 
the 1790s to pay for troops, as will be discussed below.
For Figure 111-23, I have calculated the size of the cash reserve back from the 
1798 value, adding deposits and subtracting withdrawals.
420 Feller (1955): 226-227 and 318.
421 They were combined with other ‘general’ revenue, such as payments for the postal lease and 
transfer payments.
422 The reason for stopping was certainly not a lack of space, as the Biichli contains ample of empty 
pages at the end.
423 Feller (1960): 484.
424 Fischer, E.F.v. (1868): 50. This means that communes were allowed to use the money in case of an 
emergency. See Section II-5 for the communal funds.
425 Feller (1960): 487-488.
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Figure 111-23: Accumulated Cash Reserve, 1700-1798 (Estimate)
Sources: Gwolb Biichli (StABE B VII 2520a); Historic (StABE B VII 2389); Welsch- 
Standesrechnungen (StABE BVII 762-858); Feller (1955): 226-227, 318; Landmann (1904): 21 
(values for Staatsschatz and Oberlandgelder in 1798). The period 1750-1790 is covered by the Gwdlb- 
Biichli (hence vertical lines). For the period before 1750, outflows to the Deutsch-Standesrechnung are 
missing. The accumulated cash reserve was calculated backwards from the 1798 figure.
Some of the transactions discussed in earlier sections show very clearly. The 
most massive outflow occurred in 1710 to finance the Dutch and English loans. Two 
years later, the payment for the Second War of Villmergen incurred another 
reduction. In the subsequent years, the cash reserve was steadily refilled, although the 
lack of information on outflows for this period might overstate the rate at which this 
occurred. The reaction to the 1770 crisis is also evident from Figure 111-23, as a 
withdrawal, followed by a ‘refill’ in subsequent years. This is when revenue for grain 
sales at high prices started flowing back, although their amount was smaller than the 
original outflow. The 1787 loan to the Emperor was mostly paid for by money that 
had accumulated in the preceding years.
With the detailed information from the Gwolb Biichli, it is possible to establish 
the ‘cash flow’ -  the term can be used in its literal sense here -  from 1750 to 1790 by 
destination (see Figure 111-24).
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Figure 111-24: Inflows and Outflows of Cash Reserve, 1750-1790
Sources: Gwolb Biichli (StABE B VII 2520a). Inflows to the cash reserves are to the left (positive 
scale), outflows to the right (negative scale). The figures for 1750-90* show added values for all years, 
divided by factor 4 to fit on the graph; DSR is for Deutsch-Standesrechnung\ WSR for Welsch- 
Standesrechnung.
During these four decades, the cash reserve was used by the Bemese mint 
master regularly, who usually withdrew old coins and bullion for minting, sometimes 
replacing them with newer coins. The main contributor was the account for foreign 
funds, which also caused important withdrawals in single years, such as 1787. 
Overall, the funds were a net contributor to the cash reserve between 1760 and 1790. 
The Welsch-Standesrechnung also regularly deposited its surplus in the vault, while 
its sister account, the Deutsch-Standesrechnung benefited from the cash reserve to 
cover some of its expenditure. The salt trade account benefited from an assignation in 
1750, presumably to increase the government’s salt inventory.426 On specific 
occasions, funds from the cash reserve were used directly for military expenditure: in 
1782 and 1783 for the Geneva expedition, and for a last time on 17 September 1790 
to form a war chest.427 The Gwolb-Biichli does not record any transactions after this 
date. On the eve of its downfall, the Bemese government had not only cash stacked in 
its vaults, but more importantly, financial claims that were considerably larger in size 
which the French invaders failed to take advantage of.428
426 The reason for this assignation is not clear, given that the salt account itself made large profits and 
usually was used to fund expenditure in other accounts.
427 StABE B VII 2388a, Ausgang entry for 17 Sept 1790.
428 For the attempts to save the Bemese foreign fUnds from confiscation and reclaim assets after the 
Napoleonic era: Feller (1960): 699-708 and Landmann (1904).
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Financial Investment
The Bemese government lent money mainly as a political tool to foster political 
alliances and create clientelistic dependencies. When it expelled foreign borrowers 
from the domestic mortgage market in 1677, this was also intended to provide an 
investment opportunity for government funds (see detailed discussion in Section III-5 
above and Section V-2 below). To accommodate its newly acquired domestic loan 
portfolio, the government established a domestic loan registry (Inneres Zinsrodel), 
but this was never systematically updated. Because mortgages were administered by 
bailiffs in the county rather than by a specialised unit with its own accountability, it is 
impossible to obtain an overview about how much money was invested this way 
throughout the eighteenth century. In 1770, the Treasurer and Verniers complained 
that the ledger was in such a state of ‘great falsehood and disorder’ that all too often 
financial claims by the government were forfeited because of a lack of proper 
documentation.429 They resolved to standardise and simplify the domestic loan 
registry. In addition, a table was compiled which listed all government loans as of 1 
January 1769, based on bailiff accounts for the German-speaking territories. The 
resulting figure of outstanding claims was 5.38m Bz. If we add the Vaud’s share of 
loans, an estimated 35%, the overall sum of loans in the domestic credit registry was 
around 7.25m Bz.430 Contrary to the original intention, the tables in the domestic loan 
registry were never updated. It is not clear where Emanuel von Fischer, who reports 
the sums for loans outstanding in 1798 at 13.3m Bz (German-speaking territory) and 
12.0m Bz (Vaud), obtained his information.431
Another way of estimating the size of domestic loans is to use interest payments 
as a proxy. By multiplying this sum with an interest rate, we obtain the amount of 
capital invested. It can be assumed that in normal years, the amount of interests that 
were forfeited was equal to repayment of outstanding interests. What remains 
unspecified are defaults. Using interest data from my structural analysis for the years 
1732 and 1782 (see next chapter), the amount of interest paid by accounts which were 
included in the domestic credit registry are shown as the category Registered Loans in 
Table III-l. I have calculated the principal by assuming interest rates of 5% and 4%. 
The former is based on the traditional rate for mortgaged loans, the latter relates to
429 StABE B V II2338.
430 The figure of 35% is based on Vaud’s share in domestic interest payments for the years 1732 and 
1782. See discussion below.
431 Fischer, E.F.v. (1868). It is not clear where his figures are from.
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anecdotal evidence from early modem capital markets, in which an oversupply of 
capital put pressure on the price a borrower could charge for lending money.432
Interest Capital (at 5%) Capital (at 4%) Capital (at 4%)
1732 1782 1732 1782 1732 1782 1732 1782
Registered Loans (m Bz) 0.55 0.34 10.94 6.90 13.67 8.62 18.23 11.50
Other Domestic Loans (m Bz) 0.23 0.16 4.60 3.24 5.75 4.05 7.67 5.40
Total Domestic Loans (m Bz) 0.78 0.51 15.54 10.14 19.43 12.67 25.90 16.90
Foreign Funds (m Bz) 2.59 4.44
Table III-l: Interest Payments and Estimated Capital with an Assumed Interest Rate of 5% and 
4%
Source: Database (see next chapter for details). Registered Loans are loans registered in the domestic 
loans registry (Inneres Zinsrodel); Other Domestic Loans are loans from accounts that were not 
included in the domestic loans registry; Foreign Funds are the interest payments from the account for 
foreign investments (AUS). Capital (at r%) is the principal calculated with the formula P = I x 100 / r, 
where I is interest payment, P is the principal (capital) and r stands for interest rate (assumed at 5% and 
4% respectively).
Comparing the estimated value of registered loans to the value of the loan 
register in 1770, an interest rate of 5% seems more plausible than 4%. Around half of 
the domestic interest payments came from claims by government institutions with no 
connection to the loan registry. Until 1744, both the Deutsch- and Welsch- 
Standesrechnung also included interest revenue. After that date, they only registered 
loan transactions (new loans and repayments), but did not collect interests any more. 
Once the capital was invested, financial claims were transferred to bailiff accounts.
Overall, domestic interest revenue fell by over a third from 1732 to 1782. 
During the same time, returns on foreign investments grew by 71%. This is consistent 
with other evidence about a shift in the government’s portfolio from domestic to 
foreign lending. A Balance Sheet of the state’s assets for the years 1750 to 1770 
(discussed at the beginning of this section) failed to mention the level of loans, but 
stated new outlays and repayments. During the twenty year period covered by the 
document, the government lent 4.15m Bz while receiving 6.18m Bz from redemption. 
In other words, domestic loans declined by 2m Bz between 1750 and 1770. During
432 See HLS (2002), article Kapitalmarkt and Schmidt, G.C.L. (1932): vol. 2: 66, 122-124. See also the 
discussion in Section II-6 above.
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the same period, foreign capital investments increased almost tenfold, by 19m Bz.433 
According to the General-Tabellen (see Section III-4 above), between 1785 and 1794 
revenue from domestic interests were on average 0.6m Bz per year, those from 
foreign investments 5m Bz 434 The ratio of interest revenue between domestic and 
foreign loans therefore changed from 1:3.3 (1732) to 1:8.7 (1782) and fell to 1:8.3 
(1785-1794).435
Bern’s overseas investments began in 1710 with loans to the Dutch and 
English. In the following two decades, these were converted to portfolio investments 
on the London capital market. The expansion of overseas assets that ensued was 
largely funded by retained interest payments. After 1732, the canton also invested 
money on the Continent, either in the form of government bonds or by granting loans 
to sovereigns across Europe. I will discuss the details of Bemese investment 
strategies in a separate chapter (V). In this context, I will consider them a black box 
and only investigate foreign funds as part of the state’s assets. The information for 
this is from the Historie der Auslandischen Stands Capitalien of 1776 and on 
accounts for foreign funds 436
433 StABE B VII2520. Figures for the Deutsch-Zinsrodel: angewandt 120,850 Kr, abgelost: 145,506 
Kr; for Welsch-Zinsrodel angewandt 45,127 Kr, abgelost 101,825 Kr; for AufierZins Gel ter angewandt 
1,478,709 Kr, abgelost 686,630 Kr.
434 StABE B V II2521.
435 The latter was mainly due to new domestic loans in the early 1780s while foreign funds were 
reduced.
436 StABE B VII2389 and B V II2396-2473.1 only used nominal data; the value of Bern’s foreign 
funds will be discussed in Chapter V.
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Figure 111-25: Overseas Capital Investments and Revenue, 1710-1797
Sources: Historie (StABE B VII 2389) and foreign funds accounts (StABE B VII 2396-2473). Interest 
Revenue are shown on the right scale. Capital Invested (nom.) considers nominal sums only; the value 
of Bemese assets is discussed in Chapter I (see Figure V-6 in particular).
After the initial loans of 1710, capital investments grew steadily but with high 
yearly swings until the late 1780s. In 1787, the foreign funds rose to new heights 
reaching a peak in 1791, after which their sums were in sharp decline. In 1798, the 
Bemese portfolio had a nominal value of 98.75m Bz and an estimated market value 
of 104.5m Bz (see Chapter V).437 Interest payments followed roughly in line with 
these developments. The exact rates of return will be calculated and commented later. 
The connection of the account for foreign funds with the remainder of Bemese state 
finance was mostly through withdrawals from and deposits to the cash reserve, as 
well as assignations. In Figure 111-26, I have accumulated all transfers to and from 
other accounts.
437 Landmann, using nominal values, gets the figure of 116.0m Bz: Landmann (1904): 60-62.
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Figure 111-26: Overseas Capital Investment and Accumulated Transfers from Foreign Funds, 
1710-1797
Sources: General-Bilanzen (StABE B VII 2179), Gwolb-Biichli (StABE B VII 2388a), Historie 
(StABE B VII 2389) and accounts for foreign funds (StABE B VII 2396-2473). For the Capital 
Invested (nom.) series, see Figure 111-25; Accumulated Transfers are payments from the accounts for 
foreign funds (AUS) towards the cash reserve or other Bemese accounts, accumulated over time. The 
full amount o f deposits to the cash reserve is only known for the period before 1790, that of 
assignations for the 1764-1790 period (hence the vertical lines).4 8
As mentioned earlier, the first loans were funded by cash withdrawals from the 
treasury. During the next few years, interest payments from foreign funds steadily 
accumulated in the cash reserve. As far as data is available, the break even point at 
which more money was deposited in the vault than the sums for the original loans 
was reached in the early 1730s, around the time when Bern started to invest on the 
Continent.439 In the 1790s, with the imminent military threat from France, the 
Bemese portfolio was partially liquidated to fund military preparations.
The Salt Monopoly
When introducing the monopoly for the salt trade in 1623, the government 
failed to mention any fiscal reasons for its actions, arguing that only the state could
438 1 have added the sums that the banker Gruner paid on behalf of Malacrida & Comp (3,247m Bz in 
June 1722 for interest payments that Malacrida had failed to deliver in 1720): See Landmann (1903): 
94 (appendix 2). See also Chapter V below and Linder (2004) for a discussion o f the Malacrida crash.
439 This calculation ignores assignations before 1764, as discussed above.
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guarantee sufficient supply of this crucial product at a fair price.440 Of course such 
statements have to be considered -  literally -  with a pinch of salt. The salt monopoly 
soon became one of the most important sources of income for the Bemese state, as is 
evident from my analysis. The salt trade was farmed out until 1635 441 Thereafter, the 
Salzdirektion (salt directorate) was responsible for purchasing and selling salt. 
Parallel to the trading monopoly, a privilege (royalty) for salt production existed, 
which was also assumed by the state after 1685. Domestic salt mining in Roche was 
insufficient, however, and most of the salt was imported from France and the 
Empire.442 Bern’s dependence on imports at times proved a sore spot in its 
geopolitical ambitions. Salt was not only crucial for food consumption, it was also a 
key ingredient for cattle farming and cheese production. Although it was officially 
not taxed, the state made a profit by selling salt at a higher price than the costs of 
purchasing and transporting. The salt ledgers calculated a profit, but this was only for 
informative purposes. I have deducted this figure as the government’s Monopoly 
Profit from the proceeds from salt sales, which is comparable to salt duties in other 
states, such as the French gabelle.443
In its accounts, the Bemese Salzdirektion calculated the profit for each type of 
salt with the formula
P = (Rev + Invt) -  (Exp + Invt-i)
Where P  is profit, Rev is revenue, Invt is the salt inventory at the end of the 
accounting period and Invt.j the inventory of the previous account (or the opening 
balance). The figure therefore represents the profit on the amount of salt sold by the 
state. It is important to note that this profit was not equal to the profit of the accounts 
of the Salzdirektion, defined as the difference between current revenue and 
expenditure.444 To correct for the effects of inventory changes, I have categorised
440 Guggisberg (1933): 21-22.
441 Feller (1955): 128-129 and Guggisberg (1933): 26, 31, 39. In some districts, the monopoly 
remained farmed out after that date until 1651.
442 Roche is in the county of Aigle. Salt production there had started in the sixteenth century: 
Guggisberg (1933): 17-18.
443 Bonney (1995c): 494-496.
444 The difference consisted of current revenue and expenditure of the account that had no direct 
connection with its commercial activities.
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them separately, deducting inventory increases from current expenditure and 
inventory reductions from revenue.
My analysis covers summarised versions of the Salzdirektion ledgers from 1700 
to 1797. The structure of the accounts changed after 1725. For the years prior to this 
date, the revenue from salt sales and profits was recorded separately from the overall 
revenue of the salt account. After 1725, only total revenue was recorded. They 
included end-of-year inventories as well as revenue that was not directly related to 
salt sales and accounting transfers. By deducting the inventory from this sum, we can 
obtain a proxy for revenue from salt sales. For the sample year 1782, only 78.5% of 
this proxy figure was actual revenue from salt sales, the rest was comprised of loan 
repayments and pure accounting transfers that occurred when two different types of 
salt were mixed together which had been inventoried as separate entities.
Ignoring the distinction between current transactions, inventory changes and 
monopoly profits for the moment, total revenue and expenditure are shown in Figure 
111-27. These figures exclude payments to and from other accounts {assignations).
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Figure 111-27: Total Revenue, Expenditure and Surplus Rate of Salt Account, 1700-1797
Sources: Salt trade accounts (SDI), 1700-1797: StABE B V 481-578. Surplus Rate is the difference 
between revenue as expenditure as a share o f revenue (right scale).
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With one exception, the accounts of the Saltzdirektion closed with a surplus 
every year between 1700 and 1797. The exception is 1707, when the inventory was 
increased, which will be discussed later. In most years, the difference between 
revenue and expenditure was equal to the amount of assignations to other accounts 
(see Figure VII-12 in the appendix). For the period between 1764 and 1775, the 
General Bilanzen specified the destinations of such transfer payments (see Figure 
111-28). After this date, they were recorded without destination. For comparison, I 
have added figures for contributions in 1732 and 1782. Values for the latter year were 
divided by two to fit the scale.
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E3 R efu gees
■  W elfare  
0  A rsenal
□  Aarburg Garrison
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Figure 111-28: Assignations from Salt Account by Destination, 1764-1775
Source: General Bilanz (StABE B V II2179); salt trade accounts for 1732 and 1782 (StABE B V 512 
and 563a). Values for 1782 were divided by 2. After 1775, the destination o f assignations was not 
listed in the General-Bilanzen any longer. Ave stands for the arithmetic average over all years. The 
destinations in their original wording were (from bottom to top in legend to Figure 111-28): Bau-Amt, 
Strassenbau-Rechnung, Oberlandische Holz-Entreprise, Stadtwacht, Garnison Aarburg, Zeughaus, 
Gross-Almosen-Direktion, Exulaten-Kammer, Deutsch-Standesrechnung, Welsch-Standesrechnung 
Pferdezucht-Kommission, Spitalgass-Hauser Ankauf and Gewdlb. The contributions towards 
Luzernische Unruhen (1764) and Neuenburger Unruhen (1768) were combined to Military Events.
Between 1764 and 1775, the Salzdirektion regularly contributed towards 
government institutions responsible for construction {Bau-Amt, road maintenance and 
wood production), defence {Stadtwacht, Aarburg garrison and Arsenal) and welfare 
{Gross-Almosen-Direktion and Exulanten-Kammer). Other assignations seemed to be 
one-off events, such as house purchases (1770) or military emergencies in Lucerne 
(1764) and Neuchatel (1768). From the 1732 figure, it looks as if contributions to
t ,  B^ B^ zEzB^ B^ B BYAYjmmMmm
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Bau-Amt, Aarburg garrison and Exulanten-Kammer were established permanently. 
There was also a significant transfer of money to the cash reserve in that year.445 In 
1782, the figures were entirely different, with assignations only contributing towards 
Standesrechnungen. Their figures were more than twice the amount of previous 
periods. Although figures from single years can be misleading, it seem like the 
system of transfer between accounts had been simplified and concentrated on the 
Standesrechnungen, and arrears increased in value.
Returning to the Salzdirektion accounts, one problem of considering revenue 
and expenditure alone is that this neglects the effects of inventory changes. In years 
when the stock of salt increased, it would show as if the government spent more 
money than it actually did. Therefore, we have to consider the salt inventory 
separately, and ultimately deduct its changes from current revenue and expenditure. 
Salt accounts provide information of the level of the inventory at the end of each 
accounting period. In addition, the rate of inventory to sales provides information 
about how much of a year’s salt supply was covered by the government’s reserves 
(see Figure 111-29).
m Bz Inventory
Inventory as a Share of Sales
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Figure III-29: Salt Inventory in m Bz and as a Share of Salt Sales
Sources: Salt trade accounts (StABE B V 481-578). For Inventory as a Share o f  Sales, I have 
expressed the inventory as a percentage of total salt sales (including profits).
445 If this value does not show up in the structural analysis of Chapter IV this is because as an 
assignation, it was a transfer between accounts.
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A value of 100% means that a full year’s supply of salt was stocked by the 
government. While this was the case until the mid-1720s, the coverage was less than 
half for most of the remainder of the period. In other words, the government had 
barely enough salt in stock to survive for a few months. This made it vulnerable to 
geopolitical pressure. On the other hand, purchasing salt from different regions -  
France, Tyrolia and Bavaria -  could somewhat limit the dangers of being at the mercy 
of a single provider. It is not surprising that the Bemese stocks reached their highest 
level in 1707, when Bern was at loggerheads with France over the Neuchatel 
succession. At this point, the inventory almost reached the level of two year’s 
consumption. The increase of the 1770s might have been caused by a higher degree 
of awareness for crisis prevention after the 1770 harvest failure. The alternative 
explanation, that inventories increased because pre-ordered salt could not be sold 
during agricultural crisis, is very unlikely given that turnover figures increased 
sharply during the same period.
To analyse the profitability of the salt trade, changes in inventory have to be 
deducted from current transactions. The government realised this when calculating its 
own profits (as discussed above). Figure 111-30 compares these profits with the 
amount of salt sold for each year.
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Figure 111-30: Profits and Salt Sales, 1700-1797
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Sources: Salt trade accounts (StABE B V 481-578). Please note that Profits have been multiplied by 
factor 10 and the data changed in 1725, hence the vertical line. Values before 1725 relate to actual salt 
sales; for the following years, salt sales were proxied by subtracting incoming assignations, inventory 
increases and ‘other revenue’ from total revenue.446
The interpretation of the data is complicated by the lack of reliable figures for 
revenue form salt sales. Before 1725, these were explicitly mentioned. After this year, 
they had to be proxied, which makes the data prone to errors caused by accounting 
practice. Regardless of this, it seems that salt sales slumped in the 1760s and soared 
by the late 1770s. They increased again in the 1790s. It is not clear what caused the 
sharp rise in sales in 1778 and the fall in 1779; they might be caused by accounting 
transfers. The government’s profit on salt sales moved roughly parallel to sales until 
1750, after which profits remained stable in absolute terms, though fluctuating 
strongly in the 1780s. It is plausible that the government was setting absolute profit 
targets at the time, although there is no proof of such a measure having been taken.
Public Granaries and Wine Cellars
Information about the amount of grain and wine stored in the government’s 
inventories is scarce. This is mainly because of the de-centralised nature of storage: 
stocks were usually kept by bailiffs, who also reported them in local units of 
measurement. It was not easy for contemporary actors to standardise and compile this 
information in tables. Christian Pfister, Anton Brandenberger and other scholars have 
discussed the effectiveness of public granaries in stabilising prices.447 The main 
concern of this sub-section is to discuss the implication that inventories had on 
Bemese state finance.
As a result of its territorial expansion, the Bemese state started collecting an 
increasing amount of revenue in kind since the late middle ages. The Grain Chamber 
(Kornkammer, Getreide-Direction) oversaw collection and storage of cereals. After 
1692, it consisted of the ‘Grain Senator’ (Kornherr) and another Senator, three 
former bailiffs and three ordinary members of the Great Council 448 The Kornherr 
took over the management of granaries in the cities of Bern and Thun in 1760, soon
446 Inventory reductions bare no role on the amount of salt sold and are therefore ignored. For the years 
1730-1737, profits from Roche were missing and had to be calculated in retrospect.
447 Pfister, C. (1975); Pfister, C. (1995); Brandenberger (2004).
448 RQBE, vol. 9.1: 140.
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to be followed by others throughout the territory.449 This created a ‘dual system’ in 
which part of the inventory was administered directly by the Grain Chamber, while 
the remainder was run by bailiffs under the auspices of the Vennerkammer,450 The 
Kornherr was also entitled to purchase grain to reach the required target inventory. 
For selling grain, he depended on permission from the Great Council, which 
remained the ultimate authority. After 1769 the Grain Chamber was empowered to 
dispose of a limited amount of the stored grain at its own discretion.
Anton Brandenberger provides some figures about the overall amount of 
Bemese public granaries. He estimated that in most years, the target inventory was 
exceeded by 20-30% until the crisis of 1770, when actual figures fell 30% below 
target451 Overall, Bemese grain stores were growing throughout the second half of 
the century. In 1688, the target inventory had been the equivalent of 6,700 tonnes of 
wheat, which had fallen to 6,150 tonnes in 1737. By the mid-1760, Bemese granaries 
were equivalent to 10,000 tonnes of wheat.452 This was relatively small compared to 
the granaries of Zurich, estimated at 4,500-5,100 tonnes of wheat for a considerably 
smaller territory and population. Based on his own population estimates, 
Brandenberger calculated that the Bemese states stored 20kg of wheat equivalents per 
capita in 1729, 19kg by the mid-1750s, 33kg after 1758 and 27kg by the 1790s. 
Including estimated Restanzen as a proxy for public granaries in the counties, his 
figures increase to 35kg per head in 1755, falling to 30kg in the 1770s, and ‘further 
falling’ (without figures provided) in the 1790s. When measured in nutritional value 
(calories) and compared to the need of the overall population, Brandenberger 
calculates the share of consumption covered by granaries to 10.2- 9.5% for the years 
1729 to 1757, and 16.8-13.4% for the years 1758 to 1798. In combination with other 
foodstuffs, this would be sufficient for roughly 2.5 months in the early part of the 
century and 3-4 months after 175 8 453 This is in line with Christian Pfister’s earlier 
assessment that Bemese public granaries were sufficient to cover single years of 
harvest failure, but could not overcome the problems of persistent shortfalls.454 The
449 In 1760, the Kornherr (KOR) account included inventories in Bern, Thun, Burdgorf, Payeme, 
Moudon, Lausanne, Vevey, St. Prex, Nyon and Yverdon. In 1772, Aarau was added; Brugg, Lenzburg, 
Morges and Aubonne followed in 1773: StABE B V I261-285.
450 Brandenberger (2004): 369; see also his chapter 4.2 in general.
451 Brandenberger (2004): 5.2 (in particular 381 and Diagramm 49). He seems to simply add grain by 
weight, regardless of its type. This makes his figures prone to large error margins.
452 For 1688: Kung (1993): 480 (table 4), others from Brandenberger (2004): 378-379.
453 Brandenberger (2004): 379-382.
454 Pfister, C. (1984): vol. 2: 56; see also Pfister, C. (1975): 160-162.
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Bemese granaries seem less well stocked than those of Lucerne, where up to 80% of 
one yearly harvest were stored in the 1780s.455
Information is not readily available about the first element of the two-tier 
granary system, the inventories administered by bailiffs in the counties. They 
consisted of a statutory target inventory and a floating amount of grain that was used 
to cover current grain expenses. Taken together, both formed a bailiffs Restanz, as 
explained earlier (see Section VII-5 in the appendix). Information about the relation 
between Restanzen and inventories is available for Vaud in the year 1782. In this 
year, arrears were between 40% (wheat), 75% (Mischelkom), 109% (barley) and 
230% (oats) in excess of inventories.456 In other words, only a fraction of the grain at 
the bailiffs disposal was stored in the granary.
The overall amount of grain Restanzen is difficult to establish. Because of 
practical constraints, I have only collected information for limited time periods from 
theDeutsch- and Welsch-Standesrechnungen (1730-35 and 1780-85).457 Figure 111-31 
shows the result by weight and value, based on price information from the structural 
analysis of the following chapter. In general, any capitalisation of public granaries 
has to be considered with the caveat of high grain price fluctuations, both regionally 
and seasonally. Other than the salt inventories, Bern did not have to purchase grain in 
normal years, but received it through revenue in kind. There was an opportunity cost 
of storing grain however, since it could have been sold and the produce invested 
financially.
455 Koraer (1981): 348-356.
456 ACV Bp 4 and Bp 143.
457 Restanzen from the Welsch-Standesrechnung for 1782 only. I have used the overall sum of Sack, 
multiplied by the mean of all measures in Figure VII-10 in the appendix. For a long-term view, see 
Brandenberger (2004): 382.
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Figure 111-31: Grain Restanzen in Standesrechnungen by Weight and Value, 1730-35 and 1780- 
85
Sources: Deutsch-Standesrechnungen (StABE B VII 612-617 and 662-667) and Welsch- 
Standesrechnungen (StABE B VII 790-795 and ACV Bp 4). Grain types have been converted to wheat 
equivalents following Pfister, C. (1975): table 24. Prices are from my database (discussed in the next 
chapter and Section VII-13 in the appendix).
Overall it appears that the Restanzen did not change significantly from the 
1730s to the 1780s when measured by weight. However, they nearly doubled in 
value. This was the effect of grain inflation, which will be discussed in more detail 
below (Section IV-2 and Section VII-14 in the appendix). The value of Restanzen for 
two sample years should only be considered a proxy, since grain prices varied 
strongly by region and even more throughout the harvest year.
For the county of Aarberg, I have collected information on how Restanzen in 
grain changed over time throughout the century. One problem is that in the years with 
an office handover, Restanzen were normally reduced to minimise the cost of 
inventory for an incumbent bailiff (see Section VII-5 in the appendix). Handover 
years are therefore marked with vertical lines in Figure 111-32.
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Figure 111-32: Grain Restanzen in the County of Aarberg by Value and Weight, 1700-1797
Source: Aarberg bailiff accounts (StABE B VII 851-872). Grain types have been converted to wheat 
equivalents following Pfister, C. (1975): table 24. The conversion to Bz is based on price information 
from the accounts for each type o f grain separately (as in Section VII-13 in the appendix). Vertical 
lines show handover years, for which both accounts were combined. A handover could affect the 
amount of Restanzen (see Section VII-5 in the appendix).
In the early part of the century, fluctuations were much larger; after 1730, the 
weight of Restanzen seemed to fluctuate around a value just below 200 tonnes of 
wheat. This was significantly larger than the target inventory for Aarberg, which was 
the equivalent of 122 tonnes of wheat, according to the Venner-Reglement of 1778.458 
The actual granary was about 1.5 times that amount in the 1780s, falling to around 
1.3 times for the 1790s. The reasons for the dramatic fall in 1723 are not clear, 
thought it could be speculated that the bailiff was forced to dispose of the inventory 
quickly because of a storage problem, such as loss, theft or decay. A local harvest 
failure could be an alternative explanation, but seems unlikely.459 The 1770 crisis can 
be seen in Figure 111-32 as a sharp fall in Restanzen by weight; the fall in value was 
much smaller because of price increases in that year.
For Vaud, a contemporary table (Getreid Etat) shows values for target and 
actual inventories by county for the years after 1771 (see Figure 111-33).
458 StABE B VII 6. The target inventory was 1349 Mt of spelt, 55 Mt of rye and 250 Mt of oats.
459 According to the tithe series collected by Christian Pfister, there was no significant decline in the 
neighbouring county o f Nidau in the early 1720s: Pfister, C. (1984): vol. 2, table 2/7.1.
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Figure 111-33: Grain Inventory in Vaud by Weight, 1771-1796
Source: Welsch Getreide-Etat (ACV Bp 143); grain measures converted to wheat equivalents based on 
Pfister, C. (1975): table 2 4 .1 have used the litre equivalents for each county specified in Section VII- 
13 in the appendix.
After the 1770 crisis, Vaudois inventories were severely short of the target 
value, covering only 21% in 1771 and 52% in 1772. Once the stocks had been refilled 
by the late 1770s, they remained stable for over a decade, with the exception of a 
brief dip in 1782. After 1791, the Vaud public granaries were depleted once again, in 
spite of grain transfers from other parts of the canton. This was the effect of harvest 
failures, a French export ban in 1790 and the increased need to support Bemese 
troops.460 The value of Vaud granaries can be established with price information for 
each county from a contemporary spreadsheet based on bailiff accounts from 1772 
and 1791.461
460 For the French export ban: Brandenberger (2004): 395-397.
461 StABE B VI 228.
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Figure 111-34: Grain Inventory in Vaud by Weight and Value, 1771-1796
Source: Welsch Getreide-Etat (ACV Bp 143, see Figure 111-33 for details) and Ausziige Welschen 
Landts Getreyd Preise (StABE B VI 228). Values were calculated by county, missing prices were 
extrapolated by the mean price corrected for a relative weight factor per county, calculated as the 
relation between the mean price in this county and the overall mean.
The overall value of the bailiffs’ grain store was usually around 200,000 Bz; it 
occasionally peaked in years of high prices. This sum was roughly a tenth of the 
estimated domestic loans in Vaud, which were just under 2m Bz in the 1770s (see 
above, p. 144). Christian Pfister has estimated that the Argovia granaries covered 
around 14% of a normal annual harvest in 1767 and Vaud granaries covered 19% in 
1779 462
Inventories overseen by the Grain Chamber -  the second tier of the dual 
granary system -  offer more reliable information than granaries administered by 
bailiffs. The Grain Chamber stocks represented the disposable part of the overall 
inventory. From 1760 onwards, the Kornherr accounts provide yearly figures for their 
value, which are shown in Figure 111-35 by type of grain.
462 Pfister, C. (1975): 161, based on Bucher, E. (1944): 107 and Chevallaz (1949): 114.
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Figure 111-35: Grain Inventory of Kornherr Account by Weight, 1760-1796
Sources: Kornherr accounts (StABE B VI 261-285). Grain types were converted into wheat 
equivalents based on Pfister, C. (1975): table 24. The category Wheat consists o f Weizen and Kernen.
The disposable grain inventory had been reduced in the early 1760s from a high 
in 1763. At the time of the 1770 crisis, the Kornherr could not offer grain from his 
stores to a starving population. Instead cereals were purchased from abroad at high 
prices and local inventories were depleted to meet the demand. After this shock, the 
granaries were quickly refilled in the 1770s and 1780s. A peak of grain inventories 
administered by the Grain Chamber was reached in 1793. In terms of the grain used, 
spelt was important in the early years. After 1773, most stocks were kept in the form 
of wheat. A special oven was procured in 1758 which dried the wheat. Before 
purchasing the oven, the government calculated its potential savings from using when 
using this equipment and decided that it was a worthwhile investment to make storage 
both easier and cheaper by avoiding weight loss or decay.463
As all the values in Figure 111-35 have been converted into wheat equivalents, 
they can be capitalised by using wheat prices. Ideally this would be done for each 
region with its own public granary. Since the relevant data is not available, I have 
used wheat prices from the city of Bern for all conversions 464
463 Brandenberger (2004): 386-388.
464 These are the market prices collected by Pfister, C. (1975): table 28.
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Figure 111-36: Grain Inventory of Kornherr Account by Weight and Value, 1760-1796
Sources: Kornherr accounts (StABE B VI 261-285, see Figure 111-35 for details); values were 
calculated with wheat prices for the city o f Bern from Pfister, C. (1975): table 28.
Through most of the time, the two series appear remarkably parallel, indicating 
that prices were stable. This is quite surprising, given the high volatility of grain 
prices, but an essential point is that during the years with price shocks around 1770, 
the grain inventory did not change as it was virtually empty. The other price peak in 
1793 shows quite clearly: in spite of a reduction in inventory by weight, the value of 
public granaries increased. However, the overall value of the Kornherr inventory was 
not very high. In most years it was in the same order of magnitude as the yearly 
revenue from foreign funds.
As noted above, the canton was self-reliant in its grain production in years of 
normal harvest. Only in exceptional circumstances was it necessary to purchase 
cereals from abroad to feed the Bemese population. This was the case in 1750, 1757, 
1770 and 1789/90.465 During the catastrophic years 1770 and 1771, the government 
reportedly purchased 5,411 tonnes of wheat from as far away as Sicily and Africa. 
The cost of this was 16.0m Bz, which equals an average price of 32.25 Bz/ms. By the 
end of 1772 the Grain Chamber had sold 3,407 tonnes for 7.7m Bz. The average price 
of 24.83 Bz/ms signified an overall loss of 7.41 Bz per ms sold.466 The government
465 The cash reserve contributed the following sums for grain purchases (in Bz): 1.6m (1750); lm  
(1757); 6.3m (1770); 3.7m (1789) and 4.4m (1790). See discussion o f the cash reserve above.
466 B VI 253-258, see also Brandenberger (2004): 390-396.1 have added decuctions (Abgang) to the 
amount of grain sold. According to the Grain Chamber, by 1775 the overall loss on grain trade since 
1770 had been 3.36m Bz, which would be the equivalent o f 7 Bz/ms in price.
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was willing to cover such losses as a measure of economic policy. For regular years, 
the Grain Chamber was expected to make a profit on its grain inventory that covered 
at least the cost of capital. Contemporary documents clearly point towards this 
understanding.467 The objective was to buy or store grain in abundant years at a low 
price and sell it when prices were high, normally in years with bad harvests. This 
seems to have worked quite well; overall the Grain Chamber did not rely on 
assignations by other accounts to fund its expenses. Only for major grain sales did it 
receive money from other sources within the state, as explained in the discussion of 
the General Bilanzen and the cash reserve above.
The Bemese republic stored not only grain, but also wine. Information about 
wine inventories and their price is even more difficult to find than for grain. The only 
available figures are that in 1782, the Deutsch-Standesrechnung recorded 0.94m litres 
of wine (5,644 Saum).468 Roughly the same amount was stored in Vaud, as the 
inventories of the Welsch Weinschenk confirms. These inventories were listed semi­
annually from 1781 (see Figure 111-37).
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Figure 111-37: Wine Inventory in Vaud, 1781-1798 (Semi-Annual Figures)
Source: Etat Welscher Wein (ACV Bp 146). Figures exclude wine stored in bottles and Zufullwein. I 
have converted Saum in litres on the basis of the Bemese Saum (1.67 ltr).
The overall amount of wine in Bemese cellars was relatively stable throughout 
the 1780s and 1790s. Valuing this wine inventory is difficult because of a lack of
467 See documents quoted in Brandenberger (2004): 385-386.
468 StABE B VII 664 (DSR 1782). In the previous year, the value had been 5183 Sm (= 0.87m ltr): 
StABE B VII 663 (DSR 1781).
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reliable data on prices. Using prices from the city of Bern, the overall value of the 
Vaud wine cellars was roughly lm  Bz, the overall inventory consequently worth 
about 2m Bz.469 However, these figures are crude estimates.
This section has considered the state’s most important assets for which 
information is available. The value of the legendary Bemese cash reserve can be 
estimated back from its amount in 1798. From the scarce documentary evidence it 
follows that the 1710 loans depleted the treasure of about 40% of its value; four 
decades later, the reserve had been replenished to its level at the start of the century. 
Foreign capital investments were another major asset of the canton (see Chapter V for 
details); they surpassed domestic loans by far. Inventories of salt, grain and wine 
were comparatively less capital intensive.
Hi-6 Grain Sales by Bailiffs
Part of the state’s revenue in grain was used directly for expenditure, ranging 
from salaries to subsidies for the poor or payments for services. As the state normally 
spent less grain than it received in tithes, a bailiff could sell an annual surplus. In June 
and January, he received instructions from the Vennerkammer about the exact amount 
to be sold on the market.470 Selling grain without permission was strictly forbidden. 
Considerable sums were at stake, but determining the best price for the state was not 
an easy task. A low price might make subjects happy, but it would cost the treasury 
dearly. Furthermore, if grain was sold cheaply, there was a chance that bailiffs might 
sell to their favourites, who could then make large profits on such government- 
subsidised grain. On the other hand, high prices were considered exploitative and 
could undermine the legitimacy of a government. They could also cause inflation and, 
finally, the bailiff might not be able to sell all public grain at a sufficiently high price. 
From 1731, bailiffs had to record their grain sales on behalf of the government. As 
remuneration, they received a share of the proceeds, usually one fifth, seventh or
469 Pfister, C. (1975): table 28/1, wine prices from January 1781 to July 1797 (with gaps). My price is 
the mean of all monthly prices available (overall 131 price quotes): 6.12 Xr/maas (=0.92 Bz/ltr). The 
Vaud inventory would be worth between 811,321 and 1,060,550 Bz (mean = 922,596 Bz).
470 Bucher, E. (1944): 107.
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ninth, depending on the amount sold.471 Bern thus adopted a system that was based on 
market prices and set an incentive for high prices for the bailiff.
There is too little data on Bemese grain markets to investigate the role of the 
government systematically (see Section VII-13 in the appendix). For the county of 
Nidau, a market register contains prices and volumes traded from December 1738 to 
December 1785, albeit with gaps in 1742/43 and 1744/45 472 Based on this document, 
Erika Fltickiger Strebel has calculated monthly market prices for wheat, taking the 
average between recorded maximum and minimum prices for each day, weighting 
them by the amount sold.473 Her data can be compared to the government grain sales, 
recorded in bailiff accounts.474 During the same period from December 1738 to 
December 1785, Nidau bailiffs recorded a total of 794 wheat sales on 625 different 
days (with several sales per day possible). To compare these with the market data, I 
have calculated 213 monthly aggregates, weighted by the amount of grain sold each 
month.475 For 194 cases, both a market price and a price recorded by the bailiff are 
available.476 In 153 of these observations (78.9%), the price charged by the bailiff 
was below the market price; in 41 (21.1%) it was higher. Although most of these 
instances where the bailiff sold grain more expensively than the market rate occurred 
in the early and mid-1760s, no clear trend emerges (see Figure 111-38).
471 This was called the fifth (seventh, ninth) penny. With a larger amount sold, the bailiffs share 
decreased, hence the tariff had a progressive structure. See Bucher, E. (1944): 107 and StABE B VII 
25: §9b.
472 There is no data for the following months: July 1742 to September 1743; July 1744 to September 
1745; May 1746; May 1755 and October 1758.
473 Fliickiger Strebel (2002): Table 45. Prices are for Kemen.
474 The bailiffs accounts for Nidau from 1738-1785: StABE B VII 1633-1640.
475 For the years 1749 and 1752, the amount of grain sold was not recorded by month (only prices 
were). I therefore had to assume an equal amount of grain sold in each month for which a price was 
recorded.
476 The rest of the bailiffs’ transactions fall in periods where the market series has gaps.
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Figure 111-38: Grain Prices in Nidau: Market and Bailiff, 1738-1786
Sources: Market prices from Fliickiger Strebel (2002): table 45; Bailiff prices from StABE B VII 
1633-1640 (Amtrsrechnungen Nidau). All prices are weighted prices for Kernen (wheat). Price Ratio 
is the ratio between the bailiff’s price and the market price.
One explanation for the generally lower prices charged by the bailiff might be 
that most sales were transacted with millers and not made on the open market. 
However, it might also describe the government policy of providing cheap grain as a 
matter of economic policy. It could further depict different trends in seasonality, or 
simply the inaccuracies of monthly aggregated data. Calculating a statistical measure 
of correlation between the two series is possible but would give a spurious result. The 
reason is that monthly fluctuations for grain prices followed a particular pattern over 
the harvest year.477 In theory, this could be eliminated using 12-month moving 
averages, but as the bailiffs series does not cover consecutive months, this is 
impossible. Nonetheless, because we know the amount of grain sold on the market 
and by the bailiff, we can compare selling patterns over the year, grouping the data by 
month (Figure 111-38). It is best not to show this by calendar year, but by the harvest 
year, which starts in August and ends in July.
477 For seasonal price fluctuations: Pfister, C. (1975): 152-153.
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Figure III-39: Grain Sales by Month, Nidau 1738-1785 (Averages, Harvest Year)
Sources: as Figure 111-38. All sums for the same month were added and divided by the number of 
months for which data is available; prices are weighted averages. N  stands for the number of months 
with data from bailiff accounts.
The two series follow distinctly different patterns, both in terms of prices and 
the average amount of grain sold. The bailiff consistently sold grain at a cheaper price 
than the market except in January when he charged a market price. However, the 
January figure, as well as the below-market price for December, are both based on 
few observations. While December was the busiest month in the market, average 
grain sales by the bailiff peaked in January. However, the selling pattern of the 
government was less consistent that that of the market; using average figures can 
therefore be misleading. This is illustrated in Figure 111-40.
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Figure 111-40: Grain Sold by Bailiff, Nidau 1735-1785: Total and Average (Harvest Year)
See comments to Figure 111-39. Total sold  is the accumulated total over time for each month.
When comparing the accumulated total sold per month with the average, the 
picture that emerges is quite different. Overall sales of bailiffs peaked in June, shortly 
before the harvest, and not in January, as average numbers suggest. If we combine 
these observations, it can be said that at the rare occasions a bailiff sold grain in the 
winter months, the amounts were substantial.478 The differences between average and 
cumulative total are trivial for the market series (not shown here).
Combining the amount and price of the sales, we can also investigate the 
connection between these two variables. For example, did the government sell more 
grain when prices were higher? Figure 111-41 shows a scatter plot of price and amount 
sold in all months for which market and bailiff data is available.
478 The years concerned (1753, 1766 and 1767) were not handover years for the office either.
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Figure 111-41: Grain Sold per Price (Scatter Plot), Bailiff and Market, Nidau 1738-1785
Sources: see Figure 111-38. Only data for months with both market and bailiff data (N=194). Linear 
stands for the linear trend line.
Figure 111-41 shows all monthly sales and a trend line for both series. For the 
market series, the amount sold did not depend on price, whereas for the bailiff series, 
there seems to be a positive correlation, although the statistical significance is 
small.479 This means that more grain was sold if prices were higher. An interpretation 
of this result could be that the government tried to maximise revenue by selling grain 
when it was expensive. It can also be argued that the government sold grain when 
prices where high to stabilise prices as a measure of economic policy.
If we consider the bailiffs’ grain sales by year, we can compare this number 
with Christian Pfister’s data on tithe revenue, collected from 1755 onward (see Figure 
111-42).
479 Correlation between price and amount sold (Pearson’s, significance level in brackets): for market 
series 0.003 (0.961, i.e. not significant); for bailiff series 0.147 (0.041).
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Figure 111-42: Grain Sales and Tithes, Nidau 1738-85
Sources: For grain sales, see Figure 111-38; tithes from Pfister, C. (1975): table 25/2 (value for Nidau). 
All figures are for wheat (Kernen).
Yearly fluctuations in the amount of grain sold are considerable, with a 
coefficient of variation of 46.98%.480 The series seems to roughly follow trends in 
tithe revenue, except for the years after 1770; however the correlation is not 
statistically significant.481 In 1770, the government had used some of its public 
granaries for alleviating the severe agricultural crisis.482 The resulting inventory 
reduction needed to be balanced in the following years, when grain surpluses were 
stored rather than sold. This is also apparent from Figure II1-43, which shows data on 
public granaries in Nidau from 1759 to 1783.
480 The coefficient o f variation is the standard deviation (SD = 648.214) divided by the mean (= 
1379.74).
481 Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0.063 for whole series (significant at the 0.743 level). Even if  the 
years 1771-1775 are excluded, the figures are little better, with a correlation coefficient o f 0.350 (sign. 
0.087).
482 See Fluckiger Strebel (2002): 144, 150-162 (and Table 22).
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Figure 111-43: Wheat Revenue, Granary and Bailiff Sales, Nidau 1759-1783
Sources: same as Figure 111-38. Net Revenue are revenue o f bailiff accounts, excluding previous year’s 
arrears and reduction of public granaries. Granary content is shown in Bernese mass (ms) on the 
secondary axis.
For the years following the 1770 crisis, grain sales came to a standstill until the 
public granary was filled once again. From 1759 to 1783, the bailiffs sold half of the 
net grain revenue, but this share could range from zero to almost 100%.483 If we 
compare this to a sample of counties for 1782, they sold 11% of the net wheat 
revenue, while Nidau sold 44%.484 It would be interesting to replicate the findings for 
Nidau to the actions of the Kornherr throughout the territory. Unfortunately, the 
information on grain markets is too scarce to cover more than the city of Bern itself, 
for which prices have been collected by Christian Pfister.485 From all grain sales by 
the Grain Chamber, I have isolated sales of wheat in the city and compared them to a 
median yearly market price (see Figure 111-44).
483 If accumulated totals are used, bailiffs sold 50.0% of net revenue; the arithmetic average is 50.4%.
It is impossible to calculate a mean with some values being 0. Please note that in 1764, when the bailiff 
sold almost 100% of net revenue, the public granary was reduced.
484 See Section VII-15 in the appendix and Chapter IV for details about the sample.
485 Pfister, C. (1975): table 28/1.
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Figure 111-44: Wheat Prices in Bern, Market and Kornherr, 1765-1790
Sources: Kornherr accounts (StABE B VI 261-285), Grain sales for Bern only, values for Weizen and 
Kernen; Market prices are from Pfister, C. (1975): table 28/1 (Kernen, yearly price calculated as mean 
of monthly prices). Price Ratio is the ratio between Kornherr and market price.
Prices are only available on a yearly basis and are missing for the years 1769- 
1772, when the Kornherr did not sell grain from his granaries, which were empty at 
the time.486 The number of observations is relatively small to make conclusive 
statements. In 12 of the 21 years with data, the government sold at a higher price than 
the market, but there seems to be no clear trend. If we relate the amount of grain sold 
to its price, the result is shown in Figure 111-45.
486 During that time, the Kornherr sold grain purchased abroad (discussed above).
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Figure 111-45: Wheat Sold per Price (Scatter Plot), Kornherr 1765-1790
Sources: Kornherr accounts (StABE B VI 261-285), Grain sales for Bern only, values for Weizen and 
Kernen. The number of cases (N) is 21. The outlier (63,372 ms sold) is the value for 1779.
As for the discussion of grain sales in Nidau, I have included a linear trend line. 
Unfortunately there is no data for the amount of wheat sold on the Bemese market, 
but judging from the Nidau series, the amount of grain sold on the market was 
independent of its price. For wheat sales by the Grain Chamber, there seems to be a 
positive correlation, although the result is not statistically significant.487
This section has considered grain sales by the government through its agents. 
Based on the case of Nidau, it seems as if bailiffs sold on average half of their grain 
revenue, but this share varied substantially. The government sold grain slightly below 
the market price, usually when prices were high and especially in the months before 
the harvest in July. Selling grain from public granaries thus had a stabilising effect on 
prices while generating a good return on storage investment. Sales by the Grain 
Chamber seem similar, although the information is less reliable than for Nidau.
487 The correlation coefficient (Pearson) o f 0.059 is only significant at the 0.799 level (i.e. not 
statistically significant).
Chapter III: Bemese State Finance (Long-Run Analysis) 173
iii-7 Conclusion: Bern as a Surplus State
The empirical analysis of long-term financial developments of the Bemese state 
illustrates how Bern functioned as a surplus state. Underlying all the trends I have 
discussed was the government’s willingness to limit expenditure to the means 
available from traditional sources of revenue and entrepreneurial activity. On one 
hand, the Bemese followed the traditional pattern of a patrimonial state in building up 
reserves for contingency. On the other, this was the only way for the government to 
avoid sliding into a tax-and-spend cycle in which increasing expenditure would force 
the opening of new revenue sources. In the context of the Bemese republic, additional 
tax revenue could hardly be obtained without any consent from subjects. Building a 
state that generated revenue independent of such consent was therefore the 
cornerstone of patrician financial policy.
The Bemese state ran consistent budget surpluses throughout the century. 
Revenue was larger than expenditure in 78 years between 1700 and 1796. In 
particular, profits (defined as the difference between current revenue and 
expenditure) could be invested. Investments, in turn, generated future revenue, 
though they were highly volatile. They could be several times the amount of ordinary 
expenditure, as the loans that were granted to the Dutch and English in 1710 
illustrate. In other years, investments could be negative, when assets were liquidated, 
as was the case in the 1790s. Entrepreneurial returns were increasing throughout the 
century. The two main contributors to government finance were profits from the salt 
monopoly and interest payments on foreign capital investments; they were the ‘cash 
cows’ that fed Bemese administration. For extraordinary needs, the cash reserve 
provided a backup. When the government purchased grain overseas to avoid 
starvation during the 1770/71 harvest crisis, this venture was largely financed by a 
withdrawal from the cash reserve. Public granaries, which were normally used to 
cover harvest failures, had been emptied previously. As far as information is 
available, Bemese public granaries seemed relatively small compared to the annual 
harvest, and also compared to the sums that the canton had invested financially.
Granaries were mainly fed by another main contributor to Bemese revenue, 
tithes. Because they were not monetised, it is very difficult to determine their exact 
value. This is why most contemporary attempts to generate an overview of the 
canton’s finances ignore revenue in kind entirely. An additional reason for this
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neglect is that they were collected -  and spent -  locally by bailiffs, since transporting 
grain to the central government would have been cumbersome and costly. For a long- 
run observation, tithe returns fluctuated with the size of harvests, which made them 
prone to climatic shocks. The seminal trend in tithe revenue was stable if they are 
measured by weight; when expressed in monetary units, tithe revenue increased 
because of grain inflation. The next chapter will discuss this in more detail, along 
with transactions that occurred throughout the canton in its counties. The sale of grain 
surpluses by bailiffs was analysed for the county of Nidau, where market prices are 
available for comparison. Bailiffs usually sold grain when prices were high, which 
can be interpreted as an anti-cyclical economic policy of stabilising prices, as well as 
an attempt to achieve a high return on grain storage investment.
If these findings are discussed in the context of the model of a surplus state 
outlined in the introduction, all the elements are present. The state ran budget 
surpluses and invested in various ways to generate returns; defence expenditure was 
relatively small, taxes were low compared to entrepreneurial returns; and there was 
no trace of national debt. The state had important assets in the form of cash, financial 
investments and granaries, the former two contributing considerably to the overall 
budget. The situation in the 1790s illustrates how much the Bemese equilibrium had 
been based on low levels of defence expenditure. To cover the additional costs of 
defending its borders with France, Bern had to liquidate some of its overseas financial 
assets. But ultimately the cash reserve could not prevent the downfall of the republic 
in 1798. Ironically, it might even have attracted undue attention by French army 
commanders.
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IV Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis)
rv-i Introduction and Chapter Contents
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the structure of Bemese state finance 
for two sample years and complements the overview of long-term trends discussed in 
the previous chapter (III). The remainder of this section defines the term fiscal 
redistribution and outlines the analytical framework used, as far as it differs from the 
one featured in the previous chapter. I will subsequently explain the data, selection 
criteria and conversion of transactions in kind into monetary values (Section IV-2). 
The body of the chapter represents an empirical analysis of fiscal redistribution by 
nature of transaction (Section IV-3), as well as by state function, economic sector and 
region (Section IV-4). The fiscal burden, including extraction through the militia 
system, will be covered in a separate Section (IV-5). A conclusion will consolidate 
the most important findings.
I will begin with a definition of fiscal redistribution to avoid misunderstandings 
about the scope of my analysis. In modern-day economics, fiscal redistribution is 
normally understood as the amount of money that is taxed from the rich and used for 
social transfer payments to the poor by comparing a pre-tax income distribution with 
the post-tax situation. For my analysis of eighteenth-century Bemese state finance, I 
understand fiscal redistribution in a broader sense as the way in which a state extracts 
revenue and spends it as expenditure. The pattern which ensues determines how 
resources that would have been used for different purposes in the absence of a fisc 
end up being redirected by the state. Other than many studies of fiscal history that 
focus on revenue and taxation in particular, my definition explicitly includes 
expenditure as well. In short, I define fiscal redistribution as the effect of accumulated 
revenue and expenditure by the government.
An Analytical Framework for Fiscal Redistribution
This section will explain the framework I have used for analysing the structural 
breakdown of Bemese accounts for the sample years 1732 and 1782. As far as the 
approach is identical to that of Chapter III, it will not be discussed in detail (see 
Section III-l above). My analysis of fiscal redistribution is based on four dimensions:
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factual, functional, sectoral and regional. While they will all be considered in detail 
later, the aim here is to provide an overview about how these dimensions were 
interrelated. A special case of quasi-fiscal redistribution was the militia army, 
which extracted resources in the form of forced labour and spent it as days served for 
the army. This will be discussed in a separate section (IV-5).
The basic principle of my approach is simple. All transactions of the state can 
be categorised according to an analytical framework that allows for a ‘mapping’ of 
fiscal redistribution along several axes. To this end, every transaction was labelled 
with different attributes, such as the time and place it occurred, the currency used, its 
factual nature, the function it fulfilled or the economic sector that was involved. I call 
these the dimensions of state finance, along which fiscal redistribution can be 
measured by collecting, aggregating and comparing data.
Dimensions for Fiscal Redistribution
--------- 1----------------1--------------- 1----------------1---------------- — ,
C Factual V F uncltional) C Sectoral )  f  Regional ) ■ T e m p o ra l■ Gender : Class : • Currency • Level
Dimensions of Analytical Framework Other Possible Dimensions
Figure IV-1: Dimensions for Fiscal Redistribution through Government Transactions
Factual stands for redistribution by nature of transaction; Level for the administrative or hierarchical 
level of government (such as central vs regional or local government).
In theory, defining fiscal redistribution is possible for each attribute listed in 
Figure IV-1. For instance, it would be interesting to consider the gender dimension of 
Bemese state finance. However, eighteenth-century accounting data provides little 
information in this respect and makes such an analysis impossible. Except for some 
parameters defined by the sample that I only consider briefly -  such as currencies -  
the main focus will be on factual, functional, sectoral and regional redistribution. 
Figure IV-2 shows a more detailed breakdown for each of these dimensions. It is 
important to note that each transaction of the state has to be categorised along each 
dimension. Comparing the sums of inflows (revenue) with the outflows (expenditure) 
determines fiscal redistribution for each parameter. The categories for the factual 
dimension are identical to what was discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 
III-2).
488 1 use the term ‘quasi’ because these transactions were not recorded in the state’s accounts. See 
Section IV-5 below for details.
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Figure IV-2: Analytical Framework for Fiscal Redistribution
For a more detailed version see Section VII-12 in the appendix and Hagnauer (1995): 22-23 (for the 
dimension factual, functional and sectoral only). Region includes the administrative unit in which 
transactions were recorded. For factual redistribution, see also Figure II1-1 above.
To illustrate how the distinctions of Figure IV-2 work in practice, I will use the 
example of the government purchasing a new desk for its treasurer. When 
determining the nature of a transaction for the factual dimension, the distinction 
between current and inventory transactions has already been discussed in the previous 
chapter, along with their main sub-categories (see Section III-2 above). If the state is 
buying a desk, this would be categorised as the purchase of an item of inventory 
goods. The functional dimension investigates which of the state’s activities was 
affected by a transaction. Using the example of the state purchasing a desk for the 
treasurer again, this involves the state function Finance and Taxation. For sectoral 
redistribution, the economy consists of three sectors: agriculture (primary sector), 
crafts and industry (secondary sector), as well as services and administration (tertiary 
sector). In order to determine sectoral redistribution, every single transaction must be 
allocated to one sector. Buying a desk for the treasurer is an expenditure that flows to 
the second sector, more specifically to carpentry or wood work. Once all transactions 
are categorised and compiled, the difference between revenue and expenditure in each 
sector determines sectoral redistribution through the state. Finally, I have proxied 
regional redistribution by the account in which transactions were recorded. This 
allows for a distinction between transactions carried out by central government and 
those of its representatives in the city or the territory. The territory itself is separated 
in its main regions (see Section II-3). The example of the treasurer’s new desk would 
presumably be recorded in the Deutsch-Standesrechnung and therefore count as 
central government expenditure.
If all information on inflows and outflows for each dimension is considered, 
this provides an encompassing view about how the Bemese government redistributed 
resources. In addition to the direction of fiscal redistribution, it is also cmcial to 
consider how much of an economy was affected by the government budget. In 
modem economies, this is expressed with the state quota, defined as the share of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) controlled by the state. Because reliable GDP 
estimates for early modem Bern are missing, I can only use a proxy figures for this in 
my section about the fiscal burden (IV-5). Other key figures, such as budget surplus,
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profitability of accounts or net investments have been discussed in the previous 
chapter (Section III-1, in particular Figure III-2).
iv-2 Data Selection and Conversions
The aim of this section is to provide the necessary background for 
understanding what data is underlying my empirical analysis. As a general rule, I 
have tried to place all non-essential points to the appendix. I will start by explaining 
the sampling techniques for constructing a database for fiscal redistribution in the two 
sample years 1732 and 1782. This will be followed by a discussion of how all 
transactions were converted into into monetary values. Finally, the overall amount of 
Bemese revenue will be compared to other states and the problem of measuring 
inflation between the two sample years addressed.
Sampling, Account Types and Error Quotas
To analyse redistribution by the Bemese state, it would be ideal to consider all 
accounts throughout the eighteenth century, or indeed throughout the whole early 
modem period. The abundance of primary sources renders this task quasi impossible. 
I have therefore focused my structural analysis on a cross-section of accounts for two 
sample years, 1732 and 1782. They were chosen randomly by the research project 
BeFin489 Both sample years were reasonably close to the overall average in terms of 
climatic conditions, grain prices and political events to qualify as ‘normal’ financial 
years.490 The most extraordinary events with a large budgetary impact were the 
purchase of Castelen county in 1732 and a small military expedition to Geneva in 
1782 (see also Chapter III above). Exact population figures for the sample years are 
not available and have to be extrapolated from the 1764 and 1798 population 
censuses, as well as from Christian Pfister’s estimates for the canton in its modem 
shape. If we assume a stable population distribution and linear growth, the Bemese 
state had about 317,000 inhabitants in 1732 and 388,000 in 1782 491 Incidentally, the
489 The research project collected data for 1581-85, 1631-35, 1681-85, 1732 and 1782 (primary data for 
the eighteenth century was too abundant to carry out a 5-year analysis). This will allow for a long-run 
analysis with data every 50 years once all the primary material has been categorised.
490 For the climatic conditions, see Pfister, C. (1984), vol. 2.
491 Berhist Database [Pfister, C. (1995), for the canton in its 1980 borders only]; Schluchter (1988) and 
HLS (2002), article Bern’. 267.1 have used the actual ratio for modem to Ancien Regime Bern from the
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contemporary observer Gerhard Philipp Heinrich Norrmann had estimated the 
canton’s population for 1783 at 384,000.492
For both 1732 and 1782,1 have collected summary financial information for all 
known Bemese ledgers and analysed a sample of accounts in more detail in a separate 
database. For this purpose, records were transcribed as full-text documents and then 
re-categorised using customised software for historical accounting.493 The 
methodology for categorisation was explained in Section IV-1. For simplicity, I will 
refer to the sample analysed in detail as database, while all accounts of the Bemese 
state for 1732 and 1782 are referred to as extended database. The term summary 
accounts is used for accounts which are not included in the detailed database (see 
Figure IV-3).
Figure IV-3: Database, Summary Accounts and Extended Database
Figure IV-4 illustrates how different types of accounts were included in the 
database, referring to the distinction made in Section III-3. While the most important 
accounts of the Bemese state (Type A and B accounts) were fully included, a 
selection was made for D-Type accounts.
1764 census and Pfister’s estimate for 1700, assuming linear growth. For the 1782 figure, I have used 
the actual growth rate for the whole canton between 1764 and 1798, assuming linear growth. These are 
only crude estimates.
492 Norrmann (1795): 425. He admitted having doubts about the reliability of this estimate. Norrmann 
referred to Meiners Br. BIV, S. 39.
493 This software, Schupper-Logic, works as Micro-Commands for MS Word 2000. It has been 
programmed by Stephan Hagnauer and adapted by myself. See Hagnauer (1994) and Hagnauer (1995) 
for details.
Extended Database
Database (Sample)
Summary Accounts
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Type A 
Central Accounts
Deutsch-Standesrechung (DSR) 
Welsch-Standesrechnimg (WSR)
TypeC 
Accounts Directly Integrated
Offices / Institutions: 0/21*
Type B 
Independent Accounts
Salz-Direktion (SDI) 
Salzproduktion La Roche (ROC) 
Auslandische Gelder (AUS) 
Pulver-Rechnung (PUL)
TypeD
Accounts Integrated Through Arrears
Counties: 25/52 
Offices / Institutions: 14/32
^  Fully Included J  ^  Partly Included ^   ^ Not Included* J
Figure IV-4: Accounts Included in Database (by Type)
*) The overall sums of Type C accounts are per definition included in Type A accounts (transfers to 
and from these accounts were classified as net transactions, see below).
See Section VII-9 in the appendix for details, and Figure III-5 above for A-B-C-D-Type accounts.
The sample for D-Type accounts was designed to represent all main regions of 
the canton and a number of institutions within the city itself. To avoid a sample bias, I 
have weighted the included accounts by the total figure for revenue and expenditure 
for each region, which is known from the extended database. This is explained in 
more detail in section VII-9 in the appendix. Together with the two A-Type and four 
B-Type accounts, the database covers material from 46 different sources. The total of 
accounts in the database is not identical with the number of offices included, because 
some recorded more than one ledger when there was a handover in the sample period; 
others did not exist in both sample years. The database covers 49 ledgers for 1732 
and 55 for 1782. With every single transaction categorised, it contains 31,493 
records.494
Once all transactions that were only made for accounting purposes are 
excluded, slightly less than 25,000 records in the database cover net transactions by 
the government (see Table IV-1). By defining net transactions as revenue and 
expenditure that affected the financial position of the state, the main exclusions 
concern arrears, grain sales, as well as transfers, both between and within accounts.
494 Repetitive transactions with the same characteristics, such as lists of interest payments or sales of 
the same type of grain, were sometimes entered as one record, in order not to inflate the number of 
records.
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This is explained in detail in Section VII-9 in the appendix. Unless otherwise stated, 
all my numbers for the structural analysis refer to such net transactions.
1732 1782 Total
Total Records 16,756 14,737 31,493
Transfers, Arrears 532 619 1,151
Grain Sales 550 241 791
Sums 2,476 2,318 4,794
Net Transactions 13,198 11,559 24,757
Net Revenue 3,745 2,846 6,591
Net Expenditure 9,453 8,713 18,166
Table IV-1: Number of Records in the Database
Source: Database. See Section VII-9 in the appendix for excluded transactions (transfers, arrears, grain 
sales, sums).
I have used the excluded transactions to calculate overall error quotas of the 
database, based on a methodology explained in Section VII-11 in the appendix. With 
values of -0.03% (1732) and 0.08% (1782), these are remarkably low. For the 
extended database, they are slightly higher (0.37% and 0.40%), which is still low by 
overall standards for early modem data. Overall, it can therefore be assumed that the 
data is reliable. One major caveat is the assumption that records provide a complete 
and accurate depiction of facts. Any ‘under the table’ transactions that were not 
recorded in official accounts cannot be considered for my study. There is no evidence 
that such transactions took place in eighteenth-century Bern, but of course this is 
subject to a strong tradition bias, as such dealings would normally not leave traces in 
public archives. A special case of non-recorded transactions are the militia duties, 
which are discussed in a separate section (IV-5).
Currencies, Revenue per Capita and Inflation
The plethora of currencies in which transactions were recorded in Bemese 
accounts ranges from several monetary units to different measurements for 
transactions in kind. For my empirical analysis of fiscal redistribution, I have 
converted all transactions into Bemese Batzen (Bz). This sub-section will briefly 
explain the conversion prices used. I will also discuss the effect of varying inflation 
rates on comparing figures that are half a century apart. While the conversion of 
monetary values is simple, the calculation of transactions in kind is more complex
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because Bemese officials did not systematically record prices. Whenever available, I 
used a weighted annual price for each of the goods calculated from transactions in the 
same ledger. If this information was not available, I have used weighted regional 
prices, calculated from other accounts. The results are discussed in detail in the 
appendix (Section VII-13). What matters is that my prices for 1732 and 1782 are 
consistent with other information on Bemese prices. Also, it seems that both sample 
years were not outliers, although price volatility was generally very high for 
foodstuffs in the eighteenth century. As discussed in Section III-6, government prices 
for grain could differ from market prices. For an analysis of state finance this matters 
little, since prices recorded in the accounts represent the value that the government 
could expect for its goods. For the same reason, issues of seasonality, which are 
particularly important for grain prices, do not matter at this level, as it can be argued 
that the overall weighted price represents the government’s timing preference.495
With the conversions from Section VII-13 in the appendix, the net revenue and 
expenditure of the Bemese government are shown in Table IV-2 in absolute terms 
and as a per capita estimate. These figures will be qualified later; for now, they 
provide a first overview and allow for a comparison with other states through the 
European State Finance Database.496
1732
Revenue Expenditure
1782
Revenue Expenditure
Total (Bz) 24,939,454 22,791,477 32,220,535 30,633,382
Fine Silver (tonnes) 18.40 16.81 23.32 22.17
Bz per capita 78.67 71.90 83.04 78.95
silver (g) per cap. 58.03 53.04 60.10 57.14
Table IV-2: Total Net Revenue and Expenditure in Bz and Silver
Source: Extended database. For conversion to silver, see appendix (Section VII-13); population 
estimates as discussed earlier in this section.
Between 1732 and 1782, government revenue increased by 29.2%, expenditure 
by 34.1%. This is equivalent to linear annual growth rates of 0.51% and 0.59% 
respectively. The budget surplus (the difference between revenue and expenditure, as 
a percentage of revenue) was 9.42% in 1732 and 5.18% in 1782. On a per capita
495 It can be argued that in practical terms, the government might not be able to dispose of its inventory 
according to its own timing preference.
496 ESFDB; Bonney (1995b); Bonney (1999b).
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basis, the increase in revenue was small, about 5.6% over 50 years. When expressed 
in grams of fine silver, the increase was even smaller because of a relative loss in 
silver value of the Batzen (+3.6%).
With an expenditure of 17-22 tonnes of fine silver, the Bemese budget was 
considerably larger than all other eighteenth-century city states with the exception of 
Venice (118 tonnes in 1783).497 Their expenditure ranged from one tonne 
(Uberlingen, Hanover, Lucerne) to several tonnes of silver (e.g. Basel 5.3 tonnes, 
Zurich 8 tonnes, Milan falling from 7 to 4 tonnes and Nuremberg from 11.3 to 5.7 
tonnes). The figure for Bern was roughly on par with smaller territorial states like 
Sicily and Genoa (27 tonnes each), but significantly smaller than that of Piedmont (45 
tonnes), Bavaria (41-73 tonnes) or Lombardy (49-66 tonnes around 1720). The 
expenditure of the large European monarchies such as Denmark (from 86 tonnes to 
360 tonnes in 1801) or Pmssia (from 112 tonnes to 485 tonnes) were larger by several 
orders of magnitude, as were the United Provinces’ (439 tonnes in 1795). France 
(3,000 tonnes in the 1790s) and Britain (8,500 tonnes) were playing in a completely 
different league.498 Derived from these figures, I have proxied expenditure per capita 
as far as population estimates allow for, to compare them with the Bemese figure of 
about 55g of fine silver per capita. The detailed sources for this are discussed in 
Section VII-19 in the appendix.499 It is important to note that the figures are very 
rough estimates with large error margins. The European league table in expenditure 
per capita shows a clear lead by large monarchies, with Britain spending a whopping 
810g of fine silver per capita, followed by Denmark (from 11 lg to 389g) and France 
(115g). Pmssia tails the rear of major powers with 84-78g. The United Provinces 
were also amongst the big spenders with 214 gram of silver per capita. Republics 
seem generally more in line with Bern’s expenditure: Venice spent 42g, Milan 
between 56g and 30g. While the territorial states of Lombardy (42-56g), Bavaria (28- 
58g) and Genoa (44g) are similar to Bern, Sicily spent clearly less, with only 19g of 
silver per capita (see Section VII-19 in the appendix for details).
497 The use of expenditure (rather than revenue) is purely motivated by the better availability of 
comparative data. It should not matter much in the long-run, since all expenditure had to be covered by 
revenue.
498 Komer (1995a): 401. The figure he provides for Bern (14 tonnes of silver) understates expenditure 
considerably, because it is based on General-Bilanzen (see Section III-4 above). Accordingly, his 
estimate for the Swiss Confederation (40 tonnes of silver) also has to be increased by 10 tonnes.
499 Population estimates are from Beloch (1937-1961), vol. 3: 353, 365; Bairoch/Batou/Chevre (1988): 
6-9,45; Lee (1975): 316; Helleiner (1967): 46; Behre (1905): 197-198 and Mitchell (2003): 6, 8 (see 
Section VII-19 in the appendix for details).
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Returning to the situation in Bern, we can first consider the distribution of total 
revenue and expenditure by the currency they were recorded in. Figure IV-5 shows 
this for the extended database, which includes summary accounts.500
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Figure IV-5: Revenue and Expenditure by Currency, 1732 and 1782
Source: Extended Database (including grain sales). Foreign (conv.) are transactions in foreign currency 
that have been transferred into Crowns by the government itself. Rev is for revenue, Exp for 
expenditure.
In both sample years, monetary revenue constituted the largest part o f revenue 
(1732: 80.9%, 1782: 77.8%) and expenditure (77.5% and 76.2%), with a clear shift 
from transactions in Pounds to Kronen. Revenue and expenditure in wine and grain 
increased over time, both in absolute and relative terms. When considering different 
types of grain, it is sufficient to look at revenue alone, since there was no significant 
redistribution between grain types. Grain revenue expressed in Batzen grew by 59.2% 
from 1732 to 1782. All major types rose over the period, the most remarkable being 
wheat (+100.3%) and rye (+77.5%).501 When expressed by weight and not in 
monetary units, the growth looks less impressive. This is illustrated in Figure IV-6.
500 These figures differ slightly from the weighted sample in the database. They include grain sales, 
which are relevant in this context.
501 See also Table VII-21 for details.
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□  Wheat B  Oats B  Mischel □  Other Grain
6  million
Figure IV-6: Grain Revenue 1732 and 1782, in kg and Bz
Source: Database (including grain sales). Other Grain includes Com, Wiki, Paschi, Mill, Peas, Reiter, 
Millet and Lentils. See also Section VII-13 and Table VII-21 in the appendix.
To analyse how much of this increase was due to grain price inflation, we can 
consider grain transactions by weight. Simply adding grain across different cereals 
can produce spurious results. If the relative composition changed towards more 
expensive cereals over time, this would alter net revenue for the state, but not show 
up as an increase in weight. I have therefore corrected for relative price differences by 
using price-adjusted weights, calculated on the basis of an arithmetic mean of the 
1732 and 1782 overall price for each grain type (see Table VII-13 in the appendix).'02 
With this measure, the total increase in grain revenue by weight was 12.9%. This is 
higher than the non-adjusted weight increase, which was 8.3%.503 In other words, the 
composition of the canton’s grain revenue had indeed changed towards more 
expensive cereals.504 Nevertheless, the growth in grain measured by weight was 
significantly smaller than in Batzen, which was 55.6%. This means that grain price 
inflation existed, which poses the question about how stable the Bemese Batzen 
really was. To discuss this, we have to look at different ways of measuring early 
modem inflation rates and discuss their impact on state finance.
To consider the effects of grain price inflation on government revenue, one 
option is to calculate grain inflation adjusted revenue for both sample years. I have 
used a mean inflation rate for all cereals, which was 60.9% over the whole period, 
equivalent to an annual inflation rate of 0.96% (see Table VII-21 in the appendix). 
Such a ‘grain deflator’ should only be used for monetary revenue, since revenue 
collected in kind was -  per definition -  not affected by grain inflation. If we correct 
for this, government revenue did not increase from 1732 to 1782, but fell by 10.1%;
502 This is shown in the row stable o f Table VII-13.
503 Un-weighted means that kg of grain are simply added across all grain types.
504 The relative increase for each grain type is -  per definition -  equal to the increase in weight.
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 187
expenditure fell by 5.8%. In other words, the government could buy less grain with its 
1782 revenue than half a century before. Of course this result needs to be interpreted 
with care, since grain prices were very volatile and comparing two single years can 
provide misleading results.
Deflating all values by grain prices would not represent the reality of an early 
modem economy either, since its very essence was to combine different currencies in 
order to cope with relative price changes. Compared to other items, grain appreciated 
most in value in the eighteenth century, with the possible exception of livestock and 
dairy products.505 This is illustrated in Table IV-3, which shows changes in revenue 
and expenditure based on several inflation rates for the Bemese Batzen. The 
calculation is explained in more detail in Section VII-14 in the appendix.
Index Inflation p.a. A Rev A Exp Source
Bz n/a n/a 30.46% 35.39%
Bullion -1.23% -0.02% 32.08% 37.07% Komer/Furrer/Bartlome (2001)
Wages 22.90% 0.41% 6.15% 10.16% Ebener (1999)
Tiles 16.30% 0.30% 12.17% 16.41% Ebener (1999)
Grain* } 60.89% 0.96% -10.10% -5.83% Database
Grain (all) -18.92% -15.85% Database
*) only monetary transactions indexed
Table IV-3: Changes in Revenue and Expenditure with Different Inflation Rates
See Section VII-14 in the appendix for details. Inflation stands for the price difference between 1732 
and 1782; p.a. for the (linear) annual inflation rate; A Rev (A Exp) for the increase in revenue 
(expenditure) if the 1782 figure is discounted by the inflation rate. For Grain* only monetary 
transactions were indexed as explained in the text, Grain (all) is when grain inflation rates are used for 
all transactions.
While stable in bullion content, the Bemese Batzen lost 22.9% of its value 
when compared to builders’ wages or 16.3% when measured in tiles as a relatively 
inflation-free item.506 Annual inflation rates were small by today’s standards. Even 
for grain, they were below 1%. Depending on the way inflation is measured, the value 
of government revenue and expenditure can change quite dramatically. Using bullion 
inflation (deflation) rates, the growth of state finance seems slightly larger than in 
Batzen and shows an increase by 32.1% for revenue and 37.1% for expenditure. 
Based on construction workers’ wages, the increase in state revenue from 1732 to
505 Pfister, C. (1975): 158. My figures for grain inflation are similar to his.
506 For the use of tiles: Furrer (1995).
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1782 was 6.1%; expenditure rose by 10.2% over the time same period. When 
measured in tiles, the state’s revenue increased by 12.2%, expenditure by 16.4%.
To sum up the findings of this section, according to most calculations Bemese 
government finance increased slightly from 1732 to 1782. This is in spite of the 
inherent problems which might arise when comparing two random sample years, 
which the long-term analysis in Chapter III mitigates to some extent. However, the 
absolute increase in revenue and expenditure dwindles when measured on a per capita 
basis. The divergence of figures for state revenue depending on the type of inflation 
rate applied illustrates the caveats of converting transactions into a single unit. 
Comparing numbers across time is a complicated process and is vulnerable to large 
error margins, regardless of the unit used.
iv-3 Redistribution by Nature of Transaction
This chapter will discuss fiscal redistribution by comparing revenue and 
expenditure made by the Bemese state in terms of their nature. This follows the 
analytical scheme outlined in Section IV-1. I will begin with a general overview of 
factual redistribution (by nature of transaction) before discussing the sub-categories 
in turn, starting with current revenue and expenditure and closing with inventory
507transactions.
Overview
The factual categories for revenue and expenditure have already been described 
in the previous chapter (see Section III-l in particular) but are refined for the 
structural analysis. Figure IV-7 provides a first overview.
507 In a strict sense, using the term redistribution for this section can be misleading, since it is rather a 
structural analysis of the structure of Bemese state finance.
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Revenue and Expenditure
Inventory Transactions
(Exp=Investment, Rev=Divestment)
Loans
Investment Goods 
Cash Reserve
Current Expenditure
Personnel Cost 
Public Consumption 
Transfer Payments
Current Revenue
Taxes
Non-Entrepreneurial Returns 
Entrepreneurial Returns
Figure IV-7: Categories for Factual Redistribution
As noted above, the main distinction is between current and inventory 
transactions, which have their own sub-categories. Figure IV-8 shows factual 
redistribution by the Bemese state for the sample years 1732 and 1782.
Rev 1732 
Exp 1732
Rev 1782 
Exp 1782
= 5 5 5 5 5 5 ^
CD Entrepr' B Non-Entrepr' Q Taxes B Personnel CD Consumption D  Transfer
□  Loans □  Investment B  Cash Reserve H A Restanz 3  Restanz (M)
=IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIISSSS
10 15 20 25 30 m Bz
Figure IV-8: Redistribution by Nature of Transaction (Simplified), 1732 and 1782
Source: Database, net transactions. All striped fields are for current transactions. A Restanz is the 
change in arrears in kind (grain and wine), Restanz (M) is the net arrear o f bailiffs in monetary units, 
which represents an increase in retained earnings.
If current and inventory transactions are separated, the former were in surplus, 
with profits of 20.0% (1732) and 19.9% (1782), the latter in deficit with net 
investments of 8.55% (1732) and 30.2% (1782). In other words, in both sample years 
the government received more funds than it spent for its current affairs and could 
invest. The remaining budget surplus was 9.42% in 1732 and 5.18% in 17 82.508 This 
figure represents an increase in the government’s retained earnings in the form of 
claims towards its own officials, the so-called Restanzen (arrears). 36.6% of these 
claims were in kind (grain and wine) in 1732, 88.7% in 1782; this was equivalent to
508 If figures for summary accounts are fully included (and not based on the weighted database 
sample), the profit rate is 7.92% (1732) and 5.77% (1782). The difference can be explained by the 
inclusion of grain sales (which could not be excluded for summary accounts), the use of regional prices 
for grain conversion, and the mixing o f profitable with less profitable counties in the sample.
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2.3% and of net revenue in both years.509 The residual was an increase in monetary 
Restanzen of government officials.510 The discussion of long-run development has 
illustrated how strong inventory transactions fluctuated throughout the century (see 
Chapter III). Most of my structural analysis will therefore focus on current revenue 
and expenditure.
Current Revenue
The three main categories for current revenue are taxes, entrepreneurial and 
non-entrepreneurial returns. For my analysis, I have broken them down further as 
shown in Figure IV-9.
Current Revenue
Taxation
Direct Taxation 
Indirect Taxation 
Tithes
Entrepreneurial
Returns
Production 
Government Trade 
Interest Payments
Non-Entrepreneurial
Returns
Duties
Internal Rents 
External Rents
Figure IV-9: Categories for Current Revenue
See also Hagnauer (1995): 22-23 for a slightly different breakdown.
Among the numerous ways by which to categorise taxation, I have opted for a 
distinction between direct and indirect taxes, categorising tithes separately.511 This 
separation is based on a combination of analytical criteria and practical concerns. 
Direct taxation is a forced payment to the government on wealth or income, indirect 
taxation is a surcharge on circulating goods, which includes customs duties in 
particular. As a distinctive form of tax, the tithe was levied on agricultural revenue
509 Negative changes are shown as revenue for A Restanz. Percentages in the text are based on the net 
figure (positive minus negative values of A Restanz).
510 See Section III-l for a discussion of these key figures. See also Section VII-5 in the appendix on 
arrears. The change in grain Restanzen has been calculated as the difference between the previous 
year’s and current grain Restanz’, net Monetary Restanzen were calculated as a residual (their figure in 
reality was slightly different because of transfer transactions).
511 For possible categorisations of taxation (or, taxation taxonomies): Bonney (1995c); Komer (1994).
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and thus has the characteristics of an income tax.512 However, it was not levied on 
personal income, but on specific lands. Tithes were also perceived differently in 
terms of their legitimacy, being a historically important tax that derived its credence 
from mention in the Bible. Tithes also had an important impact on the physiocratic 
self-understanding of the Bemese patriciate. I have further classified the monopoly 
profit from salt trade as an indirect tax, since this had the same effect as a specific salt 
tax (see Section VII-16 in the appendix for details).
Entrepreneurial returns resulted from the government’s commercial activities. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this includes the state domain, as well as state- 
run manufactures or monopolies. The most important monopolies that the 
government ran itself were gunpowder production, salt mines and salt trade.513 The 
final sub-category for entrepreneurial returns consists of interest payments. These are 
the result of loans or financial investments at home or abroad (see Chapter V).
Non-entrepreneurial revenue include income from the state’s rights and titles as 
a sovereign. These were mainly duties and feudal rents (Recognitionen). Duties are 
payments for government services or privileges; rents are payments due to the state 
because of a political subordination and did not entail any direct service. They had 
originated as feudal payments for state protection, regardless of how effective this 
protection was. By the eighteenth century, rents had become fees payable for the 
exploitation of resources; they did not necessarily bear any connection with the value 
of that resource.514 If paid for by other states they were classified as external rents, all 
rents paid by the state’s own subjects are internal rents. As an overview, Figure IV-10 
shows the empirical result for this breakdown of current revenue.
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Figure IV -10: C urrent R evenue (B reakdow n by M ain C ategory)
512 Monbaron (1998a), HLS (2002), article Feudallasten.
5,31 have only included current revenue from salt sales as trading income (see Section VII-16 in the 
appendix for details).
5 4 For a detailed discussion, see HLS (2002), article Feudallasten.
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Source: Database, current revenue. See also Table IV-4 for details.
While direct taxation was negligible, indirect taxes grew considerably over 
time. Tithes were also an important contributor to state revenue, as were interest 
payments and internal rents. All other types of revenue were of minor importance. On 
a per capita basis, current revenue was 55.7 Bz in 1732 and 63.5 Bz in 1782, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the context of the fiscal burden (Section IV-5). The 
largest growth rates over time are for indirect taxes and duties, which more than 
doubled over the fifty year time period. A further disaggregation of the data by 
category can illustrate where the underlying changes were most important. I will only 
highlight a few key aspects of Table IV-4 in my discussion.
1732 (in Bz) in % 1782 (in Bz) in % A(% )
TA X E S
Direct Taxes 
Handover Tax 
Other Direct Taxes
443,823
424,401
19,422
2.5% 742,762
732,315
10,447
2.9% 67.4%
72.6%
-46.2%
Indirect Taxes
Alcohol Tax 
Salt Monopoly 
Export Duties 
Transit Duties 
Other Customs Duties
2,329,565
249,500
1,825,324
27,850
185,683
41,208
13.2% 4,840,736
501,920
2,010,475
76,094
1,481,905
770,342
18.7% 107.8%
101.2%
10.1%
173.2%
698.1%
1769.4%
Tithes
Grain Tithe 
Wine Tithe 
Other Tithe
3,576,349
2,994,049
491,682
90,618
20.3% 5,102,183
4,821,573
171,627
108,983
19.7% 42.7%
61.0%
-65.1%
20.3%
ENT R EPR EN E U R IA L  R ETU RN S
Production 1,321,370 7.5% 2,068,023 8.0% 56.5%
Trade: Salt (Current) 3,878,538 22.0% 4,242,768 16.4%
Interests
Domestic Interests 
Foreign Interests 
Other Financial Returns
3,678,725
1,062,558
2,588,565
27,602
20.9% 5,076,078
512,925
4,435,698
127,455
19.6% 38.0%
-51.7%
71.4%
361.8%
N O N -E N T R E PR E N EU R IA L  R ETU R N S
Duties 93,688 0.5% 128,796 0.5% 37.5%
Internal Rents
Fixed Land Rents 
Other Land Rents 
Fiefs
Privileges (Economic) 
Marechausee 
Other Rents
2,307,378
109,294
1,529,825
192,350
368,906
0
107,003
13.1% 3,652,338
93,837
2,786,587
26,166
553,433
92,169
100,146
14.1% 58.3%
-14.1%
82.2%
-86.4%
50.0%
n/a
-6.4%
External Rents 13,193 0.1% 3,767 0.0% -71.4%
TOTAL Current Revenue 17,642,629 100% 25,857,451 100% 47%
Table IV-4: Detailed Breakdown of Current Revenue, in Bz and %
Source: Database, current revenue. A (%) stands for a relative change between 1732 and 1782.
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The handover tax was levied on specific land sales and was almost exclusively 
concentrated on French-speaking counties. Bern had taken over these so-called Lods 
from Savoy when conquering Vaud.515 Other direct taxes were levied on moving 
property abroad and in certain areas upon inheritance; both were not important in 
quantitative terms. Alcohol taxes were mostly levied in the city of Bern and not the 
territory.516 Customs duties in all forms multiplied more than nine-fold between 1732 
and 1782. Particularly important were transit duties, whose increase was related to 
improvements in the Bemese road network attracting additional traffic, and the more 
efficient organisation of customs administration.517
Tithes also increased overall (+42.7%), with the tithes levied on grain revenue 
as the most important contributor by far. The growth rates in Table IV-4 can be 
misleading in two ways. First, when calculated in price-adjusted weight, grain tithes
CIO
only increased by 13.99%, and not the 61.1% when measured in Batzen. Wine 
tithes, which declined by 65.1% in value, only fell by 51.05% when calculated in 
litres. Second, tithes were prone to high yearly fluctuations, as discussed above (see 
Section III-4).519
The main components for revenue from production were wine harvests in the 
state domain and salt production. The figure for salt sales is limited to current 
revenue and only shows part of the government’s income from selling salt; the rest is 
categorised as monopoly profit and inventory change (see Section VII-16 in the 
appendix). Duties, defined as payments made for state services, were minimal in their 
impact for Bemese finances. The same is true for External Rents. The state only 
obtained nominal sums from its involvement in administrating Condominiums of the
CA 1
Swiss Confederation (Gemeine Herrschaften). The most important Internal Rents
were irredeemable land rents paid in cash. Since their monetary value was usually
515 99.8% (1732) and 98.6% (1782) of the tax came from Vaud as Lods. The distinction to certain types 
of fiefs is not always clear, and the increase might have been slightly smaller. See also Monbaron 
(1998a).
516 93.79% (1732) and 87.25% (1782) was taxed in the city, the rest in Argovia and Vaud.
517 Pfister, C. (1995): 246-250; Feller (1955): 551-559.
518 For price-adjusted weights, see above, Section IV-2.
519 See also the discussion in Pfister, C. (1975) and Gmiir (1954).
520 Customs duties are taxes which can also be classified as duties.
521 The counties that Bern administrated together with Fribourg -  Schwarzenburg, Orbe/Echallens, 
Grandson and Murten - were probably more profitable. However they had to be excluded from my 
analysis because they did not make regular contributions to Bemese government finance, and their 
contributions were not recorded in the Standesrechnungen. It would be reasonable to assume that these 
territories would on average contribute the equivalent of a small county.
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fixed, the rent-payer would profit from inflation. Fixed land rents (abldsige 
Bodenzinsen) were redeemable, which means that the payment could be stopped by 
paying off a fixed sum of capital to the government. The relative cost of 
redemption declined with inflation, which is why most such rents had been redeemed 
by the eighteenth-century and only played a minor financial role by then. For earlier 
centuries, such fixed and redeemable loans had been more important source of 
government revenue.
For Table IV-4, I have also classified payments for economic privileges 
(Ehafte) as internal rents, because they can be considered feudal contributions to the 
government as a sovereign. By far the most costly privilege was the franchise fee for 
postal services paid by the von Fischer family.524 Finally, there were a number of 
special duties owed to the state for specific services. They usually varied between 
counties and included fiefs that the government had inherited when acquiring 
territory, or the newly introduced Marechausee payment to cover local policing 
expenditure.
Current Expenditure
For current expenditure, the rough distinction between personnel cost, public 
consumption and transfer payments from Figure IV-2 can be refined by using more 
detailed categories (see Figure IV-11).
Current Expenditure
Personnel Cost
Salaries: Regular and Ad Hoc 
Bonus and Welfare Payments 
Forced Labour (incl. Militia) 
Expenses
Public Consumption
Inventory Maintenance 
Purchases 
Services 
Rent and Lease
Transfer Payments
Welfare: Contributions 
and Subsidies
Deductions
Figure IV-11: Categories for Current Expenditure
522 It is not clear how large a proportion of land rents had a fixed amount, but this was probably the 
majority.
523 HLS (2002), article Feudallasten.
524 See the discussion in Section II-3 and in Kloti (1990). The postal lease was 225,000 Bz in 1732 and 
450,000 Bz in 1782 (Database).
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See Hagnauer (1995): 22-23, who classifies expenses as a category of public consumption. Those 
welfare payments listed under Personnel Cost are only for government personnel.
Personnel Cost consists of four sub-categories: salaries; bonus and welfare 
payments to officials; the (monetary) cost of forced labour; and expenses. Public 
Consumption is whatever the government spent on goods and services to upkeep the 
running of the state without increasing the public inventory. This includes 
maintenance, the purchase of goods for immediate consumption and services, as well 
as payments for rent and lease. Transfer Payments were welfare expenses for and 
inventory value adjustments (deductions).
The distinction between the sub-categories for personnel cost is not always 
clearly specified in the accounts, and has therefore to be considered with a pinch of 
salt.525 Salaries could be regular and fixed payments, or occur ad hoc whenever a 
specific service was needed. Ad hoc salaries include variable components of 
officeholder remuneration, such as the bailiffs’ share in grain sales (see Section III-6 
above). Bonus payments for government employees were also a variable part of 
salaries; they were paid without specific statutory requirement, depending on the 
Venner's goodwill. Bonuses were often granted to recognise specific services or 
personal hardship. Given the paternalistic nature of the government towards its 
employees, a distinction between bonuses and welfare payments for its personnel was 
not always possible; I have therefore combined these two categories. The Bemese 
accounts also included some expenses for forced labour and -  as a special form of 
this -  the militia army. This only covered monetary payments and not the number of 
days spent, which will be discussed separately in Section TV-5.
Public consumption combines expenses for goods and services that only had a 
short-term impact and therefore did not affect the public inventory. Most importantly, 
this category excludes all purchases of salt, grain and wine that were categorised as 
inventory transactions (see next sub-section). On the other hand, the cost of 
maintaining public buildings and granaries counts towards public consumption. 
Purchases of goods such as office supplies or food for immediate consumption were
525 Hagnauer (1995) classifies expenses as state consumption, not as personnel cost.
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also classified under this heading. When the government paid for services, this counts 
as public consumption as well, alongside costs for rent and lease.526
Finally, transfer payments were welfare expenses of the state and deductions 
for any loss in inventory value. Welfare payments took the form of contributions 
towards other political institutions -  states or communes for instance -  or subsidies, 
which were payments towards individual families. Hence the meaning of ‘subsidy’ is 
slightly different from the current understanding as a monetary assistance to support 
specific firms or industries. In an economy where the family was not clearly 
distinguished from its economic activities, subsidies were only geared towards a 
specific industry in exceptional circumstances; they were more an issue of welfare 
policy.
Figure IV-12 gives an overview of the empirical incidence of these categories.
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Figure IV-12: Current Expenditure by Category
Source: Database, current expenditure. See also Table IV-5 for a more detailed breakdown.
The greatest amount of expenditure was related to personnel costs, and within 
that overwhelmingly to regular salaries. Expenditure for the militia increased 
dramatically from 1732 to 1782. This is related to the dispatch of troops to Geneva,
c*yn
for which the militia was compensated. If all transactions that explicitly refer to 
this event are excluded, expenses for the militia increased by less, but they still more 
than doubled (+105.1%). Current purchases by the government were also relatively 
large, while welfare payments were not important. The Bemese state spent about as 
much for the upkeep of its buildings as it did on poverty relief. I will only comment 
on a few sub-categories from the detailed breakdown of current expenditure shown in 
Table IV-5.
526 These rents -  defined as the cost for using property -  are different from feudal rents, such as the 
land rents discussed under current revenue.
527 Feller (1955): 416-426 and Walchli (1981): 147-148; see also Section III-4 above.
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1732 (in Bz) in % 1782 (in Bz) in % A (%)
PERSONNEL COST
Salaries 4,958,392 34.6% 8,022,221 37.0% 61.8%
Regular Salaries 3,729,968 5,752,363 54.2%
Ad Hoc Salaries 886,638 1,524,715 72.0%
Bonuses 341,786 745,143 118.0%
Bonuses and Welfare 133,426 0.9% 225,331 1.0% 68.9%
Welfare* 121,317 78,455 -35.3%
Other Salaries (unspec.) 12,109 146,876 1112.9%
Forced Labour 93,961 0.7% 1,683,366 7.8% 1691.6%
Corvee Labour 58,143 53,022 -8.8%
Militia 35,818 1,630,344 4451.7%
Expenses 698,782 4.9% 2,154,104 9.9% 208.3%
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION:
Maintenance 1,243,476 8.7% 1,289,514 5.9% 3.7%
Building Maintenance 851,285 926,412 8.8%
Road Maintenance 281,138 47,309 -83.2%
Grain Maintenance 41,044 54,849 33.6%
Other Maintenance (Movables) 70,009 260,944 272.7%
Purchases 3,986,083 27.8% 4,972,866 22.9% 24.8%
Construction Goods 174,101 62,514 -64.1%
Energy (Heating, Light) 292,739 154,704 -47.2%
Foodstuffs 614,137 1,415,680 130.5%
Armament 160,712 86,786 -46.0%
Salt 2,516,817 2,911,015 15.7%
Other Purchases 227,577 342,167 50.4%
Services 1,188,542 8.3% 776,102 3.6% -34.7%
Tranport 607,177 313,193 -48.4%
Commercial Services 235,163 26,707 -88.6%
Other Services 346,202 436,202 26.0%
Rent and Lease 30,269 0.2% 55,507 0.3% 83.4%
Other Consumption 127,538 0.9% 14,844 0.1% -88.4%
TRANSFER PAYMENTS
Welfare 982,083 6.8% 1,613,676 7.4% 64.3%
Contributions 422,454 711,027 68.3%
Subsidies 559,629 902,649 61.3%
Deductions 901,064 6.3% 817,744 3.8% -9.2%
Grain and Wine Deductions 628,322 680,025 8.2%
Shared Revenues 155,064 122,447 -21.0%
Discounts (Rebate) 86,297 10,883 -87.4%
Loss on Bills of Exchange 31,381 4,389 -86.0%
Other Transfer Payments 4,564 0.0% 85,494 0.4% 1773.2%
TOTAL Current Expendit. 14,348,180 100% 21,710,769 100% 51.3%
*) Welfare Payments for Government Officials only
Table IV-5: Detailed Breakdown of Current Expenditure, in Bz and %
Source: Database, current expenditure. A % stands for a relative change between 1732 and 1782.
Overall, the Bemese state spent 53.3% more on regular salaries in 1732 than in 
1782. This figure can be qualified in several respects. As explained above (Section II- 
7), the government paid its employees in both money and kind to balance out price 
fluctuations for foodstuffs. In 1732, 54.3% of all regular salaries were paid in
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monetary units, the rest in grain (35.5%) and wine (10.4%). The 1782 figures are 
66.8% (money), 28.0% (grain) and 6.9% (wine). Determining how much of this 
increase in salary payments is due to a loss in purchasing power of the Batzen is 
difficult. If we isolate their grain component, salaries increased by 21.7% (measured 
in Batzen). When measured in price-adjusted weight, the figure actually fell by 6.2%. 
The salary component paid in wine also increased by 1.9% when measured in Batzen 
and declined by 18.2% when measured in litres. The monetary component of salaries 
increased by 88.6% over the period. This is more than the inflation rate for grain or 
increases in construction worker salaries (see Section IV-2). If we divide total 
salary expenditure by the mean daily wage of a construction worker, the state- 
employed earned the equivalent of 489,789 daily wages in 1732, and 611,156 in 
1782. In other words, there was an overall increase in salary payments by the Bernese 
state. This can be explained by above-average growth of officeholders’ salaries or a 
larger number of people working for the state. The latter seems more plausible, but 
for a lack of full government employee lists, this cannot be quantified any further. A 
functional breakdown of these salaries will be discussed in the next section.
Maintenance costs went mostly towards the upkeep of government buildings 
(68% in 1732, 72% in 1782). One problem is that maintenance was not clearly 
distinguished from new building activity. Even the research of Hans-Anton Ebener on 
building by the Bernese state does not provide a reliable breakdown of how important 
the two were in relative terms.529 From Table IV-5, it looks as if  road maintenance 
declined, although this might be because this category was not always specified as 
such. Road maintenance and -building were largely delegated to communes, which 
covered it in the form of cash and forced labour (Tagwerk). Hence, the maintenance 
cost is likely to be under-represented in government accounts.530 The maintenance of
ro i
movables was relatively less expensive.
For contributions, it would be interesting to distinguish between different 
recipients of Bernese contributions, but a detailed breakdown is not available. Most 
important were probably those to communes within the canton, but other Swiss cities
528 The respective inflation rates are 60.9 % (grain) and 22.9% (construction worker salaries). See 
above, Section IV-2
529 Ebener (1999). While he distinguished between new building and maintenance, he does not provide 
conclusive figures comparing the two.
530 See Holenstein (2005).
531 These costs were mainly for grain maintenance. Grain had to be sieved and aired regularly when 
stored over long periods of time.
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and states received donations as well, as did places overseas. As far as information is 
available, subsidies were payments in support of victims of fires (17% in 1732 / 4% 
in 1782), invalids (11% / 14%), students (13% /14% ) and widows (4% / 2%).532 This 
result does not allow testing for Erika Fluckiger Sterebel’s hypothesis that families 
with many children emerged as a new category of support-worthy poverty. These 
cannot be separated from others in my classification.
The main deductions were for weight loss of the public granary discussed above 
(Section II-7 above). For wine, a similar allowance was made. Further deductions 
included third-party shares in revenue, which ranged from fixed quotas for informants 
in criminal proceedings (Verleider) to the division of land rents with communes, 
noblemen or other states. The Bernese government also allowed rebates on 
outstanding taxes, duties or rents in case of financial hardship. These were recorded 
in the accounts as deductions. Finally, losses on bills of exchange were classified in 
this category as well. They were not very important quantitatively, however.
Inventory Transactions and Comparison to Other States
This section only provides a rough overview of relative changes in the 
inventory in 1732 and 1782. For these transactions, a long-term view is more accurate 
(see previous chapter). It is possible to discuss revenue in tandem with expenditure 
because they both followed similar categories (see Figure IV-13).
Inventory Transactions
 1 !---------------
Loans (as Lender) Public Debt (as Borrower) Investment and Divestment
(Exp) (Rev)
Increase (Lending) = Increase (Issue) =
Expenditure Expenditure Buildings
Reduction (Repayment) = Reduction (Redemption) = Property and Titles
Revenue Revenue Inventory Goods
Figure IV-13: Categories for Inventory Transactions
532 5 5% (1732) and 65.5% (1782) of subsidies could not be classified.
533 See Fluckiger Strebel (2002): 69-76 and Tab. 26. Her results are based on the number of 
observations, not the amount of the subsidy.
Cash Reserve
Increase = Expenditure 
Reduction = Revenue
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Loans and Public Debt mirror each other as increase and decrease of the state’s 
financial position and could therefore be combined. On a conceptual level, however, 
the distinction between the state acting as lender or borrower is significant. As in the 
previous chapter, a deposit to the cash reserve (increase) should be classified as 
expenditure, a withdrawal (reduction) as revenue. The empirical results for the years 
1732 and 1782 are shown in Figure IV-14.
1732 Rev 
1732 Exp
1782 Rev 
1782 Exp
'//////////A
0  Loans Dom. □  Loans Overs. H Loans (arr.) B Building □  Property, Titles
O Foodstuffs □  Armament □  Salt □  Other Goods B Cash Reserve
2222222222222222222222222222222223338^ ^
8 m Bz
Figure IV-14: Inventory Transactions by Category
Source: Database, inventory transactions. See also Table IV-6. Public Debt was not included (value = 
0). A monopoly rent has been deducted from the proceeds o f salt sales. Grain and wine sales were 
excluded because they were not net transactions (see Section IV-2).
The most important inventory transaction in 1732 was the sale of the county of 
Castelen in Argovia from Barons Doringenberg and Riedesel, for which Bern paid 
90,000 Thaler (2.7m Bz).534 This purchase was funded by taking 22,000 gold coins 
(Dublonen) from the cash reserve. In the same year, the government invested heavily 
in bonds issued by the Vienna City Bank (see Chapter V). Inventory transactions in 
1782 were marked by a reduction in the government’s salt inventory. At the same 
time, the state offered domestic loans on a large scale, of which over half were 
recorded in the Welsch-StandesrechnungP5 This was part of the increase in domestic 
loans discussed above (Section III-5). A detailed breakdown of inventory transactions 
is shown in Table IV-6.
534 Feller (1955): 475.
535 It is possible that these loans were in connection with the deployment o f troops in the region, which 
were on their way to Geneva.
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Revenue Expenditure
1732 (in Bz) in % 1732 (in Bz) in % A R (%)
LOANS (as Lender) 3,711,945 48.1% 4,677,711 55.4% 2.5%
Domestic Loans 1,607,923 258,306 -53.0%
Overseas Loans 1,445,400 3,793,478 -54.1%
Officials (arrears) 658,622 625,927 261.9%
INVESTMENT 1,237,026 16.0% 3,765,586 44.6% 99.4%
Building 244 48,953 87.7%
Property and Titles 26,487 2,987,436 -72.9%
Grain, Wine, Cattle 98 4,463 -100.0%
Armaments 612,894 452,944 18.2%
Salt 0 150,838
Other Goods 597,303 120,952 -84.1%
PUBLIC DEBT (Borr.) 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
CASH RESERVE 2,772,188 35.9% 0 0.0% -100.0%
TOTAL Inventory Trans. 7,721,159 100% 8,443,297 100% -19%
Revenue Expenditure
1782 (in Bz) in % 1782 (in Bz) in % A E (%)
LOANS (as Lender) 3,804,096 60.7% 7,184,851 84.0% 53.6%
Domestic Loans 756,383 4,674,883 1709.8%
Overseas Loans 663,978 1,634,422 -56.9%
Officials (arrears) 2,383,735 875,546 39.9%
INVESTMENT 2,467,165 39.3% 1,368,741 16.0% -63.7%
Building 458 258,607 428.3%
Property and Titles 7,170 240,184 -92.0%
Grain, Wine, Cattle 0 52,465 1075.6%
Armaments 724,683 386,456 -14.7%
Salt 1,640,080 0 -100.0%
Other Goods 94,774 431,029 256.4%
PUBLIC DEBT (Borr.) 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
CASH RESERVE 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
TOTAL Inventory Trans. 6,271,261 81% 8,553,592 101% 1%
Table IV-6: Detailed Breakdown of Inventory Transactions
Source: Database (see Figure IV-8). See also Figure IV-14. A R(A E) stands for a relative change in 
revenue (expenditure) from 1732 to 1782.
Overall, the Bernese state had made net investments of 0.7m Bz (1732) and 
2.3m Bz (1782). The most remarkable fact is that none of this was financed through 
borrowing.
Combining all the information on factual redistribution, we can compare the 
financial structure of the canton of Bern with that of other states, for which data is 
available from the European State Finance Database.536 I will only focus on a small 
number of comparative cases here; additional figures are provided in the appendix 
(Section VII-19). For Figure IV-15, Bern’s expenditure were re-classified to be 
comparable.
536 ESFDB and Bonney (1995c); Komer (1995a).
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Figure IV-15: Bernese Expenditure Compared to Other European States
Sources: Database (for Bern figures); ESFDB and Kom er (1995a). The full list o fK o m er’s data is 
represented in Figure VII-15 in the appendix.537
As expected, the Bernese structure of expenditure is most similar to the other 
two Swiss cantons in the sample group, Basel and Lucerne. Both the latter states were 
also territorial city republics, albeit on a smaller scale than Bern. When compared to 
other European states, Bern has by far the largest share of investments in its budget, 
and its proportion of public works was also high. The most noticeable difference is 
the small proportion of security expenditure, as well as the absence of any debt 
servicing costs. These features are similarly shared with the other two Swiss states.
This comparison to European states also sums up the most important findings of 
my analysis of factual redistribution. The canton was not burdened by heavy military 
expenditure or a large national debt. Instead, it leveraged on its assets which 
generated healthy profits, enabling the state to keep its income from taxation 
relatively low. Bern made a profit on its current transactions, which it then invested in 
financial claims and property. Current revenue came mainly from salt trade, interests
537 In his text, K om er also includes figures from Bern, w hich are based on the General-Bilanzen (see  
Section III-4 above).
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and tithes, plus increasingly from indirect taxes. Roughly a third of current 
expenditure was used for salaries, another quarter for salt purchases; the rest was 
divided amongst a multitude of expenses. For an in-depth analysis of the state’s 
investments, the long-term view that was presented in Chapter III is more suitable.
rv-4 Functional, Sectoral and Regional Redistribution
Results of the factual analysis of the Bernese financial structure can be qualified 
by considering the other dimensions of fiscal redistribution outlined in Section IV-1. 
In this section, I will first distinguish transactions of the Bernese government by state 
functions, then analyse the economic sectors involved, and end with the regional 
dimension based on where revenue and expenditure was recorded.
Functional Redistribution
In addition to the factual consideration about how the state spent its funds, it is 
worth investigating why they were spent. In modem states, administrative units 
(ministries) normally have a specialised portfolio and are therefore a reliable 
indication of state functions. For early modem Bern, this would be difficult since the
• • M Omain administrative units were bailiffs, who carried out a multitude of functions.
To analyse the purpose of revenue and expenditure, transactions were therefore 
categorised according to the major functions that the Bernese state fulfilled.
Such state functions are the outcome of a polity’s main duties as a provider of 
public goods. Fernand Braudel saw three main obligations of the state: firstly, to 
implement a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence; secondly to control, regulate 
and facilitate economic activities; and thirdly, to play a part in cultural and spiritual 
life.539 Following Braudel, one could speak of political, economic and spiritual 
dimensions of the state, though measuring the achievements of any government along 
those dimensions should not solely rely on accounting ledgers, but include an analysis 
of normative sources. The amount of money allocated and expended on each task 
gives some indication of whether a government actually implemented its stated plans.
538 A breakdown by accounts is therefore more appropriate for regional redistribution, as discussed 
below. For the multi-tasking of bailiffs, see also Bucher, E. (1944).
539 Braudel (1979-1986) vol. 2: 515; also quoted in Komer (1995a): 393.
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To measure how the Bernese state redistributed resources among the different 
functions it fulfilled, I have chosen a classification which mirrors Braudel’s list, 
although the distinctions are not always clear. Similar to the factual analysis, my 
categories are based on modern-day public finance, following Stephan Hagnauer.540 
Redistribution is defined as the difference between inflows (revenue) and outflows 
(expenditure) to any of the state functions from Figure IV-16 (see also Figure IV-2).
Revenue from
Difference = 
Functional 
Redistribution
Expenditure for
Defence 
Foreign Affairs 
Judiciary and Police 
Finance and Taxation 
Administration 
Economy 
Domain and Production 
Education 
Public Health 
Welfare 
Environment and Traffic 
Culture 
Religion
Braudel's "dimensions"
Political
Economic
Spiritual
Figure IV-16: Functional Redistribution: Categories and Definitions
The most problematic category is General Administration, which comprises all 
transactions that could not be categorised more specifically. For example, a bailiffs 
salary was classified this way because of the numerous functions the officeholder 
fulfilled. In case of ad hoc salary payments, the task was usually specified and the 
payment could be classified properly. Figure IV-17 shows the functional 
redistribution for all net transactions of the Bernese state.
540 My categories follow Hagnauer (1995), who in turn relies on the Neues Rechnungsmodell (see note 
368 above). The changes are minimal. In the NRM, Justice and Police are combined with Defence 
(“Military ”)  to form Public Security,; Environment and Traffic are separate categories. Additions to the 
NRM are: Foreign Affairs, Religion, as well as Domain and Production.
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Figure IV-17: Functional Redistribution, All Transactions
Source: Database, net transactions. See Table VII-23 in the appendix for details.
At a first glance, for both sample years revenue was less fragmented than 
expenditure. As expected, most revenue derived from the state function Finance and 
Taxation. Considerable expenditure also arose from the same function. It largely 
consisted of inventory transactions, as a comparison with current transaction 
illustrates (Figure IV-18).541
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Figure IV-18: Functional Redistribution, Current Transactions only
Source: Database, current transactions. See Table VII-23 in the appendix for details. Please note the 
different scale form Figure IV-18.
Revenue from the state function Finance and Taxation comprised 29.5% (1732) 
and 25.5% (1782) of interest payments. The only transaction classified as revenue 
from Economy were salt sales. Interestingly, the state function Domain and 
Production was only profitable in 1782 and made a slight loss in 1732. This was 
caused by large expenditure for salt production in Roche. This should not be 
overstated, as the state domain almost certainly produced more than what was 
recorded in the accounts. For example, if wood was directly used for heating, this
541 The share o f inventory transactions for finance and taxation is 92.6% (1732) and 88.6% (1782) for 
revenue, 94.0% (1732) and 92.5% (1782) of expenditure. The remaining inventory transactions were 
for defence (purchases and sales o f military equipment).
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would not always appear in a bailiff ledger. Overall, the state’s entrepreneurial 
activities (functions Economy and Domain) represented 29.2% (1732) and 23.2% 
(1782) of current revenue. If we add the interest revenue their share accounts for 
49.9% (1732) and 42.6% (1782). The Bernese state therefore received between four- 
fifths and half of its current revenue from entrepreneurial activities.
For expenditure, the sharp increase in defence spending is remarkable. This was 
only partly a structural development and was largely driven by the cost of sending 
auxiliary troops to Geneva in 1782. If costs with an explicit reference to this event are 
excluded, defence expenditure still more than doubled (+134%). This figure might 
include some costs that were in connection with the Geneva expedition without 
explicit mention. The overall share of defence expenditure (3.8% in 1732, 6.0% in 
1782)542 is remarkably low when compared to the figures of other European states, 
where this was often by far the most important post in the budget (see Figure IV-15 
and Figure VII-15).543 As will be discussed later on, the Bernese figures understate 
forced labour that went to the militia army (see Section IV-5).
In addition to analysing functional re-distribution, a breakdown by state 
function for specific categories of transactions -  in other words, functional 
distribution -  can provide further insights in the nature of the Bernese state. 
Sometimes such a breakdown is of little use, as in the case of tithe payments, which 
are by definition classified as Finance and Taxation. The following analysis focuses 
therefore on transactions that covered a broader range of state functions, such as 
personnel cost (see Figure IV-19).
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Figure IV-19: Functional Distribution of Personnel Cost
542 The 1782 figure excludes defence expenditure fort he Geneva expedition. If they are included, the 
figure is 13.2%, which is still very low.
54 For example, eighteenth-century Prussia spent 70-80% of its budget on defence; the situation in 
Britain is not very different, once interest payments for the national debt -  which in itself was the 
result o f warfare -  are included: For Prussia: Komer (1995a): Fig. 62 (425). For Britain: Mann (1988); 
O'Brien/Hunt (1999). See also the comparative numbers in Mann (1986-1993), Vol. 2, Tab. 4.4 (373).
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 207
Source: Database, Personnel cost.
As for the previous graph, the value for 1782 is skewed towards defence. For 
the other personnel cost, it went mostly to administration (which includes the salaries 
of government officials) and the state-employed clergy. The increase in judicial 
salaries can be explained by the establishment of the Marechausee, a forerunner of a 
professional police force. For a further breakdown of these personnel costs into 
regular, bonus and ad hoc payments, the results are shown as percentages because of 
the large differences in absolute numbers (see Figure IV-20).
Total mu.. . -----------------iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiini^
Regular ........................................................................................ i
— Bonus 
Ad Hoc
Total
Regular
: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l i m i l l l l l ? C s ! B : 8 ^ 9 & 2 ^ ^ & 8 8 £
Foreign
Health
— Bonus
Ad Hoc t m E
D  Defence O  
□  Education
iim iiiiiiiim iimmim»
mini . :
□  Judiciary □  Finance □  Admin 0  Economy □  Domain
0  Welfare 0  Environ. □  Culture 0  Religion ■  Unspecified
BBfflseaesesse
E_
iiiN i
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Figure IV-20: Functional Distribution of Personnel Cost, Further Breakdown
Source: Database, Personnel cost. Bonuses were much smaller than regular salaries in absolute value; 
see Table IV-5.
While the categories I have proposed should be applied with some reservations 
because of limitations that were mentioned earlier, some insights can be obtained. 
The administration’s share in bonuses was larger than for regular salaries, while the 
clergy obtained relatively less. The large proportion of ad hoc salaries spent for 
finance consisted mostly of payments towards officials for their share in grain sales 
and other government revenue. Judiciary and police work had changed from an 
activity remunerated on an ad hoc basis to a regular, salaried profession.
The functional breakdown of property maintenance can be used as a proxy for 
the cost of infrastructure. My figures are comparable to those of Hans-Anton Ebener, 
who investigated the state’s building activities with a sample of bailiff accounts.544
544 Ebener (1999): ch. 8 (esp. table 4.11). His exclusion o f institutions results in a difference in the 
share of expenditure for the function Domain. Ebener’s figures are (in %, 1730s/1780s): Education
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Figure IV-21: Functional Breakdown of Property Maintenance Cost
Source: Database, Expenditure for Property Maintenance (excluding movables).
In 1782, the state spent less on maintaining its general-purpose buildings than 
fifty years earlier, whereas the cost of production facilities and the state domain 
increased. The latter was mainly due to expenses for the salt mines in Roche. 
Government expenditure on maintaining religious property was mostly for vicarage 
buildings, for which the state was responsible. The upkeep of churches was left to 
parishes; the state occasionally contributed towards major expenses. The increasing 
maintenance cost of buildings with a financial function was a result of the 
multiplication of public granaries in the second half of the century. This might be 
partly overstated by the fact that previously, granaries had been considered part of 
general public administration; with their increase, they were recorded as separate 
entities.
Sectoral Redistribution
The structural composition of an economy is both a function and a determinant 
of its growth. Analysing this structure can provide clues about the stages of 
development of an economy and its potential to grow. There is no statistical 
information on how important the three main sectors agriculture, industry and 
services were in terms of output and employment in eighteenth-century Bern. Such 
data would enable a comparison between the distribution of incomes before and after 
taxation. As it stands, an analysis o f fiscal redistribution is limited to considering how 
sectors contributed to government finance and benefited from it.
0.2/3.2; Domain 0.7/5.9; Finance 4.5/8.9; Judiciary 0.6/2.2; Defence 0.6/0.5; Religion 45.8/39.5; 
Welfare 0.0/0.2; Environment 3.3/1.6; Admin 42.6/37.6, unspecified 1.7/0.1.
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 209
Ideally, a breakdown of economic sectors would follow the four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) used in contemporary statistics. In reality, applying 
this system to early modem times on a one-to-one basis is both impossible and 
misleading. It is impossible because primary documents often did not record 
economic activities accurately. It is misleading because most economic actors were 
engaged in more than one category and could have seasonally changing occupations. 
Also, the economy as a whole was less specialised. Data problems are a further 
obstacle to the use of more sophisticated classifications, such as the dual-economy 
model by Arthur Lewis, which distinguishes between a dynamic market-oriented and 
a subsistence sector.545
For my empirical analysis of sectoral redistribution, I have adapted a simplified 
sector model that takes into consideration the distinct characteristics of early modem, 
pre-industrial economies. It broadly follows modem classification, based on the 
breakdown by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics.546 For the adaptation to the 
situation of an eighteenth-century economy, I have relied on Stephan Hagnauer’s 
work.547 The resulting breakdown of categories is shown in Figure IV-22. Sectoral 
redistribution is defined as the difference between revenue from a sector and 
expenditure for it. The categories are most detailed for industry, where different crafts 
and industries were quite clearly distinguished in the records. A further breakdown of 
agriculture by activity into cattle farming, grain production or wine growing was not 
possible with the quality of information from accounting sources. A regional 
breakdown by agricultural zones can be used as proxy for agricultural specialisation; 
this will be discussed in the following sub-section.
545 Lewis (1954); Lewis (1955). For Switzerland, see Bemegger (1990).
546 Bundesamt ftir Statistik (1985),
547 Hagnauer (1995), ch. 6.
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Economic Sectors
Primary Sector: 
Agriculture
(no further breakdown)
Secondary Sector: 
Crafts and Industry
Tertiary Sector:
Services and Administration
Food Production 
Textiles 
Wood Working 
Graphic Industries 
Chemicals and Mining 
Metal Industries 
Vehicles 
Construction 
Other Industries
Trade
Hotel and Restaurant Industry 
Transport
Communication 
Other Services 
Administration
Figure IV-22: Categories for Sectoral Redistribution
Sources: Based on Bundesamt fur Statistik (1985) and Hagnauer (1995).
The largest segment of the population was engaged in primary production. The 
secondary sector consisted of craftsmen and those working in proto-industry. The 
former could -  but did not have to -  be organised in guilds and enjoy local 
privileges.548 The number of artisans and tradesmen (Professionisten) working as 
blacksmiths, butchers or bakers in the countryside was considerable. With 103 
craftsmen per 1,000 inhabitants towards the end of the century, their density in the 
rural areas was significantly higher than in all German territories for which 
comparable numbers are known.549 The canton’s proto-industry was limited to textile 
production in Upper and Lower Argovia. The tertiary sector consisted of a small 
number of administrators and tradesmen, whose numbers are not known. They ranged 
from city-based wine merchants and bankers to itinerant hawkers.550 The only attempt 
to quantify sectoral distribution is from Chritian Pfister, who has analysed 
occupational information from the 1798 government census for a sample of 12 
counties. The data has important limitations, as far as it only considers full-time 
employment of males who took an oath on the new constitution. According to this
548 City guilds had little economic power, in spite of their role in politics discussed in Chapter II; their 
members were not representatives of specific crafts.
549 Pfister, C. (1995): 289 -  compare the compilation in Meier (1986): 40.
550 Radeff (1994); Radeff (1996). She does not provide any figures about their number.
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estimate, 54% were active in the primary, 37% in the secondary and 9% in the tertiary 
sector.551
It is impossible to categorise all revenue and expenditure of the Bernese state 
because the identification of the economic sector in which a transaction took place 
was not a major concern of early modem governments. If any information on this was 
recorded, it was by accident rather than intentionally. It was possible to determine the 
economic sector for 83.3% of all transactions in my database for 1732 and 89.6% for 
1782. However, they only cover 69.5% (1732) and 73.8% (1782) of values. This is 
because state activities for which the economic sector was either not recorded or did 
not matter involved large sums. For loan transactions (including interest payments) 
and salt sales in particular, the payer or recipient was not recorded systematically. 
When occupations appear in the accounts, they are frequently intended as homage 
(‘baker master John Smith’) or to describe a person (‘John Smith, the baker’). In 
order to avoid a sample bias towards those professions for which the sector was 
recorded in such manner, I have classified them as non-specified. Among the non- 
specific categories are subsidies, duties, customs duties (except for transit duties) , 
alcohol taxes and direct taxes on property.553 If all records that are non-specific by 
default are excluded, the share of transactions without sectoral information falls to 
2.6% (1732) and 3.0% (1782), covering 16.9% and 11.8% of total transaction value.
The large number of unspecified transactions causes problems, since it is 
conceivable that they altered redistribution by the state substantially. As a result, the 
values in Figure IV-23 are only true under the assumption that government revenue 
from non-specific transactions (salt purchases and financial loans in particular) were 
not biased in terms of economic sector. Overall, these results for sectoral 
redistribution confirm the image of Bern as a physiocratic state, based on agricultural 
production.
551 Pfister, C. (1995): 239. His figure for the primary sector includes those without specific job title 
(13%).
552 The sector which ultimately bears customs duties can only be established for transit goods, which 
by definition were only paid for by traders; individuals would not transit goods in the eighteenth 
century.
553 Grain sales have been excluded from net transactions, as explained in Section IV-2. Loan 
transactions include interest payments.
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 212
U - - - . ........ .............. I.._____ 1 1 = f c i -----------------------------------------------------------------------------i
(N Rev
Exp
Rp v
□  Primary H  Secondary □  Tertiary Q  Administration □  Unspecified
00
r -
E x p ]
. 1
0  5 10 15 20 25 30 m  Bz
Figure IV-23: Sectoral Redistribution
Source: Database, net transactions.
I have classified administration as a separate category in Figure IV-23 because 
of its importance, both quantitatively and in the context of state-building. The 
primary sector was clearly the main contributor to Bernese state finance, but received 
little funds in return. Even with the allowance for a large share in unspecified 
expenditure there was a large net outflow from the primary sector. On the other hand, 
the main benefactors of the state’s transactions were government members and the 
state administration. This is hardly surprising as a result. Industry also seems to get a 
larger share of expenditure than its revenue contribution. The results for the service 
sector are more complex, showing it as a clear beneficiary in 1732 and a net 
contributor in 1782. When using current transactions alone, the share of unspecified 
transactions for expenditure declines, and revenue from administration virtually 
disappear (see Figure IV-24).554
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Figure IV-24: Sectoral Redistribution for Current Transactions
Source: Database, current transactions.
554 The revenue from administration was mainly repaid loans (arrears) o f previous office holders.
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Transactions for the primary sector cannot be specified into further categories, 
but in combination with the factual categories discussed above, some specifications 
are possible.555 Revenue from the primary sector was mostly derived from tithes 
(49% for 1732, 50% for 1782), land rents (26% and 29%) and production (10% and 
15%). By far the most important post for expenditure towards the primary sector was 
the purchase of movables (65% and 59%). The main product bought by the state was 
wood, which was used as a building material and for heating. These purchases do not 
represent the whole wood consumption of the state, since an unknown amount was 
consumed directly from the state domain forest.
If we use Christian Pfister’s estimate of the number of Professionisten (10% of 
the total population) as an indicator of the industrial sector’s size, its contributions 
towards state revenue were small. On the other hand, they obtained slightly more that 
their share from the state’s expenditure (12.8% in 1732, 10.5% in 1782, including 
unspecified transactions). Using the 37% estimate from the 1798 census, industry’s 
share in both revenue and expenditure was below its economic importance.
For the industrial and service sectors, the figures can be specified in more detail 
(see Table IV-7).
1732
Revenue
1732
Expenditure
1782
Revenue
1782
Expenditure A R(% ) A G P /.)
PRIMARY SECTOR 5,830,982 398,141 9,534,182 387,008 63.5% -2.8%
SECONDARY SECT. 825,868 1,839,436 665,672 2,284,748 -19.4% 24.2%
Food 124,726 171,793 74,584 848,880 -27.4% 394.1%
Textiles 85,091 4,263 -95.0%
Wood Work 233,632 202,865 -13.2%
Graphic Industries 31,302 24,086 -23.1%
Chemicals and Mining 684,904 163,288 584,141 73,254 319.4% -55.1%
Metal Industries 243,203 140,538 -42.2%
Vehicles 3,374 7,524 123.0%
Construction 620,697 725,931 17.0%
Other Industries 16,238 287,056 6,947 257,407 -94.3% -10.3%
TERTIARY SECT. 458,451 10,780,762 2,802,821 17,525,625 511.4% 62.6%
Trade 441,548 2,777,715 2,765,121 2,960,589 -84.1% 6.6%
Hotel and Restaurant Ind. 650 36 21,478 1705.6% -100.0%
Transport 653,580 365,249 -44.1%
Communication 8,271 29,582 257.7%
Other Service 245,831 314,767 28.0%
Administration 16,253 7,095,329 16,222 13,855,438 -99.8% 95.3%
UNSPECIFIED 10,527,328 1,329,841 12,854,776 1,513,388 22.1% 13.8%
TOTAL 17,642,629 14,348,180 25,857,451 21,710,769 46.6% 51.3%
Table IV-7: Sectoral Redistribution by Category for Current Transactions
Source: Database, current transactions. A R(A E) stands for a relative change in revenue (expenditure) 
from 1732 to 1782,
555 This was done via crosstab queries in the database. The detailed results are not shown.
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There was redistribution even within the secondary sector. Chemicals and 
mining were the most important contributors to the government’s revenue. Production 
from the salt mines of Roche was responsible for 83% (1732) and 86% (1782) of 
industrial revenue, the rest came from payments for privileges.556 The lion’s share of 
government funds towards industry went to construction and related industries, such 
as wood work and metal. This is confirmed by the fact that a large portion of the 
outflows to the industrial sector (55% in 1732 and 41% in 1782) went to construction 
and maintenance. Other industrial expenditure was for armaments (26% and 18%) 
and products of the food industry (7% and 28%). These were purchases made by the
c c<7
state’s hospitals and charitable institutions.
Virtually all revenue from the service sector came from trade. In 1732, most 
trade revenue were payments for privileges (41%), followed by transit duties (34%) 
and loans (20%). By 1782, the share of transit duties (47%) surpassed that of 
privilege payments (14%) and loans (13%) by far. This sharp increase reflects the 
introduction of new transit duties discussed above. Even the raising income from the 
hotel and restaurant industry is related to this, since it was mainly caused by a
CfO
privilege payment from an inn connected to the customs office in Aarwangen. In 
terms of payments towards the service sector, the share of trade was also high (76% 
in 1732 and 69% in 1782). The most important single expenditure consisted of salt 
sales (68% and 79% of all trade expenditure). It can be assumed that a large 
proportion of expenditure towards the transportation sector (16% and 8%) was caused 
by salt trading as well.
With these results in mind, the explanation for the change of the service sector 
from being a net recipient (1732) to a net contributor (1782) of fiscal redistribution 
becomes clearer. It was a combination of higher revenue from transit duties and 
increased expenditure for salt purchases which brought about this situation. One 
important factor of sectoral redistribution can only be considered indirectly. Bern’s 
proto-industry (discussed in Section II-3 above) is conspicuously absent from this 
section’s results. This is not the result of inaccurate data categorisation, but because 
the sector was hardly taxed at all. Even in the accounts of areas with specialisation in 
textile production, there were no specific fiscal incomes from this proto-industry.
556 The industries that paid most of these privileges were in the food sector (mills). Some service 
providers (inns, taverns, post) also paid for their privileges.
57 Early modem hospitals were less medical institutions than asylums or homes for the elderly.
558 StABE B III 176.
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Regional Redistribution
Information on the regional patterns of revenue and expenditure have not been 
categorised systematically for each transaction, but they can be classified reliably by 
the account recorded in. In a strict sense, my analysis of regional redistribution is 
therefore one of redistribution by account. This has the advantage that it also covers 
financial flows between the government itself (the Treasury) and its agents in the 
counties (mostly bailiffs). As a downside, transactions that had an effect beyond 
where they were recorded are not categorised properly. For example, all transactions 
in the Standesrechnungen count towards central revenue and expenditure, even if 
they were collected or spent in the territory. The amount of mis-specified transactions 
is likely to be small, however, since in most cases locally handled payments were 
recorded by bailiffs to whom the centre would transfer funds via assignation.559 
Another problem is that the database uses a sample of counties which might not 
represent their region properly (see Section IV-2).
For an analysis of transactions by account we can return to the distinction 
between A-, B- and D-Types discussed previously (Section III-3 above). C-Type 
accounts were not included in the database because they did not contribute to the 
government’s net revenue.560 For D-Type accounts, I have separated bailiff accounts 
in the counties (Di-Types) from institutions within the city of Bern (D2-Types).
Region / Account Type
Central (Government) Capital (Bern) Territory
A-Type accounts:
Deutsch-Standesrechnung (DSR) 
Welsch-Standesrechnung (WSR)
D2-Type Accounts: 
Institutions within the 
City (BE)
Dj-Type Accounts (Bailiffs):
Argovia (AG) 
Obeland (QBE)
B-Type-Accounts:
Foreign Funds (AUS) 
Gunpowder Production (PUL) 
Salt Production Roche (ROC) 
Salt Trade (SDI)
Oberaargau/Emmental (OAE)
Seeland (SEE) 
Vaud (VD)
Figure IV-25: Categories for Regional Redistribution
559 Assignations have been excluded from net transactions by definition. See above, Section IV-2.
560 Transfer payments to and from C-Type accounts were classified as revenue.
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See Section III-3 above and Section VII-9 in the appendix for details.
Only the territorial accounts can be located geographically. For transactions 
recorded by the central government or institutions within the city itself, the 
geographical scope is not clear.561 I have distinguished the main agricultural regions 
following the work by Christian Pfister.562 Figure IV-26 shows revenue and 
expenditure by account with A- and B-Types listed individually, Dj-Types 
aggregated by region and D2 -Types as a category of their own.
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Figure IV-26: Total Net Revenue by Account Type and Region
Source: Database, net transactions. For abbreviations, see Figure IV-25.
Only a small part of net transactions were recorded in the
Standesrechnungen.563 The most important sources of revenue were accounts 
covering the state’s entrepreneurial activities, notably salt trade (SDI) and foreign 
capital investment (AUS). The geographical distribution of bailiffs accounts shows 
that Argovia and Vaud were large contributors, alongside institutions of the city itself 
(D2). The other regions were less important financially.
This result does not necessarily show the flow of funds between different types 
of accounts, it only represents in which ledger the transactions were recorded. This 
might be more representative of political power -  where decisions were taken and 
recorded -  than of financial redistribution. The results in Figure IV-26 support the 
hypothesis that the degree of centralisation in Bern was not very high. This argument 
can be refined by separating current and inventory transactions. Figure IV-27 shows
561 It is not clear how far into the territory activities of city institutions reached (they held important 
tithe rights outside the city); I have therefore excluded them from the regional analysis, rather than 
considering them as representative for financial activities within the city itself.
562 In particular: Pfister, C. (1995): 16-17 and 28-30.
563 O f course the gross amount o f both accounts was much larger, since many o f the transactions 
recorded in the DSR and WSR were transfers which are not included in the net transactions.
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 217
the relative distribution by type of account in which transactions were recorded 
(revenue on the right, expenditure on the left).
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Source: Database, current transactions. Dj are counties, D2 institutions. For the total (absolute) figures 
of each type of transaction, see Section IV-3.
The data does not allow reliable testing of the hypothesis that money was 
redistributed from the territory to the city. Regional patterns can only be compared 
between Di-Type accounts, since these alone formed a homogeneous group from an 
accounting point of view.564 For current transactions, the share of Di-Type accounts 
(bailiff accounts) was up to 40%; on the other hand, nearly all inventory transactions 
were recorded in either A- or B-Type accounts.565 This is a predictable result, since 
important investment decisions can be reasonably expected to have been taken and 
recorded directly by the central government, rather than by its representatives in the 
counties. The result points towards some ‘skimming o ff  of current profits made in 
the territory, which were then invested by central government.
Profitability rates varied enormously between different accounts (see Table 
VII-18 in the appendix).566 For A- and B-Type accounts with their large and 
fluctuating inventory transactions, profitability was already discussed in a long-run 
perspective (see Chapter III). Unsurprisingly, they were also amongst the most 
profitable accounts of the Bernese state in 1732 and 1782. Considering only the
564 Dr Type accounts are only homogeneous in accounting terms, not in what they recorded. This 
makes a comparison possible.
565 The only significant inventory revenue in Type Dj accounts were loan repayments.
566 Summary statistics (1732 / 1782) are: Min -176.48% / 1.20%; Max 75.54% / 334.85%; Standard 
Deviation: 0.58 / 0.76; Average: -8.86% / -9.86; a mean cannot be calculated with positive and 
negative values.
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current revenue and expenditure, the accounts for foreign funds had profit rates of 
86.3% (1732) and 90.2% (1782), salt trade 42.2% and 32.15% respectively. Profit 
rates from D-Type accounts can more readily be compared with each other, which is 
done by region in Figure IV-28.
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Figure IV-28: Current Revenue, Expenditure and Profit Rate by Region (D-Type Accounts 
Only)
Source: Database, current transactions (unweighted) and profit rates. See appendix (Table V II-18) for 
details.
The emerging regional pattern is inconsistent. Argovia accounts were profitable 
in both sample years, Vaud only in 1732, Seeland in 1782. The Oberland was 
spending more than its current revenue in both sample years. These results might not 
be representative for their regions because all figures are based on a sample of five 
ledgers per county. For the further analysis of regional differences, I will only 
consider current transactions. The distribution for inventory transactions (not shown) 
is virtually identical, with the sole difference that in 1782 Vaud’s share in all 
transactions was slightly higher; in other words, Vaud profited from higher 
investments in this year. This was related to an increase in the domestic loan portfolio 
(see Section III-5 above).
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Figure IV-29: Relative Regional Distribution of Dr Type Accounts (Current Transactions only)
Source: Database, net current transactions.
Transactions in Vaud made up for roughly two-fifths of the total and in Argovia 
about one-fifth. I have also weighted these figures by the relative share of the total 
population living in each region, based on the 1764 and 1798 censuses. This relies on 
the -  admittedly slightly unrealistic -  assumption that relative population distribution 
did not change between 1732 and 1764.567 The figures should therefore be considered 
rough estimates only. Since transactions in kind were relatively important in D2 -Type
czo
accounts, Table IV-8 shows values in Bz and stable grain prices (row 1782*).
Argovia OberAG/E. Oberland Seeland Vaud
1732 18.38 19.95 13.77 14.92 17.72
1782 33.11 17.21 8.88 23.46 25.98
1782* 27.14 11.47 5.47 15.26 20.94
Table IV-8: Estimated Revenue per Capita Recorded in Dr Type Accounts by Region (in Bz)
Source: Database, current revenue for Dr Type accounts. Population distribution calculated from 
Bemhist Database/Pfister, C. (1995); HLS (2002), article Bern: 261; and Schluchter (1988). For the 
values in row 1782* I have discounted all grain revenue by the overall mean grain inflation rate.
Not only is there a marked regional difference in the level of revenue per head, 
the developments also vary substantially. For 1732, differences were relatively small. 
But while locally recorded revenue per capita more than doubled in Argovia and grew 
considerably in See land and Vaud, it stagnated in Oberaargau/Emmental and declined 
sharply in Oberland. The relative order of regions changed as well, with
567 Raw data from Bemhist [Pfister, C. (1995)]; HLS (2002), article Bern: 267; and Schluchter (1988).
I have applied the 1764 distribution for the 1732 figures, and a medium distribution (calculated as the 
mean o f the 1764 and 1798 distributions) for the 1782 figures.
568 1 have discounted all transactions recorded in grain by the overall grain inflation rate. This is less 
precise than discounting for each grain type separately.
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Oberaargau/Emmental falling from the highest revenue per capita in 1732 to a value 
below that for all other regions except Oberland in 1782. With grain inflation 
corrected for, the value for Seeland is stable, Argovia and Vaud increase, 
Oberaargau/Emmental and Oberland fall. These divergences can partly be explained 
by the fact that a lot of state revenue was not directly dependent on the number of 
subjects and was instead levied on objects. If population is kept stable at the 1798 
level, then there are still noticeable differences in level, but less in relative change.569 
It would be incorrect to understand the figures in Table IV-8 as total revenue per 
capita for each county; they only show what was recorded locally. Contributions of 
locals towards revenue recorded in central accounts are not included. I will discuss 
the fiscal burden per capita in the next section (IV-5).
We can also consider regional differences in terms of the nature of transactions. 
For this, I have focused on the most important categories for revenue from above, 
which are shown in Figure IV-30. They are tithes (grain and others); taxes (excluding 
tithes); interests; land rents; other rents; and all the remaining current revenue.
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Figure IV-30: Relative Share of Current Revenue in Dr Type Accounts by Region
Source: Database, current revenue o f D r Type accounts.
For all regions, Grain Tithes were the most important single category, usually 
followed by Land Rents. The situation in Vaud was notably different, with Other 
Taxes playing an important role. These were handover taxes levied on property 
transactions (Lods). The 1782 Other Revenue consisted almost exclusively of an
569 With 1764 population figures applied to both years, the results are for 1732 / 1782: AG 17.98 / 
37.99; OAE 18.51 / 26.32; OBE 13.47 / 15.99; SEE 14.60 / 20.79; VD 17.34 / 20.23 (all in Bz).
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increase in wine production in the counties of Nyon and Romainmotier. This might 
not have been a real increase, but the result of a different accounting technique in 
which wine production was recorded more accurately and not in combination with 
wine tithes (note the sharp decrease in wine tithes).
Expenditure also differed regionally in both sample years, as illustrated in 
Figure IV-31.
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Figure IV-31: Relative Share of Current Expenditure in Dr Type Accounts by Region
Source: Database, current revenue o f D r Type accounts. Other Pers. is for personnel cost other than 
regular salaries; Other (Consumption) includes all remaining current expenditure, mainly government 
consumption.
Personnel costs were usually about two-fifths of all current expenditure except 
in Vaud, where their share was almost two-thirds in both sample years. The high 
amount of ad hoc payments in Vaud in 1782 might be related to the military 
expedition to Geneva. This category also included the bailiffs share in revenue, Lods 
and grain sales in particular. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to differentiate 
between the portion of personnel costs which were paid to locals and what went 
towards Bernese patricians. Therefore, any statements about the redistribution of 
resources towards patricians is purely speculative.
This section has analysed fiscal redistribution in Bern in terms of state function, 
economic sectors and regions. The results confirm and qualify what was said about 
factual redistribution earlier. Regarding state functions, unsurprisingly most of the 
canton’s revenue was generated by finance and taxation, but there was an important
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 222
entrepreneurial component as well. Expenditure covered a broad array of functions, 
which is particularly noticeable in comparison to other European states spending most 
on defence. In sectoral terms, redistribution occurred from the primary to the tertiary 
sector, in particular to administration. With a lack of reliable data on the relative size 
of sectors in the economy, it is difficult to explore which parts of the economy 
contributed more than their ‘fair share’ to government revenue. The regional analysis 
has confirmed that most investment transactions were recorded by central 
government accounts discussed in the previous chapter. For locally recorded revenue, 
there were important regional differences in both level and development. Argovia, 
Vaud and Seeland had higher per capita revenue which grew over time, while 
Oberaargau/Emmetal revenue stagnated; the already low Oberland revenue fell. 
Evidence on differences in profitability by region is inconclusive.
iv-5 The Fiscal Burden and Militia Transactions
This section is dedicated to two issues that are directly related to the analysis of 
fiscal redistribution in the previous sections. First, I will discuss the fiscal burden on 
the Bernese population in more detail, relying on the classifications made above. In 
the second part of the section, I will include estimates for the militia as a ‘hidden tax’ 
that should be added to the fiscal burden.
The Fiscal Burden
With all categories fully explained, I will now analyse the fiscal burden of 
Bemese taxpayers in more detail. As a cautionary note on such calculations, Juan 
Gelabert has rightly pointed out how inaccurate the idea of an average taxpayer is for 
early modem times.570 Even today it is difficult to define what ‘average’ stands for. 
The situation was worse in early modem economies because taxes were deliberately 
discriminating by legal status. For example, inhabitants of the city who were not 
citizens paid special fees for residency. Alcohol taxes, on the other hand, were only 
levied in the city and not throughout the territory. There were no personal 
exemptions, but wine was taxed when consumed by the jar and not when it was 
traded in barrels. The situation in early modem states is further complicated by the
570 Gelabert (1995): 539 and 558.
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fact that many taxes were not personal in character, but levied on objects or 
transactions. The most important of them all, the tithe, fell on agricultural returns on 
certain plots, but only when specific types of grain were cultivated regardless by 
whom. As the ‘average taxpayer’ is an abstract and artificial concept, so too is the 
‘average tithe-payer’ an even greater abstraction from reality. When analysing the 
fiscal burden of Bern’s population, it is crucial to keep in mind how limited such an 
approach is. The incidence of taxation could differ significantly between groups of 
population. Calculating average figures can only be used as a proxy for reality, but it 
is the only way of making meaningful comparisons between states and across time.
I define the fiscal burden as all current government revenue that was not 
directly from commercial activities. This notably excludes proceeds from salt sales, 
except for the percentage classified as monopoly profit, which counts as indirect tax. 
It also excludes revenue from interest payments. Overall, the fiscal burden was 27.4% 
of total revenue in 1732, 38.8% in 1782. This is equivalent to 39.8% (1732) and 
48.1% (1782) of net revenue. For Table IV-9,1 have calculated the tax burden (only 
direct and indirect taxes) and as well as the fiscal burden. The results are in Batzen, 
metric units of silver and a percentage of total revenue.
Fiscal Burden 
of which: Taxes 
of which: Tithes
Table IV-9: Fiscal Burden in Bz and Silver
Source: Extended Database, Fiscal Revenue only. Silver prices and population from Section IV-2.
As already discussed above, the ratio of fiscal to total revenue was relatively 
small, compared to the state’s entrepreneurial activities. Additionally taxes on 
property were quasi-inexistent in Bern. The fiscal burden per capita increased by 
46.7% between 1732 and 1782. The figure for 1732 is the equivalent of 3.6 daily 
wages of a construction worker, the value for 1782 of 4.4 daily wages. By this 
measure, the fiscal burden per head increased 19.4%. Using Paul Bairoch’s proxy 
formula for calculating GDP based on an estimated 200 days of work per year, the
Total
Million Bz Silver (tons)
1732 1782 1732 1782
6.94 12.46 5.12 9.02
4.52 8.68 3.34 6.28
3.58 5.10 2.64 3.69
per Capita
Bz Silver (grams)
1732 1782 1732 1782
21.89 32.11 16.15 23.24
14.27 22.36 10.53 16.18
11.28 13.15 8.32 9.52
Share of
Total Revenue
1732 1782
27.4% 38.8%
17.8% 27.0%
14.1% 15.9%
571 The difference between fiscal revenue and taxation are mostly rents. See Table IV-4 for details.
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fiscal quota (government revenue as a share of GDP) in Bern was low, between 1.8% 
and 2.2%.572
These figures are in line with what Stephan Hagnauer found for a sample of 
Bernese counties in the 1630s and 1680s, when on average, current revenue per capita 
was equivalent to 2-3 days’ wages.573 They are also similar to Martin Komer’s results 
for Lucerne, where overall state expenditure per capita were 17.3g of fine silver in the 
1780s, which is the equivalent of a state quota of 1.6%.574 Comparing the fiscal 
burden between countries is challenging because of insurmountable difficulties in 
measurement. Therefore, such comparisons should not be taken at face value; they 
can only give a rough indication about how heavily the population was taxed. In 
France, tax revenue per capita in 1730 was the equivalent of 46g of fine silver; by 
1770, the value had risen to 69g. French subjects paid twice the amount of the 
Bernese fiscal burden for taxes alone. When measured in grain, the proportions are 
similar: the Bernese fiscal burden was equivalent to 30.0 litres of wheat in 1732 and
26.8 litres in 1782, while the average Frenchman paid taxes worth 92.2 litres in 1730 
and 84.6 litres in 1770.575 Other comparative figures are from Charles Ingrao, who 
estimated that in Hesse-Cassel during the reign of Landgrave Frederick II (1760- 
1785), the per capita fiscal burden fell from an equivalent of 78 Bz to 57 Bz. This was 
lower than in other German states: 107 Bz in Prussia, 99 Bz in Bavaria, 109 Bz in 
Baden, 138 Bz in Cologne, and a staggering 162 Bz in Zweibriicken.576 The Bernese 
values were only a fraction of this.
To calculate the overall fiscal burden, communal levies should be added to state 
revenue. As discussed in Section II-2 above, the Bernese republic had delegated 
specific tasks, most importantly poverty relief, to its communes. To fund their 
expenses, communes levied a variety of taxes, corvee labour and payments in kind, 
such as the forced housing of destitute community members. A systematic 
comparison of the fiscal situation across communes is not possible because financial 
information was not consistently recorded. The Bernese state did not interfere directly
572 For this method, see Bairoch (1977) and Komer (1981): 374-378, as well as the critique by Braudel 
(1979-1986): vol. 3: 255-258.
573 Hagnauer (1995): table 42. His figure only represents locally collected revenue, not the contribution 
of the counties to central revenue.
574 Komer (1981): Table 64. He estimated GDP figures with the Bairoch method (see note 572 above).
575 Figures from ESFDB and Gelabert (1995): 563. Conversions of French taxes are based on figures 
collected in the ESFDB as well, assuming a bushel of wheat holding 36 litres. For Bemese values, I 
have used the overall price for wheat from Table VII-12 and Table VII-13.
576 Ingrao (1987): 127.1 have proxied his Taler figures with the parity rate of the Reichstaler at 26 Bz 
(see Section V-l below).
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with communal finance, nor did it collect systematic data about this matter. For 
specific communes, information on the fiscal burden per capita was collected in Table 
IV-10.577 The provenance of the data is discussed in detail in Section VII-20 in the 
appendix.
Commune Tax (Bz/cap) Year(s) Population Type Comments
Aarberg 5.00 1772 Small City 1 daily wage of unskilled labourer
Worb (Viertelgemeinde) 6.02 1745-1760 768 Village Net revenue only (11 accounts)
7.78 1761-1773 772 Village Net revenue only (12 accounts)
6.26 1776-1794 1,221 Village Net revenue only (16 accounts)
Langnau 6.21 1763 2,894 Village Poverty relief revenue only
Menziken 6.40 1773/74 1,098 Village Without poverty relief (?)
Table IV-10: Communal Tax Burden in Bz per Capita (Yearly Figures)
Sources: Bartlome (1999); Holenstein (2005); Bietenhard (1988); Steiner (1956). The data is discussed 
in detail in see Section VII-20 in the appendix.
Compared to levies by the state, the communal tax burden was light. It varied 
both across communes and within the population of the same polity. Usually, cities 
were better off than their hinterland, and residents without citizenship were taxed 
heavily. The disaggregated data for the village of Langnau illustrates how much the 
tax burden changed according to political status, which is another case in point for the 
inaccuracies of the idea that there existed an ‘average’ taxpayer.578 In Langnau, 
landowners’ property was taxed at a rate of 0.05% (for each 7,500 Bz), mobile 
property at 0.08%. Citizens without landed property paid 0.22%, which should 
compensate for the fact that they did not provide any poverty relief in kind. Residents 
(i.e. non-citizens) were taxed at 0.24% and paid an additional flat fee of 75 Bz per 
year. Of the 530 households in Langnau, only 315 paid taxes.579 For those, the yearly 
average was 38.825 Bz, with averages in the different districts ranging from 33.375 to
47.8 Bz. If non-taxpayers are included, the average household paid 23.075 Bz, with a 
range per district from 19.475 Bz to 27.65 Bz. The commune’s total revenue was
CQA
17,985 Bz; citizens contributed 67.8%, the rest came from residents. It is not clear 
how representative the differences in Langnau are for the rest of the territory. Overall,
577 For early modem communal finance in the Empire, see Thomes (1994); Thornes (1995); Fouquet 
(1988).
578 See Bietenhard (1988) for details. His figures include only revenue for poverty relief. For a critique 
on the concept of the ‘average taxpayer’, see footnote 570 above.
579 If Biethenhard’s error margin is included, the figure rises to a maximum of 340 households.
580 Bietenhard (1988): 254.
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the information on communal finance is too scarce and unreliable to include it in the 
detailed discussion of the fiscal burden.
The figures on the fiscal burden levied by the Bemese state (excluding 
communes) from Table IV-9 can be further qualified in several ways. To start, we can 
correct for the share of the inactive population. If children and the aged are excluded, 
the result is the actual fiscal burden on the economically active. Based on the 1764 
census analysed by Christian Pfister, 30% of the population was younger than 16 and
C O I
7% older than 60. If we exclude these and assume that part of the 16-60 year old 
were not active due to illness, wedlock or other reason, we can proxy their share at 
half of the total population.582 In other words, the fiscal burden on the active 
population would be twice as high as the above figure, nearing 7-9 daily wages per 
year, or 3.5 to 4.5% of their annual income -  which still seems very low.
This figure also puts severe restrictions on the scope for redistribution through 
the government, at least when the focus is on overall per-capita figures. The impact of 
fiscal redistribution on the overall economy was relatively small. In certain cases -  
for example for farmers which paid the tithe on their grain harvest -  taxation could be 
substantial. The importance of fiscal redistribution was therefore less in its quantity 
than its incidence. The other importance of taxation was that implementing levies in 
cash could force monetisation of the economy. Peasants were made to sell crops to 
pay for such taxes, which ultimately favoured labour division and hence ‘Smithian’ 
growth. This development towards a monetisation and specialisation of the economy 
was undermined if taxes could be paid in kind. For Bern, the number of taxes that 
were paid in kind was declining. In 1732, 63% of the fiscal burden accrued in grain, 
31% in monetary units, and 6% in wine. By 1782, monetary fiscal revenue (48%) was 
larger than in grain (44%), while wine slightly increased its share (7%). In absolute 
terms, monetary fiscal revenue grew by 158%, grain revenue by 38% when measured 
in Batzen, and wine revenue doubled (+102%). If fiscal grain revenue is discounted 
by the mean grain inflation rate, it fell by 16%.
When analysing the fiscal burden by economic sector, it would again be ideal to 
compare a pre- and post-tax sectoral distribution, which is not possible with
581 Pfister, C. (1995): Tab. 9.3 (432). His figures are for the canton in its 1980 borders only.
582 The figure of half the population being active is probably a conservative estimate for an economy in 
which child labour was common. Excluding women from the active population would be a mistake, 
since most of them actively contributed to the economy.
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eighteenth-century data. A sectoral breakdown of fiscal and tax revenue by sector is 
the only possible proxy.
□  Primary S  Secondary H Tertiary □  Unspec.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 mBz
Figure IV-32: Fiscal and Tax Revenue by Sector
Source: Database, Fiscal and Tax Revenue.
Unsurprisingly, the primary sector contributed most to Bemese fiscal revenue. 
The contribution of the secondary sector was almost non-existent, while the share of 
the tertiary sector increased rapidly from 1732 to 1782 as a result of raised transit 
duties (discussed above). Christian Pfister has estimated that in the period 1762-1771, 
a share of 57% of the cereal production in the canton was subject to tithes by the
coo
Bemese state. On average, the agricultural sector therefore paid a 5.7% tax to the 
state (0.57 x 10%) for tithes alone. This did not represent the entire burden on grain 
producers, however, since many tithes were due to private landowners, who were 
often patrician families. Pfister has also calculated that as an overall average, 14-19% 
of a harvest was used for tithes and rents. This was still much lower than the rough
C04
estimates for feudal duties and taxes in the Empire, which range from 22% to 40%. 
The regional distribution of the fiscal burden was calculated in Figure IV-33.
■  Argovia 13 Oberaargau/Emmental B Oberland E3 Seelamd □  Vaud H ]Bern* S  A/B-Type
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Figure IV-33: Relative Distribution of Fiscal Revenue by Region
583 Pfister, C. (1975): Table 27/1. On a further 33.2%, tithes were levied by other institutions, such as 
communes or particulars. With 5.8% of the harvest subject to foreign tithe-holders, only 4% of the 
Bemese harvest were free from taxation through tithes.
584 Pfister, C. (1995): 171.
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Source: Database, fiscal revenue of Dr Type accounts. A- and B-Type accounts added as A/B-Type 
(almost all were recorded in A-Type accounts).
Most fiscal revenue was recorded in accounts of institutions that were based 
within the city. Of the bailiff accounts, Vaud and Argovia contributed most. They 
were also the most populated. I have corrected for this by calculating per capita fiscal 
burdens for all Di-Type accounts, based on the population distribution described 
earlier, and discounted for grain inflation by calculating 1782 figures with deflated 
prices for grain revenue (row 1782*).
Argovia OberAG/E. Oberland Seeland Vaud
1732 15.28 18.74 11.00 13.18 16.22
1782 31.63 17.16 8.38 22.58 22.27
1782* 28.47 14.09 5.56 18.79 19.00
Table IV-11: Locally Collected Fiscal Revenue per Capita by Region (in Bz)
Source: Database, fiscal revenue in Dr Type accounts only. Population distribution calculated as for 
Table IV-8.1782* is for figures with grain revenue discounted by the overall mean grain inflation 
rate.585
Strictly speaking, Table IV-11 does not show the total fiscal burden for each 
region, but the part of it that was locally recorded. The figures can only be compared 
under the assumption that all other fiscal revenue was equally distributed. The 
relative regional distribution looks similar to total revenue per capita, discussed above 
(see Table IV-11). Fiscal revenue increased in Argovia, Vaud and Seeland and 
declined in Obaraargau/Emmental and Oberland. By 1782, Argovians carried by far 
the highest fiscal burden, followed by Vaudois and Seelanders. The inhabitants of 
Oberland, on the other hand, only contributed little towards Bemese fiscal revenue. In 
Oberaargau/Emmental, fiscal revenue per capita declined over the period.
For grain tithes as one of the most important source of revenue of the Bemese 
state, it is worth considering the regional distribution in absolute terms as well. 
Institutions in the city collected 35% (both 1732 and 1782) of total tithe revenue for 
the state. The league table for tithes by region shows Vaud on top (22% and 24%%), 
followed by Oberaargau/Emmental (13% and 14%), Argovia (12% and 12%),
585 The fact that in some instances fiscal revenue per capita seems higher than overall revenue per 
capita in Table IV-11 is caused by the use of a mean inflation rate for grain. This can overstate overall 
inflation if the true inflation rate was lower than the mean.
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Seeland (13% and 11%), and Oberland (4% and 5%). These figures seem consistent 
with Christian Pfister’s figures for tithe revenue measured by weight. With the 
population distributions taken into account, Table IV-12 shows tithes paid per 
inhabitant for each region. Since tithes were not levied on people but on land, I have
COT
also included tithe revenue per surface of arable land.
Per Capita
Argovia OberAG/E. Oberland Seeland Vaud Bern**
1732 5.94 9.24 5.44 8.18 6.09 34.16
1782 8.18 10.22 4.88 12.17 8.74 32.88
1782* 4.98 6.22 2.97 7.41 5.33 20.03
Per Hectar
Argovia OberAG/E. Oberland Seeland Vaud Bern**
1732 6.14 3.57 0.65 7.71 3.02 4.80
1782 9.92 6.17 1.07 10.39 5.16 7.65
1782* 6.04 3.76 0.65 6.33 3.14 4.66
Table IV-12: Grain Tithe Revenue per Capita
Source: Database, grain tithe revenue. Population distribution calculated as for Table IV-8, figures on 
arable land from Schluchter (1988). 1782* is for figures with grain revenue discounted by the overall 
mean grain inflation rate. Bern** stands for the residual of the country.
The figures for institution from the city (row Bern**) are not fully comparable 
with those for the territory, since they are only based on a residual calculation for 
population and surface. Tithe revenue by institutions within the city could also 
include lands in the territory. The ‘tithe burden’ seems to have been highest in 
Seeland and Argovia when measured per capita; when measured per surface, 
Oberaargau/Emmental and Seeland look like the most taxed regions. Unsurprisingly 
the Oberland, where grain production and feudal duties were less prevalent, 
contributed significantly less in relative terms. Table IV-12 confirms the earlier 
finding that any increase in tithe revenue from 1732 to 1782 was caused by grain 
inflation rather than growing revenue in kind.
586 See Pfister, C. (1975): Table 25/1. His figures for 1782 are: Bern 30.7%; Aaretal (=Oberland) 4.2%; 
Oberaargau and Emmental 18.1%; Unteraargau (=Argovia) 15.1%; Seeland 5.8%, Vaud 25.7%. 
Differences can be explained by sampling (mine is a selection of accounts for each region; he did not 
include all types of grain), conversion prices, and different categorisation of regions. For the period 
1762-71, Pfister also gives the breakdown for the state’s tithes, which are slightly different (Table 
27/1, series MGHZehnten): BE 23.9%; AG 16.7%; OAE 17.2%; OBE 4.9%; SEE 7.0%; VD 30.3%.
587 1 have calculated this from the 1798 figures in Schluchter (1988), assuming there was no increase in 
arable land.
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Militia Duties as a Hidden Fiscal Burden
For my empirical analysis so far, I have only considered revenue and 
expenditure that was recorded in government accounts. One issue that is 
systematically excluded by this approach are transactions for the Bemese militia. 
Because information about this is not reliable and detailed enough, I have decided to 
address it in a separate section rather than include it in my database. For an overall 
consideration of the fiscal burden, forced labour extracted by the militia should be 
included. The militia system not only raised revenue in the form of corvee labour, it 
also ‘spent’ it as days served for defence of the canton. The direct costs involved were 
small, since regular training was not remunerated, although communes usually 
contributed a token salary and food supplies, for which the government fixed
fQO
maximum payments. When calculated as an opportunity cost, however, 
redistribution through the militia system was considerable.589 Added to this should be 
the cost of equipment that soldiers had to purchase and maintain at their own expense. 
Since all these transactions were not recorded in detail, I have to rely on estimates to 
calculate the ‘militia burden’. The variables involved are army size, training 
frequency, opportunity cost of serving and the total cost of equipment (see also 
Section II-5 above).
Exact figures for the size of the Bemese army in 1732 are unknown. I assume 
effectives of 45,000 men, based on the army size in 1721. In 1782, the army consisted 
of some 64,000 men.590 The militia usually trained for 40 days a year in spring and 
autumn, before and after the harvest season.591 The opportunity cost for serving in the 
militia can be proxied with wage data for construction workers (discussed in Section 
VII-14 in the appendix).592 The state subsidised the purchase of military equipment 
and provided ammunition, but the expense for a soldier could be considerable. In 
1782, a full set of infantry gear cost L. 70-72 (700-720 Bz), which is the equivalent of
588 Feller (1955): 506. If the militia served for longer periods, soldiers received a daily allowance.
589 Other types of forced labour were not important in Bern, except for a few days of communal service 
(Gemeinwerk) in Seeland: Hagnauer (1995). On a communal level, citizens were required to work for 
road maintenance: Holenstein (2005).
590 Rodt (1831-1834): Vol. 1, 186-189. The exact figure is 63,697, of which 27,218 were Auszug 
troops.
591 Rodt (1831-1834): Vol. 1, 186-189.
592 Based on Ebener (1999): Tables 5.2 and 5.3. See the discussion my Table VII-17 for details. The 
exact figures are 6.00 Bz (for 1732) and 7.37 Bz (for 1782).
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 231
almost 100 daily wages.593 Figures for 1732 are not known. We can assume that on 
average one in forty soldiers had to buy this equipment every year. This figure is 
obtained by considering the years of service (44, from 16 to 64), corrected by a lower 
life expectancy, plus the fact that some soldiers inherited rather than bought their 
equipment (see Table IV-13).594
1732 1782 Unit Source
Soldiers 45,000 63,697 men Rodt (1831): 186-189
Traings days per year 40 40 days/year Rodt (1831): 186-189
Days served 1,800,000 2,547,880 days
Wages 6.00 7.37 Bz/day Ebener (1999): Tab. 5.2 and 5.3
Days served in Bz 10,800,000 18,777,876 Bz
Equipment per soldier 578 710 Bz Rodt (1834): 250
Replacement rate 0.025 0.025 (=1/40)
Cost of Equipment 650,271 1,130,622
Total Cost 11,450,271 19,908,497 Bz
Table IV-13: Cost of the Bernese Militia Army
Sources: see Table.
If we add all regular costs of the Bemese militia army, they account for 11.4m 
Bz in 1732 and 20.0m Bz in 1782 (excluding the Geneva expedition). These sums are 
sizeable when compared to other revenue and expenditure figures recorded in 
government ledgers (see Figure IV-34).
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Figure IV-34: Revenue and Expenditure by Currency, including Militia
Sources: Database, net transactions (including grain sales, see Figure IV-5) and estimates for militia 
cost (see Table IV-13).
593 Rodt (1831-1834), Vol. 2: 250.
594 I have assumed that the cost o f equipment at 710 Bz in 1782, and -  based on a fixed ratio to wages 
(1 equipment = 96 daily wages) -  at 580 Bz in 1732.
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The militia accounted for 29.1% (1732) and 31.1% (1782) of revenue, as well 
as 35.8% (1732) and 36.7% (1782) of expenditure by the Bemese state. Adding 
militia duties also alters the results for fiscal redistribution discussed in this chapter. 
Militia revenue consisted of a tax levied in labour and a special tax for the equipment. 
Both had the state function Finance and Taxation. The sectoral distribution would 
follow the occupation of the soldiers. In theory, the conscription system should be 
non-discriminatory with respect to economic sectors. It is not clear if this was really 
the case, since information on which professions were over- or under-represented in 
the Bemese army are missing. In terms of expenditure, days served in the militia 
would count as special salaries, and the cost of equipment as military inventory. This 
would be categorised as expenditure for the defence function of the state.
With militia expenditure included, defence becomes by far the most important 
state function, covering 46.5% (1732) and 54.7% (1782) of current expenditure. If the 
expenses for the Geneva expedition are excluded from the 1782 figures, defence 
spending was 51.0% of current expenditure. These figures have to be qualified in two 
ways. First, their value cannot easily be compared to other states where military 
services had to be purchased. The frugal Bemese government would certainly have 
limited its defence budget if it actually had to pay for its army in cash. Second, when 
expressed in absolute terms, the Bemese figures were still low. Defence expenditure 
was equivalent of 8.9 (1732) and 16.5 (1782) tonnes of silver, which is a fraction of 
the hundreds of tonnes monarchical states paid for their standing armies.595
The fiscal burden on the Bemese population considerably increases if militia 
duties are included. The revised estimates are shown in Table IV-14.
Fiscal Burden 
of which: Militia
Table IV-14: Revised Estimates for Fiscal Burden (including Militia)
Source: See Table IV-9 and Table IV-13.
595 Proxied by figures from the ESFDB: Multiplying the share of defence spending (see Figure VII-15) 
by overall expenditure from Komer (1995a): 401, the figures are as follows (in tonnes of silver, see 
years from Figure VII-15): Piedmont 17; Britain 2,500; Denmark 65-360; France 3,000; Prussia 112- 
485; United Provinces 439. These are very rough estimates with large error margins.
Total
Million Bz Silver (tons)
1732 1782 1732 1782
18.39 32.37 13.56 23.43
11.45 19.91 8.45 14.41
per Capita
Bz Silver (grams)
1732 1782 1732 1782
58.01 83.42 42.79 60.38
36.12 51.31 26.64 37.14
Share of 
Total Revenues
1732 1782
50.0%
31.1%
62.2%
38.3%
Chapter IV: Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis) 233
The fiscal burden increases by 165% (1732) and 160% (1782) with militia 
duties included (measured in Batzen). Probably a more accurate way is to add the 40 
days of militia training per year to the average fiscal burden on the active part of the 
population of roughly 7-8 days’ wages. Much like the fiscal burden in general, the 
main importance of the ‘militia tax’ was in its incidence. Serving more than a month 
per year in unpaid military training could be an important extraction of labour that 
represented considerable foregone earnings for many individuals.
The figures on militia duties presented here are highly dependent on the number 
of days served, for which there is only anecdotal evidence. As a result, they are little 
more than a ‘back of the envelope’ calculation. It would be interesting to consider 
regional differences in contributions to the militia in more detail, and to find more 
accurate estimations for the cost of equipment.
rv-6 Conclusion: Fiscal Redistribution
This chapter analysed how the Bemese state redistributed resources through its 
revenue and expenditure. The main source of data is a compilation of government 
accounts covering two sample years, 1732 and 1782. With regards to bailiff or county 
accounts, I have used a regionally weighted sample. For the calculations, units in 
which transactions were recorded were converted into stable monetary values, 
expressed in Batzen (Bz). The results have been discussed separately for different 
inflation rates for wages, foodstuffs and goods. Most measures indicate that the 
absolute amount of revenue and expenditure of the Bemese state increased between 
1732 and 1782, but the figures show a fall when expressed in grain equivalents. This 
is the effect of grain inflation, which the government was shielded from by their 
transactions that were directly collected in grain. This was certainly the case for 
between one fifth and a quarter of the total amount recorded. On a per capita basis, 
the differences between the two sample years were small; the overall state budget per 
capita remained roughly the same.
I have analysed fiscal redistribution among the four dimensions factual (by 
nature of transaction), functional, sectoral and regional. In terms of the nature of 
transaction, the most important findings are that the Bemese state made a net profit in 
both years, which it proceeded to invest in financial claims and property. The returns
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from previous investments also contributed significantly to the government’s current 
revenue, mainly in the form of interest payments. Other important sources of revenue 
were the salt trade, tithes, land rents and indirect taxes. The latter increased 
substantially over time because of additional road tolls, which were in turn the 
outcome of previous infrastructure investments in road building. Current expenditure 
went to a broad array of categories, with salaries (c. 35%) and salt purchases (c. 20%) 
being the most important.
The most significant and distinguishing features of the Bemese republic only 
surface through comparison with other states. The absence of any debt servicing cost 
-  the absence of a national debt -  is remarkable, as is the low level of expenditure 
geared towards defence. This is confirmed by my analysis of redistribution by state 
function. In addition to revenue from finance and taxation, Bern had significant 
entrepreneurial returns; and its defence expenditure was low. Even in 1782, when a 
small military expedition to Geneva was launched, defence was only responsible for 
6% of overall expenditure. The investigation of economic sectors which contributed 
to and profited from the Bemese fisc is challenged by the lack of information on 
professions, which results in a large number of unspecified records. For transactions 
which have sectoral information, the data show that resources were mostly levied 
from the primary sector and spent for the tertiary sector, with administration as the 
main beneficiary of state expenditure. This is an expected result, given the reliance of 
the Bemese state on tithes and land rents. Regional differences were also to a large 
extent caused by the traditional differences in feudal penetration. The relatively 
unburdened inhabitants of the Oberland generated significantly less government 
revenue per capita. While in Argovia, Seeland and Vaud revenue per capita grew 
from 1732 to 1782, they stagnated in the Oberaargau/Emmental region and fell in 
Oberland.
The fiscal burden on Bemese subjects increased from the equivalent of 3.6 
days’ wages in 1732 to 4.4 in 1782. In spite of an almost 50% increase, these figures 
are very low by comparison. Using 200 days’ wages as a rough proxy for GDP, it 
would be the equivalent of a state quota of about 2%. Bemese subjects paid to their 
state about a third of what their French neighbours paid in taxes alone. Compared to a 
number of German states, the fiscal burden in Bern appears very low as well. 
However, as the militia army extracted resources in the form of forced labour which 
was not recorded in government accounts, these figures can be misleading. Based on
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a rough estimate, militia duties increase the fiscal burden by 38%. It would therefore 
still be much smaller than in other European states. Since most revenue extraction 
was dependent on personal circumstances, average figures can give an inaccurate 
rendition of reality. Taxes were often levied on objects rather than people, as the 
examples of tithes or land rents illustrate. As a result, differences in fiscal burden 
were significant, but they are difficult to measure.
The wider implication of the findings in this chapter is that the financial scope 
for state-building was limited in Bern. While the government had more resources to 
spend in absolute terms, the increase was roughly at par with population growth. 
When measured in grain equivalents, its spending power even declined over time. In 
other words, the Bemese state in the eighteenth century was ‘built’ with stable 
resources. The government also forfeited the possibility of introducing new taxes on 
property, relying mostly on traditional methods of extraction such as tithes and militia 
duties. In addition, returns from entrepreneurial activities were very important 
contributors to state finance. This confirms the image of Bern as a physiocratic state, 
depending to a large extent on its revenue in kind. This role was combined with the 
Cameralist postulate of the state acting as entrepreneur.
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V The State as an Overseas Investor
v-i Chapter Content and Background
On 22 June 1720, Samuel Muller sold 261 shares of the South Sea Company on 
behalf of the Bemese government for £198,730 (c. 26.5m Bz) in London. These titles 
were bought for roughly a seventh of the selling price a year earlier. This made 22 
June 1720 arguably the most profitable day for a Bemese treasurer since the battle of 
Grandson in 1467, when Swiss troops looted the war chest of Duke Charles the Bold 
of Burgundy.596 Unfortunately for Bern, Muller failed to deliver the spectacular profit 
and was declared bankrupt; most of the speculative windfall was lost. Even though it 
was not representative of the government’s investment strategy, the episode of 
summer 1720 illustrates how important foreign investments had become for the 
Bemese treasury.
This chapter will investigate how Bern acted as an investor in overseas capital 
markets. The remainder of this section will provide the historical and technical 
background. In Section V-2,1 will discuss the ideas behind the canton’s first overseas 
investments, including the situation on the domestic capital markets, the origin of its 
first loans in 1710 and the transition to purely financial investments a decade later. 
Bern’s reaction to the South Sea Bubble -  the events of summer 1720 mentioned in 
the opening paragraph -  is the focus of Section V-3. Section V-4 is an analysis of the 
portfolio’s administration on the basis of principal-agent theory. Subsequently, I will 
consider the investment strategy of the canton using tools of portfolio analysis, before 
concluding the chapter. The contribution of foreign capital investments to overall 
Bemese state finance has already been covered by Section III-5 and will only be 
referred to briefly throughout this chapter.
Historiography, Data and Currency Conversion
Since Julius Landmann’s seminal study of Bemese overseas investment over a 
century ago, the issue has received little scholarly attention.597 Landmann’s findings 
have been integrated into several other studies, but have never been complemented
596 Deuchler/Bemisches Historisches Museum (1963).
597 Landmann (1903) and Landmann (1904).
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with further analysis.598 William Monter’s research on Swiss overseas investment in 
England even ignored the activities of the Bemese state completely.599 More recently, 
the collapse of the Malacrida bank, which was closely involved in overseas 
investments of the canton, has been studied in detail by Nick Linder.600 Bela Kapossy 
has investigated the impact of overseas lending on Bemese political thought.6011 have 
published some of my research of Bern’s dealings during the South Sea Bubble, 
along with a working paper on its role as an overseas investor, on which part of this 
chapter is based.602
The primary data for my analysis is drawn from a contemporary book entitled 
Hisotire der Auslandischen Stands Capitalien (History of the Foreign Capital of the 
State), written in 1776.603 The function of this document is not entirely clear; it was 
presumably intended to educate future government officials about one of the 
cornerstones of Bemese state finance. Landmann’s study relies heavily on the text 
and offers a closely edited version of its core parts.604 In addition to the His tor ie, I 
have used the accounts of foreign funds and government reports on the topic.605 To 
set Bemese investments in the context of the Financial Revolution in northern 
Europe, I have relied on asset prices collected by other scholars, mainly from Larry 
Neal and Gary Shea.606
A major problem with establishing the value of Bemese overseas assets is the 
plethora of currencies that were used across Europe and which were only partly 
standardised in Bemese government accounts. Sums were recorded in Pounds 
Sterling, Reichstaler and Bemese Crowns separately because the relative values of 
these currencies were not stable. This is similar to the current system of floating 
exchange rates with the major difference being that slow and scarce information 
during the early modem period made the establishment of reliable exchange rates 
difficult. One option was the use of parity rates defined as the ratio between the
598 For example: Peyer (1968): ch. 3; Feller (1955): 106-109; Komer (1999).
599 Monter (1969).
600 Linder (2003); Linder (2004). See also the older publications on Malacrida, particularly Miilinen 
(1896).
601 Kapossy (1998); Kapossy (2002).
602 Altorfer (2003); Altorfer (2004a); Altorfer (2004b).
603 StABE B V II2389.
604 Landmann (1903).
605 StABE B V II2396-2473; StABE A V 1470-1490; StABE B I 107.
606 Their material is only partly edited: Neal (1990) and ICPSR Study 1008:
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-PRA/01008.xml; Shea (forthcoming-b). Many thanks to 
both authors for allowing me the use of their databases, as well as for their valuable comments on 
earlier drafts of this chapter.
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bullion content of minted ‘heavy’ coins for two currencies. These ratios were 
relatively stable over time, but differed from market exchange rates whenever there 
was a premium on a specific currency. Unless otherwise stated, I will use parity rates 
throughout this chapter and convert all transactions into Bemese Taler (abbreviated 
with the symbol Thl), with one Taler being the equivalent of 30 Batzen. I have opted 
for the Taler rather than the Batzen because the former was the main currency in 
which foreign funds were recorded. For London investments, I will also use Pound 
Sterling (£). The parity rates used for conversion are shown in Table V-l.
Symbol Currency Place Parity
Thl. Taler Bern 1
Kr. Krone (Crown) Bern 1.2
BE-Lb. Pound (Bemese) Bern 4
L. Livre Suisse (‘alter Franken’) Bern 3
£ Pound Sterling Britain 0.225
R. Reichstaler Empire 1.153
fl. Guilder (Imperial) Empire 2
Hfl. Dutch Guilder Netherlands 2.5
Bz. Batzen Bern 0.333
Table V-l: Conversion of Currencies to Bernese Taler at Parity Rates
Sources: Furrer (1995); Komer/Furrer/Bartlome (2001); McCusker (1978); Schneider, J. et al. (1992); 
Tuor (1977). See also Section VII-13 in the appendix for other Bemese currencies.
Real exchange rates tended to diverge from the parity course in times of 
financial crises or war; the two often came together. In this situation, flows of funds 
from one currency to another altered the relative position of offer and demand and 
hence their relative price. This resulted in an increase in the exchange rate for the 
currency in low demand, for which a premium had to be paid. However, in 
peacetime, exchange rates stayed reasonably close to parity courses to justify their
V-2 Towards a Productive Use of the Cash Reserve
By the turn of eighteenth century, the Bemese government had a sizeable cash 
reserve secured in its vaults. The reserve had originally been intended to serve as a
607 For the use of parities see also Ashton (1966): 188-196.
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war chest but had outdated this function in two ways. First, the need for contingency 
in cash declined because of the growing possibility of resource mobilisation on 
capital markets and through loans. Second, because Bern never had to use its 
reserves, they continued to accumulate beyond the coverage of immediate needs. The 
government’s hoarding of cash excluded funds from productive use and was therefore 
subject to opportunity costs. This section will compile an overview of how the 
government became increasingly concerned with putting its reserves to productive 
use. I will present my case chronologically beginning with the Bemese government’s 
earlier attempts to invest on the domestic mortgage market to the loans of 1710 and 
their conversion into portfolio investments.
Early Investments from the Cash Reserve
In spite of the investments described in this chapter, the Bemese cash reserve 
served its original purpose as a war chest on a number of occasions. During the 
Neuchatel succession of 1699, Bern opposed French aspirations and had to protect the 
principality by sending troops. An anonymous citizen from Bern penned a mocking 
letter to the French ambassador that the half-rotten money from the treasure would be 
unearthed to finance a militia that was in serious need. In his words ‘pour faire 
manquer une couple de 100m ecus a nostre Canton qui en fera la depense sans 
beaucoup de peine puisque ces escus a demi moisis dans les coffres serviront a 
dresser et a excercer une milice, qui en a fort besoin.1608 The second war of 
Villmergen against the Catholic cantons of the Swiss Confederation was also funded 
solely by a withdrawal from the cash reserve.609 As discussed in Section III-5, the 
military needs of the 1790s were mainly financed through the sale of overseas assets 
rather than the bullion from the government vaults.
Some government officials had realised that hoarding cash limited monetary 
circulation and might exert an adverse effect on state finance.610 They also discussed 
this as a problem of the Bemese economy as a whole, arguing that an outflow of 
bullion was harming domestic trade. Their worries were largely unfounded, as I will 
explain in more detail below. At a time when the Bemese capital market was
608 Unknown Bemese citizen to Castella (11 January 1708), quoted from Feller (1912): 46 (note 1).
609 See Section III-5 above. Bern withdrew 437,500 Thl (13.125m Bz).
610 Such arguments are also made for Prussia’s treasure; see Henning (1974). He argues that hoarding 
cash has harmed the economy.
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characterised by problems of abundance rather than shortage, the effects of a cash 
drain were probably minute. Contemporary authors cited the negative trading balance 
and scarcity of ‘good money’ as aggravating factors. This view was expressed in 
1687 by the newly founded Commercial Council, which was a government chamber 
modelled after the French Conseil de Commerce under Colbert. In an expose to the 
Great Council, the Commercial Council described money as the blood that kept the 
political body alive:
As the ordinary circulation of blood in the natural human body 
maintains the health and life of the natural human body, its congestion 
conversely causing illness and even death; so can the liquid wealth in 
money and circulating ready cash maintain the well-being of the 
political body of the republic; yet the lack of cash and poverty [can 
create] big inopportuneness, and sometimes even its decline, as can be 
amply seen from history.611
The report then tried to establish a trading balance for Bern. All imported goods 
were listed and their value estimated at 700,000 Thl. This sum was set against 
virtually no exports. The Commercial Council added profits generated by the salt 
monopoly and the state administration to this negative balance for being ‘excluded
(\ 19from circulation, as if they were alienated outside the country.’ To address the 
negative situation, the report proposed to encourage the settlement of Huguenot 
refugees, who would engage in commercial and industrial activities throughout the 
country. The ultimate goal of this policy was the export of manufactured goods. In 
spite of comparing the effects of the cash reserve to a cash drain, the report of 1687 
did not suggest an investment, let alone an overseas investment. The government took 
more than two decades to come to this conclusion. When a visit to the vault in 1697 
found that there was not enough money to support an army of 30,000 for a year, the
/ ' I ' l
Secret Council pondered over ways to achieve this objective. Their suggestions are 
not known, but large-scale investments took another twelve years to materialise in the 
form of loans to the Dutch and British discussed below.
There were predecessors to these loans: from its early existence as a medieval 
city-state, Bern had lent money to noblemen in the surrounding areas. Subsequent
611 StAB B V 2: 47-52, quote: 47. The passage is quoted in Schneider, H. (1937): 35. For the use of 
similar metaphors from Locke to Quesnay, see Christensen (1994): 249-288 and Finkelstein (2000).
6,2 StABE B V 2: 48.
613 See Section III-5 above for the episode of the 1697 inspection.
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governments were well aware of the political leverage that could be exerted this way. 
The seizure of lands and titles that had been pawned as collateral for loans was one of 
the main expansion strategies for the nascent territorial state. The most impressive 
coup was landed in 1554/55, when Bern and Fribourg took over the lands of the Duke 
of Gruyere for failing to service his debts towards the two republics.614 Lending 
money was both an investment and a political tool. This did not only apply at the 
inter-state level, but also within the state itself. Strategic loans buttressed clientelistic 
relations and enhanced political influence over subjects or rivals. Ulrich Pfister has 
argued that the financial dependency of borrowers on their lenders was more 
important than feudal links in early modem Switzerland.615
Throughout the sixteenth century, Bern was heavily engaged in lending to other 
Swiss states and Protestants across Europe.616 The French crown was also a recipient 
of funds which were largely generated by French payments for Bemese mercenary 
troops. The notorious credit habits of the French gave the Bemese government also 
some experience in dealing with reneging debtor states. The best solution was 
deemed to be avoidance of such loans, which the Bemese government did for most of 
the seventeenth century; though the French crown still maintained outstanding dues. 
This thorny issue was a constant point of contention between the Bemese and the 
French ambassador based in Switzerland.617 Throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, claims on outstanding interest payments were usually settled by 
Bern demanding salt supplies for a few years, which were then delivered until the 
next default. In 1720, Bern estimated its claims against France at 630,000 Thl.618 
These debts were never repaid, nor did they yield any interest payments. The write­
off is illustrated by the fact that neither the accounts for foreign funds nor the Historie 
document mentions a single claim on France. To the French, beyond their well- 
known financial problems, maintenaning debts with the canton represented a tool for 
tempering anti-French feelings in Bern. The potential repayment of outstanding debts 
was viewed a tmmp-card in political negotiations. Overall, financial credibility was 
of little concern to both the Bemese and French when it came to the latter’s loans. 
Things took an interesting turn in 1794, when the Bemese government was asked to
614 Komer (1980); Komer (1995b).
615 Pfister, U. (1992b).
616 Komer (1980): 277-290.
617 Feller (1955): 96, 329; Gem (1970): 174-175.
618 Feller (1955): 329 (the exact figure was 2,524,786 BE-Lb). The debt had been re-negotiated in 
1787: StABE B VII2465/2.
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register its loans for a conversion into paper money assignats. When confronted with 
the dilemma of either accepting the Revolutionary government or forfeiting its 
claims, the Bemese decided to wait and see. As a government report put it, it was 
‘better to wait with patience for better times than to take a step that could have severe 
political consequences.’619
Another option for investing funds from the cash reserve was the purchase of 
territories or jurisdictional powers which could be integrated into the republic. The 
problem was that such lands within close geographical proximity rarely appeared on 
the market. If a local title was put up for sale, patricians were often more interested in 
making a purchase for their own families rather than the state. The canton had 
acquired several small territories throughout the century, such as the County of 
Castelen in 1732. There had also been attempts in the 1700s to make the Emperor 
sell the Fricktal, a neighbouring county. Bern proposed to buy this territory, whereas 
the Habsburgs preferred to use it as collateral for a loan. The canton wanted to avoid 
having the Emperor as debtor because of his poor credit history and reputation for not 
paying interests regularly. During a second attempt to buy the Fricktal for Bern in
f\ 911737, only a political uprising prohibited the closure of a deal.
Finally, the government could also invest on the domestic capital market. With 
the virtual absence of commercial and industrial credit, this market consisted almost 
exclusively of mortgages, which the government had secured in its function as a 
lawmaker (discussed in Section II-6 above). Most of the mortgage credit was on 
agrarian land. Since patricians were important players in this market, there was a 
conflict of interest. In finding the best investment opportunities, patricians as private 
investors competed with the government which tried to find a productive use for the 
financial surplus of the state. The government significantly increased its domestic 
loan portfolio with the so-called Auskauf (buyout) of 1677. In that year, an edict 
declared the mortgage of Bemese lands to foreigners illegal. The government 
offered to discharge the mortgages of all affected parties and lend them money at the 
conditions they had previously enjoyed. Put simply, the Bemese government evicted 
foreign lenders and took over their mortgages. The risk of default for these loans was
619 StABE B V II2465/57.
620 See the list in footnote 181 above. For Castelen, see also Section III-5 above.
621 Landmann (1903): 80-97.
622 Foreigners were defined as non-residents of the canton.
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low because the foreign lenders had already screened their borrowers. The 
government took advantage of its law-making powers to acquire and secure a safe 
loan portfolio. The Auskaufh&d been funded by an assignation of lm  Bz from the salt 
trade account and the withdrawal of half this sum from the cash reserve.623 Compared 
to the overall size of financial transactions, the funds which could be invested in the 
domestic mortgage credit market were limited. From the late seventeenth century 
onwards, the state started granting loans to private borrowers and companies to 
stimulate domestic economic development.624 This exacted a negative effect on the 
capital market, as there were insufficient investment opportunities to absorb the credit 
on offer. Economists use the term crowding out to describe when government
625borrowing absorbs money that would ordinarily have been invested productively.
In eighteenth-century Bern, there was a reversed crowding out, since the government 
was active as a lender, not as a borrower. The Auskauf of 1677 magnified this 
problem.
Government decrees and usury laws fixed the interest rates for mortgages in 
Bern (discussed in Section II-6). Philip T. Hoffmann, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean- 
Laurent Rosenthal describe a similar situation in eighteenth-century Paris as a 
‘priceless market’. With interest rates fixed by law, the capital market could not be 
coordinated through the interest rate as the price for money. Information about the 
borrowers’ ability to service debt was crucial in lending decisions because investors 
could not apply a premium for riskier loans. As their only options, investors had to
627either lend at the fixed rate or withhold their funds, referred to as credit rationing. 
The main adverse economic effect of credit rationing is a lack of capital, which was 
not severe in the Bemese case, as there was a consistent oversupply in the market. 
Credit rationing only affected lenders, who failed to find sufficiently secure 
investment opportunities for their funds. With its jurisdictional and administrative 
records, the Bemese state benefited from the enormous information advantage it had 
over other investors. This information could also be utilised by individual 
government members who acted as bailiffs and wanted to enter the local capital 
market. As in the rest of the Swiss Confederation, a lack of productive investment 
opportunities curtailed the demand for capital. Combined with wealth accumulation
623 RQBE, vol. 7/1: 329-336; StABE B I 2: 94; Landmann (1903): 13-23; Altorfer (2006).
624 Landmann (1903): 13-23; Bodmer (1973).
625 Temin/Voth (2005).
626 Hoffinan/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000).
627 Temin/Voth (2005); Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000).
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that was not hindered by war or taxation, this led to an oversupply of capital. The 
result was a massive capital export, facilitated by a banking sector specialised in these 
operations.628
From the situation of oversupply on the domestic capital followed the 
investment of funds in Paris, London, or Amsterdam by patricians. For the state to 
trail the same path, the decision making process was complex and solicited criticism 
both within the government and from outside. Abraham Stanyan shared the view of 
the Commercial Council about a lack of circulating money (discussed above) and was 
at the same time sceptical about the economic impact of foreign investment: 
‘Whoever will take the Pains to compare their [i.e. Bern’s] Exportation, must by this 
Account cast up such a Balance against them, that he will rather wonder to find that 
there is any Money left in the Country, than that it is a poor one.’ Two centuries of 
peace may have enabled Bern to hold out against a capital drain, but bullion was 
scarce because of the public treasure ‘which, for want of Circulation, is lost to the 
Country [...] [and because of] the Want of Conveniences, in placing Money at 
Interest upon good Security, which forces the People to put it in foreign Banks; and 
so the Country is deprived of the use of it.’629 As mentioned in the previous sub­
section, in reality the canton suffered less from a lack of capital than from an 
insufficiency of productive investment opportunities.
The Loans of 1710
In 1709, the Secret Council was ordered to investigate investment opportunities 
for a ‘considerable sum of idle government money [...] for the drain to be stopped 
and [money] to be returned to the whole country.’630 The increasingly impersonal 
nature of public credit throughout the eighteenth century had reduced some of the 
earlier political importance of loans between governments and made investment for 
simple financial reasons possible. This transition was gradual, as the first foreign 
loans by Bern were motivated not only by economic, but also political goals. When 
the Great Council decided to start credit negotiations with Great Britain and the 
United Provinces in 1709, both these states were at war with the canton’s geopolitical
628 Komer (1999); Ritzmann (1973); HLS (2002), article Kapitalmarkt.
629 Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 165-166.
630 StABE A I I 626: 19-20. The original words are: ‘eine Nahmhaffte Summa miifiig liegenden 
Oberkeitl. Gelts [...] damit der aufilauffgestoppet werden thut defi ganzen landts an gelt retroviert 
seye. ’ The same argument was used in the Historie of 1776 (discussed below).
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rival of the time, Louis XIV, in the extremely costly war of the Spanish Succession. 
Bern had a weak military alliance with the Dutch and was negotiating a defence treaty 
with Britain which never materialised. The spiritus rector behind these activities was 
Mayor Johann Friedrich Willading, leader of the anti-French party in the government 
and also the wealthiest citizen of Bern.631 Support for fellow Protestants was fuelled 
by religious solidarity as well as personal contacts with Holland through mercenary 
regiments. The Queen of England finally received a credit of £150,000 (666,666 Thl) 
from Bern against yearly interest payments of 6%, guaranteed by future revenue of 
taxes on wine and other consumables.632 As for the Dutch loan, the treasury in the 
Hague issued six bonds on the republic of Holland, each worth R. 100,000 (115,300 
Thl), with a maturity of 15 years at 4% interest.633 The final sum granted was almost 
a fifth in excess of the sum that the Great Council had originally intended to lend 
overseas (lm  Thl).634 The difference in interest rates is remarkable and was a risk 
premium that Britain had to pay for its less sound financial administration.
The transfer of money to its destination proved to be a complicated matter, 
since bills of exchange from Bern to Holland or London could not be easily 
purchased. According to Markus Denzel, none of the Swiss cities was integrated into 
the European system of exchange.636 This was mainly a result of the low level of 
commercial activity which rarely required facilities for large overseas payments. The 
purchase of bills of exchange directly from merchant bankers would only be possible 
with exorbitant handling fees. For the loan to Queen Anne, her ambassador to 
Protestant Switzerland, Abraham Stanyan, was willing to receive the £150,000 in 
cash on her behalf.637 He could then transfer the funds to Italy where it was used to 
pay Britain’s allies. The Dutch on the other hand, insisted that Bern pay the loan 
directly to their treasury in the Hague.
631 Willading owned Bank stock since 1701: BERO AC27 423:4057. For the political situation: Feller 
(1955): 195-240 and Fischer, H.R.v. (1927).
632 StABE B 194: 194 and StABE B V II2389.
633 StABE B V II2389; Landmann (1903): 24-30; see also Altorfer (2003).
634 The actual loans cost 1.232m Thl because of favourable exchange rates: StABE B V II2389 and 
StABE B 194: 194.
635 This is also interesting in the light of discussions about the impact of the Glorious Revolution on 
borrowing costs: North/Weingast (1989); Epstein (2000): ch. 2; Sussman/Yafeh (2003).
636 Denzel (1998). He measures market integration by the regularity of published exchange rates, 
which is a proxy at best.
637 StABE B V II2389. It was the same Abraham Stanyan who wrote an anonymously published 
Account o f Switzerland a few years later (see footnote 219 above).
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The Bemese envoy to the peace negotiations in the Hague, Fran?ois Louis de 
Pesmes de Saint Saphorin, relied on information from Dutch merchants and advised 
the government on this matter. St Saphorin’s correspondence with Mayor Willading 
presents interesting information about financial transactions in the height of the 
Financial Revolution. St Saphorin devised a sophisticated plan for transferring the 
funds to their destination by purchasing bills of exchange on Amsterdam in Genoa, 
making a profit on favourable exchange rates along the way (see Figure V-l).
Bill 1 ©
 I
Malacrida
Cash
Tresury
BERN (Treasury)
Tresorerie
~ T Z
Cash
©
Obligation
I ® '
■i Cash
THE HAGUE (Tresorerie)
Actions:
Cash ©[
Malacrida
Bill 2
Market
GENOA (Market)
Claims j ©
Chaumel / 
Malacrida
©
BUI 1 Transfer
St. Saphorin
Q  3-month Bill of Exchange on St Saphorin (Bill 1)
( ^ )  Cash Transport to Genoa
( V )  Purchase on 2-month Bills of Exchange on Amsterdam (Bill 2) 
( ^ )  Drawing Bill 2 by Chaumel, Malacrida’s Agent
Drawing BiU 1 by Bank Transfer at the Wisselbank (to fl. banco) 
©  Depostit of Money by St Saphorin (in fl. courant)
AMSTERDAM (Wisselbank)
BiU 2
Figure V-l: Transferring Money from Bern to Amsterdam for the 1710 Loan
Source: based on Livre Argent Anabaptistes (StABE B I 94). See also Altorfer (2003): 65 (Fig. 1).
638 StABE B I 107. See also Altorfer (2003).
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St Saphorin suggested a cash transfer to Genoa, where bills of exchange drawn 
on Amsterdam could be bought on the open market. The government was careful not 
to disrupt the exchange rate by transferring too much money at a time. It also kept the 
market uninformed since an anticipation of the money transfer by speculators would 
entail a deterioration of conditions for the exchange. The government worked closely 
with the only bank in Bern, Malacrida & Comp for this operation. The bank was 
founded by patricians who were barred from holding office for religious reasons. 
With the ongoing war in Italy, money to pay troops was scarce and thus highly 
valued. This allowed the purchase of bills of exchange on Amsterdam at a premium 
as these funds ran against the general flow of transfers. In peacetime, the reverse 
situation would be expected because the Italians had a negative trading balance with 
the Dutch and English. Thus, Bern profited from an agiotage profit on the transfer.640 
For the second instalment of the Dutch loan, Stanyan received £100,000 in cash 
against bills of exchange drawn on London, from where the money could be easily 
transferred to Amsterdam. This second route was riddled with problems, as the 
English defaulted on their bill payment.641
As discussed in Section III-4, the loans of 1710 comprised the largest single 
transaction undertaken by the Bemese government in the eighteenth century and had 
a large impact on its cash reserve. But while the loan capital was important to the 
canton, its amount was miniscule compared to the size of the British national debt, 
which had increased by £37.29m during the war of the Spanish succession. The 
overall debt was roughly 250 times greater than the Bemese loan.642 Even in per 
capita terms, that difference was significant. In 1722, the British national debt per 
(British) capita was c. £10.5, whereas Bern invested c. £0.5 per (Bemese) capita in 
London.643 For other comparative figures for the 1710 loan to Britain, see Table V-2.
639 For a more detailed description, see Altorfer (2003). For Malacrida & Comp., see Section V-4 
below and Linder (2004).
640 In this context, the Italian word aggio refers to the difference between the actual exchange rate and 
their parity rate that is based on the bullion content of coins.
641 See Altorfer (forthcoming) for details.
642 Hamilton (1947): 127; see also O'Brien/Hunt (1999); Brewer (1989); Ferguson (2001).
643 The total value of Bemese foreign investment was therefore about £1 per capita in 1710-1720; it 
was about £2.15 in 1764 and had fallen to £1.35 by the time of the French invasion. The British per 
capita figures are based on a national debt of £55.283m (in 1722) and a population of 5.25m.
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Sum (£) Incident Ratio Source
150,000 Loan to England 1.00 StABE B V II2389 
0.66 Feller (1955): 318 
0.95 Feller (1955): 98
357.87 Hamilton (1947): 127
368.55 Hamilton (1947): 127
61.19 Neal (1990): 52
257.09 Neal (1990): 52
0.79 Monter (1969): 290-291 
0.82 Dickson (1967): 263
98,43 8 Second War of Villmergen 1712
142,020 Bemese Claims on France 1720
16,395,000 British National Debt 1713
55,283,000 British National Debt 1722
9,177,968 Capital South Sea Comp. 1711
38,564,180 Catpial South Sea Comp. 1720
< 118,000 Swiss Investors in London 1712
123,491 Assets of Peter Henriquez jun. 1709
Table V-2: Comparative Figures to Bernese Loan to England in 1710 (all in £)
Sources: see Table. Ratio is the relation between the sum and the Bemese loan to England.
If Bern became one of the largest single investors in the London capital 
markets, at least until the middle of the century, this was also because the market had 
become extremely fragmented as a result of the financial revolution. When the canton 
lent Britain £150,000 in 1710, even the wealthiest individuals of the city were worth 
considerably less. The biggest investor mentioned by Peter Dickson was Peter 
Henriquez Jr., a member of the ‘cosmopolitan mercantile plutocracy of the City’, with 
total assets worth £120,000 (excluding any South Sea stock for which there is no 
information).644 The total Swiss investment in London according to William Monter 
was £25,000 in 1709 and slightly more than £150,000 in 1718. In 1712, Bemese 
citizens held £16,813 in Bank stock and subjects from Vaud an additional £8,705 in 
shares of the East India Company.645 The ledgers of the Bank o f England account for 
£9,446 shares in possession of Bemese citizens in 1720 and £11,920 in 1725; 
Vaudois holdings were £3,924 and £6,001 respectively.646 As the stock ledgers of the 
South Sea Company have not survived, holdings and transaction of individual 
investors in these securities cannot be traced. The only available record for 1723 
shows 44 shareholders who were citizens of Bern, with total assets of £35,126 
compared to the canton with £235,000 (discussed below).647
644 Dickson (1993): quote 263. The assets of Peter Henriquez jun. in 1709 were: £20,500 Lottery 
Annuities, £46,591 East India stock, £25,500 Bank stock (plus £20,500 new subscription in 1709).
645 Monter (1969): 290-291. His numbers include Lottery Annuities, Bank and East India stock, but not 
South Sea stock.
646 This data is from Ann Carlos and Larry Neal, based on the Bank stock ledgers from the BERO [see 
also Carlos/Neal (2006)]. The authors have kindly supplied me with this information.
647 The BERO possesses the only list of shareholders of the South Sea Company. It is a subscription list 
for the capital split in midsummer 1723.1 thank Larry Neal for letting me use his database of investors 
for this query.
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Investment on Foreign Capital Markets
Malacrida & Comp played an important role as advisors when the government 
made a significant change in its investment strategy in April 1719. For the first time 
in its financial history, Bern bought shares of a private company on the capital 
market.648 Less than a decade earlier, treasurer Alexander von Wattenwyl had written 
to St Saphorin that English shares were not suitable for the canton: ‘Les actions en 
Angleterre, quoy que d ’un profit considerable, nous paraissent requerir trop de 
mouvements et de soin -  de sorte que nous ne pensons point d ’en acheter.*649 It is not 
clear what caused the government to change its view. The Great Council was 
informed that the loan to Queen Anne would be redeemed prematurely as part of a 
conversion scheme of the British national debt in January 1719.650 As Bemese 
protests to the English ambassador were futile, the government had two options: to 
withdraw its money or invest it in securities of the chartered companies that managed 
the British national debt. For the latter, a Bemese government report to the Great 
Council proposed to buy 5%-Lottery Annuities, a parliamentary fund ‘and solid as 
nothing else.’ Stocks of the Bank o f England, the South Sea Company, or the East 
India Company were not advised since they were all ‘subject to revolutions [i.e. 
changes in price].’651 Muller & Comp, the partner of Malacrida & Comp and Bern’s 
banker in London, did not carry out the orders from the Great Council to purchase 
Land Tax tallies. Instead, they recommended a purchase of South Sea stock.652 The 
government decided to purchase some shares ‘as a test’ initially, and eventually 
invested the entire £150,000.653
In this way, Bern joined the ever-increasing circle of investors in joint-stock 
companies which were mostly engaged in government financing. Their emergence 
had been a result of the so-called Financial Revolution.654 Investors could profit from
648 Bern had already bought Bank stock from interest payments in 1711 because the exchange rate was 
unfavourable. These assets were sold shortly afterwards and the money transferred to Bern: StABE A 
I I 631: 188.
649 Wattenwyl to St Saphorin (29 January 1710): StABE B 12: 204-208 (quote: 208). Willading had 
suggested to buy English funds: Willading to St Saphorin (27 October 1709): StABE B 1 107.
650 Dickson (1993): 84-89.
651 StABE A V 1506: 38.
652 StABE B V II2389; PRO C 11/483/2.
653 StABE A V II665: 358. The original words were: ’zu einemprobier streich. '
654 For the Financial Revolution, see in particular Dickson (1993); Roseveare (1991); Tracy (1985); see 
also footnote 98 above.
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an array of innovations that had enabled capital markets to expand rapidly in width 
and depth. At the root lay a system of government finance based on parliamentary 
commitments to secure the national debt with regular interest payments. This 
‘funded’ national debt was then issued in tradable securities, such as annuities or 
bonds. In a second step, the British government started to sell its debt to private joint- 
stock companies rather than on the open market. Joint-stock companies, like the Bank 
of England and the South Sea Company, were privileged by parliamentary edicts and 
enjoyed close ties with important government officials.655 They financed the takeover 
of public debts by floating shares on the capital market. Such a debt-for-equity swap 
had the advantage that investors did not have to buy government debt directly but 
could purchase shares in companies instead. These shares were easier to resell, hence 
investors benefited from a liquidity premium for which they were willing to pay 
lower interests than for direct loans to the government itself which were comparably 
cumbersome to trade and administer.656 The advantages for the government were the 
lower interest payments which ultimately allowed the pursuit of geopolitical interests 
through borrowing on an unprecedented scale.657 The price was a commitment to play 
by the rules of the capital markets: paying interests regularly and not reneging on 
public debt were supposed to maintain the government’s reputation and credibility.
As a function of these developments in public credit and the financial 
innovations related to long-distance trade, Amsterdam and London had emerged as 
the most advanced and important European financial markets of the eighteenth 
century.659 The two cities were well integrated through a reliable network of 
payments, information and legal action.660 Beyond this London-Amsterdam axis, 
capital markets were still badly integrated and information communicated slowly. 
Because the innovations were so radical in character, ‘teething problems’ were 
unavoidable and financial crises appeared to loom around every comer. Depending on 
an author’s standpoint with respect to market efficiency theory, crises are either the 
outcome of irrational speculative manias and exuberances (Kindleberger, Chancellor), 
or a reaction to the uncertainties linked to economic transition and thus the necessary
655 Carswell (2001) stresses the political differences between Whig supporters of the Bank of England 
and Tories in support of the South Sea Company.
656 Neal (1990): 1-19.
657 Brewer (1989); Ferguson (2001); O'Brien (1988); O'Brien (2001).
658 Neal (2000): 124. See also the discussion of North/Weingast (1989) in the introduction (Section I- 
2).
659 For the latter: North (1991). See also Section 1-2 above.
660 Neal (2000).
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and useful learning experiences on the way to a sounder financial system (Neal).661 
Even with the benefit of hindsight it is often difficult to separate change from crisis. 
Contemporary observers are not always congruent with statistical indicators; their 
writing is often biased and had a tendency to over-dramatise. Rumours about 
Britain not being able to service her national debt were common, with David Hume 
being among the most prominent advocates of a voluntary state bankruptcy. In 
spite of all these inconveniences and uncertainties, the new capital markets offered 
relatively safe investment opportunities. Compared to investments in land, trade or 
foodstuffs, financial investment was the best way to generate regular and reliable 
returns, an opportunity that the Bemese government was anxious not to miss.
As a govemment-cum-shareholder, Bern was almost unique. Some other Swiss 
republics had followed its example, but on a considerably smaller scale.664 The only 
state that possibly preceded Bern in foreign investment was the canton of Solothum. 
As early as 1698, this state held bonds of the Paris City Hall, most of which became 
worthless during the Mississippi crisis of 1720. It is unclear from the sources if these 
bonds were purchased on the capital market or simply obtained through debt 
conversion. As the closest ally of the French king within the Swiss Confederation and 
host of his ambassador, it is likely that Solothum’s investment was more political 
than financial in nature.665 There were a number of other institutional investors from 
Bern itself, such as the butchers’ guild, which held South Sea Company shares after 
1725, as did associations and family funds. Although there are no detailed studies 
about this issue it can be argued that these institutions followed the example of the 
government belatedly and on a smaller scale.666 The same is true for individual 
investors from Bern. Monter mentions one single Bemese shareholder of the Bank of 
England in 1709 (although there were at least two in reality) and 15 in 1712.667
661 Kindleberger (1989); Chancellor (1999); Neal (1990); Neal/Weidmenmier (2002).
662 For a possible definition of financial crises: Kindleberger/Laffargue (1982): 2; See also Hoppit 
(1986): 39-42 and for a critical view Garber (2000). The literature on early modem financial crises is 
abundant. For a selection, see: Ashton (1959); Kindleberger (1989); Neal (1990); Flood/Garber (1994); 
Chancellor (1999); Schnabel/Shin (2004); Duckenfield/Altorfer/Koehler (2006), vol. 1.
663 Hume (1994): 166-178; see also Hoppit (1990) and Hont (1993).
664 Veyrassat (1982): 290-291 (Annexe 2); Buchli (1916); 82-85; Peyer (1968): 30-33.
665 Buchli (1916). For the conversion schemes: Bely (1996), article Rentes su r l’hotel de ville.
666 BBB ZA Metzgem 19 and 1121; See also Schlappi (2001): 398; Capitani (1985): 77; Zesiger 
(1910): 143-145. Guilds were also amongst the creditors of Malacrida & Comp (discussed below): 
StUB H X X II117.1 (8). For investment by the von Wattenwyl family fund: Braun, H. (2004): 155- 
162.
667 Monter also misspells the name of the first Bemese holder of Bank stock (Graffenreid instead of 
Graffenried), which might be due to a spelling error in the original ledger. In addition to the citizens
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According to the stock ledgers, there were 13 Bemese holding Bank of England stock 
in 1720 and 20 in 1725. Other institutional investors in London were from the 
United Provinces. Dutch orphanages, hospitals, or family funds often held English 
assets.669 Another state that participated in the London capital market of the late 
eighteenth century was Hesse-Cassel, where the Landgrave purchased stocks using 
the proceeds from selling mercenary troop services to Britain. Interestingly, the 
Landgrave himself had obtained loans from Bern in 1738-1750 and 1758-1763. 
Another credit request was declined in 1774 because, as an internal report put it, ‘this 
court [has] too big a war machine and is not sufficiently economical [with its 
resources].’670
To sum up this section, by investing abroad, the Bemese government had drawn 
the ultimate conclusion from the dilemma it faced through limited domestic 
investment opportunities and the resulting low returns. Since it tried to limit the 
unproductive hoarding of cash in its vaults and could not invest at home, going 
overseas was the only option left. While the first foreign loans had to a large extent 
been politically motivated, their conversion to purely financial investments was not. 
This was facilitated by innovations which made capital markets more impersonal and 
secure.
V-3 Reaction to Crisis: The South Sea Bubble
Problems of investor behaviour often become most tangible in times of crisis. 
In studying crises however, a potential bias of tradition should be kept in mind. 
Contemporaries -  and historians -  are more likely to register extraordinary events 
than uneventful ones which are considered regular business. As Edwin Perkins noted,
from Bern, there were 10 subjects from Vaud who held shares of the East India Company: Monter 
(1969): 290 (note 3) and 291. The other investor in Bank stock was Mayor Willading (see footnote 631 
above).
668 In addition, the Bank had 8 Vaudois shareholders in 1720 and 9 in 1725 .This data is from Ann 
Carlos and Larry Neal, based on the Bank stock ledgers in the BERO [see also Carlos/Neal (2006)]. 
The sums held are discussed below.
669 Carter (1975) and Wilson, C. (1941).
670 Landmann (1903): 75 (quote) and 54-58. The original quote is: ’weil [...] dieserHof einen 
allzugrossen Kriegsstaat und nicht genugsame Okonomie fiihre.’ For Hesse-Cassel: Ingrao (1987) and 
Ferguson (1998): ch. 2 (60-80).
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‘the bad guys get all the ink.’671 This section will analyse the government’s reaction 
to financial crises using the example of the South Sea Bubble of 1720, which was 
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter. This crisis had a substantial
6 7 9impact on where and how Bern invested its money abroad.
The difficulties of defining and interpreting financial crises have already been
fS l 'y
discussed. The South Sea Bubble of 1720 was one of the most dramatic financial 
events of the century, particularly for those involved in government securities.674 The 
crisis was driven by the issue of shares by the Governor and Company o f the 
Merchants o f Great Britain trading to the South Seas and other Parts o f  America and 
fo r  Encouraging the Fishery. In spite of its name, the main activity of the South Sea
f .n c
Company was the administration of the British national debt. The company had 
secured a contract for taking over all government short-term debt in 1719, which was 
later extended to large parts of the remaining government debt. This was an example 
of the debt-for-equity swap which was described earlier. The company released four 
subscriptions for government debt holders to sign up for South Sea stock between 
April and August 1720.676 Since the term of conversion between government debt and 
South Sea stock was not fixed, the company directors had an interest in boosting 
share prices, which translated into a more favourable conversion price. All 
instruments available, legal and otherwise, were used to convince investors that 
trading their claims on the government for South Sea stock would be profitable. This 
was certainly the case for as long as share prices rose until June 1720. When it 
became apparent that the company directors could not honour their commitments, the 
bubble burst and South Sea share prices fell rapidly. Figure V-2 shows market prices 
for South Sea Company shares in 1720 as noted in Castaing’s Course o f the 
Exchange, edited by Larry Neal.677 Prices between 24 June and 22 August are not
671 These words were used by Perkins (2003).
672 This section is based on Altorfer (2003) and Altorfer (2004b).
673 See previous Section (V-2) and footnote 662 in particular.
674 For Hoppit, the South Sea Bubble had little impact on the rest of the economy, except for those 
inexperienced investors who suffered most. He argues with the number of bankruptcies of non­
landholding proprietors: Hoppit (1986): 47-48.
675 For the non-fmancial activities of the South Sea Company. Paul (2004).
676 For details: Shea (2004a); Shea (2004b).
677 Neal (1990): appendix. Daily courses are from ICPSR Study 1008: 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-PRA/01008.xml.
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spot prices, but forward prices for the opening of the books, as the company closed its
c *70
transfer ledgers between these dates. Vertical lines represent the four subscriptions.
1000
South Sea Company 
share price (% of par)
800
Share price SSC (spot) 
Share price SSC (forward)
600
200
0 11 ■ 1111111111
Figure V-2: Share Price of the South Sea Company and the Assets of Bern, 1720
Sources: Neal (1990): appendix, based on Castaing’s Course o f  the Exchange', daily courses are from 
1CPSR Study 1008: http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/lCPSR-PRA/01008.xml. The nominal value 
o f  a South Sea Company (=SSC) share was £100. Prices from 24 June until 22 August are forward 
prices for the opening o f the books: Neal (1990): 101 (see also footnote 678). Vertical lines are for 
subscriptions.
To Larry Neal the South Sea bubble, in conjunction with the virtually parallel 
Mississippi crisis in Paris, was ultimately the result of converting fixed-interest, 
irredeemable national debt into tradable, variable-yield securities. The bubble 
occurred because of problems with the adaptation of new market instruments. In the 
beginning, during the ‘rational bubble,’ the share price rose because investors were 
prepared to pay a high liquidity premium for these securities.679 The crisis laid the 
basis for London’s international capital market: ‘The South Sea Bubble proved to be
ron
the “big bang” for financial capitalism in England.’ This interpretation is rejected 
by Edward Chancellor, who argues that the liquidity premium could not have been so 
great as investors with a desire for liquidity before 1720 could have held other assets
678 Neal (1990): 101. For the discussion on forward prices, see the exchange between 
Dale/Johnson/Tang (2005) and Shea (forthcoming-a).
679 Neal (1990): 62-71.
680 Neal/Weidmenmier (2002): 10-11 (quote: 11).
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like Bank of England or Million Bank shares. The attempts of the South Sea
• • ♦ • r o iCompany in 1720 were not the first to convert public debt into private stock either. 
Since the company had no prospects for profitable trade, the value of its shares was 
derived entirely from government payments that would fix it around £150. For 
Chancellor, the bubble was therefore entirely irrational and speculative; it was 
nothing but an investment strategy in which everyone hoped to find a ‘greater fool’ 
who would pay a higher price for shares later.682 Most economists tend to agree with 
Neal’s view.683
When Bern bought South Sea Stock in April 1719, the Great Council had 
expected an increase in share price if Britain could overcome the commercial war 
with Spain and negotiate a peace.684 The government was surprised by the actual rise 
in share prices, which it did not anticipate to be on such a scale. When Muller & 
Comp reported in April 1720 that prices in London were rising dramatically, the 
Great Council decided to sell its shares.686 On 22 June, the day before the books of 
the South Sea Company were closed for dividend payments and when the share price 
was almost at its apex, Bern sold its South Sea stock, resulting in a profit of almost 
660% compared to the original cost of its investment! Calculated on a yearly basis, 
the 261 shares sold that day made a staggering return of 571.2%. The last orders from 
Bern were to sell the remaining stock at prices between 1,200% and 1,500% of par 
(see Table V-3).
order carried out
shares remains price shares date (O.S.) price
date N.S. date O.S. £100 each £100 each £100/share £100 each £100/share
12/04/1720* 01/04/1720 600 700 240 600 22/04-20/06 365.26
14/06/1720 03/06/1720 200 500 (best)
19/06/1720 08/06/1720 200 300 481 261 24/06/1720 761.41
26/06/1720 15/06/1720 300 0 800 0 (not carried out)
21/08/1720 10/08/1720 239 200 1200 0 ***
21/08/1720 10/08/1720 200 0 1500 0 ***
23/09/1720 12/09/1720 0 1000 0 ***
Table V-3: Bernese Orders to Sell South Sea Stock 1720
681 Such debt-for-equity swaps had occurred in 1697 (Bank of England), 1711 and 1719 (South Sea 
Company). The first South Sea conversion even led to a fall in the share price: Chancellor (1999): 93.
682 Chancellor (1999): 92-95. In his critique, he fails to cite Neal’s most important work [Neal (1990)].
683 In particular: Garber (2000); Temin/Voth (2004).
684 StABE A I I 666: 37-39. For the brief war and the peace with Spain: Dickson (1993): 90-156.
685 For share prices: Neal (1990): appendix.
686 StABE A I I 670: 77.
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Sources: StABE B VII 2389; StABE A II 670; PRO C 11/483/2. O.S. is for dates in old style (Julian 
calendar, used in Britain), N.S. is for new style (Georgian calendar, used in Bern). Shares is for the 
amount o f shares concerned by the order, remains is the number of Bemese shares after the order was 
carried out.
The final Bemese orders reached London when share prices had already started 
to fall.687 The South Sea share price never reached the levels at which Bern intended 
to sell its remaining stock. In Figure V-3, the Bemese assets are compared with the 
South Sea Company share price from Figure V-2.
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Figure V-3: Share Price of the South Sea Company; Assets and Orders of Bern, 1720
Sources: South Sea share prices as Figure V-2 (see discussion there); Bemese assets from StABE B 
VII 2389. For a list o f orders, see Table V-3.
By the end of June 1720, the canton had made the enormous profit of £416,558. 
Bern, which ironically has the bear as its national symbol, followed a highly 
successful bull strategy during the bubble. To outsiders it seemed like a splendid 
operation: King George congratulated the republic for its financial operations and 
Applebee’s Weekly Journal blamed it as a foreign profiteer of the speculative
/■oo
mania. However, the qualitative evidence from Bemese government archives paint 
quite a different picture. The success was largely unintended and its stark contrast to
687 StABE A II 671: 2, 22, 62, 284.
688 StABE A II 670: 292-293; Applebee’s Weekly Journal, 16 July 1720; See also Dickson (1993): 150 
(who misinterprets it as a wrong rumour) and Carswell (2001): 137 (note 29).
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well-informed speculators like Hoare’s bank which was actually ‘riding the bubble’ 
cannot be exaggerated.689 The motivation for the Bemese sale was a worry that the 
sudden rise in share prices could render the investment unsafe.690 Thomas Manning, 
the English ambassador in Bern at the time, also shared this view. On 19 June 1720, 
he wrote to his secretary of state James Craggs about the government of the canton:
Their apprehension that a fall of the stock may be as sudden and as great as the 
rise has been[,] has caus’d this resolution [to sell the shares]. [...] Contented 
with their present gain and distrustful of the future, they think it a wise part to 
secure the former, and not to tempt their fortune, or rely wholly upon the 
latter.691
During the summer of 1720, the Bemese were badly informed and constantly 
lagged behind current market developments. In fact, most of the profit was made 
because of the time that orders took to be transferred to Britain and carried out. The 
canton at first benefited magnificently from opportunistic behaviour of their London 
agent Muller & Comp who had expected prices to rise further and therefore delayed 
the sale of shares.692 To the English public, however, this was of little importance. In 
February 1721, two members of the Bemese government wrote home from London 
that ‘everywhere people complain that the machinations of the South Sea directors 
has caused big losses in England [...] and some speak [...] more than we would like 
about the profit that our estate [i.e. Bern] is said to have made.’
Most of the windfall which was made during the summer of 1720 was lost in 
the bankruptcies of Muller & Comp in London and Malacrida & Comp, in Bern.694 
They had used the canton’s shares as collateral for speculative credits without consent 
of the principal. This happened despite the fact that the bankers were members of 
government families and risked drastic consequences for their families’ wealth, 
influence and honour.695 As a first reaction to this crisis, the government sent two 
representatives to London to manage its foreign assets. One of them, Samuel
689 See Temin/Voth (2004).
690 StABE A II 67: 77.
691 Manning to Craggs (19 June 1720): PRO 95/50.
692 PRO C 11/483/2; Altorfer (2004b); Linder (2004).
693 Morlot/Tschamer to Sinner (6 February 1721): BBB Mss. Hist. Helv. Ill 89.
694 Linder (2004).
695 For the concept of honour see Muldrew (1998). After the bubble, all property of the Malacrida 
associates was confiscated and they were banned from the city.
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Tschamer, was appointed Commissioner fo r  the English funds soon after, a newly 
introduced office that existed until 1765 (discussed in the next section).696
The reason why Bern did not choose the more drastic solution of a complete 
withdrawal from foreign capital markets was because the government had only lost a 
speculative profit and not the invested capital. The canton made an overall profit, as 
can be seen from Figure V-4, which shows the value of Bemese investments in 
London from 1719 to 1724 on a monthly basis. Market values were calculated with 
data from Castaing’s published by Neal.697
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Figure V-4: Bernese Assets in London, 1719-1724 (Nomial and Market Value, Monthly Figures)
Sources: Historie (StABE B VII 2389 and accounts foreign funds (StABE B VII B VII 2396-2473); 
see also Landmann (1903); prices from Neal (1990), appendix and Dillen (1931); see footnote 697 for 
details.
During the time of the Bubble, the market value of Bern’s assets soared in spite 
of asset sales that show by their decreasing nominal values in Figure V-4. After all 
the bankruptcy trials of the early 1720s, the funds of the canton were still worth 
considerably more than the original sum of £150,000 invested four years before (the 
dotted line in Figure V-4). If we add the sums that were delivered to the Treasury in
696 RQBE, vol. 9/1:201-206.
697 Edited by Neal (1990), appendix. Prices for South Sea annuities (old and new) have been edited for 
Amsterdam by Dillen (1931). His data is very reliable and is almost perfectly correlated with the 
London series for prices quoted in both spots [see Neal (1990): 146].
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Bern before the Malacrida bankruptcy, the overall profit during the South Sea Bubble 
was well in excess of £100,000.698 This makes the profit of Hoare’s bank (£28,000) 
look less impressive in scale, even if it was achieved with a much smaller initial 
capital.699
By midsummer 1723, when the South Sea Company divided its capital, Bern 
was by far its largest single stock holder, with assets worth £255,214 (nominal value: 
£253,OOO).700 Had the government simply kept its original stock from the beginning 
of 1720, its shares would have been worth £131,138 by then.701 Even though other 
London investors had more balanced portfolios, only one of them is known to have 
had more money invested on the capital market.702 The strong concentration of Bern’s 
assets in South Sea stock is remarkable and can only be explained as a very particular 
form of risk aversion. Commissioner Tschamer considered annuities too risky, 
because they were not registered in stock ledgers.703 In a report of 1725, he also 
explained that Bank o f  England and East India Company stock were insecure because 
of their involvement in trade.704 Tschamer failed to recognise that spreading
nr\c
investment would help to curtail investment risk.
The reaction of the Bemese government to later crises of the eighteenth century 
was much less dramatic. In fact, it usually did not react at all, as the constant
1C\(\investment in nominal terms shows (discussed below). During the crises that 
Hoppit classified as crises of public finance (i.e. 1745 and 1761), the Bemese reaction 
was even anti-cyclic.707 In 1745, the government decided to profit from low share 
prices and sent 50,000 Thl to London to buy 3%-annuities. These were considered 
‘pure parliamentary funds and thus best secured, and because of their very low 
interest are the last to be redeemed, [and] at the moment [they] can be purchased at
698 See also Landmann (1903): 94.
699 Temin/Voth (2004): 1655.
700 Data for a comparison with other investors is from Larry Neal, who has kindly provided me with 
this data.
701 Altorfer (2004b). These calculations do not consider any dividend payments.
702 Holdings in South Sea stock (nominal): Sir Denis Dutry £141,600 (overall asset market value: 
£202,779), Sir Peter Delme £122,103 (overall £325,222), Bank of England £150,000 (overall assets 
unknown), Million Bank: £136,147 (ditto). See Dickson (1993): 270-284. Market values were 
calculated with Neal (1990): appendix.
703 StABE B V II2389.
704 StABE B V II2465/1.
705 Other eighteenth-century investors were more aware of this: Carter (1975): 48-49; Bernstein (1996): 
6 .
706 See the figures in Landmann (1903).
707 Hoppit (1986): 45.
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15% below their true and intrinsic value.’708 The main consideration of the 
government was its fear of debt redemption by the British, to the point that the 
canton’s authorities were willing to invest in lower yield securities to avoid being 
paid back. As an additional measure of security against redemption, Bern bought 
annuities issued in different years (1744, 1745, and 1750). Ashton argued with 
evidence from exchange rates that Dutch investors had the same bullish strategy of 
buying during a financial crisis, in the hope of a price increase.709
To summarise Bern’s experience during the South Sea Bubble, the canton had 
made enormous profits from selling its assets when share prices were at their height 
in summer 1720. This was the unplanned outcome of a series of uninformed 
decisions, slow communication and opportunistic behaviour by the canton’s London 
agent. Although most of the speculative profit was lost shortly afterwards, Bern 
emerged from the troubled 1720s with a more valuable portfolio and was arguably 
one of the largest investors in London by 1723.
v-4 Portfolio Administration as a Principal-Agent Problem
The case of Bern’s investment in London presents typical features of a 
principal-agent relationship, where the government as an investor (the principal) uses 
an agent to manage its portfolio. Microeconomics offers a broad range of principal- 
agent theory to deal with this issue.710 The main concerns are with problems that arise 
because of opportunistic behaviour, when the agent has differing individual 
objectives and the principal cannot ensure that the task is carried out in pursuit of her 
goals. The risk of self-interested behaviour by the agent (moral hazard) increases if a 
task is impossible or too expensive to monitor; if differences in incentives between
708 Landmann (1903): 47. Similarly, in 1740 the Financial Commission expected that an immediate 
outbreak of war with Spain would bring a fall in prices for public funds and provide the opportunity to 
buy at low prices: StABE A V 1486: 49-56.
709 During crises, the foreign exchange rate did turn in favour of the pound. Ashton explained this by 
the bull investment from Dutch investors and a run for liquidity in London when merchants sold 
foreign bills of exchange at very low prices: Ashton (1966): 194.
710 For an overview: Milgrom/Roberts (1992), esp. ch. 6. Agency theory is often combined with 
concepts from game theory to explain the strategic behaviour of actors: Dixit/Nalebuff (1991); 
McMillan (1992); Hart, O. (1995). For an explicit use of agency theory in a comparison of early 
modem fiscal systems in Europe: Kiser (1994).
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principal and agent cannot be resolved by designing and enforcing a complete 
contract; or if information is asymmetric.711 Several studies of early modem 
European capital markets explicitly use agency theory.712 Avner Greif s analysis of 
principal-agent problems in long distance trade has found that problems of imperfect 
monitoring, especially in non-repeated transactions, can be overcome by group 
cohesion that provides an informal contract enforcement institution (second party 
enforcement).713 In contracting with their agents, principals of the early modem 
period had to overcome the same basic problems as their modem counterparts. 
However, there were also significant differences: transaction costs were much higher 
and coordination mechanisms were slow. Information was extremely costly, and the 
legal framework for the contract enforcement was only partially available.714 With the 
fundamentals of principal-agent theory and their constraints in mind, we can 
formulate a set of working hypotheses for investments made by Bern. First, 
government officials can be expected to show awareness to problems of contract 
design, such as agent remuneration or monitoring. Second, in the absence of a 
universally enforceable legal system for Bern, the government was likely to use 
alternative informal enforcement mechanisms. Third, if changes in administration 
occur, they can be expected in response to agency problems. It is possible to test these 
hypotheses using documents about the administration of Bern’s foreign portfolio.
The loans of 1710 had been prepared by the Secret Council as a matter of 
foreign policy.715 After the South Sea Bubble, the Secret Council was expanded to 
include the Mayor and two experts (‘councillors’) for matters concerning foreign 
investments. It was then referred to as Geheime Rate und Beigeordnete, which I will 
call the Financial Council for simplicity. The Great Council was the ultimate decision 
maker for all investment decisions; the Financial Council had to prepare decisions 
and report on important issues.716 The minutes of the Financial Council have not
711 Milgrom/Roberts (1992): ch. 6.
712 Hofftnan/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (1999); Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000); Neal/Quinn 
(2001).
713 Greif (1996); Greif (2005); Greif (2006). Compared to a legal system, they were only a second-best 
solution, because group membership was not free. See Weber, M. (1978); Sugarman (1996).
714 North (1991).
7,5 The Secret Council consisted of eight Senators: Linder (2003): 4.
716 Landmann (1904): 6; Linder (2003): 164-184. The instruction is edited in RQBE, vol. 9/1: 199-201.
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survived, but some of its discussions about the administration of foreign funds were
717recorded in a collection of government reports, the Responsa Prudentum.
As explained above, the first loan to England in 1710 was transferred by 
Ambassador Stanyan.718 Bankers Malacrida & Comp from Bern were entrusted with 
the administration of interest payments for the loan. Malacrida was a company 
founded by young members of patrician families who had converted to Pietism. As 
followers of this faith, they refused to swear an oath on the Second Helvetic
710Confession and Unity of Faith that Bern had introduced in 1699. As a result they 
became ineligible for government office. Robbed of their political ambitions, they 
founded a bank with close ties to the government. They were associated with 
Saumuel Muller, a citizen from Bern active as banker in London, and together they 
formed Muller & Comp. The original purchase of South Sea stock in 1719 was in part 
a result of their opportunistic behaviour, when they did not carry out orders by the 
government but advised the purchase of securities instead; the same holds true for 
much of the profit made in summer 1720 (discussed above). The actions of Samuel 
Muller seem like a classic case of opportunistic behaviour, where an unmonitored 
agent does not follow the principal’s orders. However, the outcome was not always 
benign. When Muller mortgaged the assets of the republic without the principal’s 
consent to grant speculative credits, these became non-performing loans once the 
asset price bubble burst.720 As a result, both Muller & Comp and Malacrida & Comp 
were declared bankrupt. The government was worried about its London assets and 
sent two members of the Great Council, Marx Morlot and Samuel Tschamer, as 
‘commissioners’ to handle the matter. Morlot was a lawyer with knowledge of 
foreign languages and administrative experience, Tschamer was an officer in a 
Bemese mercenary regiment positioned in the Netherlands.721 It is not known how 
good their financial expertise was. From their correspondence with the treasury, it can 
be argued that they were acquainted with most investment tools of the time, though
7 9 9they did expect the government to despatch an accountant to London for assistance.
717 An accountant or secretary carried out minor administrative duties. He was not part of the 
government, but usually a young member of a ruling family: RQBE, vol. 9/1: 83.
18 See Section V-2 above and StABE B VII2389. For Stanyan see footnote 219 above.
719 Dellsperger (1984); Dellsperger (1993); Feller (1955): 168-173.
720 This episode is also referred to as the Malacrida crisis: Mulinen (1896); Landmann (1903): 24-50; 
Linder (2003); Linder (2004).
721 HBLS (1921-1934), articles Morlot (# 8) and Tschamer (#10).
722 Tschamer/Morlot to Sinner (21 April 1721): BBB Mss. Hist. Helv. 111.89 (for the request: 39).
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The way in which the office of a commissioner for the English funds was 
established as an ad hoc solution to a problem and then perpetuated further illustrates 
the patrimonial character of Bemese administration.723 Tschamer remained in London 
until 1724 to manage the assets, as well as to attend the bankruptcy trials of Muller & 
Comp.124 Shortly before his return, the government sent instructions for the future 
administration of English funds: a member of the Great Council should be elected and 
sent to London for two years, with a yearly salary of £600 (c. 2,666 Thl). He had to 
collect interest payments and report to the Financial Council, was accountable to the
79 cGreat Council and would be accompanied by a secretary-cum-accountant. Thus, 
financial intermediaries were excluded from the administration of the portfolio as a 
reaction to a crisis. Contractual relations to banks were replaced by a direct line of 
command from the Great Council to one of its members, linked to the republic by 
both birth and oath.726 The sanctions for opportunistic behaviour included the 
exclusion from future government offices as well as the loss of both fortune and 
honour; this also threatened his whole family.727 Private banks only became involved 
in the administration of the English funds after 1765, when London bankers Van Neck
79R& Comp managed the assets and informed the government about financial matters. 
For investments on the continent after 1732 the Great Council relied on banks from
7 9 0Vienna, Frankfurt, Dresden, Amsterdam and Geneva, as well as domestic banks. 
By sending one of its members to London, the government paid a high security 
premium for the administration of its English funds. This do-it-yourself solution was 
more expensive than contracting the task to a third party, and it impeded gains from 
specialisation. This move stirred a lively discussion within the frugal Bemese 
government.730 Before the commissariat for the English funds was formally 
established in 1730, the Financial Council would have preferred contracting with a
723 See for example: Agena (1972). For the Bemese commissioners: Linder (2004): 182-198.
724 For the trials: PRO C 11/483/2.
725 StABE A II 682: 347.
726 One document also mentions his ‘duty to the estate’ ( ‘Standespflichty. StABE A V 1479: 365-380. 
See also Linder (2003): 164-184.
727 The loss of honour is not to be neglected in a pre-modem society: Muldrew (1998).
728 Van Neck & Comp was a Dutch-English-Huguenot partnership. It was one of the most important 
and influential actors on the London capital market around 1760: Wilson, C. (1941): 111-114; Carter 
(1975): 99.
729 See the (incomplete!) list in Landmann (1904): 4.
730 Landmann (1903): 6-7.
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London bank, but it was outvoted by the Great Council, who insisted on introducing 
this new and profitable office for one of its members.731
The commissariat was an office similar to the post of bailiff in one of the more 
profitable counties of the canton. The commissioner was elected amongst the 
members of the Great Council by majority, served for four years and received a fixed 
salary. The appropriate remuneration for the office was controversial. The 
Financial Council considered a yearly salary of £600 largely sufficient, citing that 
most ambassadors in London were not paid even half as much. Furthermore, this pay 
rise could attract ‘all kinds of subjects’ to stand for office who may not ‘carefully 
examine themselves if they have the necessary capacity [for this task].’734 In 
microeconomics a situation where high remuneration attracts the wrong economic 
agent is referred to as adverse selection, or a ‘lemon problem.’735 The Great Council 
did not share this concern and decided to pay the commissioner £800 a year, but 
abolished the post of a secretary at the same time. This relatively high salary was also 
intended to compensate for the prohibition of other sources of income for the 
commissioner during his tenure as a measure to prevent opportunistic behaviour. The 
commissioner was neither allowed to trade assets for himself or others, nor to collect 
interest payments or perform any other duties for third parties.736 This awareness of 
agency problems arose from the negative experiences encountered in the past. Apart 
from the case of Muller & Comp, the secretary Samuel Schneider had cheated several 
government members in 1729 and absconded with their private money.737
After the commissariat was established, discussions about the administration of 
foreign funds did not come to a halt. As early as 1737, suggestions of its abolition
71o
were raised. In the 37 years of its existence there were at least 13 attempts to
731 StABE A V 1470: 899, 1000-1001; After the abolition of the commissariat in 1765 a report against 
its re-introduction estimated that this would mean to ‘satisfy a farfetched private interest’: StABE A V 
1479: 357-364.
732 The commissariat was classified as an office of the second class in the four-class system of 
government offices: Feller (1955): 106-129; Anonymous [Abraham Stanyan] (1756): 81-82.
733 For bailiffs, see Section II-4 above.
734 StABE A V 1470: 999-1007, quote: 1002. It is not clear if the statement about ambassadors was 
true.
735 Akerlof (1970).
736 StABE AIV 215: 912-916, edited in RQBE, vol. 9/1: 201-206. See also StABE A V 1473: 285- 
297.
737 One victim was future Mayor Christoph Steiger: BBB Mss. Hist. Helv. L67; see Linder (2003): 
173.
738 StABE A V 1472: 133-158.
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reform the commissariat and its instructions changed several times. The critique 
centred on two issues: the lack of candidates and the problem of security. The lack of 
candidates was the result of several factors that made this office unattractive. A 
commissioner was stationed far away from home; the high salary did not make up for 
missed career opportunities in Bern, where an even more profitable bailiff position 
could be obtained (see figures in Section II-4). In contrast to this, living in London 
was expensive and, as one report had it, a commissioner had to live ‘amongst people 
whose language he [the commissioner] neither knows nor understands.’740 
Furthermore, tasks undertaken in normal times were repetitive, since a commissioner 
only had to collect dividends and write ‘increasingly sterile’ letters, a duty that the 
Financial Council considered both unaccustomed and unworthy of a government 
member.741 As a remedy against all these unappealing aspects, there were attempts to 
raise the salary for the commissioner.742
To address the lack of candidates, the abolition of the existing limits in 
eligibility and a reduced term of office were discussed.743 A diplomat from Basel had 
suggested the transformation of the commissariat into a fully fledged embassy in 
London in 1750, but this option was never seriously considered within the Bemese 
government.744 The major subject of debate was the security of funds and interest 
payments -  or the agency problem of opportunistic behaviour. One proposal sought to 
establish an additional guarantee for commissioners, as they were dealing with 
considerable sums on behalf of the treasury.745 Such a guarantee would have had to 
cover at least one years’ worth of dividends to be effective, approximately £10,000 
(or 1.3m Bz). Such a huge sum made it difficult to find someone willing to stand as 
guarantor, ‘considering that the office is so remote, and there are so many fatalities,
739 The 13 attempts for reform are only those for which reports can be found in StABE A V 1472 -  A 
V 1490. For effective changes: RQBE, vol. 9/1: 201-206.
740 StABE A V 1478: 9. The reports also mention the strange, or foreign air and food (the German 
expression fremd means both ‘strange’ and ‘foreign’).
741 In the view of the Financial Council, this task was more suitable for a merchant: StABE A V 1479: 
10 (report written in April 1765, after the abolition of the commissariat).
742 StABE A V 1486: 905-910 and 1478: 826-837. The limits to eligibility were the same as for other 
offices of the second class (discussed in Section Section II-4 above): StABE A V 1486: 905-910 and 
1478: 826-837.
743 StABE A V 1472: 133-158 and 1478:826-837, 902-911.
744 Sir Luke Schaub to Mayor Steiger (25 August 1750): BBB Mss Hist Helv L 74(2); also quoted in 
Utz (1992): 110.
745 The documents speak of Biirgschaft (collateral, bail): StABE A V 1472: 133-158 and 1478: 902- 
911.
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temptations and dangers a friend [i.e. the commissioner] is exposed to.’746 The 
Financial Council was also aware that such collateral would further reduce the field 
of potential candidates.747 Having said that, the discussion reveals how important the
nAQ , .
security of its investment was to the government. The Great Council did not trust 
the internalised sense of duty of its own members whole heartedly, in spite of the 
existence of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms.749 After all, the 
fraudulent activities of Muller & Comp had happened even with informal inter-group
'ycA
sanctions in place.
When the commissariat was finally abolished in 1765, Bern paid considerably 
less for the administration of its English funds. According to the contract with Van 
Neck, they received £200 per year, which was not even a quarter of what a 
commissioner had been paid previously if travel expenses are included. The bankers 
had to inform Bern in good faith about ‘news that is likely to have an influence on 
[Bern’s] interests.’ As security (collateral) for dividend payments, van Neck had to 
mortgage £10,000 in 3%-Consols to Bern.751 A report by the Financial Commission 
of 1737 shows that an earlier, stalled project had expected bankers Boissier & Selon
nc'y
from Geneva to mortgage real estate as a security, which they apparently refused. 
Improved monitoring possibilities, such as a well established legal infrastructure in 
London, and the availability of more reliable and faster information helped reduce the 
costs of contracting out.753 Even after the commissariat was abolished, discussions 
were continued for a short time. There were concerns that the financial know-how 
within the government was disappearing or that information provided by bankers was 
unreliable. These arguments were dismissed with reference to the ‘great many books
746 StABE A V 1478: 902-909.
747 StABE A V 1472: 133-158 and 1478: 902-911.
748 See also StABE A V 1473: 285-297.
749 Greif (1996).
750 The property of the bankers was confiscated and they were banned from the city. For the trials: 
Linder (2003): 135-147.
751 In case of a capital transaction they would have to do the same for the sum involved. The 
convention is edited in: Landmann (1904): 63-64 (annex 32).
752 StABE A V 1472: 133-158. As a reply to this, David Gruner as the successor of Malacrida & Comp 
had proposed his services, but considered that mortgaging property could harm his credibility. It is 
according to his proposal that Boissier & Selon had finally refused this form of collateral: BBB Mss. 
Hist. Helv. II.9 (35).
753 See North (1990); North (1991).
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written and published in all languages’ and to existing contacts to London through 
both merchants and private investors.754
To analyse the inherent problems of portfolio administration, I have used 
micro-economic principal-agent theory. The main findings are that the government 
was well aware of the underlying agency issues. By carrying out financial 
administration through a member of the Great Council sent to London rather than 
relying on foreign bankers, the government was willing to pay a high security 
premium for this costly do-it-yourself solution. Throughout its period of existence, 
the office of commissioner for the English funds attracted much critique, as the 
government was trying to find a balance between adequate remuneration and 
incentives to avoid issues of moral hazard. The commissariat was largely the outcome 
of the painful experiences Bern had made during the South Sea Bubble. After several 
uneventful decades in which communication and information improved, the time was 
finally right for a return to contracting out the administration of foreign funds to 
London banks in 1765.
V-5 Early Modern Portfolio Analysis
Financial economics offers a set of sophisticated tools for analysing investment 
portfolios and their performance.755 In this section, I will use some simple methods to 
analyse the risk profile of the Bemese investment strategy. I will first explain the 
applied techniques, then discuss the London portfolio and finally Bemese investments 
on the Continent.
The basic principle of portfolio management is for an investor to diversify 
holdings in order to maximise the expected return for a given amount of risk.756 The 
underlying assumption is that yields are inversely related to risk, or that investors 
have to pay a negative risk premium for safe assets. The capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) suggests that markets will adjust to ensure that returns compensate investors 
for the risk of their assets when held with a perfectly diversified portfolio. It
754 StABE A V 1479: 357-364 and 365-380.
755 See for example: Elton/Gruber (1995) or Kohn (2004).
756 The basic concept was presented by Markowitz (1952); Markowitz (1959).
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calculates an expected return for any asset as a function of the rate of return of risk­
free assets, plus a risk premium (called Beta coefficient) for this particular asset.757 
The problem when applying these models quantitatively to early modem times is to 
find the necessary data. London and Amsterdam asset prices have been edited, but
nco
there is little information about markets on the Continent. For example, prices for 
bonds issued by the Vienna City Bank, one of Bern’s major investments, are 
anecdotal.759 Some of the canton’s assets were not traded at all. It was therefore 
impossible to calculate their real value. Furthermore, it is difficult to define a risk-free 
return for the eighteenth century; the fact that there was never a state bankruptcy in 
Britain does not mean that government securities were safe ex ante. Innovations in 
government finance were still relatively recent and the governments’ commitment to 
follow the new mles of the capital market was not always beyond any doubt. As a 
proxy for risk-free assets, Neal uses the Consol, a fixed interest government bond that 
was introduced in 1751.760
Given the imprecise nature of the raw data, the use of sophisticated econometric 
techniques would suggest an inappropriate degree of accuracy. Because my figures 
are largely based on non-market values and parity courses (see Section V-l), I only 
use basic models of financial economics, such as yearly holding-periods rate of return 
(HRP). The HPR is defined as
HPRt =[(Pt+1- P t) + Dt+1] / P t
Where P  is the price per share as a percentage of par, and D  is the dividend as a 
percentage of par. A regression of the HPR series for a single stock against that of the 
market as a whole provides the beta coefficient as a measure for the risk of an asset. 
Beta coefficients usually range between 0.5 for low-yield, low-risk securities and 1.5
761for high-yield, high risk assets. I will use HPR regressions for the London
757 For the basic CAPM: Elton/Gruber (1995): 294-310; Neal uses a simplified version for the 
eighteenth century: Neal (1990): 125-131.
758 For Amsterdam and London: Neal (1990); Dillen (1931).
759 Records before the establishment of the Vienna stock exchange in 1771 are uncertain. After this 
date, bond prices had to be posted by official brokers, the Sensale. It is not clear if these prices were 
published; they have not been edited so far. See Chaloupek/Eigner/Wagner (1991): 930; Baltzarek 
(1973): 1-32; Fuchs (1998). I thank Dana Stefanova (Vienna) and Markus A. Denzel (Leipzig) for 
information about this matter.
760 Neal (1990): Consols were perpetual and redeemable (‘consolidated’) annuities. For the time before 
Consol prices are available (i.e. before 1753), Neal extrapolated back using 3%-Bank annuities until 
1723 and South Sea annuities for earlier years: Neal (1990): 127 (note 16).
761 Neal (1990): 55. HPR regressions are usually made with monthly data.
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portfolio, for which market data is available. For the canton’s Continental portfolio, 
gross returns on investments were calculated by setting the revenue recorded in 
Bemese accounts in relation to the capital. Standard deviations for these gross returns 
are an indication of the underlying risk of assets. These quantitative results will be 
compared with unsystematically collected qualitative data about portfolios of other 
investors and with government reports about the foreign funds.
The London Portfolio
The early investments in London and their transformation into portfolio 
investments have already been discussed (see Sections V-2 and V-3 above). Figure 
V-5 provides an overview of Bemese investments at market value, calculated with 
data from Castaing’s Course o f  the Exchange published by Neal.762
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Figure V-5: Investment of Bern in English Funds 1718-1798, Market Value
Sources: Historie (StABE B VII 2389) and accounts for foreign funds (StABE B VII B V II2396- 
2473); Landmann (1903); calculated with prices from Neal (1990), appendix and Dillen (1931) as 
discussed in Figure V-4. The category others consists o f short-term investment, such as Land-Tax 
bills. SSC Annuities combines old and new South Sea Annuities.
Investment in England increased until 1730 and remained constant for about six 
decades, despite some fluctuations. The two troughs of the 1760s and the late 1770s
762 Edited by Neal (1990), appendix and Dillen (1931). See also footnote 697 above.
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were due to low share prices. In the 1790s, the value of English funds fell rapidly 
when Bern liquidised its funds (see Section III-5 above). In 1719, the entire portfolio 
consisted of South Sea stock. After the South Sea Bubble, the canton also held Bank 
stock, South Sea annuities and several short-term assets. All these bearer bonds were 
sold for South Sea stock in 1722. When the South Sea Company split its capital a year 
later, half of the assets became South Sea annuities. The redeemed Dutch loan was 
invested in Bank stock between 1725 and 1730. After the mid-1730s, there were no 
more significant changes in the portfolio. If new assets were bought, they were 
Consols. From 1792 to 1796, the government sold mainly Bank stock.763
To assess the risk of this portfolio, it would be ideal to regress its HPR against 
the HPR of an average market portfolio, but since dividend payments for its 
calculation have not been edited, I have use fixed interest annuities as an alternative. 
As a result, HPR of the Bemese portfolio were regressed against the HPR of a Virtual 
Consol in a linear regression.764 Thus, only a relative beta coefficient (relative to the 
Consol) can be established. We would expect the portfolio of Bern as a risk averse 
investor to have a similar beta coefficient to the Consol, considered to be the safest 
asset of the time. The regression results in Section VII-21 in the appendix indicate 
that the Bemese portfolio was almost identical to the Consol and therefore rather low- 
risk, with a relative beta coefficient of 0.9702 (the results are highly significant but 
have a relatively low value for R squared of 0.7890). The HPR series themselves had 
a very high volatility.765 The conclusion from this quantitative analysis is that the 
London portfolio of the canton was a low-risk and low-yield investment. This 
interpretation can now be verified with qualitative evidence from government 
sources.
The security of its investment was always of major concern to the government. 
For example, Bern bought Bank stock in 1725 because this was believed to be the 
safest of the English funds. In addition, bearer bonds (such as annuities) were 
considered less safe than the registered stock, because they could be sold more easily 
by an agent without the consent of the principal. In May 1730, the Great Council
763 See Landmann (1903) for the nominal values.
764 Virtual in the sense of: before its official establishment: See also note 760. For the regression: 
Hudson (2000): 153-159; Neal (1990): 55.
765 With an arithmetic average of 3.66%, the standard deviation is 9.16% (min. -29.66%, max.
28.49%); a mean cannot be calculated with negative values.
766 StABE B V II2389.
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ordered the Financial Commission to report on different investment opportunities. 
They suggested to abstain from further investing in South Sea stock because Bern 
already held £158,700 at this time. It was considered the most endangered and 
uncertain of all the English funds in the case of war. Moreover, the company directors 
were not held in high esteem. Overall this is a remarkable assessment of the fund in 
which the republic had most of her money invested. The report also dissuaded the 
government from buying shares of the East India Company that were supposedly 
overpriced, despite a yearly dividend of 8%. More suitable for Bern were annuities of 
the South Sea Company or the Bank o f  England, because they were ‘a parliamentary 
fund and not involved in risky commercial ventures.’767 In particular, titles of the 
Bank were said to have an excellent reputation, being the most profitable assets 
despite their relatively high price.
When the government thought about withdrawing money because of the 
‘uncertain times’ in 1792, the assets in London were considered the easiest to 
liquidate. A high price and an advantageous course of exchange made them suitable 
for such an operation, even though they were also the canton’s most secure 
investment. According to the Financial Commission, bonds of the Vienna City Bank 
were less volatile and should thus be saved for ‘urgent necessities.’ Another major
7AQconcern of the government was the fear that Britain might repay her national debt.
In a report of 1732, commissioner Lerber was worried that South Sea stock could be 
repaid as soon as the British started to redeem debts. The Great Council discussed the 
possibility of increasing its continental assets, but finally decided to leave the money 
in England, where ‘the whole nation is liable, to pay a little more, and to be safe.’ 770 
But the government was still concerned about the commitment of the English to play 
by the rules of the capital market, at least in the way the Bemese understood them. In 
1736, there were complaints that the English parliament -  with ‘deceit and force’ -  
tried to get rid of foreign creditors by repaying them through the sinking fund while
767 StABE B VII2465/1. The Great Council decided to invest in Bank stock on 7 June 1730.
768 StABE B V II2465/56. It is not possible to test this quantitatively with HPR regressions, since bond 
prices for the Vienna City Bank are not edited. The standard deviation of their gross returns was lower 
than that of the English funds (median gross return: 4.57%, std dev: 0.90%; for the English funds: 
3.79% and 1.10% respectively); see Section VII-21 in the appendix for details.
769 See also Steiger, C.F. (1952); Kapossy (1998).
770 Quotes from Landmann (1903): 53.
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taking up loans at lower interest rates; in the opinion of the Bemese government this 
was only harming the old creditors.771
Continental Investments
Given that the Bemese strategy for its London investment was to maintain a 
low risk profile, the continental portfolio will be analysed with the hypothesis that the 
government was willing to take a greater risk by starting to invest there. This 
hypothesis will first be discussed quantitatively, then against the background of 
qualitative evidence.
Figure V-6 shows Bemese foreign investment from 1710 to 1798 based on 
contemporary accounts. Its assets in London are at market prices, the rest are at 
nominal value with currencies converted at parity rate.
□  England (value)
■  Others
□  Denmark
■  Empire
B  Vienna City Bank 
H Holland
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Figure V-6: Foreign Investments of Bern by Geographic Distribution, 1710-1796
Sources: Historie (StABE B VII 2389) and accounts o f foreign funds (StABE B VII B VII 2396-2473); 
see also Landmann (1903): 90-91. England (value) calculated as explained in Figure V-5. See Table 
V-4 for the full list o f investments and their classification.
771 StABE B VII 2465/2; Landmann (1903): 51-52.
772 For parity rates, see Section V-l above.
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The general trend of the overall sums invested increased until the middle of the 
century and then remained constant for some 30 years. This was followed by a short 
and steep rise in the 1780s and a drastic fall in the 1790s. Geographically, most of the 
assets were concentrated in London. After 1732, investment was made in the Empire, 
first in bonds of the Vienna City Bank, later in bonds and loans to cities, princes or 
estates. In the second half of the century, the king of Denmark became one of the 
largest debtors; he was joined in 1787 by the Emperor (see also Sections III-4 and III- 
5 above). In Table V-4,1 have calculated the gross returns on all Bernese loans and 
funds.
Date Security N max
Gross Return 
min mean median std dev
English funds (value) 1718-1798 (funds) 77 5.89% 1.22% 3.79% 3.77% 1.10%
Vienna City Bank 1732-1798 B 65 6.54% 1.69% 4.57% 4.59% 0.90%
Tax Office Leipzig (Electorate of Saxony) 1737-1781 B 38 5.96% 0.00% 2.74% 2.96% 1.47%
Count of Hesse-Cassel (1738-49; 1758-63) 1738-1763 M 19 6.92% 2.33% 4.13% 4.65% 1.18%
City of Leipzig 1746-1798 C 46 9.31% 0.00% 4.08% 3.97% 2.09%
Electorate Estates of Saxony 1746-1776 C 25 7.49% 0.00% 2.95% 3.30% 1.99%
Duke of Wurttemberg 1750-1798 M 48 8.10% 2.45% 5.28% 5.40% 0.86%
King of Sardinia 1750-1764 B 14 4.00% 2.28% 3.84% 4.00% 0.47%
King of Denmark 1757-1798 B 40 6.77% 1.24% 4.55% 4.82% 1.22%
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1769-1798 M 29 5.07% 2.58% 3.78% 3.90% 0.76%
Bishop of Speyer 1770-1778 M 9 3.88% 2.59% 3.53% 3.88% 0.54%
Count of Nassau-Saarbrucken 1770-1798 M 24 5.90% 0.00% 4.02% 4.36% 1.59%
City of Ulm 1772-1788 C 17 5.82% 1.94% 3.81% 3.88% 0.73%
Abbot of St. Gallen 1772-1798 M 25 6.47% 1.29% 3.83% 3.92% 0.91%
Count of Hesse-Darmstadt 1775-1798 M 21 6.47% 0.00% 4.97% 4.81% 1.24%
City of Nuremberg 1776-1798 C 16 6.27% 0.00% 3.89% 4.61% 2.32%
Duke of Zweibrticken 1777-1798 M 13 3.96% 0.00% 2.33% 3.88% 1.95%
Duke of Saxony-Weimar 1779-1790 M 9 6.52% 0.00% 4.35% 4.35% 1.77%
Emperor 1787-1798 B 10 6.12% 4.01% 5.72% 6.12% 0.78%
Duke of Schwarzenberg 1788-1798 M 9 3.88% 3.88% 3.88% 3.88% 0.00%
Commune of Le Locle 1789-1792 C 3 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 0.00%
Table V-4: Bernese Overseas Capital Investment: Funds and Loans
Sources: Historie (StABE B V II2389 and accounts foreign funds (StABE B VIIB V II2396-2473); 
see also Landmann (1903): 90-91. In the column Security, B stands for bonds, A/Tor loans secured by 
mortgage, C for loans secured by collective guarantee; N  stands for the number of observations (i.e. 
years). The values for All Bonds, All Mortgages, and All Collective Guarantee were calculated as the 
yearly sum of interest payments divided by the capital invested at the given year. I have not included 
the loan sums because they were changing over time. See Figure V-6 for an overview by region.
When comparing gross returns, we would expect the continental assets to have 
a higher yield and higher standard deviation than the English funds as an indicator of 
their risk. Table V-5 provides aggregated data for investment categories defined by 
the type of security offered. We would expect higher risk for investments in loans
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secured by mortgage (usually to princes) or by collective guarantee (cities and 
estates).
Gross Return
Investment / Security N Mean SD
English funds 77 3.79% 1.10%
Investment in bonds (Continent) 167 3.87% 0.90%
Loans secured by mortgage 205 3.96% 1.21%
Loans secured by collective guarantee 107 3.49% 1.49%
Table V-5: Gross Return on Different Investments
Sources: Historie (StABE B V II2389 and accounts foreign funds (StABE B VIIB V II2396-2473); 
see also Landmann (1903): 90-91. N  is for the number of yearly interest payments for each type of 
investment, SD for standard deviation. See Table V-4 for the full list of investments and their 
classification.
A direct comparison between the different types of investments is difficult 
because loans had fixed interests while the return on funds -  at least on some of the 
funds -  varied. The investment in continental bonds had a slightly higher yield than 
the English funds, but their standard deviation was smaller. Loans secured by 
mortgage were slightly riskier, with higher average returns and standard deviation. 
Loans granted against collective guarantee paid a lower interest rate and had a higher 
standard deviation. This was also because most non-performing loans of Bern were of 
this type.
My quantitative analysis of government documents focuses on the most 
interesting of the continental investments.773 The hypothesis is that Bern used a 
(proto-) country risk assessment for its decisions.774 After the Dutch loan of 1710, the 
canton’s first investment outside London was made in 1732, when bonds issued by 
the Vienna City Bank (VCB) were chosen to diversify the portfolio. This bank issued 
bonds guaranteed by the city of Vienna in order to finance the Imperial debt, 
modelled after the French Rentes sur I ’Hotel de Ville de Paris?15 Bern bought these
773 For a chronology and a complete list: Landmann (1903).
774 Proto in the sense that it was used before the concept was formally invented. For country risk 
assessment: Calverley (1985); Haner/Ewing (1985). For a historic example from the late eighteenth 
century: Ortuba (1963); Ortuba (1975).
775 For the Vienna City Bank: Fuchs 1998; Chaloupek/Eigner/Wagner (1991): 909-997; Baltzarek 
(1973): 1-32; Dickson (1987): vol. 2: ch. 10 (300-339).
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77bonds shortly before the Vienna City Bank suffered a severe crisis in 1733. It is not 
clear what other investment opportunities were discussed for this first investment on 
the continent, but shortly afterwards the Financial Council was asked to report about 
possibilities for further diversification. These included estates in the Empire (Silesia, 
Nurmberg, Wurttemberg), princes (the Count of Isenburg and Biindingen, the 
Margrave of Baden-Durlach) and even a commercial project of a merchant from 
Geneva (M. Port, for salt trade).777
Despite its investment in bonds of the Vienna City Bank, the Bernese 
government avoided direct financial relations with the Emperor. He repeatedly 
offered the Fricktal as collateral for a loan, but Bern was more inclined towards 
purchasing the county (see Section V-2 above).778 In 1728, a report by the Financial 
Council recommended against providing an Imperial loan in order to avoid having 
great lords as debtors, from which, ‘as is known, it is difficult to obtain one’s capital, 
and no republic wants to provoke their antagonism.’779 To avoid this issue, the 
government concealed its identity for the 1787 loan. When the Emperor issued loans 
in Frankfurt a few months earlier, the printed prospectus did not arrive timely enough 
for Bern to participate in the subscription.780 For the second loan, the Financial 
Council proposed an investment of fl. 250,000 (125,000 Thl), but the Great Council 
decided to take up the whole sum of fl. 500,000 (250,000 Thl). Bonds were issued in 
Vienna to the name of Frankfurt bankers Bethmann Bros, and then endorsed to Bern. 
The intention was to leave the Imperial treasury uninformed about the true nature of
781its creditor. It is doubtful that the strategy worked, given that the decision to invest 
was made by the Great Council within which secrecy was difficult to maintain.
The government usually applied a country risk assessment to its investment 
decisions, although it was not always as explicitly stated as in the report about Duke 
of Hesse-Cassel in 1774 mentioned above (see p. 252). In exceptional circumstances,
776 Fuchs (1998): 71-91. He mentions a ‘spectacular drop’ of bond prices without providing 
quantitative data.
777 StABE B V II2465/2. Part of the Financial Council wanted to concentrate the investment in Vienna, 
others to spread the money evenly over different investments.
778 Landmann (1903): 80-97. In 1703, St Saphorin was the Imperial agent for negotiations with Bern: 
Mensi (1890): 417. For St Saphorin, see Section V-2 above and Altorfer (forthcoming).
779 The original text says: '[...] will man sich anders nicht mit ihrer Feindschaft beladen, die [sic, 
should be: der] dock jeder republikanische Staat sorgfdltig ausweichen soil’: Landmann (1903): 82. 
For similar demands of the Emperor to Zurich (1706-1737): Peyer (1968): 125-127.
780 The prospectus is reprinted in Landmann (1903): 126-127.
781 The same procedure was applied for the interest payments: Landmann (1903): 85-87.
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security standards were not strictly applied for political reasons. For example, a loan 
to the city of Ulm was granted despite concerns about security because of the 
credibility of its citizens, geographical proximity and the purpose of the loan being a 
grain purchase to avoid starvation.782 The same generosity was applied for some loan 
extensions, where lower interest rates were conceded, mostly at times when the 
debtors were at war. In 1787 -  before investing in the Imperial loan discussed above 
-  several investment opportunities were assessed. According to the report of the 
Financial Council princes, cities and estates with the appropriate guarantees were 
unlikely to take up loans at 4%, which was considered the minimum interest rate 
when lending overseas. Therefore, the money should be invested in public funds, of 
which the most appropriate were in France, England, Saxony and Vienna. With 
regards to an investment in France, the possibility was not even seriously discussed. 
Bern had so far ‘adopted a system of which no reason for change seems to be 
existent.’783 There were already important sums in England, and conditions were not 
particularly favourable at this moment. Funds in Saxony were accorded a good 
reputation, but the interest payment (3%) was deemed too low. The interest rate paid 
by the Vienna City Bank (4%) was considered more attractive and the funds safer.
Apart from studying investments which were made, it is perhaps more 
interesting to look at gaps in the portfolio and explore why Bern bypassed some 
prime investment opportunities. A number of demands from small states were 
declined upfront.784 More strikingly, France did not receive a single Batzen in the 
eighteenth century, arguably because the canton’s old claims from the sixteenth 
century were still outstanding (as discussed in Section V-2 above). The Bourbon 
kings were notoriously unreliable debtors and the French capital markets was less 
well developed than in England and Holland.785 Geneva, with which Bern had close 
ties, was the major centre for French financial ventures that were sometimes of 
dubious nature.786 Despite -  or rather because of -  its nature as a high-risk business, 
several private investors from Bern were heavily involved with their personal money 
in life annuities and other French assets. Government members appear to have been 
less risk averse with their private investment than public funds, even though
782 Landmann (1903): 73.
783 StABE B VII2465/36.
784 Landmann mentions the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the City of Diinckelsbuhl in Swabia, the 
City of Milan, or the Republic of Wallis: Landmann (1904): 6.
785 See Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (1999); Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000).
786 See Liithy (1959); Sayous (1935); Sayous (1937).
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systematic numbers on this cannot be established.787 Other Swiss Cantons were less 
scrupulous than Bern. Solothum’s investment in bonds of the Paris City Hall was 
already mentioned (see Section V-2 above) and Zurich increased its French assets 
after Necker became finance minister in 1778. The Zurich investment consisted of
< 7 0 0
bonds issued by cities in Burgundy and Artois county, as well as life annuities.
None of the arguments used for France can explain the absence of Bernese 
investment in the most important and developed capital market of the eighteenth
70Q
century, Amsterdam. After the 1710 loan ran out in 1725, Bern did not make 
further investments with the Dutch, whose funds were not even evaluated in the 
investment proposals. This was probably because there were hardly any new issues of 
Dutch government bonds; those that were issued were usually oversubscribed despite 
bearing relatively low interest rates. However, foreign governments used the 
Amsterdam capital market to issue their own bonds. The absence of Bern in these 
ventures can probably be attributed to low interest rates in the overcrowded capital 
markets of the Netherlands.790 The Dutch themselves were net capital exporters, even
7Q1though Amsterdam regularly outperformed London in terms of net capital returns.
In the second half of the century, a public debate ensued around the safety of 
the canton’s investments.792 The key issue was that overseas investment created a 
new form of dependency as Bern had to rely on the commitment of its debtor states to 
service their debts. This was noted by several contemporary critics of the state’s 
foreign investments, of which Adam Smith was certainly the most prominent. In the 
Wealth o f  Nations, he mentioned the Bernese case, highlighting the inherent danger 
for the canton of
placing it [i.e. money] in the public funds of the different indebted nations 
of Europe, chiefly in those of France and England. [...] The security of 
this revenue must depend, first upon the security of the funds in which it 
is placed, or upon the good faith of the government which has the 
management of them; and secondly, upon the certainty or probability of 
the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the case of war, the
787 One example would be Friedrich Karl Ludwig Manuel: BBB Mhh. XXII.59. Thanks for Andrea 
Schtipbach and Manuel Bigler (Bern) for providing this data.
788 Peyer (1968): 135-138,140-141. Some of the assets were held by the state-run bank Lew & Comp: 
see Landmann (1905).
789 Wilson, C. (1941): 195.
790 For the low interest rate: StABE B V II2389.
791 Hart, M.t./Jonker/Zanden (1997): 56 (table 3.5), 20-21, 52-56.
792 See Kapossy (1998).
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very first act of hostility, on the part of the debtor nation, might be the 
forfeiture of the funds of its creditor.793
As explained above, Bern never invested in French funds, but the difficulty of 
getting regular interest payments on its outstanding loans is a case in point for 
Smith’s argument. Reformers from the Bernese Economic Society were also sceptical 
about the dependence on foreign debtors and doubted their stability. In addition, they 
saw economic dependence as being incompatible with the political self-determination 
of a free state.794 On the other hand, the fact that Bern was profiting from the high tax 
burden and the constant warfare of other states was not considered a moral issue by 
the Economic Patriots. Even the state as a potential speculator was apparently not 
criticised. Patricians in favour of foreign funds defended the state’s policy to invest. 
In the view of Karl Friedrich Steiger, it was only with the additional revenue from 
foreign interest payments that the Bemese government could maintain the freedom it 
inherited from its forebears and maintain a low tax burden on Bemese subjects while
HQC
establishing a welfare state that was generous in his view.
The government’s dilemma was that in order to secure sufficient funds for a 
war chest to help maintain geopolitical independence, it had to rely on foreign debtors 
to service their national debt. The reasons why Bern decided to undertake the risk of 
investing overseas were economic and political. Economically, issues of monetary 
circulation and the lack of productive domestic investment opportunities were push-
1Qf\ •factors. Politically, the government gained internal independence from its subjects 
and their claims for political participation by generating ‘tax-free’ returns from 
investing, as was discussed under the heading of a representation cycle in the 
introduction (see Section 1-3 above). From this perspective, the promise of safe and 
generous returns from investing on impersonal capital markets abroad was too 
attractive to let go.
In this section, I have analysed Bemese overseas investments with qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The results of the former show the canton as a risk-averse 
investor that obtained returns that were roughly in line with the most secure assets of
793 Smith (1976): 819-820.
794 Kapossy (2002): 245. See also Kapossy (1998).
795 Steiger, C.F. (1952), based on a speech made in 1784.
796 This is discussed in Section V-2 above.
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the London market. On the Continent, the government took slightly more risk but can 
still be qualified as a ‘widow-and-orphan’ investor. Qualitative evidence supports this 
view, as the government used embryonic forms of country risk assessment in its 
investment decisions and preferred steady returns to high interest payments. The most 
interesting gaps in Bern’s overseas portfolio are France for political and the 
Netherlands for financial reasons.
V-6 Conclusion: An Assessment of Bernese Overseas 
Investments
The importance of overseas investment to Bemese state finance was addressed 
in Section III-5. The sums invested in 1710 represented about the same amount as all 
other transactions recorded by the A- and B-Type accounts that were later listed in the 
General-Bilanzen. They were also significant compared to the amount of cash stored 
in the government vaults: according to my own estimate, the loans of 1710 reduced 
the cash reserve by roughly two fifths (see Figure 111-23 above). Interest revenue from 
overseas investments was also considerable, reaching 14.7% of current revenue in 
1732 and 17.1% in 1782 (10.3% and 13.8% of total revenue respectively).797 
Although this is not the third of the canton’s income that Landmann had estimated, it 
was still a significant contribution to the Bemese surplus state.798 While the sum 
invested was large by Bemese standards, it was only a fraction of the national debt of 
the recipient states. Nevertheless, Bern was one of the largest single investors in 
London, where the capital market of the city was fractured as a result of financial 
innovation that lowered entrance barriers for investors. By the late eighteenth century 
the canton had become one of many investors with similar sums at stake and was 
surpassed by the big players.799
Another way of assessing the importance of Bern’s overseas investments is 
their role in the surplus state model. Foreign loans generated returns that were 
independent of taxpayers’ consent, making them an attractive option for the 
government to secure its independence. The foreign investments started as a
797 Database (as in Chapter III above); see also Table IV-2 and Table IV-4 above.
798 Landmann (1904): 9. He used information from General-Bilanzen and General-Tabellen from 
1785-1795 (discussed in Section III-4 above).
799 See fort the expansion: Neal (1990).
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geopolitical tool to bolster relations with political allies during the time of the War of 
the Spanish succession, when Bern was at loggerheads with France. The government 
was willing to bear the risk of investing its money abroad because of the overcrowded 
domestic capital market, political motives and the desire for independence from its 
own taxpayers. If we assess Bern’s relationship to risk as an investor, it acted very 
cautiously, both in terms of portfolio administration and investment strategy. The 
impersonal nature of the early modem capital markets helped the government to 
downplay the political importance of its investments, but the independence of 
taxpayers came at the cost of an exposure to market movements and uncertainties. 
Having no national debt itself, the canton profited from the indebtedness of other 
European states which relied on capital markets to finance their warfare expenditure, 
and thus qualifies as a free rider of the Financial Revolution.
In 1720, the government made enormous windfall profits during the South Sea 
Bubble, which were lost almost immediately afterwards though the bankruptcies of 
her London agents. If the canton did not withdraw from capital markets entirely as a 
reaction, this was because the losses affected only a speculative gain and not the 
original capital invested. The crisis had a major impact on how Bemese funds in 
London were administrated and led to the replacement of financial intermediaries by 
government members. This was a costly solution to avoid agency problems. 
Diversification through investment on the continent a decade later was not only a late 
reaction to the South Sea Bubble, but also a way of averting dependency on a single 
borrower. The creditworthiness of Britain as the most important recipient of Bemese 
funds was questioned at several occasions. After 1732, Bern had a balanced portfolio 
of mostly low-yield (low-risk) securities, with slightly higher risk taking on the 
Continent. With its investment strategy, the government acted as a widow-and-orphan 
investor, seeking a steady interest payment rather than a quick profit. Qualitative data 
from its decision-making process supports this view. Issues of security were the 
central guideline when the government compared investment opportunities in a 
(proto-) country risk assessment. Thus, the quantitative and qualitative evidence on 
investor behaviour demonstrate Bern’s low-risk profile as an investor. If we assume 
that the government acted as a rational actor -  and there is no reason why we should 
not -  it can be argued that it was willing to pay a negative risk premium in the form 
of missed opportunities from higher returns. The safety of its investment was a highly 
valued utility in both the canton’s investment strategy and portfolio administration.
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With respect to the ongoing debate about how integrated early modem capital 
markets were, evidence from the Bemese case points out how uninformed one of the 
largest ‘institutional investors’ of the time was. It might well be that the canton was 
representative for widow-and-orphan investors who invested in financial assets 
without much knowledge about how the market worked. The lack of information and 
know-how also points out severe limitations of early modem capital markets, once 
the scope is broadened beyond Amsterdam and London as the most advanced and 
integrated financial centres.
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VI Conclusion: State-Building without Taxation
The Bemese state was a puzzling entity for both contemporary observers and 
historians alike with its absence of warfare and taxation. My thesis proposes solutions 
to parts of this puzzle. This conclusion consolidates the empirical findings and 
discusses their wider implications for the study of early modem state-building. The 
first section summarises the main points of the empirical analysis in the context of the 
surplus state model outlined in the introduction. Section VI-2 discusses the 
physiocratic nature of the Bemese government, both with respect to state-building 
and economics. In Section VI-3, theoretical explanations that were discussed in the 
introduction will be used to put Bern into a European context, giving an overall 
assessment of the canton’s alternative way of state-building.
vi-1 Bern as a Surplus State
The Bemese fiscal constitution was overtly patrimonial. It evolved to comprise 
a structure with numerous coexisting accounts, all of which were interconnected 
through a complex system of transfer payments. Every officeholder was responsible 
for all transactions he carried out on behalf of the state with his private fortune. A 
sophisticated system of checks and balances limited moral hazard and ensured that 
agents behaved in the government’s interest. While the logical way to secure this 
would have been the establishment of a consistent and transparent budgeting process, 
this was never attempted by Bern. Instead, the government assessed its financial 
situation by compiling accounting information in tables, which revealed its half­
hearted approach to the reform of fiscal institutions.
My empirical analysis of Bemese state finance takes a two-pronged approach, 
combining the long-term consideration of the most important government ledgers 
with a structural breakdown including all accounts for the sample years 1732 and 
1782. In absolute terms, the canton’s expenditure was comparable to that of other 
small territorial states in Europe. With an estimated government expenditure of 17-22 
tonnes of fine silver per annum, Bern spent about as much as Genoa or Sicily, but 
considerably more than other Swiss states.800 In per capita terms, Bemese expenditure 
of 55g of fine silver was roughly half of France’s, but slightly more than that for
800 Figures for Bern are for 1732 (17 tonnes) and 1782 (22 tonnes); see Section IV-2 for details.
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Italian or German states of comparable size (see Section IV-2). The overall increase 
in public revenue, which more than doubled over the course of the century, was 
extensive in character, as it only mirrored population growth. With an annual growth 
rate of 1.3%, government finance was also roughly in line with secular grain price 
inflation in Bern (see Section III-4). Between the sample years 1732 and 1782, 
revenue grew by 30% when measured in the stable Batzen currency, by 6% when 
compared to wages, by 12% relative to tiles as a price-stable item; in grain 
equivalents, revenue even fell by 10%, which because of the high yearly fluctuations 
of grain prices requires careful interpretation (see Section IV-2). The government 
used a dual system of monetary payments and contributions in kind to avoid negative 
effects from grain inflation. Roughly a fifth of overall revenue was levied in grain and 
wine. This was consumed, stored and the eventual surplus sold on the market.
When considering Bern in the context of the surplus state model presented in 
the introduction, all elements can now be underlined with empirical evidence: budget 
surpluses, low level of defence expenditure, the absence of a national debt,
OA 1
investments and low taxation levels. First, the Bemese state consistently ran budget 
surpluses throughout the century. As far as reliable aggregated data is available, this 
was the case in 78 out of 96 years, with most deficits occurring in the 1790s. On 
average, the budget surplus was 11.8% of revenue although with high yearly 
fluctuations. Current revenue regularly exceeded current expenditure, resulting in a 
profit that was then invested. Profit rates averaged 12.6% over the century and were 
even more volatile than budget surplus rates. If the state was able to increase its 
overall assets over time this was largely the result of accumulated profits (see Section 
III-4).
Second, as both the long-run and the structural analysis illustrated, the canton 
was blessed with low levels o f defence expenditure. In the two sample years, military 
spending was an estimated 4.4% (1732) and 10.7% (1782). The latter figure includes 
the cost of a small expedition to Geneva; if this is excluded, defence expenditure falls 
to around 6%. This is remarkably low in comparison with other European states, both 
in absolute and in relative terms (see Section IV-3 and IV-4). However, the cost of 
Bemese military measured through recorded expenditure alone can paint too rosy a 
picture. The main defence burden was shouldered by militia soldiers who were 
trained regularly and provided their own equipment without compensation. If
801 For details about the elements of the surplus state model, I refer to Section 1-3.
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extracted labour through the militia system is factored in as an opportunity cost, both 
defence expenditure and the fiscal burden on the Bemese population rises 
considerably (see Section IV-5).
Third, Bemese state finance was characterised by the absence o f a national 
debt. In contrast to its European neighbours who invented sophisticated techniques of 
funding their budget deficits by floating loans on the newly established capital 
markets, the canton had no need to borrow money. This manifested itself in the 
complete absence of any records of public debt or debt service in the empirical 
evidence. Instead of amassing debt, the canton accumulated assets.
Fourth, the Bemese government was in a position to invest its surpluses with 
the aim of generating future returns. The main types of investments have been 
discussed in Chapter III; the data show that foreign capital investments were 
quantitatively the most important by far (see also Chapter V). Purchases of territories 
and judicial rights by the Bemese government, for which there is only limited 
financial information, were relatively few in number as such objects rarely appeared 
on the market. The state also had relatively moderate sums invested in grain, wine 
and salt inventories. The cash reserve is a special issue, as it did not generate a direct 
financial return. Since the treasure was originally intended as a war chest, its ‘return’ 
was arguably the peace dividend that ensued for as long as the bullion fulfilled its 
function of deterrence. The Bemese government had a long history of lending money 
on the domestic mortgage market, which had fuelled its territorial expansion and 
reinforced clientelistic relationships. In spite of that precedence, the scale and nature 
of Bemese overseas lending in the eighteenth century was unmatched by earlier 
activities. The first massive loans to Britain and Holland in 1710 were partly 
politically motivated, but their conversion into purely financial investments on the 
London capital market less than a decade later was not (see discussion below). Bern 
maintained a loan portfolio that served as an income generator as well as a 
contingency buffer till the end of the century.
Fifth, to the extent that comparable data is available, the level of taxation in 
Bern was the lowest of any European state. Only the other Swiss subjects benefited 
from similarly light fiscal burdens. For the sample years 1732 and 1782, the canton 
levied an estimated 16-23g of fine silver per capita. This is roughly equivalent to four 
days’ wages for a construction worker or some 2% of economic output (GDP). By 
comparison, in France tax revenue per capita was roughly three times higher; in the
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states of the Holy Roman Empire subjects also paid between two and four times as 
much (see Section IV-5). Direct taxation on property was virtually unheard of in the 
Bemese republic. Most of the tax income accmed from indirect taxes on salt -  
disguised as a monopoly profit -  and tithes on agricultural returns. Since the latter 
were levied in kind, they were also immune to any detrimental effects of grain price 
inflation. Tithe revenue allowed the Bemese state to enlarge the content of its 
granaries, which in turn was used to stabilise grain prices as a tool of economic 
policy.
How dependent the positive equilibrium situation was on the absence of 
warfare became clear when the geopolitical constellation changed in the 1790s. With 
an invasion from Revolutionary France as an imminent threat to independence, Bern 
had to liquidate part of its overseas assets and current expenditure soared. Budget 
surpluses and high investments became hallmarks of the past. Ironically, the prospect 
of looting the legendary treasure of the canton was one of the main attractions which 
enticed the Napoleonic troops. At the downfall of the Bemese republic in 1798, the 
militia’s military strength was dismal. Ultimately, the ‘war chest’ deterrence strategy 
had failed.
As outlined in the thesis introduction, the model of Bern as a surplus state 
functioned as a positive equilibrium structure, in which all elements are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Some of the more obvious connections have 
been pointed out as Militia-, Representation- and Investor Cycles in Section 1-3. The 
militia system secured national defence at a relatively low cost to the state, in spite of 
the cost to individuals serving in the army. Spending over a month in unpaid training 
every year meant an important deduction from potential earnings, although it kept the 
pecuniary tax burden low. Issues of domestic security in Bern were minimal; tax riots 
in particular were not common. The main forms of political protest were aimed at 
opening up participation in the republic within its existing form. This also ties in with 
the representation cycle. Since the Bemese state did not have to rely on direct 
taxation, there was no need to accommodate demands of taxpayers-cum-subjects. 
Embryonic attempts to integrate mling elites from the territory into the government 
towards the end of the century were mainly intended to stabilise Bemese rule. 
Returns from the government’s overseas portfolio investments helped to keep the 
fiscal burden at a low level and curtail attempts to reform the state fundamentally.
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Bemese financial support to the Dutch and British in 1710 was on an entirely 
different scale from what had been lent in earlier centuries. Compared to the Bemese 
budget, the sums invested were huge: the 1710 investments were roughly 1.5 times 
the sum of overall government revenue for 1732. The loan to the British crown alone 
(£150,000) was more than 50% larger than the cost of the second war of Villmergen. 
Interest payments contributed roughly a fifth to current revenue (see Section IV-3 and 
V-2). The loans only covered a fraction of the borrowers’ expenditure of the War of 
the Spanish Succession, however. The financial -  as opposed to political -  dimension 
of Bemese loans became apparent when they were converted into portfolio 
investments upon redemption. In the ‘teething age’ of capital markets, the canton 
made an enormous profit during the South Sea Bubble of 1720. A combination of 
ignorance and slow communication resulted in the sale of government assets at the 
right time. Although a portion of the windfall was lost through the opportunistic 
behaviour of their London agent, Bern still made a substantial profit and emerged as 
one of the largest individual investors on the London market.
The lesson that the Bemese government gleaned from the events of 1720 was to 
carry out its own portfolio administration rather than leaving it to financial 
intermediaries who were difficult to monitor. The Great Council was willing to pay a 
high risk premium for this solution, which was in place for four decades. Otherwise 
the government changed little in its investment strategy; it was only in 1732 that the 
loan portfolio was diversified by investing on the continent. Throughout the second 
half of the century, Bern regularly lent money to foreign mlers, which in turn made 
the republic dependent on the goodwill of these borrowers. In particular, the fear of 
Britain reneging on her national debt undermined the perceived security of Bemese 
portfolio investments and was ultimately in conflict with their purpose of enhancing 
government independence.
In terms of fiscal redistribution, the results from the data are what would be 
expected for an early modem state. The government taxed the least mobile resources, 
mainly agricultural returns and salt, while spending its budget on salaries and 
consumption. Hence the primary sector bore the largest part of the fiscal burden, and 
administration was the main beneficiary of state expenditure. The small size of the 
contribution made by proto-industry towards state finance is remarkable; it was 
almost entirely free of tax. The relatively small share of the Bemese budget compared
Chapter VI: Conclusion 287
to the size of its economy meant that the scope for fiscal redistributed was small, thus 
limiting its economic effects.
vi- 2  The Tithes that Bound
The Bemese government relied heavily on physiocratic and patrimonial ideals; 
both were epitomised by the tithe as a cornerstone of the canton’s finances. Tithes 
allowed for an accumulation of granaries which were primarily a safeguard against 
harvest failures. In addition, granaries were also intended to stabilise prices while 
guaranteeing a lucrative profit if the government sold grain when prices were high 
and stored it when they were low. The empirical evidence suggests that this was the 
case for most years (see Section III-6). During severe harvest failures however, the 
government used large sums from the cash reserve to cover shortfalls in food supply. 
In the most dramatic agricultural crisis of the century in 1770, the Grain Chamber 
bought over 5,000 tonnes of grain from Sicily and Africa for 7.7m Bz. By selling it at 
a loss of 30% in spite of its high price, the government was willing to sustain heavy 
financial losses to prevent starvation and social unrest (see Section III-5). The idea of 
saving for the unexpected followed from a patrimonial attitude towards state finance. 
The state’s budget was regarded akin to that of a household, in which good 
housekeeping should prevail. Spending more than could be afforded was frowned on 
and debts were considered living off future generations of citizens. The tight 
budgetary framework of the Bemese government was partly a result of this ideology 
by which expenses were curbed to stay in line with the limited resources.
Overall, the provision of public goods by the state was favourable. Bemese rule 
was relatively mild and benevolent; the state administration was effective and 
inexpensive. Courts were non-discriminatory by early modem standards, and the 
interference of the mling elite to secure its economic privileges was comparatively 
small. Nevertheless, the judicial system remained fragmented and was an impediment 
to ‘Smithian’ growth through market expansion. The government was mainly 
concerned with agricultural issues, not least because Bemese patricians were 
landholding gentry and tithe revenues were crucial to state revenue. Patricians were 
also among the most important private recipients of tithes and land rents, which is 
why property rights for mortgages were better developed and protected than 
mercantile law.
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The government controlled the administration of the canton very tightly. The 
main positions were staffed by patricians, who were elected as bailiffs to govern over 
counties in the subject territories for a limited period. These positions were not 
sinecures; a bailiff was expected to reside in loco and carry out administrative tasks 
himself. With its extensive territory, the canton provided a sizeable number of 
relatively well-paid administrative offices, which were recruited exclusively from the 
Great Council. The Bemese parliament had evolved into a body of full-time 
politicians-cum-administrators whose main ambition was to serve in one of these 
positions. Bemese patricians retained traits of Weberian honoratiores, although the 
ideal of serving the Res Publica for the sake of civic duty had been replaced by a 
generous remuneration for government offices. Access to government became 
increasingly limited by the high opportunity cost of waiting until accession to a 
lucrative position. Patricians were usually well educated and prepared for their duties, 
having been groomed with the prospect of becoming bailiffs at some point in their 
lives. In this sense, the Bemese administration bore some traits of a professional 
bureaucracy without fulfilling its main criteria of recruitment by qualification. 
Without a proper separation between private and public fortune, patrimonial traits 
persisted.
An incumbent bailiff was in charge of the public inventory, for which he was 
held accountable by the government. He collected revenue on its behalf and was 
allowed to deduct expenditure within strict guidelines set by the Vennerkammer as a 
supervisory board. The Venners also scrutinised the yearly accounts submitted by 
each bailiff on the financial aspects of his administration. Overall, the government 
followed a frugal -  or parsimonious -  approach to state finance. Lavish expense on 
representation was curtailed to make the state appear useful and sensible in its budget 
management. These were the virtues of a patriciate that considered itself the caretaker 
of the republic on behalf of future generations -  more precisely, future generations of 
patricians. Towards its subjects, the government adopted a more paternalistic attitude, 
with the intention to provide a minimum of state activity at moderate cost, sans 
taxation and representation. In their daily administration, bailiffs were assisted by 
local support staff. These were often recmited from subaltern nobility who had 
secured exclusive access to their positions akin to the preferential entry that the 
patricians had into the government of the republic. These minor officials exercised 
considerable influence at the local level, mainly through an information advantages
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they had over other subjects on one hand and over bailiffs who only served for a 
limited tenure on the other.
Since the bailiffs as those who were ultimately in charge of administration were 
also part of the government, this ensured that incentives of the two bodies were 
aligned. Principal-agent problems were therefore limited in their impact on the 
Bemese state. The remuneration of bailiffs illustrates this point well. They received a 
fixed salary complemented by variable payments for specific tasks and a share in the 
proceeds from grain sales. The latter gave them an incentive to sell grain at the best 
possible price. Based on the empirical evidence from the grain market in Nidau 
county this seems to have worked well: grain was usually sold when prices were high, 
to the benefit of both state and bailiff (see Section III-6).
As far as contemporary sources are available, the Bemese bailiffs appear to 
have achieved a reputation of being incorrupt and just. Although there may have been 
a bias in the tradition, the outlook of patricians and constitutional arrangements are 
viable explanations for this phenomenon. The constitutional arrangements in 
particular ensured that bailiffs were properly scrutinised and that any abuse of office 
was punished. A ban from future elections into government positions was a 
threatening prospect for any officeholder, since it could apply to his entire family. 
This created a system of peer pressure, which was further fuelled by the rivalry 
between families. The reliance of Bemese patricians on income from landholding 
limited economic conflicts of interest considerably. Because they were not involved 
in commercial or industrial activities, government factions had few vested interests to 
defend. On the other hand, from the perspective of farmers whose land was subject to 
tithes, the degree of government control was significant because in addition to the tax 
on agricultural revenue, cultivation was dependent on the landlord’s consent. The 
choice of crops was determined by fiscal needs rather than by nutritional benefits. In 
addition, there was the risk of bailiffs abusing their information advantage to 
strengthen their own position in the mortgage market. The government’s involvement 
in agriculture was not entirely negative, since patricians were among the main 
promoters of agricultural reform within the existing feudal order. The programme of 
the Economic Patriots, who were prominently represented in the Bemese 
government, was targeted at increasing domestic food production with the aim of 
maintaining the canton’s economic independence and securing government revenue 
through high tithe receipts.
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For (proto-)industry and commerce, the lack of involvement of Bemese 
patricians in economic affairs had a two-fold impact. First, regulation was moderate 
and can be characterised as benign ignorance. Economic privileges existed locally, 
but overall subjects were free to engage in economic activity. The systematic 
preference of the capital towards its territory, which occurred in other city republics, 
was absent in Bern. This negligence proved less benign for export-oriented industries. 
Bemese textile producers could not rely on their government to protect access to 
markets for imports and exports in the way privileged merchant-producers of St 
Gallen or Zurich could. While these cantons boosted cotton manufacturing, Bern was 
stuck with low-quality and low-margin linen production. It appears that in a world of 
mercantilism, the absence of protection outweighed the benefits of free enterprise. 
However, the fact that the canton missed out on industrialisation in the early 
nineteenth century only seems like a failure in retrospect. From a contemporary 
perspective, specialising in agriculture as the most profitable activity of its time made 
sense. On this note, the Bemese economy was arguably a victim of its own success 
based on the territory’s rich soils and mild climate. The opportunity costs of changing 
to export-oriented proto-industry were too high. In terms of state-building, on the 
other hand, the strong reliance on the primary sector with its large yearly fluctuations 
limited the ability to plan ahead.
With its reliance on revenue extraction via tithes and forced labour through the 
militia the Bemese state was characterised by Bela Kapossy as an agricultural
OA^
military republic. This description is accurate as long as the absence of a standing 
army is acknowledged as a significant difference to other military states.803 It is also 
important to stress that commercial republics, such as Venice or the Dutch Republic, 
were largely funded through taxation on commerce and property, as well as by 
issuing public debt on the capital market.804 In the logic of the Bemese surplus state, 
relying on income and indirect taxation was inopportune because potential taxpayers 
would have to serve in the militia army in times of geopolitical crises when revenue 
was most urgently needed. This offered an additional reason for the state to 
accumulate surpluses as a contingency measure.
802 Kapossy (2002)
803 The most obvious example is Britain, which has been labelled a fiscal military state: Brewer (1989); 
O'Brien (1988); O'Brien (2001).
804 Hart, M.t. (1999); Hart, M.t./Jonker/Zanden (1997).
Chapter VI: Conclusion 291
Among the negative aspects of state-building in eighteenth-century Bern was 
that political representation and participation in top-level administration was limited 
to less than 1% of the population. Even among the citizenry, the concentration of 
office holding within an increasingly small patrician oligarchy deprived many 
talented Bemese subjects of playing an active part in the governance of their republic. 
This led to a status inconsistency, which was felt acutely by the economically 
successful who were unable to transfer their wealth into political power or rents. 
Furthermore, Bemese markets were only partially integrated domestically, much less 
with the remainder of the Swiss Confederation. The lack of a stronger push for 
economic unification was an impediment to ‘Smithian’ growth based on market 
expansion and regional specialisation. While this applies to Bern as a state, the 
potential benefits from judicial, institutional and market integration would have been 
even larger on the scale of the Swiss Confederation, which remained fragmented until 
the advent of the federal state in 1848. Even within Ancien Regime Bern, numerous 
path dependent inconsistencies prevailed, such as different measurements, customs, 
and inequalities. Property rights were relatively secure, but the legal system was ill- 
prepared for commercial activities.
The reliance on tithes for state funding was an important barrier to more radical 
agricultural reforms. The government and its patrician members as individual 
landholders had a vested interest in maintaining an existing ‘feudal’ mode of 
production which maximised the production of cash crops (wheat) for fiscal revenue 
rather than the most productive mode of agriculture, such as potatoes or dairy 
farming. A breakthrough in agricultural productivity increase was only reached after 
1798, in spite of some precursors during the Ancien Regime. In the Oberland, where 
feudal structures were historically weaker, the economy shifted to a market-oriented 
mode of production much earlier than in the grain- (and tithe-) producing parts of the 
canton. The fact that production was free was arguably more important than the level 
of taxation. As a comparison with the textile industry suggests, exemption in itself 
was no guarantee of innovation. The Bemese textile sector may have been virtually 
free of tax, but it ultimately failed to succeed because it had neither the dynamism nor 
ability to adopt new commercial strategies.
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vi-3 An Alternative Way of State-building: Fossil or Free- 
Rider?
The concept of a militia state and the idea that the state should rely on its own 
resources stemmed from traditional European ideals for state finance. They were 
amongst the constituent elements of the medieval domain state described by Joseph 
Schumpeter.805 If Bern was able to follow its virtues for so long, this was mainly due 
to its isolation from geopolitical pressure. Although the transition from domain state 
to tax state was not as well choreographed as it first seemed in Schumpeter’s model, 
by the eighteenth century, domain states had become rare in Europe. From this 
perspective, Bern and the other Swiss states seem like fossils of a bygone era.
What changed was the nature of the domain. It was not limited to lands any 
more, but followed the Cameralist doctrine and expanded its activities to 
entrepreneurial activities such as salt trade and money lending. To use a term by
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Richard Bonney, Bern had become an entrepreneurial domain state. Interestingly, 
mercenary services as one of the pioneering activities from which states had made 
economic profits had been buried to oblivion, at least from the perspective of state 
finance. In earlier centuries, the Swiss republics received important pensions from 
foreign states against the right to recruit troops. This was not the case in eighteenth- 
century Bern any more; its mercenary troops had evolved into the private business of 
patrician families. They kept a geopolitical importance and remained under tight 
political control through defensive treaties. In financial terms however, the Bemese 
state did not benefit financially from the export of mercenary services. In this sense, it 
differed significantly from another eighteenth-century surplus state, Hesse-Cassel, 
which invested the payments for mercenary troops on the London capital market in a 
similar fashion.807
The canton profited in other ways from the externalities of European warfare. 
On one hand, the contracts for mercenary regiments ensured that the troops could be 
used at home in case of war, which helped to secure national defence by deterring 
potential invaders. Returning mercenaries also boosted the capacity of the Bemese 
militia, ensuring that at least some of the troops and officers had fighting experience. 
Put differently, Swiss soldiers killed on the battlefields of Europe were part of the
805 Schumpeter (1954).
806 Bonney (1995c): 447-463; for cameralists, see also Bonney (1995a): ch. 6.5.
807 Ingrao (1987). Interestingly, the Hessian ‘business model’ looks similar to that of sixteenth-century 
Swiss states: see Komer (1980) and Komer (1999).
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price to pay for military independence and ‘neutrality’. The other significant way in 
which Bern benefited from geopolitical rivalry between other European states was 
through funding part of their national debt. Without the pressure of ever-increasing 
military costs, the establishment of capital markets in which impersonal and highly 
liquid bonds could be purchased was unlikely to have happened on such a large scale. 
Insignificant as Bern’s participation may have been to the recipients of its loans, the 
loans themselves represented one of the main contributors to the canton’s finances. 
Bern, in other words, was a free rider on the pan-European spiral of ever-increasing 
warfare expenditure and public debt. Additionally, there is a political twist to this free 
rider approach: by investing in Britain, the patrimonial and paternalistic Bemese 
government benefited from a national debt that was based on parliamentary consent, 
the very thing it hoped to avoid at home. One reason for the low fiscal burden was 
that across the channel, a ‘body of chauvinistic taxpayers’ (O’Brien) was willing to 
fund the geo-political aspirations of its government.808 It is truly ironic that the 
Bemese government, which invested abroad to avoid taxing its own population, 
benefited from the financial revolution in Britain in Holland, both of which relied on 
increasing the coercive capacities of their states to secure tax income.
There was an intrinsic conflict between the entrepreneurial element of Bemese 
state finance and its character as a self-reliant domain state. By investing abroad, the 
canton was purportedly dependent on other states, which ran against the ideals of 
Economic Patriotism. A public debate ensued about the sustainability of overseas 
investment as contemporary observers struggled to come to terms with the 
contradictions between autarchy and profits maximisation. In spite of mild criticisms 
of overseas investment, attempts to curtail dependence on lenders were ultimately 
unsuccessful. The government never seriously considered the liquidation of its assets 
except for funding military needs. The fruit of secure returns from abroad were too 
sweet for any radical alteration of the financial strategy.
The situation of the state hoarding and investing resources rather than spending 
it on welfare or to support industry has been diagnosed by Richard Feller as ‘an 
anaemia of commerce and trade, and a hypertrophy of the treasury.’809 This is a 
teleologic and anachronistic view, since the expectation of Bern’s engagement in 
modern-day welfare activities is clearly an illusion. The low levels of domestic 
investment were caused by the absence of sufficiently attractive opportunities within
808 O'Brien (2001): 25.
809 Feller (1912): 45.
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Bemese territory. As evidence from the domestic capital market illustrates, being a 
surplus state was not entirely beneficial to the economy but could create an 
embarrassment o f riches. Attempts by the government to invest on the local mortgage 
market led to a ‘reverse crowding out’ in which the state competed with private actors 
for the best investment opportunities. The results of this were low returns, credit 
rationing and capital export. Even if  the oversupply of capital limited the adverse 
effect of credit rationing for the overall economy in Bern, wealthy individuals found 
it difficult to secure productive investments (Section V-2). The question remains why 
the abundance of capital did not lead to more productive investment. This might be 
yet another puzzle for historians to ponder.
Another open question is if the canton could have been as a state supporting 
industry and trade (a ‘Gerschenkronian’ state). It certainly had the financial means to 
do so, but the government decided not to follow this avenue after some unsuccessful 
attempts in the late seventeenth century, when a Commercial Council had been 
established. With their lack of commercial background, it is not clear how successful 
Bemese magistrates would have been in sponsoring (proto-)industry and protecting 
export markets. An engagement in the sector that most patricians were familiar with, 
namely agriculture, would have been more realistic. To be commercially successful in 
this area implied moving away from grain cultivation to dairy and cattle farming in 
many parts of the country -  which is what happened in the early nineteenth century. 
The consequence would have been to change the feudal order and undermine the 
state’s tithe base. It could probably have been possible for the state to introduce some 
form of tithe-like income tax on agricultural returns to replace tithes. The opportunity 
cost of switching to a more commercially oriented agriculture must have been too 
high for the decision makers in Bemese government to ever consider such a change 
seriously, however. Instead, they preferred the status quo which benefited their 
interest as a social group most.
An overall assessment of Bemese state-building must stress its differences to 
the European paradigm. While it is commonly argued that state-building was a 
function of rising demands for funding geo-political rivalry, the cantons of the Swiss 
Confederation were curiously isolated from these developments. Yet, as I have 
argued in my thesis, the process of state-building clearly took place, albeit on a 
moderate level. The government attempted to unify its territory slowly while 
assuming new powers in the field of jurisdiction and economic policy. Furthermore,
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the burgeoning number of decrees had a deep impact on the daily lives of its subjects. 
All this occurred within the boundaries set by limited resources, as the government 
only controlled a small part of the country’s economic output. While the size of its 
budget increased in absolute terms, it hardly outpaced the rate of population growth.
Relying on traditional sources of revenue extraction as well as entrepreneurial 
returns, the Bemese government was dependent on co-operation from its subjects 
rather than top-down coercion. It stressed the legitimacy of its financial claims and 
largely restrained from introducing new fiscal duties. This legitimacy approach to 
state-building is an interesting niche strategy. It was a cost-effective alternative to the 
avenues taken by more coercive regimes. The Bemese state had neither the force nor 
the willingness to introduce a tax state, which would undoubtedly have faced fierce 
opposition by armed subjects on whom the government relied for defence. In this 
sense, the canton was trapped in its surplus state equilibrium. It could even be argued 
that the government failed to tax its population to the degree it could have. On the 
other hand, rather than being caught in a spend-and-tax spiral like most other 
European regimes of the time, Bern kept its budget in balance and on a moderate 
level.
Bern is therefore in strong contrast with all explanations of state-building that 
focus on geopolitical pressure as the main force in shaping polities. For example with 
respect to Charles Tilly’s explanation, the canton followed neither a warfare and tax 
intensive way of state-building, nor could it rely on economic development to provide 
a substitute in the form of an increasing tax base. Its commercial base was small and 
lightly taxed. State-building in Bern was not coercion intensive, capital intensive, and 
also did not follow Tilly’s third possibility of ‘capitalised coercion’, but an alternative 
route that was non-coercive and capital extensive. Although political representation 
was limited, the state-building process was consent based. The consent was not 
explicit and formal, but implicit: Bemese subjects were armed and posed a constant 
revolutionary threat. Furthermore, many decisions were delegated to the local level. 
This brings the canton closer to explanations by a state-building from below approach 
in the spirit of Peter Blickle and others. A better expression would probably be state- 
building with implicit consent, as the initiative was top-down and not bottom-up. 
With its respect for old traditions, at least in their formal way, Bern showed elements 
of an ‘Old European’ state in Gerhard’s sense. Underneath the medieval structures,
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the nature of the republic had fundamentally changed by the eighteenth-century, 
however.
Considering Bern from a perspective of New Institutional Economic History, 
the overall assessment seems favourable. Property rights were guaranteed and most 
political institutions were efficient in reducing externalities. The result of this in 
economic growth was not outstanding, however. This might be related to the fact that 
commercial property rights did not benefit from additional protection. Additionally, 
for most of the agricultural production the traditional feudal institutions that were in 
place in Bern -  the crop rotation system and tithes -  had significant externalities that 
made the return to the cultivator different from the overall agricultural return. The 
incentive to be more productive was small. The situation was different for enclosed 
lands, in which increased returns went directly to cultivators.
Finally, it is also difficult to reconcile the developments in Bern with Thomas 
Ertman’s model of state-building that was outlined in the introduction (see Section I- 
2). While its infrastructure was clearly patrimonial in character, it is not clear where 
the canton’s political regime stands on the scale between constitutional and 
absolutist. The government was not built on any formal consent from its subjects; 
they were not directly represented in the political sphere for the most part. However, 
this ‘absolutist’ rule was curtailed by the need to rely on cooperation from the ruled. 
Paradoxically, the very role of parliamentary assemblies in Bern was not to increase 
representation, but to limit it to an increasingly select group of oligarchic patrician 
families who extended their rule over the territory. The fact that Bemese financial 
history cannot easily fit into Ertman’s model does not invalidate his explanations 
entirely. Rather, the contradictory outcome offers the possibility of exploring 
boundaries of his explanation and to challenge certain assumptions. Most 
significantly, it illustrates just how unique the Bemese state-building process is in a 
European context.
As a closing comment, while my thesis has described Bern as an extraordinary 
example of a state that runs against the paradigm of early modem state-building, this 
might in part be partly the result of a general neglect by the scholarly community 
when it comes to including peripheral countries into high-level explanations of state- 
building. After all Bern, along with the rest of the Swiss Confederation, might be 
representative of another Europe that has been overlooked all too often in
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comparative studies focusing on the large, warring states which have survived into 
the modem age.
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VII Appendix
vii-1 Abbreviations
£ Pound Sterling [Currency]
ACV Archives Cantonales Vaudoises
Ag Silver
AG Aargau
Au Gold
BBB Burgerbibliothek Bern
BE Bern
BE-Lb. Pound; Bernese Pound [Currency]
BERO Bank of England Record Office
BL British Library
BoE Bank of England
Bz Batzen; Berner Batzen [Currency]
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CC 200 (= Great Council)
EIC East India Company
ESFDB European State Finance Database
fl. Gulden [Currency]
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GE Geneva
Hfl. Dutch Guilder [Currency]
HPR Holding-Period Return
Kr. Krone, Crown [Currency]
L. Livre Suisse; (Alter) Franken [Currency]
LU Lucerne
NIE New Institutional Economics
PRO Public Record Office
R. Reichsthaler [Currency]
RQBE Rechtsquellen des Kantons Bern [see References]
SD Standard Deviation
SH Schaffhausen
SSC South Sea Company
StABE Staatsarchiv des Kantons Bern
StAAG Staatsarchiv des Kantons Aargau
StUB Stadt- und Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Thl. Thaler [Currency]
VCB Vienna City Bank
VD Vaud
Xr Kreuzer; Berner Kreuzer [Currency]
ZH Zurich
Please note that abbreviations for accounts are shown separately on page 324.
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vii-2  Glossary (Translations of German Words)
English tranlsation
Arrear(s)
Arsenal-Senator
Bailiff
Canton
Central Account
Commissioner
Commons
Commune
Condominium
County
County Enquiries
Court Clerk
Crop Rotation System
Demesne: see Domain
Diet: see Federal Diet
Domain, sometimes: Demesne
Federal Diet
Financial Commission
Government
Grand Officer
Great Council (CC)
Mayor
Peasant’s Revolt
Public Morals (Policing of)
Salt-Senator
Secret Council
Secretees
Senate
Small Council, see: Senate
State Clerk
Swiss Confederation
T ownhall-Mayor 
Treasurer 
Vice-Mayor 
Venner, Vennerkammer
German original (primary sources and 
literature)8
Restanz
Zeugherr
Landvogt, Amtmann 
Kanton, Stand, Staat, Ort 
Standesrechnung811 
Kommissar, Kommissarius 
Allmend 
Gemeinde
Gemeine Herrschaft, Mediatamt 
Amt812
Amterbefragungen
Gerichtschreiber
Dreizelgenwirtschaft
Domane
Tagsatzung
Geheimer Rat und Beigeordnete 
“Schultheiss, Rat und Burger”; Regiment 
Grossweibel
Grosser Rat, Burger, Rat der 200, CC (Latin for 
200)
Schultheiss 
Bauemkrieg 
Sittenzucht 
Salzherr (vom Rat)
Geheimer Rat, Geheimrat 
Heimlicher (H. von Burgem)
Kleiner Rat, Kleinrat, Rat
Staatsschreiber
Eidgenossenschaft, alte Eidgenossenschaft,
Corpus Helveticum
Ratshausammann
Sackelmeister, Quastor/Quaestor
Stillstehender Schultheiss
[not translated; the original meanings of banner
bearer and chanmber of banner bearers cannot
capture their functions, which included financial
auditing]
810 For the meaning of the terms in the primary sources, see Schweizerisches Idiotikon (1881-present); 
HLS (2002) and HBLS (1921-1934).
811 There were two Standesrechnungen, one for the German speaking territory (Deutsch 
Standesrechnung) and one for the Vaud, or French speaking territory (Welsch Standesrechnung).
812 In the sense of: district (not: office).
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vii-3 Original Texts Quoted in Chapter II
StABE B VII 862 (Jahrrechnung Aarberg):
Mein[e,] Johann Rudolff Wagner[s,] Vogts der Grafschaft Aarberg[,] zweyte 
Rechnung und Bescheid Alles meines Einnemmens und AuBgebens solchen Amts 
wegen[,] vom Netiw Jahrs Tag 1782 biB Gleiche Zeith 1783.
[...]
Montags den lOtn February 1783 ward vor MnHgH. Teutsch Sekelmeister und 
Venneren, gegenwartige Herren Johann Rudolff Wagner[s,] Landvogts zu Aarberg[,] 
2te Amts Rechnung abgehort, und under dem gewohnten Vorbehalt der 
MiBrechnung, pahsiert, und gutgeheiBen, durch welche dann, nachdeme bevorderst 
[es folgen Rechnungskorrekturen, sowie] der Herr Amtsmann auch mit etwas an 
Getreyd gratificiert[,] folgends Einnemmen und Ausgeben gegen einander gehalten, 
und abgerechnet worden, derselbe, mit Begriff seiner femdirgen Getreyd Restanz, 
MmGhHm ausher schuldig verblieben An Kronen 669, An Kemen 20 Mt, An 
Mtihlekom 20 Mt, An Roggen 75 Mt, An Dinkel 1769 Mt, An Haber 540 Mt.
Actum ut Supra.
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v i m  Categories of the Deutsch-Standesrechnung 1732
German (original) English Translation
EINNAHMEN
An alten Restanzen
Von Ohm Geld
Von Zollen und Gleith wegen
Von Vogten, Ambt Leuthen und Schaffneren
Von der Statt Wein-Schenk und Kommeister
An Zinsen
An AbLoosungen
An Steuren und Tribut
An Verhor- Einzug- und Legitimations-Gelt
An BueBen, Confiscationen imd Lehen
Von Vergabungen und Erkaufften Pfrundten; Von
Verkaufften Haiiseren, Erdrich, Wein und dergleichen
An Habitanten- und HinderaB-Gelt
Das Allgemeine Einnemmen
Vemdige Restanz
REVENUE
debts (arrears) of former officials 
wine tax 
customs duties
balance from officials’ accounts
balance from the wine and com accounts
interest payments
repaid loans
special taxes and tribute
judicial and criminal duties, confiscations, fines
donations and pensions
sold goods (houses, land, wine, etc)
immigration and naturalisation taxes 
general revenue
balance (arrears) of previous year
AUSGABEN
Ordinaria
An Rahts Besoldimgen
Das Allgemeine AuBgeben
An Leib-Gedingen, Baden Curen, Steuren,
Allmoosen, Passaden, ProSemel und Dergleichen
An Brand und Anderen Steuren
Der FreyWeiblen Verdienst
Verdienst sonderbarer Personen
Bezahlte Restanzen
Von Erkauftem
An Gultbrieffen
Von Stifften, Pfarren und Studenten wegen
An Zehrungen
Von Gebauwen wegen
Umb Lundsche Tucher Schiirletz, Wiffling und Leynen- 
Tuch
Reith Lohn Mrghh. der Rahten / der Burger / der Knechte
Amm Lohn und Verding zu Handwerken 
Artzet Lohn 
HandWerks Leuth
Der Ambt und Dinest Leuthen Fronfastliche Bestallungen 
Restanz
EXPENDITURE 
ordinary salaries
remuneration for government members 
general expenditure
annuities, pensions, alms, cures, etc; payments
for fire damage (“fire tax”)
salaries of “particular persons” (state employees)
redeemed debts from former officials
purchases
loans
stipends for religious education 
meals
for buildings (maintenance and construction) 
cloth for uniforms
riding expenses (i.e. travelling expenses) for 
Senators, Great Councillors and Servants 
nursing and indentures (orphans) 
medical expenses 
services by craftsmen 
expenses for official’s horses
arrears (i.e. balance)
Table VII-1: Categories of the Deutsch-Standesrechnung 1732
Source: StABE B VII 613 (Deutsche Standesrechnung; 26 December 1731 to 26 December 1732)
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vii-5 The Restanzen  System
The Bemese state used a complicated system to transfer funds from its administrative 
units or institutions to the government. It relied on claims from the government on its 
officeholders, who were liable for all transactions that they carried out on behalf of 
the state with their private fortune. This system was particularly important for bailiff 
accounts (Type D accounts). For these, the balance at the end of the financial year 
was determined as an arrear {Restanz), which could then be transferred to central 
government. In reality, the technique was both complex and sophisticated. It had been 
invented to cope with the fact that many transactions in the counties were not paid in 
cash but in kind, mainly in grain and wine. To minimise the transportation of grain 
for account settlement at the end of each financial year, as well as to avoid the 
negative effects of high price inflation and volatility for foodstuffs, Bern used an 
accounting system that combined monetary with non-monetary units. Every 
incumbent had to take over the public inventory as his debt to the state while in 
office. All his transactions on behalf of the state were then added or subtracted from 
this debt. Temporary balances at the end of each financial year determined the 
amount of an officeholder’s debt, which was called Restanz. While monetary 
balances were immediately transferred to the state at the end of each accounting year, 
an eventual inventory arrear was carried over to the next account for the time of an
O M
officeholder’s tenure as Restanz. Inventory arrears of the previous year 
( Vorjahresrestanz) constituted the opening balance of every ledger. This way, 
subsequent accounts included earlier debts of an officeholder towards the state. The 
final balance at the end of tenure was equivalent to the bailiffs total debt towards the 
state and hence also called Restanz. Using the word Restanz -  as well as its English 
translation as arrear or leftover -  is problematic in the sense that it has not been 
consistently used by contemporaries or historians. On one hand, the Restanz consisted 
of what was left over when expenditure was subtracted from revenue. In other words, 
it described the account balance {saldo) at the end of an accounting period.
The working of the Restanzen system is illustrated schematically in Figure VII-1. 
Please note that time runs from top to bottom and from right to left, to minimise 
arrows running across the graph.
8,3 StABE B V 1470, 136-143.
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The Restanzen System of Arrears (Type D Accounts)
_►: to Standes-
Rechnung
 t ........
Type D 
Account 1 (Opening)
_q Arrears Opeining
(grain)(money)
~° Arrears
(grain)
Revenue
(money and 
grain)
Expenditure
(money and 
grain)
o Inventory
bought from predecessor
Time
Type D 
Account (T-l)
O Arrears
(goney)
Opening
(grain)
Arrears
(grain)
Expenditure
(money and 
grain)
(money and 
grain)
T .7^-
Type D 
Account 3
o  Arrears
(money)
Opening
(grain)
Arrears
(grain)
Expenditure
(money and 
grain)
(money and 
grain)
Type D 
Account 2
6 Arrears
(money)
Opening
(grain)
Arrears
(grain)
Expenditure
(money and 
grain)
(money and 
grain)
Transfer
into monetary value \
Inventory
sold to successor :
Type D 
Account T (Closing)
° Arrears
(money)
Opeining
(grain)
0 Arrears
(grain)
Revenue
(money and 
grain)
Expenditure
(money and 
grain)
Figure VII-1: The Restanzen System of Arrears (Type D Accounts)
Abbreviations: T = Tenure. I have translated the term Restanz as Arrears for this figure.
Each new officeholder had to buy the content of the inventory -  consisting mainly of 
the public granary -  from his predecessor in the so-called Amtskauf (purchase of 
office).814 The sums necessary to take over the inventory of a large county could be 
considerable and it would take a bailiff the full five years in office to accumulate 
enough funds for amortising this debt. In accounting terms, the purchased public 
granary was booked as an inventory, or opening balance, in the bailiffs first account. 
Added to this was the current revenue for the first accounting year. Once current 
expenditure was subtracted from total revenue, the difference was the first-year
814 The handover of the office was called a bailiffs Aufzug (start) and Abgang (end). See also: 
Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 161.
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Restanz a bailiff owned to the state. The monetary Restanz was due immediately, 
while an eventual grain restanz was carried over to the next account, where it was 
entered as an opening balance. Again, the bailiff added his current revenue, 
subtracted current expenditure and determined the new Restanz. This process was 
repeated for his period in office. In the closing account, the grain inventory was sold 
to the successor and the remaining debt in grain converted into a monetary debt. It 
was then added to the monetary balance of his closing account to determine the 
bailiffs final Restanz. After leaving office, bailiffs had 27 months to settle their final 
debt to the state.815
In terms of institutional design, the main problem of a Restanzen system is that the 
state accumulated relatively large claims on its office holders during their tenure. 
Restanzen are in fact nothing but involuntary loans from the government to its 
officials. When it came to repayment, bailiffs often took their time, thus benefiting 
from an interest-free loan. In 1695, the Great Council confirmed the generous policy
0 1 /
towards officeholders in terms of Restanzen repayment. To overcome the issue of 
moral hazard -  office holders not repaying their arrears -  the punishment for belated 
payment included limitations on the eligibility for government positions. However, 
the fact that Bern did not introduce a penalty fee on late payment, or an interest 
payment on outstanding arrears, shows that the patrician families were probably not 
as diligent as they could have been in policing abuse of their peers.
Another way of looking at Restanzen is to understand them as an indicator for the 
profitability of an office and, if all offices are added up, of the overall state 
administration. The annual change in Restanzen shows the surplus (loss) between 
revenue and expenditure in any given accounting period. Therefore, the difference 
between revenue and expenditure should equal the difference between the current 
Restanz and that of the previous year.817 I have calculated this for the county of 
Aarberg from 1700 to 1796. If grain prices are kept stable to eliminate the effect of 
price fluctuation, the two series are virtually identical. The correlation coefficient of 
0.967 is significant at the 1% level.818
The difference between the inventory a bailiff sold to his successor and the amount of 
grain received from his predecessor when starting the position was the bailiffs profit 
in grain. Added to this were eventual cash profits, if monetary expenditure and arrears 
were smaller than revenue. All these profits came in addition to his regular salary and 
ad hoc payments for administrative activities. Of course a bailiff could also make a 
loss during his term in office, notably when climatic distress lowered agricultural 
proceeds.
The Restanzen  System in Practice: Johann Ott in Aarberg, 1731-1738
A concrete example from the county of Aarberg can illustrate how the Restanzen 
system worked in practice. Johann Ott (occasionally spelled Otth) was Landvogt of
815 StABE B V 1470, 136-143.
816 StABE B V 1470, 136-143.
817 This is valid for transactions in kind; the monetary balance was transferred to the Treasury at the 
close of each accounting period.
818 Data for Aarberg accounts, 1700-1796 (missing: 1729): StABE B VII 851-872; N = 115; I have 
used Pearson’s Correlation (significance two-tailed). N is greater than 100 because of the numerous 
handovers, i.e. there are more accounts than years. Grain prices have been fixed at the mean over the 
whole time period for each type of grain.
Appendix 305
Aarberg from 1731 to 1738.819 He took over the office on Gallus day (16 October) 
1731, which was the traditional handover date for most counties.820 Interestingly, 
while the handover day remained unchanged throughout the century, the accounting 
year varied with each new bailiff. It could be, say from 13 January to 13 January. For 
Johann Ott, the accounting year coincided with the calendar year. Therefore, his
821opening account covered the period from 16 October 1731 to 31 December 1731.
For the following years of his tenure, ledgers covered the calendar years from 1732 
until 1737. Ott’s closing account was for the period from 1 January until 15 October 
1738, when his successor took over the post.
In Figure VII-2, all grain transactions have been converted into Berner Batzen, using 
prices from the bailiffs accounts. It follows the schematic outline of Figure VII-1, 
with revenue on the left-hand side of the T-account, expenditure on the right. Please 
note that as above, the timeline runs from right to left (see also Table VII-3 at the end 
of this section for details).
□  Open(g)
□  Rest(g) ■  Rest(m)
From
Predecessor
,000
300
250
200
to
Successor
Bz
to Standes­
rechnung
The Restanzen System, Aarberg 1732-1738
B  Rev(m) Q Rev(g)
IE Exp(m) H Exp(g)
aar7381 aar737 aar736 aar735 
Time —
aar734 aar733 aar7322
Figure VII-2: The Restanzen System, Aarberg 1732-1738
See also Table VII-3 in the appendix. Source: Aarberg accounts (StABE B VII 853-854). Please note 
that the time scale is from right to left. Revenue is shown in the right column for each account, 
expenditure on the left. Abbreviations: Rev -  revenue, Exp = expenditure, (m) = money; (g) = grain; 
Open(g) = opening balance (in grain); Rest = Restanz (i.e. Arrear). For details about conversion into 
Batzen, see Section VII-13. The differences between revenue and expenditure within each year are 
caused annual price movement for grain. For filenames, see Section VII-9.
819 He followed his brother Jacob Friedrich Ott, who had died in office. While it was not unusual for a 
relative to inherit an office, the heir usually only served for the remainder of the original term. Johann 
served a full term o f six years, however.
820 Other days were Michael’s Day (29 September) or Simon and Judae (28 October). See 
Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 161.
821 In practice, Ott also included transactions that had occurred before his start, which had been 
transferred to him by his predecessor.
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When starting his new job, Johann Ott bought the public granary from his 
predecessor. This was accounted for as an opening balance (.Einmessung) in his first 
ledger. His first account also included the tithe revenue of the 1732 harvest. Although 
the harvest had taken place in July, tithes were due in autumn and thus recorded by 
the incumbent. In addition to tithes, Ott received current proceeds in cash on behalf of 
the government. From all this revenue, his expenditure in money and grain was 
deducted to establish the first Restanz. Minor grain arrears were converted into 
monetary units and added to the cash Restanz, which was due for immediate payment 
to the Treasurer. Meanwhile, the grain Restanz (or, grain inventory) was transferred 
to Ott’s next account, where it was booked in as an opening balance. The process was 
then repeated until his last year in Aarberg in 1738. In his closing account, Ott 
recorded no revenue in grain, as the tithes for 1738 were collected by his successor. 
Ott’s final arrear was calculated by deducting expenditure from revenue (plus the 
opening balance). The part of the grain Restanz that formed the public granary was 
sold to his successor, the remaining grain converted to monetary units and added to 
the monetary Restanz.
What Figure VII-2 illustrates is that simply looking at the total sum of revenue or 
expenditure for Aarberg would render spurious results compared to the net current 
transactions. The amount of Restanzen transferred from year to year was considerably 
larger than net revenue; in this example between 2.5 and 3 times. This makes 
establishing total revenue and expenditure of the Bernese state a more complex than 
simply collecting the sums for each single account.
The Financial Year
The accounting period for Bernese officials was usually twelve months. Two 
matters complicate the issue, however. First, the financial year did not necessarily 
coincide with the calendar year, nor did all ledgers start at the same date. Apart from 
the respect for old local traditions, this helped to avoid a bottleneck in auditing 
through the Venner chamber (see Section II-7). Second, office handovers occurred 
during the financial year, not at the end. Therefore, the twelve months of a handover 
year were divided between two accounts, written by different officeholders. Table 
VII-2 shows the start of the financial year for all known accounts in the years 1732 
and 1782. They are separated by month and category of account. For the latter, I 
distinguish between Regular accounts, Opening accounts of newly elected officials 
and accounts which contained no transactions in grain. This is important because for 
grain revenue, the timing of the harvest was crucial. As a rule of thumb, those 
accounts with grain components were bailiff accounts. For ledgers that did not 
involve agricultural produce the timing of the financial year mattered little and could 
therefore easily coincide with the calendar year.
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Regular
1732
Opening No Grain Regular
1782
Opening No Grain
1st of Jan 3 6 25 13
January 13 4
February 18 2 12
March 14 4 9 2
April 3 4
May 4 2 2
June 1 3
July 1 1 1
August 1
September 2 3 1
October 1 7 2
November 1 3 1 1 5
December 2 5
unclear 2
Table VII-2: Start of the Financial Year by Month, 1732 and 1782
Source: Extended database (as explained in chapter IV and Section VII-9). January excludes accounts 
starting on the 1st of January, which are shown separately (as 1st o f Jan). Regular stands for accounts 
with grain revenue without handover in the sample year; Opening is for opening accounts of newly 
appointed bailiffs; No Grain stands for accounts without grain transactions.
Starting dates for the regular bailiff accounts were concentrated in the first three 
months of the year, while the opening ledgers of incumbent bailiffs started after the 
grain harvest in July. This enabled the outgoing bailiff to sell his surplus grain in the 
months before the harvest. Since tithes were due some months after the harvest in 
autumn, they would then be included in the opening account of the incumbent bailiff 
(see previous section). This technique limited the content of the public granary that a 
new bailiff had to buy from his predecessor during a handover and would give him 
some grain revenue of his own within a short time in office. The increasing number 
of regular accounts starting at the beginning of the calendar year in 1782 is an 
indicator for the standardisation that took place in the second half of the century. It 
also illustrates that the standardisation was far from complete.
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Accounts of Johannes Ott, Aarberg 1732-1738
from
to
Account Nr
Opening Money (Bz) 
Wheat (ms) 
Mischel (ms) 
Mill (ms) 
Rye (ms) 
Spelt (ms) 
Oats (ms)
Current Money (Bz) 
Wheat (ms) 
Mischel (ms) 
Mill (ms) 
Rye (ms) 
Spelt (ms) 
Oats (ms)
Restanz Money (Bz) 
Wheat (ms) 
Mischel (ms) 
Mill (ms) 
Rye (ms) 
Spelt (ms) 
Oats (ms)
Filename
15 Oct 1731 
31 Dec 1731 
1
Exp
288 
0 
192 
4,320  
67,584 
12,240 
from predecessor
Rev
24,053
100
16
116
2,132
3,620
1,488
-691
1,296
240
1,056
3,312
83,952
25,152
23,349
1,504
288
1,252
5,518
88,316
27,428
1 Jan 1732 
31 Dec 1732 
2
1 Jan 1733 
31 Dec 1733
1 Jan 1734 
31 Dec 1734 
4
Exp Rev
1,296 
240 
1,056 
3,312 
83,952 
25,152
17,986
1,153
198
1,032
812
18,888
14,036
22,740
1,344
240
960
3,600
85,920
25,200
40,726
1,216
288
1,060
1,198
22,536
15,088
22,740
1,344
240
960
3,600
85,920
25,200
Exp Rev
1,344
240
960
3,600
85,920
25,200
37,467 44,874
1,993 1,216
130 288
1,161 1,060
356 1,196
23,547 20,548
13,756 16,164
7,407
144
384
720
4,080
82,560
27,360
Exp Rev
144
384
720
4,080
82,560
27,360
22,549 33,453
257 1,216
176 288
560 1,060
1,180 1,196
17,488 21,096
13,316 15,304
10,905
1,056
384
960
3,984
84,960
28,560
1 Jan 1735 
31 Dec 1735 
5
Exp Rev
1,056
384
960
3,984
84,960
28,560
19,439 37,410
1,077 1,216
886 288
937 1,060
1,036 1,196
22,327 22,696
17,481 15,384
17,971
1,152
0
1,056
3,840
85,200
24,000
1 Jan 1736 
31 Dec 1736 
6
1 Jan 1737 
15 Oct 1737 
7
Exp Rev
1,152
0
1,056
3,840
85,200
24,000
22,538 34,603
877 1,216
14 288
1,073 1,060
620 1,196
21,287 21,652
14,271 16,788
12,065
1,392
144
480
4,320
85,440
28,800
Exp Rev
12,065
1,392
144
480
4,320
85,440
28,800
10,441 33,997
1,168 0
4 0
388 0
4,028 0
84,620 0
28,082 0
35,250
0
0
0
2,640
64,800
12,000
to successor
aar7322 aar733 aar734 aar735 aar736 aar737 aar7381
Table VII-3: Accounts of Johann Ott, Aarberg 1732-1738
Source: StABE B VII 853. Abbreviations: Bz = Berner Batzen; ms = Bern-mass (14.1 ltr). Abbreviations: Rev for revenue, Exp for Expenditure. For an explanation o f the 
Filename, see Section VII-9.
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vii-6 The Long-Run Database 
Data (Sources)
All data for the years 1764-1794 is from the General Bilanzen (StABE B V II2179). 
For the remainder, I have used the following documents:
Account Archive Shelf Mark
Deutsch-Standesrechnung, DSR (1700-1796) StABE B VII 581-679
Welsch-Standesrechnung, WSR (1700-77; 1778-97) StABE B VII 762-837; ACV Bp 4
Auslandische Gelder/Fonds, AUS (1710-1796) StABE B VII2396-2473 and 2389
Salzdirektion, SDI (1700-1797) StABE B V 481-578
Schatzgewolbe [Cash Reserve] (1750-1790) StABE B VII 2520a
Komherr, KOR (1760-1796) StABE B VI261-285
Table VII-4: Accounts included in Long-Run Database
Factual Categorisation of Long-run Data
The re-classification of categories from the General-Bilanzen followed the list below. 
I have used a modernised German spelling for the original categories.
Revenue:
Taxation: Umgeld; Zolle und Geleit; Abgaben im Kaufliaus; Abzug im Ausland angelegte 
Fonds; Steuern und Tribut; Audienz-, Naturalisations- undLegitimationsgeld; Abgabe auf 
fremdem Wein; Bussen; Lehesempfangsgeld; Habitantengeld; Konfiskationen; Badisches 
Jahrgeld; Fiskal- und verschiedene Einnahmen;
Entrepreneurial Returns: Post-Regal; Pfrund-Tax Geld; Marechaussee-Anlagen; 
Buchdruckerei-Zins; Stadt. Weinschenk; Gewinn der Pulver-Handlung; Realer Profit 
Salzdirektion (auf Handlungs-Kapital); Fabrikation (abzuglich Pensionen und 
Gratifikationen); Profit; Zinsen auf Kapital; Ertrag auswartiger Geldanlage; Current 
Revenue from Salt Trade Account (see Section VII-16).
Arrears from Bailiffs: Amtsrestanzen; Restanzen.
Other Current Revenue: Recognitionen; vermischte Einnahmen; Verschiedenes.
Loans: Ablosungen; An Alten Restanzen;Einnahmen aus Malacridanischen Effecten. 
Divestments: Verkauftes;verkaufte Hauser; Weinverkauf; Getreideverkauf; Gebaudeverkauf. 
Salt Inventory Reduction: = Reduction in Salt Inventory (see Section VII-16).
Cash Reserve Withdrawals: Aus dem Schatzgewdlbe.
For Salt Transactions (Current, Profit, Inventory), see Section VII-16.
[see expenditure overleaf]
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Expenditure:
Personnel Cost: Odrinari Pensionen; Pensionen fur Zoll-Commissen; Verdienste; Bezahlte 
Wein-Pensionen; Zehrungen; Tiicher Ehrfarb; Ammen-Lohn, Arzt-Lohn; Handwerk; 
Scharfrichter; Extra-Pensionen.
Military Expenditure: Land-Major und militarische Unkosten; Beitrage an Gamison 
Aarburg, Stadtwacht und Zeughaus; Ausgaben fur Luzernische und Neuenburger Unruhen; 
geliefertes Pulver (an Zeughaus); Musterungen; Militarische Unkosten.
Other Public Consumption: Strassen-Arbeit (Stadt und Region); Kriminalkosten; Neue 
Gebaude und Gebaudereparationen; Bibliothek; Ausbesserung der Staats-Schaubiihne 
(Stadttheater); Wein: lesen und keltem; Reben Herstellung; Beitrage an Strassen-Cassa, 
Bau-Amt, Strassen-Reparation /  Zoll-Kassa, an Obrigkeitl. Holz-Entreprise, an Pferdezucht- 
Kommission; Indemsisationen; Unterhalt Salzwerke, Pensionen; Gebdudereparation und 
Entlohnung Salpeterleute; Gesandtschaften; Reitldhne; Gemeine Ausgaben (Zehrungen, 
Tiicher, Gemdldesammlung etc.); Vermischte Ausgaben; Current expenditure from Salt Trade 
Account (see Section VII-16).
Passive Arrears to Bailiffs: bezahlte Restanzen (Passivrestanzen).
Transfers: Brandsteuem und andere Steuern; Badenkuren; Prosemel; Almosen; Stiftungen, 
Pfarrern, Studenten; Pfrund- Verbesserungen; zuriickgegebene Lober; Beitrag an Amt Oron, 
an Welsche Predicaturen, an Gross-Almosen-Direktion, an Exulantenkammer.
Loans: Angewandte Kapitalien; Giiltenbriefe.
Investments: Erkauft und Angewendet; Erkaufte Gebaud; zugekaufte Wohnungen; Verlust 
an verkauften Hausern; Gelieferte Gelder fur die Ankauf Fremder Frucht; Getreide-Ankauf; 
Lehenskauf; Erkauftes.
Salt Inventory Increase: = Difference in Salt Inventory (see Section VII-16).
Cash Reserve Deposits: Lieferung ins Schatzgewdlbe.
For Salt Transactions (Current, Inventory), see Section VII-16.
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vii-7 Addditional Graphs and Analyses to Chapter III
H D SR  ■  WSR D A U S □  SDI D CAS B O ther
Figure VII-3: Revenue by Account, 1700-1796 (Yearly)
Sources: Long-run Database (see Section VII-6 for details). This figure is the equivalent of Figure III-9.
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Figure VIM: Expenditure by Account, 1700-1796 (Yearly)
Sources: Long-run Database (see Section VII-6 for details). This figure is the equivalent of Figure III-10.
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Figure VII-5: Revenue by Category, 1700-1796 (Yearly)
Sources: Long-run Database (see Section VII-6 for details). This figure is the equivalent o f Figure III-12.
Appendix 314
□  Cash Reserve
□  Loans
□  Salt Inventory
□  Investment 
H Military Exp
□  Salt Purchase 
B  Passive Arrears
□  Consumption 
^  Personnel
Figure VII-6: Expenditure by Category, 1700-1796 (Yearly)
Sources: Long-run Database (see Section VII-6 for details). This figure is the equivalent of Figure 111-13.
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Cash Reserve 1270: 14.5m BzCash Reseije 1710: 36.5mBz
■  A Arrears 
□  A Salt Inventory 
B A Cash Reserve
m Bz
Loans 1710:36.8mBz
□  A Current (excl Arrears)
□  A Investment 
H A Loans
Figure VII-7: Net Contributions by Category, 1700-1796 (Yearly)
Sources: Long-run Database (see Section Vli-6 for details). Please note that the graph uses two different scales. The composition of the data changed in 1764 and 1794, hence the 
vertical lines.
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vii-8 Categorisation of the General-Tabllen and Special- 
Tabellen
The categories of General-Tabellen (StABE B VII2520) were based on the more detailed 
Special-Tabellen (StABE B VII2521), which are listed below.
Einnahm-Tabelle an Pfenningen
1. Unablosige Lehensgerechtigkeiten,
als: Bodenzinse, Ehrschatze, Lober, Todtfalle, Herrschaftszinsen, Ewige Anerkennntnisse, Tagwnergelder, 
Erdeinschlags-Concessionen, Ehfede-Zinsen u.
2. Zehnden, Domainen, Pachtzinsen;
dahin gehoren: Abtrag von Sommerungen, Waldungen, Fischetzen und Zinstragender Gebaude
3. Zinsen von ablosigen Capitalien
(nach einer Druchschnitt-Rechnung des verschiedenen Zunsfuss von den im letzten Jahr des Decenniums sich 
vorfindenden Capitalien)
4. Lands-Abgaben und Telle
4.1 Marechaussee
4.2 Tavemengeld
4.3 Bottengeld
4.4 Ohmgeld
4.5 Abzug
4.6 Feuerstattgeld
4.7 Brugsommer, Zoll, Geleit
4.8 Trattengeld
5. Judicatur-Gelder
5.1 Bussen, Gefangenschaft
5.2 Betreibungs-Botten
5.3 Konfiskationen
6. Dem Fisco zufallende Obrigkeitliche Gefalle
An Naturalien [Durchschnitt von 10 Jahren]
An Getreid
1. Lehensgerechtigkeiten
2. Zehnden, Domainen und Pachtzinse
3. Landsabgaben und Telle
An Wein
1. Lehensgerechtigkeiten
2. Zehnden, Domainen und Pachtzinse
3. Landsabgaben und Telle
I have classified the categories as follows: 1, = Rents; 2 = Tithes; 3 = Interests; 4, 5 and 6 = 
Duties and Taxes -  Transactions in grain and wine: 1 = Rents; 2 = Tithes; 3 = Duties and 
Taxes
In addition to these catgories, the General-Tabellen also included Strassengelder u. Zolle 
(which I classified as Duties and Taxes), Bergwerk u. Miinzstatt ^Entrepreneurial Returns), 
Grosse Salzhandlung (= Entrepreneurial), Pulver und Salpeterhandlung (= 
Entrepreneurial), Holz, Torf undManufaktur-Verkauf (= Entrepreneurial), Von Gemein 
Eydgenossischen Amtern (=Rents).
[Expenditure discussed overleaf]
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The headings for Expenditure in the General-Tabellen were:
Ausgaben-Tabelle an Pfenningen
1. Besoldungen, Amts-Beneflcum und Pensionen
2. Gratifikationen
2.1 Ordinaria
2.2 Extraordinaria
3. Militair-Anstalten
3.1 Schiess- und Zihlgelder
3.2 Musterungsplatze, Tambour-Majoren, Einquartierungen
4. Armen-Anstalten
4.1 Almosen, Steuem, Prosemel, Mutschen, Abendbrot
4.2 Verpflegung von Pfrundem, Sauglingen oder Ammenkindem, Aerzet-Lohn, Badenfahrten, Tischgelder, 
Begrabniskosten
4.3 Brand- und Hochgewitter-Steuem
5. Gebaude und Bausachen
5.1 Neue Gebaude
5.21 Reparationen: Schlosser und Dependenzen, 1st alle ihre Rural- und Oekonomie-Gebaude
5.22 Reparationen: Oeffentliche Gebaude, als: Komhauser, Zeughauser, Gefangenschaften, Officialen- 
Wohnungen, Wachthauser
5.23 Reparationen: Landschreiberey und Dependenzen
5.24 Reparatioinen: Pfarrhauser und Dependenzen
5.25 Reparationen: Chor und Thiirme der Krichen
5.3 Baumaterialien in Vorrat
6. Oeffentliche Polizey- und Administrations-Anstalten
6.1 Marechaussee und Patrouilleurs, Betteljagden
6.2 Sanitats-Anstalten
6.3 Strassen und Briicken
6.4 Schwellenunterhaltung, Raumung der Wuhren, Riinsen und Flusse
6.5 Brandanstalten
6.6 Geheime Ratsausgaben
6.7 Speer- und Extra-Polizeianstalten
6.8 Schiess- und Weidgelder zu Ausrottung schadlicher Tiere
7. Gefangenschaft- und Criminal-Unkosten
8. Unterricht und Religions-Anstalten
8.1 Nachtmahlwein, Schulpfennige und Bucher
9. Cameral-Ausgaben
9.1 Getreid- und Weinbesorgung
9.2 Zehnd-Schatzung- und Verleihungskosten, Bodenzinstrager-Lohne
9.3 Steuren an Fuhrungen
9.4 Forstwesen
9.5 Dominal-Unkosten, als: Einfristung, Brunnen- imd Wasserleitungen, Holzaufmacher-Lohne, Emdt- und 
Herbstkosten, Obrigkeitliches Werkzeug, Schiff und Gschirr
10. Ankauf neuer Domainen, Lehengsrechtigkeiten und Liegenschaften
11. Zehrgelder, Mahlzeiten, Gesandtschaften
12. Amtshuldigungen, Installationen, Ritt- und Bottenldhne, Prozssunkosten, Planimetrationen, Marchungen, 
Publikationen, Schreibmaterialien und kleine Ausgaben
[continued overleaf]
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[Categories of expenditure in the General-Tabellen, continued]
An Naturalien [Durchschnitt von 10 Jahren]
An Getreid
1. Besoldungen und Pensionen
2. Gratifikationen
3. Militair-Anstalten. Als Mustungs-Haber und Fourrage
4. Brandsteuren und Almosen
5. Getreidebesorungs-Kosten, als Abgang, Kastenschweinung, Amts-Beneficum in Natura 
An We in
1. Besoldungen und Pensionen
2. Gratifikationen
2.1 Ordinaria
2.2 Extraordinaria
3. Weinbesorgungs-Kosten, als Abgang und Amts-Beneficum in Natura
I have classified these categories as follows:
Monetary transactions: 1 and 2 = Personnel Cost; 3 = Military; 4 = Transfers; 5-12 = 
Consumption
Grain transactions: 1 and 2 = Personnel Cost; 3 = Military; 4 = Transfers; 5 = Consumption 
Wine transactions: 1 and 2 = Personnel Cost; 3 = Consumption.
The General-Tabellen included the additional categories Bergwerk zu Kiittigen u. Miihletal 
(classified as Consumption), Geheime Raths Ausgaben (= Consumption) and Gemein 
Eydgendssische Amter Ausgaben (= Consumption).
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vii-9 Data Selection 
Sampling
I have collected information on all accounts of the Bernese state for which the 
financial year ended between 1 January and 31 December 1732 or 1782. If the period 
was spilt between two ledgers -  which was the case during an office handover -  then 
both accounts were selected. If the records of an account finishing in 1732 were 
missing or incomplete, those of the following or previous year were selected, 
depending on availability.
Section VII-9 contains a detailed list of accounts that were included in the database. 
Selection criteria included a regional balance, for which the canton was divided into 
its five main geographical regions: Argovia, Vaud, Oberland, Oberaargau/Emmental 
and Seeland. In addition, accounts from institutions of the city and surrounding areas 
constitute the category Bern (or, Institutions). For each region, I have randomly 
selected five accounts, of which at least one was former monastic institution, which 
had a distinctly different financial structure.823 Table VII-5 shows what proportion of 
net transactions the database covers for each region as a percentage of total revenue.
1732 1782
Region Selection Revenue Expenditure Revenue Expenditure
Argovia 5/7 73.68% 75.32% 87.33% 82.92%
OberAG 5/11 39.81% 44.65% 40.72% 47.33%
Oberland 5/10 68.75% 68.43% 84.51% 81.49%
Seeland 5/9 57.38% 51.67% 54.08% 53.42%
Vaud 5/14 70.00% 67.71% 67.88% 71.65%
Institutions 15/34* 84.23% 86.84% 63.50% 62.52%
Total (D) 40/83 70.86% 71.86% 65.70% 65.94%
*) some only existed in either year: 13/19 (1732), 15/28 (1782)
Weighting Factor
1732 1782
1.3410 1.1693
2.3710 2.2798
1.4583 1.2083
1.8400 1.8599
1.4514 1.4325
1.1686 1.5862
Table VII-5: Amount of Transactions Covered by Database and Weighting Factors (D-Type 
Accounts Only)
Source: Extended Database, net transactions including grain sales824 -  The row Selection shows the 
number of accounts selected (usually 5) out of all counties in this region. All other rows show the 
amount of net transactions covered by the sample database. All transactions were converted into 
Batzen as specified in Section VII-13. The weighting factor was calculated as the inverse relationship 
of the sample size to the total (revenue and expenditure added) for each region.
Regional differences in the coverage are considerable. For the Oberaargau and 
Emmental regions, the database covers less than half, for Seeland slightly more than 
half of the government’s transactions; Oberland and Argovia are well included, as are 
Institutions within the city. Their coverage is smaller in 1782 because of an increase 
in absolute number. In order to compare the figures of the D-Type accounts sample 
with A- and B-Types, I have weighted all D-Type transactions by the factor shown in
822 See Section VII-5 for details.
823 Former monasteries were used as asylums or hospitals and fulfilled social duties (mainly poverty 
relief).
824 1 could not exclude grain sales because their amount is unknown for summary accounts.
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Table VII-5 (column Weighting Factor). This factor was calculated for each region as 
the inverse relationship of transactions in the database to total transactions.825
Net Transactions
All transactions that were only made for accounting purposes inflate revenue and 
expenditure unnecessarily for an analysis of fiscal redistribution. Although such 
transactions can contain information that is relevant in other contexts, they have to be 
excluded from my database.826 The most important exclusions are arrears, transfers 
(both between and within accounts) and grain sales.
The reasons for excluding arrears from net transactions follow from their 
characteristic as an officeholder’s debt to the state, which did not increase 
government revenue (see Section VII-5). The amount of arrears was recorded both in 
the Standesrechnungen (as revenue) and in the bailiff accounts (as expenditure), and 
therefore cancelled each other out. An inclusion in my analysis would therefore only 
inflate figures for revenue and expenditure. As explained in Section III-1, the overall 
difference between revenue and expenditure (budget surplus) should equal the change 
in the government’s claims towards officeholders, which have the function of 
retained earnings. The exclusion of inventory and closing balances for accounts 
using double-entry bookkeeping follows the same logic.
Similar arguments apply to transfer payments between accounts. These range from 
assignations to the Standesrechngen worth several hundred thousand crowns to puny 
contributions for poverty relief that were transferred to bailiff accounts by 
government chambers. These figures could safely be excluded from an analysis of net 
transactions since they were recorded in both the sender and recipient account and did 
not contribute to the net financial position of the state.827
In addition to payments from one account to another, I also had to exclude 
transactions within the same account, which were mostly related to the handling of 
the office inventory. This refers to the issues discussed in the Restanzen system 
(Section VII-5). The inventory arrears which every officeholder included in his ledger 
did not constitute net revenue for the state, and therefore had to be deducted from 
total revenue. I have also excluded inventory transactions in kind for those 
entrepreneurial accounts that used double-entry bookkeeping. On the other hand, 
information from arrears was used to calculate overall error quotas for the database, 
which are remarkably low (see Section VII-11). Arrears could also be used to 
determine changes in the public inventory over the sample year. If the opening 
balances are compared to the closing balances and arrears, the difference shows by 
how much the public inventory has increased or decreased.
Grain sales by the government are a special type of transfer within the same account. 
The bailiffs recorded how much grain they sold: the proceeds counted as revenue in 
cash, while the grain sold was listed as expenditure in kind. These transactions 
contain important information about which currencies were used in Bernese accounts,
825 Revenue and expenditure were added for this purpose.
826 The opposite situation is true for transactions for the militia army, which we know occurred but 
were not recorded in the accounts (see Section IV-5).
827 Transfer payments to and from C-Type accounts (which were not included in the database) were 
classified as revenue and expenditure. Otherwise all transactions recorded in these accounts would 
have been excluded from the analysis.
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and about how monetised state finance was. However, if all transactions are 
converted into monetary units, grain sales only represent a transfer from one currency 
(grain) to another (money); overall state revenue did not increase by selling grain. 
They were therefore excluded from the database. Revenue and expenditure from grain 
sales -  which per definition should be equal in monetary values -  accounted for 
5.32% of total revenue in 1732 and 7.60% in 1782.828 When compared to the net 
grain income in litres, 29.3% of grain was sold in 1732 and 24% in 1782.829 Table 
VII-19 shows the amount of grain sold in litres for each type of grain separately.
The same applies to wine sales, which were also recorded twice, as monetary revenue 
and expenditure in kind. However, it seems that the recording of wine sales was less 
accurate: the overall sum of sales recorded as inventory reduction does not match the 
monetary income. On several occasions officials sold wine without registering the 
transaction in kind. This is because in some counties, the wine inventory was kept 
separately and was not included in the bailiffs regular accounts. The overall 
differences are relatively small, however. Overall, wine sales accounted for 1.03% of 
net revenue in 1732 and for 0.86% in 1782. When measured in litres, the Bernese 
state sold 40% of its net revenue in wine in 1732 and 29% in 1782 (see Table VII-14 
for a regional breakdown).
The situation for salt sales is different, since salt was not used as a currency of 
account the way grain and wine were. This is because the government did not have 
any direct revenue that accrued in salt, except for the relatively small domestic salt 
production. The state therefore had to buy salt in monetary units. Other than grain 
sales, salt sales were not counter-booked by inventory adjustments in kind.83 In other 
words, salt trade was a commercial activity by the state, while grain sales were only 
an accounting adjustment that generated no net income. Accordingly, all proceeds 
from salt sales had to be included in an analysis of net transactions by the state. I have 
divided the government’s proceeds from salt sales into the three components current 
trade, inventory change and monopoly profit, which is discussed in detail in section 
VII-16.
To obtain the net revenue of summary accounts, arrears of the current and previous 
year were subtracted from total revenue. What remained unspecified, compared to the 
net transactions of the database, are transfer payments to other accounts. From the 
database it seems that these were not very important: net transfers between accounts
O O  1
only represented 1.61% of total net transactions.
828 Source: Database. Total revenue excludes transfer payments. I had to include grain sales for the 
weighting factor of accounts because the amount of grain sales in summary accounts is unknown.
829 These figures should only be considered rough estimates, however, since grain litres were simply 
added across all types of grain.
830 In reality, the salt accounts included inventory lists in salt and money, but only the latter were used 
for accounting purposes.
831 Net transfers are defined as transfers between accounts, excluding transfers within the same 
account, such as previous arrears (which make up the largest part of transfers in the database). The 
exact figures (for D-Type accounts only) are 1.06% (1732) and 2.39% (1782) for revenue and 2.38% 
(1732) and 0.08% (1782) for total expenditure.
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Filenames
The filenames for accounts included in the database consist of several attributes. 
a) Three letters describing the account/office (see next list of abbreviations 
overleaf); capital letters were used for accounts included in the database, small 
letters for those from the exended database.
b) 3 digits to identify the year (leaving the first 1 out, i.e. 732 for 1782)
c) if necessary one additional digit to signifiy if there were more than one 
account in the same year.
As an example, the filename AAR7322 stands for the second account for the county 
of Aarberg in 1732.
Types of Bernese Accounts
For the distinction in A-B-C and D-Types see Section III-3.
A-TYPES: Deutsch-Standesrechnung (DSR), Welsch-Standesrechnung (WSR).
B-TYPES: Auslandische Kapitalien (AUS), Salzproduktion La Roche (ROC), Salzdirektion
(SDI), Pluverrechnung (PUL).
C-TYPES: Integrated in DSR: Abzugrechnung, Burgerkammer, Chorschreiber, Chorweibel,
Collegio Insulanio, Freiweibel, Grossweibel, Kaufhaus (later in General Customs account),
Staatsschreiber, Stadt-Physicus, Werkmeister.
Dr  TYPES: District /  Bailiff Accounts
Argovia: Aarburg (ABU), Biberstein (BIB), Kastelen (kas), Koenigsfelden (KOE), Lenzburg 
(LEN), Schenkenberg (sbg), Zofingen (ZOF).
Oberaargau / Emmental: Aarwangen (ARW), Bipp (bip), Brandis (BRA), Burgdorf (bur), 
Fraubrunnen (fra), Hettiswly (het), Landshut (lan), Signau (SIG), Sumiswald (sum), 
Torberg (TOR), Wangen (WAN).
Oberland: Frutigen (FRU), Hasli (has), Interlaken (INT), Interlaknerhaus Thun (ITH), 
Niedersimmental (nsi), Oberhofen (obe), Obersimmental (osi), Saanen (saa), Thun 
(THU), Unterseen (UNT).
Seeland: Aarberg (AAR), Buchsee (buc), Buren (bue), Erlach (ERL), Friensiberg (FRE), 
Gottstatt (got), St. Johannsen (joh), Laupen (LAU), Nidau (NID).
Vaud: Aigle (aig)832, Aubonne (aub), Avenches (ave), Bonmont (bon), Lausanne (LSN), 
Morges (mor), Moudon (MOU), Nyon (NYO), Oron (oro), Payeme (pay), 
Romainmotier (ROM), Vevey (vev), Villeneuve (vil), Yverdon (YVE).
D2-TYPES: Public Institutions
In Bern (excluding Landgerichte): Buchsen-Almosen (alb), Stadt-Almosen (als), Bauherr 
von Burgem (BHB), Bospfennig (BPF), Frienisberghaus Bern (ffb), Grosses Spital 
(GSP), Grossweibel (gwr), Interlaknerhaus Bern (INB), St. Johannserhaus Bern (JOB), 
Koniz (koz), Mushafen (MUS), Schallen- und Arbeitshaus (sah), Schenkenberg (sbg), 
Schulsackel (SLS), Stiff (STI), Stadtwacht (stw), Umgeld (UMG).
832 Aigle (AIG) was accountable to the Deutsch-Standesrechnung (DSR), although it was French- 
speaking.
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Other public institutions: Armengut Pays de Gex (apg), Eisenbergwerk Kiittingen (eis), 
Exulantenkammer (exk), Gamison Aarburg (gar), Komherr (KOR), Landes- 
Oekonomiekommission (lak), Oberlandische Holz-Entreprise (ohe), Silber (sil), 
Strassen (str), Deutsch-Weinschenk (WED), Welsch-Weinschenk (WEW), Zeughaus 
(ZEU), Ziegelproduktion (zie), Deutsche Zolldirektion (ZOD), Welsche Zolldirektion 
(ZOW).
Excluded:
Condominions with other Swiss states: Murten, Grandson/Echallens, Baden, Frauenfeld, 
Thurgau, Rheintal, Mendrisio.
Landgerichte: Konolfingen (kon), Seftigen (sef), Stemenberg (ste), Zollikofen (zol).
Unknown accounts or lack o f records: The following accounts were mentioned in 
eighteenth-century lists but records are not available. Some of them may not have existed for 
1732 or 1782, or were integrated into other accounts: Commissariats-Rechnung, Gross- 
Almosen, Holz und Torf, Illuminsationsrechnung, Kanzlei, Kirchmeyer, Kommerzienrat, 
Lizenz-Gelder, Landsassen und Fundel, Miinzwardein, Munz-Fabrikation, Oberhofen 
Stiftsamman, Pferdezuchtkommission, Sanitatsrechnung, Stadtbach, Toleranz-Gelder, 
Torffechnung, Waisenhaus.
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Account Abbreviations
AAR Aarberg LSN Lausanne
ABU Aarburg MOR Morges (Morsee)
AIG Aigle (Ahlen) MOU Moudon (Lucens, Milden)
ALB Biichsen-Almosen MUS Mushafen
ALS Handwerk- und Stadtalmosen NID Nidau
APG Armengut Pays de Gex NSI Nieder-Simmental (Wimmis)
ARW Aarwangen NYO Nyon (Neus)
AUB Aubonne ORO Oron
AUS Auslandische Kapitalien OHE Oberlandische Holzentreprise
AVE Avenches (Wiflisburg) OBE Oberhofen
BHB Bauherr von Burgem OSI Ober-Simmental (Blankenburg, Zweisimmen)
BIB Biberstein PAY Payeme
BIP Bipp PUL Pulver-Rechnung
BON Bonmont ROC La Roche (Salzwerk)
BPF Bospfennig ROM Romainmotier
BRA Brandis SAA Saanen
BUC Buchsee (Miinchenbuchsee) SAH Schallen- und Arbeitshaus
BUE Buren SBG Schenkenberg
BUR Burgdorf SDI Salzdirektion
DSR Detusch-Standesrechnung SIG Signau
EIS Eisenbergwerk Kiittingen SIL Silberhandlung
ERL Erlach SLS Schulsackel
EXK Exulantenkammer STI Stift (Chorherrenstift)
FRA Fraubrunnen STR Strassenrechnung
FRB Frienisberhaus Bern STW Stadtwacht
FRE Frienisberg SUM Sumiswald
FRU Frutigen THU Thun
GAR Gamison Aarburg TOR Thorberg
GOT Gottstatt TRA Trachselwald
GWR Grossweibel-Rechnung UMG Umgeld
GSP Grosser Spital UNT Unterseen
HAS Hasli VEV Vevey (Vivis)
HET Hettiswil VIL Villeneuve (Neuenstadt)
INB Interlaknerhaus Bern WAN Wangen [= Wangen an der Aare]
INT Interlaken WED Deutsch-Weinschenk
ITH Interlaknerhaus Thun WEW Welsch-Weinschenk
JOB Johannserhaus Bern WSR Welsch-Standesrechnung
JOH St. Johannsen YVE Yverdon (Ifferten)
KAS Kastelen (Castelen) ZIE Ziegelrechnung
KOE Konigsfelden ZEU Zeughaus
KOR Komherr ZOD Deutsche Zolldirektion
KOZ Koniz ZOF Zofmgen
LAK Lands-Almosen-Kommission ZOW Welsche Zolldirektion
LAN Landshut
LAU Laupen See also list of accounts on the previous page
LEN Lenzburg
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Accounts Included in the Database and Summary Accounts: Details
Account Type Region weight ltr wine ltr grain from tm Reference
AAR7321 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.67 14.00 15/01/1731 16/11/1731 StABE B VII 853
AAR7322 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.67 14.00 16/11/1731 04/02/1732 StABE B VII 853
ABU7321 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 26.03 13/03/1731 29/09/1731 StAAGBd. 31
ABU7322 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 26.03 29/09/1731 18/03/1732 StAAG Bd. 32
ARW7321 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 01/05/1731 01/11/1731 StABE B VII 1261
ARW7322 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 01/05/1731 01/05/1732 StABE B VII 883
AUS732 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 01/03/1731 01/03/1732 StABE B V II1261
BHB7321 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 03/03/1731 01/09/1731 StABE B X  47
BHB7322 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/09/1731 10/03/1732 StABE B X  48
BEB732 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 14.00 30/01/1731 05/02/1732 StAAG Bd. 489
BPF732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.33 22.52 12/05/1731 12/05/1732 StABE B VIII 570
BRA732 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 31/01/1731 14/02/1732 StABE B V II1104
DSR732 A BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 26/12/1731 26/12/1732 StABE B VII 613
ERL732 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.67 14.00 24/01/1731 13/02/1732 StABE B V n  1265
FRE732 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.67 14.00 22/01/1731 11/02/1732 StABE B V n  1363
FRU732 D1 OBE 1.4583 1.67 14.00 08/02/1731 27/02/1732 StABE B V II1393
GSP732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/01/1732 31/12/1732 B B B V A B SB  3.3 R G 1 18
INB732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 22/01/1731 12/02/1732 StABE B VII935
INT732 D1 OBE 1.4583 1.67 14.00 05/03/1731 17/03/1732 StABE B V II1487
ITH732 D1 OBE 1.4583 1.66 14.00 08/05/1731 08/05/1732 StABE B VII2025
JOB732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.76 14.00 01/02/1731 21/02/1732 StABE B VII962
KOE732 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 14.00 08/03/1731 01/04/1732 StAAG Bd. 489
KOR732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/01/1732 31/12/1732 StABE B V I250
LAU732 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.42 22.12 01/02/1731 20/02/1732 StABE B V n  1595
LEN732 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 14.00 28/02/1731 27/03/1732 StAAG Bd. 842
LSN7321 D1 VD 1.4514 1.56 22.52 25/03/1731 01/01/1732 ACV BP 32/32
LSN7322 D1 VD 1.4514 1.16 13.70 01/01/1732 05/04/1732 ACV BP 32/33
MOU732 D1 VD 1.4514 1.16 13.70 16/02/1731 16/02/1732 ACV BP 34/29
MUS733 D2 BE 1.1686 1.41 11.73 01/03/1732 01/03/1733 StABE B in  1158
NID732 D1 SEE 1.8400 1.67 14.00 17/01/1731 06/02/1732 StABE B V II1632
NY0732 D1 VD 1.4514 1.67 14.00 25/03/1731 13/04/1732 ACV BP 35/25
PUL732 B BE 1.0000 1.34 17.18 01/11/1731 31/10/1732 StABE B II 546
ROC732 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 01/07/1731 01/07/1732 StABE B V 782
ROM732 D1 VD 1.4514 1.67 16.36 11/02/1731 11/02/1732 ACV BP 40/35
SDI732 B BE 1.0000 2.18 14.00 24/06/1731 24/06/1732 StABE B V  513
SIG732 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 16/01/1731 05/02/1732 StABE B V II1858
SLS732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/01/1731 31/12/1732 StABE B in  1100
STI732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/01/1732 31/12/1732 StABE B Vn 1000
THU732 D1 OBE 1.4583 1.67 14.00 29/09/1731 29/09/1732 StABE B VII2025
TOR732 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 01/05/1731 01/05/1732 StABE B V II1979
TRA732 D1 OAE 2.3710 1.67 14.00 01/03/1731 12/03/1732 StABE B VII 2067
UMG732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 05/05/1731 05/05/1732 StABE B V in  501
UNT732 D1 OBE 1.4583 1.67 14.00 08/02/1731 18/03/1732 StABE B VII2099
WED732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/09/1731 01/09/1732 StABE B VIII 630
WEW732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 25/03/1731 13/04/1732 ACV BK 41/24
WSR732 A BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 25/12/1731 25/12/1732 StABE B VII 793
YVE732 D1 VD 1.4514 1.35 14.00 06/03/1731 06/03/1732 ACV BP 42/33
ZEU732 D2 BE 1.1686 1.67 14.00 01/09/1731 31/08/1732 StABE B n  750
ZOF732 D1 AG 1.3410 1.67 14.00 14/02/1731 06/03/1732 StAAGBd. 1675
Table VII-6: Accounts included in Database: Details [continued on next page]
See comments on page 326.
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Account Region weight ltr wine ltr grain from till Reference
AAR782 D1 SEE 1.8599 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1783 StABE B VII 862
ABU782 D1 AG 1.1693 1.67 26.03 26/02/1781 25/02/1782 StAAG B d 38
ARW782 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 08/03/1781 28/02/1782 StABE B Vn 890
AUS782 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 01/03/1781 01/03/1782 StABE B Vn 2449
BDR782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 26.03 01/05/1781 01/05/1782 StABE B V  203
BIB782 D1 AG 1.1693 1.33 22.52 01/03/1781 01/03/1782 StAAGBd 251
BPF782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 07/04/1781 30/03/1782 StABE B V ni 573A
BPFAU782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/05/1781 01/05/1781 StABE B Vn 610
BPFIN782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 31/12/1781 01/01/1782 StABE B V ni 589
BRA782 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 01/01/1781 31/12/1781 StABE B Vn 1109
DSR782 A BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 25/12/1781 25/12/1782 StABE B Vn 664
ERL782 D1 SEE 1.8599 1.67 14.00 19/03/1781 07/03/1782 StABE B Vn 1271
FRE782 D1 SEE 1.8599 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B Vn 1370
FRU7821 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 30/09/1782 StABE B V n  1397
FRU7822 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.67 14.00 28/10/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B V n  1398
GSP782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 31/12/1782 BBB VABSB 3.3 R G I68
INB7821 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/07/1782 StABE B V II941
INB7822 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/07/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B Vn 942
INT782 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.66 14.00 08/02/1781 06/02/1782 StABE B V n  1495
ITH782 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.76 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1783 StABE B Vn 2036
JOB782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B VH 967
KOE782 D1 AG 1.1693 1.42 22.12 01/01/1782 31/12/1782 StAAG B d 498
KOR782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1782 StABE B VI 271a
LAU782 D1 SEE 1.8599 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1783 StABE BVH 1602
LEN782 D1 AG 1.1693 1.56 22.52 04/04/1781 20/03/1782 StAAG B d 849
LSN7821 D1 VD 1.4325 1.16 13.70 09/03/1781 28/10/1781 ACV BP 32/40
LSN7822 D1 VD 1.4325 1.16 13.70 28/10/1781 08/03/1782 ACV BP 32/41
MOU7821 D1 VD 1.4325 1.41 11.73 09/02/1781 27/10/1781 ACV BP 34/37
MOU7822 D1 VD 1.4325 1.41 11.73 27/10/1781 25/01/1782 ACV BP 34/38
MUS782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 14/02/1781 14/02/1782 StABE B H I 1163
NID782 D1 SEE 1.8599 1.67 14.00 25/01/1781 24/01/1782 StABE B Vn 1639
NY0782 D1 VD 1.4325 1.34 17.18 06/04/1781 22/03/1782 ACV BP 35/33
PUL782 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 31/12/1781 31/12/1782 StABE B n, 555
ROC782 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 01/07/1781 01/07/1782 StABE B V  831
ROM782 D1 VD 1.4325 2.18 16.36 01/02/1781 31/01/1782 ACV BP 40/44
SDI782 B BE 1.0000 1.67 14.00 24/06/1781 24/06/1782 StABE B V 563a
SIG7821 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 28/10/1782 StABE B Vn 1864
SIG7822 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 26.03 28/10/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B Vn 1865
SLS782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/01/1781 01/01/1782 StABE B m  1108
STI782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 19/02/1782 23/02/1782 StABE B Vn 1021
THU782 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1783 StABE B V n  1261
TOR782 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 01/01/1782 01/01/1783 StABE B Vn 1987
TRA7821 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 01/02/1781 28/10/1781 StABE B Vn 2075
TRA7822 D1 OAE 2.2798 1.67 14.00 28/10/1781 21/01/1782 StABE B Vn 2076
UMG782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/04/1781 01/04/1782 StABE B V n i 511
UNT782 D1 OBE 1.2083 1.67 14.00 31/12/1781 31/12/1782 StABE B V n  2102
WED782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.67 14.00 01/09/1781 01/09/1782 StABE B Vni 636
YVE782 D1 VD 1.4325 1.67 14.00 10/01/1782 31/12/1782 ACV BP 42/42
ZEU782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.59 12.83 01/01/1782 01/01/1782 StABE B n  796
ZOD782 D2 BE 1.5862 1.59 12.83 01/01/1782 31/12/1782 StABE B Vni 176
ZOF7821 D1 AG 1.1693 1.67 14.00 07/03/1781 30/09/1781 StAAGBd 1682
ZOF7822 D1 AG 1.1693 1.67 26.03 01/10/1781 07/03/1782 StAAGBd 1683
ZOW782 D2 AG 1.1693 1.67 14.00 24/06/1781 24/06/1782 StABE B Vni 220
Table VII-6: Accounts included in Database: Details
See comments on page 326.
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Account Reg. ltr (w) ltr (g) Reference Account Reg. ltr (w) ltr(g) Reference
aig7321 VD 1.43 22.52 ACVBp 25/11 aig782 VD 1.43 18.55 ACVBp 25/21
aig7322 VD 1.43 22.52 ACVBp 25/12 apg782 VD 1.43 17.18 [in NY0782]
alb732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B X n 173 aub7821 VD 1.50 14.51 ACVBp 26/13
als732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B X n  164 aub7822 VD 1.50 14.51 ACVBp 26/14
apg732 VD 1.35 22.52 [inNY0732] ave782 VD 1.57 15.95 ACVBp 27/43
aub732 VD 1.50 14.51 ACVBp 26/5 bip782 OAE 1.67 13.24 StABE B W  1080
ave732 VD 1.57 15.95 ACVBp 27/35 bon782 VD 1.35 15.95 ACVBp 28/31
bip732 OAE 1.67 13.24 StABE B V II1074 buc782 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1145
bon732 VD 1.35 22.52 ACVBp 28/23 bue782 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  1183
buc732 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1136 bur782 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B VH 1219
bue732 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1176 eis782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V 960a
bur 73 2 OAE 1.67 13.60 StABE B Vn 1214 exk782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B X n 283
fra732 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1314 fra782 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  1321
frb732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 909 frb782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  914
gar7321 AG 1.67 14.00 StABE B n  173 gar782 AG 1.67 14.00 StABE B n  176
gar7322 AG 1.67 14.00 StABE B n  173 got782 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n 1429
got732 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1424 gwr782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n 2235
has732 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1682 has782 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V II1683
het732 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1454 het782 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1456
joh732 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1751 joh782 SEE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V II1762
kas733 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAGBd. 1513 kan782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 2248
lan732 AG 1.67 14.00 StABE B V II1555 kas7821 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAGBd. 1518
mor732 VD 1.61 22.52 ACVBp 33/31 kas7822 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAGBd. 1519
nsi732 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V II1885 koz782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1534
obe732 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1691 lak782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B XH 189
oro732 VD 1.35 22.52 ACVBp 36/33 lan782 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  1562
osi732 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1916 mor782 VD 1.61 16.40 ACVBp 33/40
saa7321 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1712 nsi782 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B W  1890
saa7322 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1712 obe782 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1694
sah732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B IX  1314 ohe782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B VI 960
sbg7321 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAGBd. 1137 oro782 VD 1.35 13.70 ACVBp 36/41
sbg7322 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAGBd. 1137 osi782 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  1923
sil732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B VII 5341 saa782 OBE 1.67 14.00 StABE B W  1718
stw732 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B n  649 sah782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B IX 1323
sum732 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B Vn 1942 sbg782 AG 1.33 22.52 StAAG 1144
wan732 OAE 1.67 14.00 StABE B V n  2123 sil782 BE 1.67 14.00 StABE B VII 5517
str782 BE 1.67 14 StABE B X  115
stw782 BE 1.67 14 StABE B n  655
sum782 OAE 1.67 14 StABE B V n  1948
wan782 OAE 1.67 14 StABE B V II2130
zie782 BE 1.67 14 StABE B X 68
Table VII-6: Accounts included in Database: Details for Summary Accounts
Source: Database and Extended Database. Weight is the weighting factor in the database (see Section 
IV-2), ltr wine is the volume content of the major wine unit, ltr grain the equivalent for grain (see 
Section VII-13 for details). For account abbreviations, see page 324.
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vii-io Comparing Data for 1732 and 1782 with the Long-run 
Database
Comparing the results for the two sample years 1732 and 1782 is difficult for several 
reasons. First, the sample size is not identical. The accounts for the General Bilanzen 
only include all D-Type accounts through their arrears only, but not with all revenue 
and expenditure. Second, the timing of the sample might not be consistent. For the 
database, I have defined the accounting years to cover all accounts that finished 
within the calendar year; this was not always the same for the accounts in the General 
Bilanzen. For example, on 20 December 1782 the sum of 100,000 crowns (2.5m Bz) 
was taken from the cash reserve to be invested in Denmark. This transaction was 
recorded in the account for foreign funds (AUS) for 1782/83, which ran from 1 
March 1782 to 1 March 1783. It was therefore not included in the sample. Third, 
some transactions change in nature when the sample size is not identical. Notably 
payments between accounts (assignations) change their character with the sample 
size: If the corresponding account is also part of the sample, then the transfer has to 
be excluded to avoid double counting; if the corresponding account is not part of the 
sample, then the payment counts as revenue (or expenditure). And finally, the 
summary categories of the General Bilanzen can mask transactions that were only 
made for accounting purposes, such as transfers or opening balances.
If in spite of these differences an absolute budget surplus is calculated for 1732 and 
1782, the figures from the General Bilanzen are higher that from the database. For 
1732, the budget surplus from the General Bilanzen was 3.34m Bz, compared to 
2.04m when calculated from the database sample. The corresponding figures for 1782 
are 3.10m Bz (Bilanzen) and 1.98m Bz (database).
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vii-ii Error Quotas of the Database
Some of the records in the database can be used for control purposes, such as page 
sums, overall account sums or arrears. Page and account totals (summarum and 
summa summarum) have been used to assure that all records from a page, and all 
pages of an account, were included. Arrears could be used to check the overall 
accuracy of the data with the simple formula Revenue = Expenditure + Arrears. If the 
difference (R -  E + A) is expressed as a share of revenue, this is a rough indicator of 
the error quota in the database. Table VII-7 shows the error quotas of accounts in the 
database and for summary accounts.
Number of Accounts 
Total Revenue in Bz 
Total Expenditure in Bz 
Arrears (Positive) in Bz 
Passive Arrears (Negative) in Bz 
Difference in Bz 
Difference in % of Revenue 
Absolute Difference in Bz 
Absolute Difference in % of Revenue
Table VII-7: Error Quotas of Database
Source: Database (all transactions). Bz = Bernese Batzen. The Difference is calculated as (Revenue + 
Passive Arrears) -  (Expenditure + Arrears); Absoulte Difference ignores the sign of the value for 
Difference. It is shown as the sum of all differences for each single account. For summary accounts, 
Arrears and Passive Arrears have been added (the value can be negative).
The overall error quotas of -0.03% (1732) and 0.08% (1782) in the database are very 
low; they are slightly higher for summary accounts. Even if the absolute value of 
errors for each single account is considered -  which means that negative errors in one 
account do not cover positive errors in others -  the quotas remain low, around 0.5%. 
These figures include conversion and rounding errors as well as the contemporary 
inaccuracies in determining outstanding arrears.
Database
1732 1782
49 55
49,141,705 83,391,282
33,428,988 49,694,030
16,097,008 34,112,147
370,655 477,836
-13,636 62,940
-0.03% 0.08%
253,690 148,765
0.52% 0.18%
Summary Accounts
1732 1782
36 41
6,505,128 10,160,926
2,985,649 5,506,005
3,495,529 4,614,296
23,950 40,626
0.37% 0.40%
29,267 52,744
0.45% 0.52%
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vii-12 Data Categorisation
To categorise data from primary sources, I have used the custom-made software 
Schnupper-Logic, programmed as macros to Microsoft Word by Stephan 
Hagnauer.833 Documents were first transcribed entirely in the archives as word files, 
then categorised on the computer. The underlying classification scheme (‘accounting 
scheme’) is specified in Table VII-8 in German. The categories are in line with the 
analytical framework explained in Section III-2 and Section IV-1. They follow 
methods pioneered by Martin Komer.834 My accounting scheme in Table VII-8 
differs from Hagnauer’s original marginally. In particular, I have added an asterisk 
for net transactions.
The software assigns an ‘account’ (row Konto) for each category. These accounts 
were also used to define categories in my database, which were then related to the 
analytical framework. The accounts are named after their position in the hierarchy of 
categories. For certain transactions, the programme suggests a default value for the 
state function (row Fkt) and sector (row Skt). Transactions with the value div in Table 
VII-8 were assigned manually.
All transcript files can be found on the website http://www.befin.hist.unibe.ch
[see pages overleaf]
Table VII-8: Accounting Scheme for Categorisation (in German)
833 For details, see Hagnauer (1995). See also Hagnauer (1994); Hagnauer/Bartlome (1998); 
Bartlome/Hagnauer (2006).
834 Komer (1981).
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El 1NVESTITIONS-EINNAHMEN Konto Fkt Sekt Net
D DARLEHENS- UND BETEILIGUNGS-RUCKFLUSSE
B Beteiligungs-RQckflOsse El DB F div *
D Darlehens-ROckflUsse (ohne Restanzen) El DD F div *
R Restanzen-z.G.-Obrigkeit-ROckflOsse El DR F 3V *
1 INVESTtONSGLITER-VERAUSSERUNG
1 IMMOBILIEN-VERKAUFSERLOSE
G GrundstGcks-Verkaufe El IIG F div *
H Hochbauten-Verkflufe El IIH F div *
K Konglomerats-Verkaufe El UK F div *
X Obrige Immobiliar-Rechts-Verkaufe El 1IX F div *
M MOBILIEN-VERKAUFSERLOSE
B Bau-Material und Holz El 1MB F div *
F Fleischwaren El IMF F div *
G Getreide, Spreu E l IM G div div
K KulturgOter El IMK div div *
M Miichprodukte El IMM F div *
R RQstungsgdter E1IMR L div *
V Vieh El IMV div div *
W Wein El IMW div div *
R_ RECHTS-VERKAUFSERLOSE (iibrige) El IR F div *
[SLSALZ: LAGERAUFLbSUNG (in Geld) El ISL F 4 *
L LAGER-E INGANG (so im Ausgetwn gagenwrrechnet)
G Getreide-KSufe (in GetreidewShrung) E l LG div div
T Tuch-Kaufe (in Lager) El LT div div •
W  Wein-KSufe (in Weinwdhmng) E l LW F div
S SCHULDEN-AUFNAHME E l S F div *
U  U E B E R T R A G U N G E N  (o h n e  E r tra g e )
E  Eingemessen von letzter Rechnung E IU E (P ) F 3V
N  von NEBEN-Ebene E IU N F 3V
O von OBER-Ebene E l UO F 3V
U von UNTER-Ebene E l UU F 3V
EV /ERBRAUCHS-EINNAHMEN (LAUFEND) Konto Fkt Sekt Net
S STEUERN
A AUSGABEN-STEUERN
S SPEZIELLE AUSGABEN-STEUERN
B Bbspfennig EV SASB F 4 *
U_Umgeld EV SASU F 4 *
Z ZOLLE
A Ausfuhrzblle, Sortie-, Trattengeld EV SAZA F 3H *
B Bruckenzolle EV SAZB F 4 *
E Einfuhrzblle EV SAZE F 3H *
G Geleit u. Transitzolle EV SAZG F 3H *
M Marktzbile EV SAZM F 4 •
E EINNAHMEN-STEUERN
|Z ZEHNT-ERTRAGE
G  Getreide EV SEZG F 1 *
H Heu EV SEZH F 1 *
K Kartoffeln EV SEZK F 1 *
W Wein EV SEZW F 1 *
X unbestimmt (Werch-, Jungzehnt) EV SEZX F 1 *
V VERMbGENS-STEUERN
S STAND DES VERMOGENS EVSVS F 4 *
V VERKEHR DES VERM6GENS
A Abzuggeld EV S W A F 4 *
E Erbschatz (Erbfaile) E V S W E F 4 *
G Grundbesitz-Ehrschatz (Lbber) EV S W G F 4 *
E ERTRAGE (ERWERBSEINKUNFTE)
B BETRIEBS-, BETEILIGUNGS-UBERS. EV EB div div *
(sofem keine eigenen Rechnungen)
F FINANZVERMbGENS-ERTRAGE
K KAPITAL-ERTRAGE
|Z _ Z in sen  (aktiv)
A ablbsige Zinsertrage EV EFKZA F 4 *
|x unspezifizierte Zinsertrage EV EFKZX F 4 *
L LIEGENSCHAFTS-ERTRAG EV EFL F div *
R RECHNUNGSFEHLER zG. O brigke it E V EFR F div *
WECHSELGEWINNE EV EFW F 3V
M MONOPOLGEWINN EVEM F 4 *
(z.T. nieht direkt ausgewtesen)
P  PRODUKTIONS-ERTRAG EV EP div div *
(ink! Aufnahmegeider v. Pfrundem) S 1 *
S SALZVERKAUF (LAUFEND) EVES F 4 *
G GEBUHREN
A AMTS- u. VERWALTUNGSGEBUHREN
E EINWOHNERKONTROLLE
B Burgrechtsaufnahme EV GAEB V 4 *
E Einzug EV GAEE V 4 *
H Hintersassengeld EV GAEH V 4 *
X unbestimmt (Befr. v. unehl. Geburt'EV GAEX V 4 *
R RECHTSPFLEGE
A Aemterausschlag EV GARA J 4 *
B Bussen (inkl. Leistungsbussen) EV GARB J 4 *
K Konfiskationen EV GARK J 4 *
S Siegelgeld EV GARS V 4 *
Z Zeugnis- u. Attest-Gelder EV GARZ V 4 *
X unbestimmt (u.a. Appellationsgeld) EV GARX J 4 *
B BENUTZUNGS-GEBUHREN EV GB D div *
R RECOGNITIONEN u n d  BEIT RAGE
A AEUSSERE
B BOndnisgelder EV RAB A 3V *
G Gemeine Herrschaften EV RAG A 4 *
K Kriegsgewinne EV RAK A div *
1 INHERE
B Bodenzinsen
H Hufthofstattzinsen EV R1BH F 4 *
P  Pfennigzinsen, unablbsige ewige EV RIBP F 1 *
X unspezifizierte Bodenzinsen EV R1BX F 1 *
E Ehhaften (Tavemen etc) EVRIE F div *
F Fischenzen EV RIF F 1 *
G Geschenke, Legate EV RIG F 4 *
H Holzhaber, Holzgeld EV RIH F 4 *
L Lehenszinsen (Ehrschatz v. Zehnden) EV RIL F 4 *
M M arechauseegelder EX  RIM F 4 *
S br.Sommer EVRIS F 4 *
V Vogtsteuem (Landsteuer, Wachtgeid) EV R I\ F 4 *
W WynmSnni EVRIW F 4 *
S STORNO AUSGABEN EVRS F div
| P  bei Passation durch Vennerkammer EVRSP F div
EINNAHMEN NACH STAATS-FUNKTION
|E EINNAHMEN fur Fla
A Auswdrtige Beziehungen EA
B Bildung EB
D Domanen und Produktion ED
F  Finanzen und Steuem EF
G  Gesundheit EG
J  Justiz und Polizei EJ
K Kultur EK
L Landesverteidigung EL
R Religion ER
S Soziale Wohlfahrt ES
U Umwelt, Raum und Verkehr EU
V Verwaltung allgemein EV
W Wirtschafts-Politik und Versorgung EW
SUMMEN UND RESTANZEN
S SUMMA der
E  EINNAHMEN p ro
IS Seite SES SF S4
|ff  Rechnung SER SF S4
A AU SG ABEN  p ro
S Seite SAS SF S4
|f f  Rechnung SAR SF S4
R RESTANZ m  |
O ZU GUNSTEN d e r O brig ke it
|£  Exklusive Altrestanz ROE RF R3V
[/__Inklusive Altrestanz ROl RF R3V
U  ZU  UNGUNSTEN de r O brigke it
£  Exklusive Altrestanz RUE RF R3V
[ / _  Inklusive Altrestanz R U I RF R3V
V VORJAHRES-RESTANZ
O ZU  GUNSTEN d e r O b rig ke it
| £  Exklusive Altrestanz VOE VF V3V
| /  Inklusive Altrestanz VO1 VF V3V
U  ZU  UNGUNSTEN de r O b rig ke it
£  Exklusive Altrestanz VUE VF V3V
11 Inklusive Altrestanz VUl VF V3V
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AV VERBRAUCHS-AUSGABEN (LAUFEND)
P PERSONAL-AUFW AND
B BESOLDUNGEN d es  E tat-P ersonals
|G Grundbesoldungen 
|V Verbesserungen
GRATIFIKATIONEN fur d a s  E tat-Personal
G Gutjahr-Gelder 
M Mahlzeiten, Umtrunke 
T Trinkgelder, -getreide (Ergetzlichkeit)
H HONORARE-ad-hoc fur E tat-Personal
|A Alters-Versorgung 
|H Hinterbliebenen-Versorgung
T TRUPPEN-SOLD 
V VERGliTUNGEN fur G em einw erker
F Fuhrdienste 
R  fRondienste 
X unspezifiziert
S  SACH-AUFWAND
L LEISTUNGEN DRITTER fur
Konto Fkt Ski 1
AV PBG div 3V
AVPBV div 3V
1
AVPGG div 3V
AV PGM div 3V
AV PGT(P) div 3V
AV PH 
nal
div 3V
AV PSA div 3V
AV PSH div 3V
AV PT L 3V
AV PVF div 3F
AV PVR div 2R
AVPVX div div
H HANDEL AVSLH div 3H
N NACHRICHTEN-UBERMITTLUNG AVSLN div 3N
P PRODUKTION
|L Ldhne AV SLPL D div
|V Verpflegung AV SLPV D div
S STRAFVOLLZUG AVSLS J 3div
T TRANSPORTE AVSLT div 3S
U UNTERHALTder 
I IMMOBILIEN
G Grundstucks-Unterhalt AV SLUIG div
H Hochbau-Unterhalt AVSLUIH div
T Tiefbau-Unterhalt inkl BrOcken AV SLUIT U
W W asserbau-Untertialt AV SLUIW U
M MOBILIEN
M MOBILIEN (laufend)
P PACHT- UND MIETZINSE
ll Immobilien-Miete 
|M Mobilien-Miete
S SPESEN-ENTSCHADIGUNGEN
T TRA N SFERA U SG A BEN
2div
2div
2div
2div
G Getreide-Unterhalt AV SLUMG F div
M Mobiliar-Unterhalt AV SLUMM div 2div
R  Rustungsguter-Unterhalt AV SLUMR L 2drv
S  Salz-Unterhalt AV SLUMS div 2dtv
W  Wein-Unterhalt (ohne Herbst) AV SLUMW V div
rERE DIENSTLEISTUNGEN AVSLW div 3D
B Bau-Material (laufend) AVSMB div div
D Dienstbekleidung AV SMD div 2T
F Futter-, Saat- u. DQnger-Mittel AVSMF div 1
G G erate u. Fahrzeuge-Anschaffung AVSMG div 2div
H Helzungs- u. Beleuchtungs-Material AVSMH V div
K Kanzlei-Material AVSMK V 2div
M Mobiliar (laufend) AVSMM div 2div
N Nahrungs-Mittel (oh. Lohn Fron Grati.) AVSMN div div
R Rustungs-Material (laufend) AVSMR L 2div
S Salz (laufend) AVSMS F div
AV SPI div div
AV SPM div div
R Reise-Spesen AVSSR div div
V Verpflegung (oh. Lohn. Fron, Grati) AVSSV div div
X unspezifizierte Spesen AVSSX div div
BEITRAGE AV TB div 3V
FREMDANTEILE AN EINNAHMEN AV TF F div
n a c h l As s e
R Recognitions-Nachlass AVTNR div div
S  Steuer-Nachlass (Zehnten) AV TNS F 1
Z Zinsen- und Schulden-Nachlass AV TNZ div 4
SUBVENTIONEN
B Brandgeschadigte AVTSB S 4
F Fremde AVTSF S 4
K Kranke. Invallde u. Alte AVTSK div 4
S  Studenten (bem.) und Lehrkinder AV TSS B 4
W  Wittwen u. W aisen (ohne Etat-Angeh.) AV TSW S div
WERTBERICHTIGUNGEN
E Einnahmen-Stomo A V TWE(P) F div
G  Getreide-Abgang (Kastenschweinung) AV TWG(P) F 3V
R Rechnungsfehler z.L. Obrigkeit AVTW R F 3V
W W echsel-Veduste AVTW W F 3V
ZINSENDIENST AV TZ F 4
Konto Fkt Skt
Al DB F div
Al DD F div
Al IBH div div
Al IBT U div
Al IBW U div
A1I1G div div
i) Al IIH div div
Al IIK F div
Al IIT U div
A IIIX div div
Al INVESTITIONS-AUSGABEN
D DARLEHEN UND BETEILIGUNGEN
|B Beteiligungen 
|D  D arlehenssprechung
I IN V ESTIO N SG U TER-BESCH A FFU N G  
B BAUVORHABEN (ohne KSufe)
H Hochbau-Vorhaben (ohne Unterhalt)
T Tiefbau-Vorhaben (ohne Unterhalt) 
W _W asserbau-Vorhaben (ohne Unterhalt) 
I IMMOBILIEN-KAUFE
G Grundstucks-Kaufe
K Konglomerats-Kaufe 
T  Tiefbauten-K8ufe 
X ubrige Immobiliar-Rechts-Kaufe
M MOBILIEN-KAUFE (in Vorrat)
B Bau-Material 
G G etreide und FrOchte 
K Kulturguter 
R  Rustungsguter 
T Textilien (In Vorrat)
V Vieh 
W_Wein
R RECHTS-KAUFE (ubrige)
SL LAGER-AUFFNUNG SALZ (in Geld)
LAG ER-AUSGANG (so im Einnehmen gegenverrechnet)
G GetreideverkSufe (in Getreidewhhrung)
T Tuch-Verkaufe (vom Lager)
W  W ein-Verkaufe (in Weinwahrung)
Al IMB F div *
Al IMG div div *
Al IMK K div *
Al IMR L div *
AIIM T F div *
Al IMV div div *
Al IMW F div *
Al IR div div ■
AIISL F 4 •
A !  LG div div
Al LT div div
A JL W F div
S  SCH ULDEN-TILGUNG
R R estanzen-z L -Obrigkeit tilgen 
|S  ubrige Schulden tilgen
Al SR 
Al SS
div
div
U_ U E B E R T R A G U N G E N  (d e r  In v e s t i t io n s re c h n u n g )
E  Eingemessen zur ndchsten Rechnung 
N  zur NEBEN-Ebene 
O zur OBER-Ebene  
U  zur UNTER-Ebene
A1UE(P) F 3V
A t  UN F 3V
A1UO F 3V
A l  UU F 3V
EINNAHMEN NACH STAATS-FUNKTION 
[E_ EINNAHMEN fOr Fkt
A Auswartige Beziehungen EA
B Bildung EB
D Domanen und Produktion ED
F Finanzen und Steuern EF
G  Gesundheit EG
J  Justiz und Polizei EJ
K Kultur EK
L Landesverteidigung EL
R Religion ER
8  Soziale Wohlfahrt ES
U Umwelt, Raum und Verkehr EU
V Verwaltung allgemein EV
W Wirtschafts-Politik und Versorgung EW
SUMMEN UND RESTANZEN
S SUMMA d e r
E  E INNAHM EN p ro
|S  Seite SES SF S4
|R  Rechnung SER SF S4
A  AU S G A B E N  p ro
S Seite SA S SF S4
[f? Rechnung SAR SF S4
R  RESTANZ
0  Z U  GUNSTEN d e r O b rig ke it
E  Exklusive Altrestanz ROE RF R3V
[/_Inklusive Altrestanz ROI RF R3V
U  Z U  UNGUNSTEN d e r O b rig ke it
\E  Exklusive Altrestanz RUE RF R3V
\ l Inklusive Altrestanz RUt RF R3V
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vii-13 Measurements and Conversions
This section will discuss the prices used to convert all transactions into a single 
accounting currency, the Bernese Batzen. I will start with monetary units and 
subsequently present measurements for basic foodstuffs as well as conversion prices 
used to transfer values into Batzen.
Monetary Units
The Batzen was an ideal accounting currency with a stable value. It was not minted 
and the value of a Batzen changed relative to circulating coins used for daily 
transactions. The Bernese government used three different accounting currencies 
with fixed proportions between them (see Figure VII-8). In addition to the Crown- 
Batzen-Kreuzer system, the Pound-based ‘LSD system’836 dating back to 
Charlemagne was still in frequent use. In Vaud, the currency was based on the Savoy 
model using the Light Guilder (florin petitpoids)Pn In Argovia,yorms were used in 
combination with Bernese currencies. 38
Bernese Crown: 
K r - Bz - Xr
Plus: 1 L = 10 Bz
1 fl(AG)=15Bz
Kr Bz Xr Lb S d
1 25 1 0 0 1 2 0 240
1 4 1 Lb = 7.5 Bz 1 12
Charlemagne: 
Lb - S - d
Plus:
1 Thl = 80 S 
1 fl = 40 S
fl
1 Lb = 1.875 fl (pp)
Vaud (Savoy): 
fl (PP) - S - d
12
1
144
12
1 S (VD) = 4 Cart 
1 S (VD) = 8 Fort
Equivalents
Thl Kr fl (AG) L Lb fl(PP) Bz S Xr d
1 1 .2 2 3 4 7.5 30 80 12 0 960 Thl
1 1 2/3 2.5 3.333 6.25 25 66.67 10 0 800 Kr
1 1.5 2 3.75 15 40 60 480 fl (AG)
1 1.333 2.5 10 26.67 40 320 L
1 1.875 7.5 2 0 30 240 Lb
1 1.875 7.5 2 0 32 A(PP)
1 4 10.67 17.07 Bz
1 1.5 12 S
1 8 Xr
Figure VII-8: The Bernese Currency System: Origins and Equivalents
Based on Furrer (1992); Furrer (1995); Komer/Furrer/Bartlome (2001).
Abbreviations: Thl = Taler; Kr = Krone (Bernese Crown); fl = Gulden or Berner Gulden (Bernese Guilder); fl 
(AG) = Argovia gulden; L. = Livre Suisse or Schweizer Pfund; Lb [also: BE-Lb] = Pfund or Bem-Pfund
835 For the different monetary systems, see Furrer (1995).
836 LSD standing for Librum (Pound), Solidus (Shilling) and Denarius (Penny).
837 The proportions between the Vaudois system and the Bernese had been fixed in 1590: Furrer 
(1992): 109-110.
838 One Argovia florin (which was different from the florin petit poids) held either 40 Bernese Shillings 
(of 12 d each) or 15 Bernese Batzen (of 4 Kreuzer each).
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(B ernese Pound); fl (pp) =  Florin petit poids (V audois Guilder, Light Guilder); Bz = Batzen or Berner Batzen; S = 
Sch illing  or Solidus; S (VD) =  Sol V audois or sol gros; Xr =  Kreuzer; d [also: Pfg] =  P fenn ig  or Denarius; d 
(VD) = D en ier V audois.
Although state accounting saw a gradual shift to the Crown system in the eighteenth 
century, this transition was not comprehensive. In 1773, three years after the first 
Deutsch-Standesrechnung was issued in Crowns, the Great Council discussed about 
switching back to the Pound. As a result of such discussions, it was finally decided to 
make the Crown the standard currency for all bailiff accounts which had a connection
O T Q
to the Deutsch-Standesrechnung. But even after 1773, some bailiffs kept recording 
parts of their ledgers in Pounds and only converted the overall sum into Crowns. 
Others apparently did not adopt the new currency at all.
The value of these ideal units of account can be determined in two ways: relative to 
the purchasing power in terms of goods or respective to other currencies. For the 
latter, we can analyse the value of ‘heavy’ foreign coins like the Reichstaler or the 
Ecu Blanc, whose bullion content was fixed and stable.840 Based on their exchange 
rates in Bern, the ideal bullion content of Bernese Batzen was calculated for Figure 
VII-9.
180 
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120  -  
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Bz
a Reichstaler (Ag) ■ L. Blanc (Ag) * Ecu N euf (Ag)
•  Ducat (Au) + L. Vieux (Au) ♦ L. N euf (Au)
++fr4--H+-H-+++++
•  •  m  H
-H + + + +  + +  + + +
A* A * ^ A A
X X*X x *
A A  AA
X I t
0  11 i i i  i i i i i  i r  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i m  1 1 1 1 1 i l l m i  i n  i i  m i m i  m i  m i  i i  t i i  m i  
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v ©  r- t"  oo as as
Figure VII-9: Ideal Bullion Content of the Bernese Batzen, Based on Exchange Rate of Silver and 
Gold Coins
Sources: Exchange rates from Komer/Furrer/Bartlome (2001); bullion content o f coins from Schrotter 
(1930). Abbreviations: Au = gold and Ag = silver.
While the results for gold coins are consistent, using the Reichstaler gives a 
considerably higher silver content for the Bernese Batzen than the French coins. This 
is probably because the Speciestaler on which Bernese exchange rates are based were 
minted coins whose silver content was not identical with that of the original
839 Leuenberger-Binggeli (1999): 178.
840 In practice, most international transactions were not made in cash, but via bill o f exchange: see 
Section V -l.
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Reichstaler. Using the French Louis Blanc and the Ecu N euf as a currency of
reference is more reliable. Overall, the Bernese currencies of account were
relatively stable throughout the eighteenth century, with some depreciation in the 
earlier part of the period. This stands in marked contrast to previous centuries, where 
currency devaluations were frequent.843 As a proxy, the silver content of 1 Batzen was 
0.7 g of fine silver or 0.05 g of fine gold.
The conversion of foreign currencies for overseas investments was based on parity 
rates, as discussed in Section V-l.
Measurements for Grain and Other Basic Foodstuffs
The measurements for basic foodstuffs in Bern were only partly unified. Numerous 
local units coexisted. Therefore, the administration had to consider a plethora of 
different weights, volumes and capacity measures. This was further complicated by 
the fact that those systems were all non-decimal, which made adding and comparing 
sums difficult. Also, the same unit by name did not necessarily contain an equal 
amount wherever it was used. For example, the Bernese grain Mass contained 14 
litres.844 It was used within most of the German-speaking parts of the canton, except 
for the county of Bipp, where grain was measured in Solothurn Mass containing 13.2 
litres. In Vaud, almost every county had its grain measure, which in spite of their 
similar names differed significantly. Argovia, too, had measurements of its own. This 
is an indication for how fragmented the Bernese economy remained in the eighteenth 
century, even when it came to the most important staple of the time.
One Mutt (mt) consisted of 12 Mass (ms), each measuring 4 Imi (im). In daily life the 
Mass was the most important measure and prices were expressed in Batzen per Mass 
(Bz/ms). In Argoiva, one Malter (mlt) contained four (Argovia-)M#/ (mt) of four 
Quarters (Fiertel) or 16 Vierling. 45 In Vaud, the mayor measure was the Muid, a 
French version of the German word Mutt. For sub-divisions of the Muid, counties 
would use either twelve coupes of four quarterons each; or a system with twelve 
coupes of two bichets each. Sometimes the sac was used, of which 3 made one Muid 
(see Figure VII-10).846
841 Other explanations are devaluations of the Reichstaler, or a risk premium that was applied for these 
coins in Bern.
842 1 thank Norbert Furrer for advice in how to calculate these values.
843 The same can be observed for Lucerne: See Komer (1981).
844 Early modem grain was measured by volume, not weight.
845 One Vierling consisted of 9 (Argovia-)//w. See Ebener (1999): 220 for more details on Argovia 
measures.
846 For details on the Vaud systems: Monbaron (1992). See Table VII-9 for which system the counties 
used.
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Bern
Miltt Mass Imi
1 BE-Mutt = 168.1 ltr
-^------- Argovia ------
Maker Mutt Fiertel Vierling
1 4 16 64
1 4 16
1 4
Content of Mutt differs by County
r Vaud
Muid Coupe Bichet Muid Coupe Q'ron
1 12 24 1 12 48
1 2 1 4
A
Plus: 1 Muid = 3 Sac
Content of Muid differs by County
Figure VII-10: Grain Equivalents in Bern, Argovia and Vaud
Abbreviation: Q ’ron = Quarteron. For the litre content of Mutt and Muid per county, see Table VII-9.
Miitt or Muid did not always contain the same volume. Only for the core Bernese 
territory did the Mutt contain the same amount (168.1 ltr). In Argovia and Vaud, the 
content of each unit varied from county to county. Table VII-9 gives a list of grain 
content per Mutt in litres, based on data from Christian Pfister and Patrick Monbaron.
Bern Miitt in litres Vaud Muid in litres Sub-unit used
Regular Mutt 168.1 Lausanne 163.0 Quarteron
Great Miitt (grosses Bemmutt) 174.8 Aigle 224.2 Bichet
Bipp (Solothum Miitt) 158.9 Vevey, Villeneuve 210.2 Quarteron
Burgdorf, Aarwangen, Wangen, Landshut 163.0 Nyon, Bonmont 206.2 Quarteron
Morges 196.9 Quarteron
Romainmotier 196.6 Bichet
Argovia Mutt in litres Avenches 189.2 Bichet
Brugg (Konigsfelden) 88.5 Aubonne 174.2 Quarteron
Aarau, Lenzburg, Biberstein, Schenkenberg 90.1 Orbe 171.2 Quarteron
Zofingen, Aarburg 104.1 Payeme 168.1 Bichet*
Yverdon 154.5 Quarteron
Moudon 140.1 Quarteron**
Table VII-9: Litre Content of Mutt/Muid by County
Sources: For Bern and Argovia: Pfister, C. (1975): table 24. For Vaud: Monbaron (1992): fig. 20. See 
also Tuor (1977) and Dubler (1975). Abbreviation: Q ’ron for Quarteron. Pfister’s data for Argovia are 
in Malter (divided by four); Monbaron’s figures are calculated from his relative figures for local Muid 
to Bern Mutt. The great Mutt (grosses Mutt) was used in Bern itself, Thun, Oberhofen, the Seeland, 
and in the Emmental, except for Signau.
*) Payeme used a variation of the regular Bichet system, with one Muid containing 2 2/3 Sacs.
**) In Moudon, one Muid contained 4 Sacs.
The most commonly used types of grain were spelt, wheat and oats. While spelt 
(Dinket) was the basic breadstuff for the German-speaking parts of the canton, wheat 
was more common in Vaud. Dehusked spelt was called Kernen, a term occasionally 
used to describe wheat as well. Kemen was more valuable because of its higher
R47density (weight per volume) than spelt. It was also more nutritious. Oat was 
cultivated mainly for animal consumption. In addition to these main types of grain, 
there were various mixed grains, such as Mischelkorn, which consisted of two thirds 
of rye and a third of wheat, or Paschi/Baschi (barley, peas and oats). Miihlekorn -  
literally translated as mill com to describe whatever was left over at the mill -
847 For a conversion of different grain types into nutritional values, see Fluckiger Strebel (2002): Table 
45.
Appendix 337
0^ 0
described a varying mix of wheat, spelt, rye and barley. We can convert all these 
grain types into weight equivalents by using data on their relative weight.849 From 
there, nutritional values could be established based on relative calorie content.850
In the eighteenth century, potatoes had been slowly adapted to complement the 
Bernese diet, especially of the poor. The nutrition value per acre of potatoes was 
roughly four times that of grain. In addition, the climatic prerequisites were slightly 
different, which made it suitable for crop diversification. 51 Since potato harvests 
were not liable to tithes, potatoes are conspicuously absent from Bernese accounts. 
On the other hand, the lack of potato tax records also means that exact figures about 
cultivation are unknown. Christian Pfister estimates that a fifth of all calories 
consumed in the canton came from potatoes. Grain was easier to store, transport 
and sell.
Wine was measured and consumed in Bemese Mass of 1.67 litres. To trade and 
calculate larger amounts, barrels (Fass) of 600 Mass (=1,002 litres) were used.853 In 
between, the Saum contained 100 Mass. In Vaud, the basic unit was the pot, of which 
30 constituted a setter, and 480 a char (16 setters to one char).854 As with cereals, the 
content of a Mass varied according to location (see Table VII-10). Other liquids, 
particularly oil, were measured in the same units, but their weight could differ from 
the local wine measure.
Bern Mass in litres Argovia Mass in litres Vaud Pot in litres
Bemmass 1.67 Aarau 1.44 Aigle 1.43
Biel 1.61 Brugg 1.54 Aubonne 1.49
Buren 1.55-1.57 Lenzburg 1.57 Avenches 1.56
Burgdorf 1.59 Zofingen 1.54 Lausanne 1.17
Erlach 1.90 Morges 1.61
Frutigen, Nieder- Moudon 1.44
simmental 1.88 Nyon 1.33
Obersimmental 1.87-1.92 Orbe 1.70
Saanen 2.76-2.79 Payeme 1.55
Thun 1.76 Romainmotier 2.17
Unterseen 1.66 Vevey 1.54
Villeneuve 1.71
Yverdon 1.58
Table VII-10: Mass/Pot in Litres by County (Wine only)
Source: Tuor (1977): 98-99 and Dubler (1975): 44-46.
The main problem with wine transactions is that the quality of the product was 
usually not recorded but could vary considerably. Often the records did not even state
848 Fluckiger Strebel (2002): 321.
849 Christian Pfister and other authors converted all grain into hundredweights (Doppelzentner), each 
equivalent to 100kg of wheat: Pfister, C. (1975): table 24.
850 See Pfister, C. (1975): table 24; Kiing (1993): 453 and Fluckiger Strebel (2002): table 45.
851 Pfister, C. (1978): 232-235.
852 Pfister, C. (1995): 204. This is significantly less than previous authors had estimated.
853 Such barrels were mainly used for transport; storage barrels were larger: Tuor (1977): 80.
854 See also Dubler (1975): 42-46.
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if white or red wine was transacted, although bailiffs were inhibited by oath to mix 
red with white wine.855
Salt was a basic foodstuff, a crucial ingredient for dairy and cattle farming, as well as 
an important source of revenue for the state. Bern had little domestic salt production 
and depended to a large extent on imports from France and Austria (see Section III- 
5). Salt was traded by weight for which numerous different local units coexisted. 
They matter little for this study, because the Bernese salt accounts contained 
transactions in a variety of foreign weights and measures, which were all converted 
into Bernese Centner (hundredweights) of 100 pounds.856 Since 1711, the weight of 
the pound was pegged to the Parisian market weight of 489.51 g.857
Most other foodstuffs were also measured by weight. The Bernese pound used for 
these differed slightly from that for salt; it measured 520 grams. Sub-units of the 
pound were Lot (32 per pound), ounces (16 per pound) and Quentchen (128 per
o c o
pound). Wood and hay were measured in Klafter of six cubic Schuh that measured 
5.4 m3. One Schuh contained 10 Zo//.859
Price Conversions
For monetary units, the conversion is straightforward. Table VII-11 shows the Batzen 
value of all units based on the equivalents discussed above. I have also included 
proxy values for fine silver and gold.
Currency Conversion (in Bz) Proxy Value
Lb S d Kr Bz Xr fl (AG) fl (pp) S (VD) d (VD)
0.133 0.375 32 0.04 1 0.25 15 0.25 3 36
Silver Gold
0.7g 0.05g
Table VII-11: Currency Conversion to Bernese Batzen 
Based on Table VII-11 and Figure VII-9.
For transactions in kind, I have used a weighted annual price for each good, 
calculated from transactions in the same ledger whenever they were available. Prices 
that referred to inferior quality goods were excluded, as were prices that were obvious 
outliers.
The Bernese state did not collect cereal prices systematically. Most price data is from 
grain sales by bailiffs, for which I have used averages weighted by the amount of 
grain sold. This data takes account of regional price differences, as well as local
855 StABE B V II25: §20. Exceptions are ROM and NYO, where white and red wine were accounted 
for separately.
856 For example, foreign weights used were Austrian Fass of 16 ounces each or French Minots. For an 
overview: Guggisberg (1933): 67-71.
857 Quoted in Tuor (1977): 86. See also Guggisberg (1933): 70-71.
858 Tuor (1977): 84 and Dubler (1975): 51. Some counties used a different weight for the pound (e.g. 
496 g in Burgdorf). But because there were hardly any transactions measured by weight, I assume that 
the Bernese pound of 520g was used throughout the canton. The Vaud Livre weighted between 503g 
(Yverdon) and 572 (Vevey): Dubler (1975): 51-53.
859 Tuor (1977): 37, 51-61 (listing local deviations from the Bernese measure).
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measurements. If an office did not sell any grain of a specific kind, and hence did not 
record a price, I have used a regional average, calculated in Batzen per litre. For 
regions with fewer than two price observations, I have used a weighted price for the 
whole canton instead. All conversions used are shown in Table VII-12 and Table 
VII-13 as weighted averages in Batzen per litre. The results are consistent with the 
findings of Hans-Anton Ebener and Erika Fluckiger Strebel, who based their research 
to a large extent on similar sources, covering few years in the 1730s and 1780s. We 
can also compare price data for 1732 and 1782 with other price series.
Christian Pfister has collected monthly prices for wheat in the city of Bern between 
1755 and 1798, based on the official bulletin Avis-Blattlein and the journal of the 
Economic Society of Bern, the Abhandlungen und Beobachtungen. A
contemporary document providing monthly prices for the town of Nidau from 1739 
to 1785 has been edited by Erika Fluckiger Strebel.862 For Lausanne, Patrick 
Monbaron has collected yearly price data for the whole Bernese period (1536-1798), 
with monthly figures available for 1735-1739, 1743-1747 and 1780-1782.863 
Unfortunately, grain prices for Argovia are only available on a yearly basis from 
1565 to 1770. They have been collected as five-year moving averages by Willy 
Pfister, based on government accounts.864 I have further added a series of grain prices 
from bailiff accounts in Aarberg and Nidau counties.
For all these series, I have calculated the ratio of prices in the database to several 
moving averages in Figure VII-11. Data for 1732 is scarcer than for 1782.
Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Spelt Oats Mill Rye
Argovia Lausanne Bern Nidau(m) Nidau(b) Aarberg Aarberg Aarberg Aarberg Aarberg
1700-70 1700-96 1755-97 1738-85 1738-85 1700-97 1700-97 1700-97 1700-97 1700-97
Bz/mt fl/qt Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms Bz/ms
Price 1732 60.000 35.318 12.492 3.882 3.400 8.197 7.516
3yMA (1732) 0.994 1.139 0.920 1.014
5yMA (1732) 0.987 1.202 1.016
7yMA (1732) 1.000 1.242 0.908
9yMA (1732) 0.994 1.260 0.959
nearMA (1732) 1.058 0.879 1.054 1.060
Geomean 0.846 1.004 0.831 0.671 0.766 0.863 0.832
N 71 96 52 59 92 70 59
Price 1782 50.229 19.000 19.730 16.205 16.000 6.899 5.806 10.000
3yMA (1782) 1.065 1.081 1.105 0.993 0.999 0.978 1.007 1.012
5yMA (1782) 1.105 1.121 1.149 1.013 1.259 1.017 1.017 1.018
7yMA (1782) 1.255 1.283 1.294 1.151 1.359 1.137 1.186 1.143
9yMA (1782) 1.255 1.283 1.359 1.137 1.186 1.143
Geomean 1.428 1.070 1.248 1.131 1.065 1.193 1.307 1.053
N 96 43 46 45 52 59 92 70
Figure VII-11: Grain Prices of 1732 and 1782 compared to Moving Average
860 Ebener (1994): 205-219 [for 1730-32 and 1780-82]; Fluckiger Strebel (2002): Table 47 [for 1731- 
33 and 1781-83].
861 Pfister, C. (1975): Table 28.1.
862 The document is entitled Friichten-Register des Kornmarkts zu Nidau: Auffuhr undPreise (StABE 
B VI 219). See Fluckiger Strebel (2002): Table 48.
863 Patrick R. Monbaron (Lausanne), unpublished data. I thank Mr Monbaron for providing me with 
this material.
864 Pfister, W. (1940): esp. 258-264.
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Sources: Pfister, W. (1940): 237-264 [Argovia]; unpublished transcripts by Patrick Monbaron 
[Lausanne]; Pfister, C. (1975): Table 28.1 [Bern]; Fluckiger Strebel (2002): Table 48 [Nidau (m)]; 
StABE B VII 1633-1640 [Nidau (b)], StABE B VII851-872 [Aarberg series]. Abbreviations: Bz = 
Batzen; mt = Miitt; f l  -  Florin (petit poids); ms = Mass; Nidau(m) is the market price, Nidau(b) the 
bailiffs price (see Section III-6). The Aarberg figures are from bailiff accounts. I have replaced 
missing values for Aarberg in 1732 with three-year moving averages for wheat, mill and rye (shown in 
italics); 3yMA (1732) stands for the ratio of the price of 1732 to the three-year moving average for 
1732; nearMA is for the ratio of the 1732 price to an average price over the nearest nine-year period 
where no values are missing; Geomean is for the ratio of the 1732 to the mean for the whole series; N  
for the number of years used for calculating the mean.
The overall impression is that while there were local differences and yearly 
fluctuations, both 1732 and 1782 were average price years. Given the high price 
volatility for grain in general, they are as representative as sample years can get for 
the eighteenth century.
Wine prices were more difficult to establish. On one hand the quality of the product is 
quite likely to differ significantly between different places, but quality measures were 
usually not recorded. In addition, prices are scarcer and less reliable. I have therefore 
converted all wine sold into litres and calculated a price in Bz per litre. As can be 
seen from Table VII-14, the price differences are considerable. To control for outliers 
while still respecting local price differences, I have used the following conversion 
method. For accounts with a wine price, I have calculated the average of the priceOZf
recorded in the account and the overall weighted average price. All other wine 
transactions were converted using the overall weighted average for the whole 
canton.866
Numerous other conversions for transactions in kind were made based on prices 
given in the accounts. In some cases, these transactions were puny and only covered 
the odd tin of oil that a bailiff got as a tithe. There was also significant trading in salt 
recorded in specialised accounts, which was quantitatively important. The salt ledgers 
included reliable figures on prices used by the government that the government itself 
used for converting all transactions into Bernese currency (see Section VII-16).
Detailed Assumptions for Price Conversion 
I Grain Types
The following grain types have been added, based on the combined used in contemporary 
accounts:
Orgeon = Barley (ERL782)
Kemen = Wheat (numerous, e.g. FRE782)
Com = Spelt (ABU732)
Fassmuss = Kernel; Stucke = Kernel; Com = Spelt (KOE732 and KOE782)
Kernel = Wheat (AAR7322)
Haber und Mischelkorn = Mischel (INT732 and INT782)
Linsen = Erbsen = Peas (assumption)
Reiterkom = (Oats + Spelt)/2 (various)867
865 This is show in row conv. in Table VII-14.
866 Table VII-20 shows how much wine sold in each account (in litres).
867 For ROM, oats only.
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The conversions of different types of grain into standard weight (g, kg, tonnes) and calories 
(kcal) follow the data from Fluckiger Strebel (2002) [based on Pfister, C. (1975): Table 24 
and Kiing (1993): 453].
II O ther Goods
For the following goods, the medium weighted price of all accounts where a price was 
recorded has been calculated and used for conversion.
Good Year Price Sources (price)
Oil 1732 7 Bz/Mass BHB7321
Ziger 1732: 1 Bz/lb FRE732, TRA732
1782: 1 Bz/lb FRE782, INT782
Cheese 1732 1.44 Bz/lb INT732, YVE732, TOR732, GSP732, FRE732
1782 1.72 Bz/lb INT782, TRA7822, TOR782, ROM782, KOE782, GSP782, 
FRE782
Butter 1732 2.23 Bz/lb TOR732, MUS733, KOE732, GSP732, FRE732
1782 3.20 Bz/lb TOR782, INT782, KOE782, GSP782, FRE782
For the conversions of summary accounts -  for which grain sales were not recorded 
separately - 1 have used prices for the same region from the database. If the database 
contained no price information, I have used weighted averages for the whole canton 
instead.
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Prices for Conversions of Grain to Bz
Spelt Oats Wheat Rye Corn Mischel Barley Wiki Mill Paschi Reiter Peas Millet Lentils
AAR 0.291 0.246 0.735 0.521 0.599 0.543
ABU 0.201 0.372 0.288 0.892
ARW 0.282 0.185 0.420 0.286
BHB 0.380 0.238 0.696 0.643 0.667 0.476 0.607
BIP 0.201 0.620 0.372 0.288
BRA 0.300 0.219 0.466 0.493 0.259
ERL 0.414 0.724 0.593 0.417
FRE 0.364 0.231 0.867 0.505 0.540 0.417 0.543 0.550 0.297 0.483 0.571
GSP 0.444 0.240 0.925 0.537 0.668 0.417 0.476 0.483 0.571 0.483
INB 0.263 0.223 1.076 0.547
INT 0.272 0.200 0.806 0.588 0.417
ITH 0.272 0.200 0.434
JOB 0.326 0.221 0.676 0.547 0.417 0.483
KOE 0.230 0.201 0.618 0.363 0.335 0.494 0.483 0.571
KOR 0.366 0.224 0.512 0.494 0.476
LAU 0.317 0.251 0.466 0.599 0.417 0.543 0.550 0.284
LEN 0.224 0.201 0.605 0.394 0.483 0.362
LSN 0.249 0.863 0.530 0.417 0.483
MOU 0.255 0.800 0.485
MUS 0.366 0.223 0.779 0.518 0.417 0.786
NID 0.317 0.244 0.714 0.561 0.714 0.322 0.281
NYO 0.254 1.026 0.543
ROM 0.174 0.857 0.568 0.387 0.174
SIG 0.377 0.251 0.929 0.571 0.376
STI 0.391 0.224 0.893 0.512 0.720
THU 0.272 0.263 0.929 0.536
TOR 0.298 0.228 0.714 0.502 0.371 0.464 0.376 0.263 0.571
TRA 0.365 0.195 0.776 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.571
YVE 0.221 0.741 0.477 0.324
ZOF 0.261 0.201 0.743 0.551 0.528
all 0.281 0.239 0.730 0.434 0.288 0.588 0.417 0.494 0.498 0.550 0.260 0.483 0.571 0.483
kg/ltr 0.405 0.550 0.780 0.735 0.758 0.550 0.711 0.627 0.780 0.780
kcal/ltr 880 1975 2551 1977 2139 1606 2136 2 0 1 0 2449 2761
Table VII-12: Grain Conversion for 1732 in Bz/ltr
See comments to Table VII-13 on the following page.
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Spelt Oats Wheat Rye Corn Mischel Barley Wiki Mill Paschi Reiter Peas Millet Lentils
AAR 0.493 0.411 1.143 0.725 0.892 0.714
ABU 0.343 0.982 0.715 0.396
ARW 0.389 0.294 0.521 0.268
BIB 0.375 0.355 0.977 0.603
BRA 0.457 0.360 0.668 0.608 0.395
ERL 0.393 0.942 0.725 0.823 0.664
FRE 0.500 0.435 1.242 0.756 0.964 0.606 0.714 0.557 0395 1.143 0.803
GSP 0.605 0.311 1326 0.845 0.929 0.606 0.636 1.143 0.821 1.143
INB 0.535 0.376
INT 0.438 0.393 1.178 0.606 0.395
ITH 0.438 0.393 0.715
JOB 0.539 0.395 0.857 0.606 1.143
KOE 0.436 0.316 1.020 0.675 0.679 0.955 1.143
KOR 0.500 0.366 1.101 0.807 0.606
LAU 0.496 0.405 0.714 0.619 0.714 0.595 0.395
LEN 0.385 0.369 0.933 0.567
LSN 0.415 1.125 0.781 0.890 0.591
MOU 0.426 1.194 0.741
MUS 0.500 0.385 1.071 0.807 0.606 1.143
NID 0.452 0.384 1.030 0.660 0.714
NYO 0.400 1.164 0.820
ROM 0.324 1.114 0.781 0.553
SIG 0.565 0.393 1.357 0.668 0.608
STI 0.476 0.366 1.101 0.627 0.893
THU 0.580 0.393
TOR 0.552 0335 1.260 0.734 0.657 0.955 0.981 0.787
TRA 0.355 0.328 1.071 0.519 0.487 0.589
YVE 0390 1.408 0.760 1.080 0.657
ZOF 0.364 0313 0.999 0.650
all 0.438 0.376 1.200 0.715 0.396 0.822 0.606 0.955 0.636 0.557 0.395 1.143 0.803 1.143
kg/ltr 0.405 0.550 0.780 0.735 0.758 0.550 0.711 0.627 0.780 0.780
kcal/ltr 880 1975 2551 1977 2139 1606 2136 2010 2449 2761
stable 0.359 0.308 0.965 0.575 0.342 0.705 0.512 0.724 0.567 0.554 0.328 0.813 0.687 0.813
Table VII-13: Grain Conversions for 1782 in Bz/ltr
Source: Database. For account abbreviations, see page 324. For grain, where the English title is not 
self-explanatory: Wheat stands for Weizen and Kemen; Mischel for Mischelkom, Mill for Miihlekom, 
Reiter for Reiterkom, Com for Kom. Bold numbers are prices from the same account, italics are 
regional weighted averages, normal numbers are cantonal weighted averages. Underlined prices are 
based on the assumptions discussed on page 340. The table only shows conversions that were actually 
used in the database.
Data on weight (kg/ltr) and nutritional value (kcal/ltr) is from Fluckiger Strebel (2002): table 45, which 
is based on Pfister, C. (1975): table 24 and Kiing (1993): 453.1 have calculated the nutritional value 
for spelt indirectly, via the value for wheat, after correcting for weight loss when de-husking. For the 
conversion of grain without explicit reference, I have used the values for Mill (for Com and Reiter), 
Paschi (for Wiki), and Peas (for Lentils) respectively.
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Conversions of Wine into Bz
W ine Prices (1) 1732 W ine Prices (2) 1782
Account ltr/ms sold (ltr) Bz/ltr conv. Account ltr/ms sold (ltr) Bz/ltr conv
BIB732 1.33 3,990.0 0.19 0.09 AAR782 1.67 133.6 0.60 0.73
DSR732 1.67 131,679.5 0.60 0.30 DSR782 1.67 352,663.9 0.71 0.78
GSP732 1.67 47,030.5 0.71 0.35 GSP782 1.67 10,404.1 1.19 1.02
INT732 1.66 33.2 1.25 0.63 KOE782 1.42 35,944.5 0.91 0.88
KOE732 1.42 142.0 2.11 1.06 LEN782 1.56 3,861.0 0.80 0.83
LSN7322 1.16 255.2 1.72 0.86 LSN7821 1.16 639.5 2.03 1.44
MOU732 1.41 183.3 1.06 0.53 MOU7821 1.41 407.2 2.23 1.54
NY0732 1.34 100.5 2.13 1.06 ROM782 2.18 678.0 0.58 0.72
WED732 1.67 153,110.6 0.60 0.30 TRA7821 1.67 23,964.5 1.35 1.10
WEW732 1.35 113,161.1 1.93 0.97 WED782 1.67 1,085.5 0.30 0.58
WSR732 1.35 2,430.0 0.56 0.28 WEW782 1.35 4,657.5 0.55 0.70
all 452,115.9 0.94 0.47 WSR782 1.35 366,795.0 0.95 0.90
all 801,234.3 0.85 0.85
Table VII-14: W ine Prices, 1732 and  1782
Source: database, local measures as in Table VII-10. For account abbreviations, see page 324. 
Abbreviations: ltr = litre, ms = Mass, sold (ltr) = Amount of wine sold at a known price, in litres. 
conv = conversion price used. This was calculated as the mean of the recorded price in an account and 
the overall weighted price. Please note that some of the wine prices -  particularly those in DSR and 
WSR -  are only recorded price conversions, not wine sales.
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Conversion Prices for Summary Accounts (in Bz/ltr)
1732 Spelt Oats Wheat Rye Corn Mischel Barley Wiki Mill Paschi Reiter Peas Millet Lentils
AG 0.239 0.201 0.620 0.372 0.288 0.588 0.417 0.494 0.498 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
BE 0.366 0.228 0.848 0.547 0.288 0.668 0.417 0.494 0.476 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
OAE 0.298 0.200 0.776 0.466 0.288 0.588 0.417 0.494 0.376 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
OBE 0.281 0.263 0.929 0.434 0.288 0.588 0.417 0.494 0.536 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
SEE 0.317 0.251 0.806 0.521 0.288 0.599 0.417 0.494 0.543 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
VD 0.281 0.254 0.676 0.485 0.288 0.543 0.417 0.494 0.498 0.550 0.288 0.362 0.571 0.483
1782
AG 0.384 0.343 0.982 0.650 0.396 0.822 0.606 0.955 0.636 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.821 1.143
BE 0.500 0.343 1.326 0.807 0.396 0.900 0.606 0.955 0.636 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.803 1.143
OAE 0.438 0.324 1.260 0.668 0.396 0.822 0.619 0.955 0.608 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.787 1.143
OBE 0.454 0.393 1.178 0.715 0.396 0.822 0.606 0.955 0.636 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.803 1.143
SEE 0.500 0.411 1.224 0.725 0.396 0.821 0.664 0.955 0.714 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.803 1.143
VD 0.438 0.400 1.178 0.760 0.396 0.820 0.591 0.955 0.636 0.557 0.395 0.501 0.803 1.143
Wine
0.940
0.940
0.940
0.940
0.940
0.940
0.855
0.855
0.855
Table VII-15: Conversion Prices for Summary Accounts (in Bz/ltr)
All prices are in Bz/ltr. Source: Database (see Table VII-12 and Table VII-13 for details). Italics are regional weighted averages; normal numbers are cantonal weighted averages. 
Underlined prices are based on assumptions (see page 340 for details).
Abbreviations:
AG Argovia 
BE Bern
OAE Oberaargau/Emmental 
OBE Oberland 
SEE Seeland 
VD Vaud
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v ii-14 Different Ways of Measuring Inflation
This section presents details on how I calculated the different inflation rates in Table 
IV-3.1 will first discuss monetary inflation, then wage data and price information for 
tiles. The difference in price between 1732 and 1782 is the overall inflation rate for 
this period. Annual inflation rates are calculated with the formula
i = (V1782/V1732)^ ^  -  1
where i is the inflation rate, V 1782 is the value of a good in 1782, V 1732 its value in 
1732 and n the number of years (50). As discussed in Section VII-13, the Bernese 
currency was very stable in its theoretical bullion content (i.e. its exchange rate to 
bullion). Table VII-16 shows the ideal bullion content of the Batzen for the value 
nearest to 1732 or 1782 respectively. There was no monetary inflation in terms of fine 
silver or gold; the Batzen even appreciated slightly in value between the two sample 
years.
R'Taler
SUver 
L. Blanc Ecu Neuf Basket Ducat
Gold 
L. Vieux L. Neuf Basket
1732 (nearest) 0.812 0.719 0.682 0.738 0.049 0.049 0.047 0.048
1782 (nearest) 0.787 0.719 0.665 0.724 0.051 0.048 0.046 0.048
change -3.03% 0.00% -2.50% -1.88% 2.86% -1.57% -3.13% -0.58%
Table VII-16: Ideal Bullion Content of the Bernese Batzen based on Exchange Rates, 1732 and 
1782
See Figure VII-9 for explanation. I have used the value for the year nearest to 1732. R ’Thaler stands 
for Reichstaler, Basket stands for the mean of all three values.
Another way of considering how much government revenue increased over time is to 
consider inflation in terms of real wages or purchasing power. The problem here is 
that reliable data on Bernese wages is rare. Hans-Anton Ebener has collected daily 
wages for construction workers from accounts of numerous counties.868 Based on his 
figures, I have calculated average daily wages for skilled and unskilled construction 
workers in the 1730s and 1780s (see Table VII-17). As a caveat, the basis for this 
calculation is narrow and Ebener did not use weighted averages for his figures. An 
additional problem is that construction workers’ salaries might not be representative 
for an early modem economy, where most of the workforce was active in the primary 
sector. Given the lack of wage data for agriculture, the construction worker series is 
best -  and only -  alternative.
868 His county sample is similar to mine.
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1730s 
wage N
1780s 
wage N change
Skilled 6.46 47 8.09 38 25.3%
Unskilled 5.54 34 6.65 15 20.1%
mean 6.00 7.37 22.9%
Table VII-17: Daily Wages of Construction Workers in Bz, from Bernese Accounts, 1730s and 
1780s
Based on Ebener (1999): Tables 5.2 and 5.3. His figures are not weighted by the number of days 
employed. N  stands for the number of observations in Ebener’s sample; mean is the arithmetic mean 
between the skilled and unskilled wage (using total numbers would give a spurious result, because the 
share of unskilled workers is smaller in the 1782 sample).
Table VII-17 shows the prevalence of wage inflation, although it was lower than the 
increase in grain prices. On an annual basis, wages increased by 0.41% over the 
period. We can use this wage data to correct for changes in purchasing power by 
using the arithmetic mean of all wage increases from Ebener’s sample.
Finally, inflation can be measured in terms of a specific non-agricultural good that is 
unlikely to change over time. Norbert Furrer has used tiles for this purpose when 
analysing monetary inflation for Fribourg.869 From Ebener’s figures on expenditure 
for construction materials, I have collected price information for tiles.870 Within this 
sample, the state bought 1,000 tiles in the 1730s at a weighted average price of 
0.1305 per tile. With an average price of 0.1518 for 1,100 tiles purchased in the 
1780s, inflation was 16.30% over fifty years. This is equal to a yearly inflation rate of 
0.30%.
869 Furrer (1995).
870 Ebener (1999): Tables 6.1 and 6.2 (186-191).
Appendix 348
vii- 15 Database Queries
Revenue, Expenditure and Profit Rate by Account
1732 Revenue Expenditure Arrears Profit-
Account gross net gross net to state from s. rate
AAR7321 165'295 2*183 137*430 19*365 26'875 704 } 0.7%AAR7322 154'143 49*555 35'527 32'029 119'333
ABU7321
ABU7322
76'160
101*035
769
66730
71'306 
42797
27929
41*875
8'612
58'377
4'057 } -3.4%
ARW7321 351'547 7*710 291'083 31*088 61'456 2'007 } 32.6%ARW7322 279759 70*857 22'962 21*861 252*788
AUS732 4'682'664 4*033*965 4*148773 4'148'734 518*891 -2.8%
BHB7321
BHB7322
425'690
615*257
523
176*231
279'537
398'600
166*547 
322'142
145*500
215*452 } -176.5%
BIB732 34'620 27*419 34*081 17*163 488 37.4%
BPF732 31'474 31'474 11*614 8*013 19'859 74.5%
BRA732 172787 27*646 47'049 22*829 124*389 17.4%
DSR732 674T634 4*819*776 5'930'987 5'040'978 810*648 -4.6%
ERL732 216'225 52*484 128*414 88*379 101*534 15*943 -68.4%
FRE732 743'385 182*354 202'457 157'342 640'222 8*016 13.7%
FRU732 8'482 5'328 6*961 6'960 2'025 -30.6%
GSP732 2*106*214 899*328 1*117*054 845*877 999*469 1*280 5.9%
INB732 180*080 62793 108*235 71*261 78*088 7*612 -13.5%
INT732 161*664 63'805 175*808 162*289 24*725 41*755 -154.4%
ITH732 172'844 86'138 95'606 40'030 84'848 7*100 53.5%
JOB732 177748 47'602 61'999 45'509 116*488 4.4%
KOE732 1'092'434 370'053 691*215 457'309 414'090 11'339 -23.6%
KOR732 310722 249'119 244'530 200'326 64'610 19.6%
LAU732 24'905 20'235 60'880 53*995 36'074 -166.8%
LEN732 867'272 199'039 200'496 79'972 666'290 59.8%
LSN7321 514781 185'068 391*262 248'886 122*320 } 15.6%LSN7322 488'836 463*746 299*506 298'595 238*978 50'515
MOU732 437722 191*833 230*331 160*819 207'087 5*189 16.2%
MUS733 160*423 83728 114*775 109*769 50'081 -31.1%
NID732 336*898 69'486 79*586 36*971 256*200 46.8%
NY0732 137*843 89*283 79'382 75'930 57'128 15.0%
PUL732 849*809 514*397 884*080 475740 34*271 7.5%
ROC732 4'428'485 1'346*803 4*262*617 817*218 168*250 39.3%
ROM732 1*099*494 220*650 575*952 210*914 545'858 4.4%
SDI732 14'379’190 5711*165 8'3 62*390 3777*577 6*016*959 33.9%
SIG732 28'001 21'269 46'526 42'022 1*897 20'883 -97.6%
Table VII-18: Revenue, Expenditure and Profit Rate by Account (Database) [1/3]
See comment on page 350
Appendix 349
1732 Revenue Expenditure Arrears Profit-
Account gross net gross net to state from s. rate
SLS732 164,078 52,719 45,585 38,083 119,171 27.8%
STI732 526,817 325,894 526,379 414,763 65,505 61,569 -27.3%
THU732 203,780 70,532 131,885 88,186 70,516 -25.0%
TOR732 399,843 146,686 229,456 206,068 225,535 58,599 -40.5%
TRA732 140,983 86,284 92,385 72,182 49,055 16.3%
UMG732 68,171 68,171 69,198 69,199 1,031 -1.5%
UNT732 4,433 4,433 5,098 5,097 1,200 -15.0%
WED732 613,436 132,840 381,243 174,609 232,943 1,513 -31.4%
WEW732 1,045,742 202,514 359,382 97,225 686,788 52.0%
WSR732 1,579,626 1,140,119 1,004,524 748,505 575,102 34.3%
YVE732 685,086 204,041 254,024 160,808 422,101 21.2%
ZEU732 331,371 84,282 196,602 196,601 74,123 -133.3%
ZOF732 622,818 174,238 261,419 161,126 356,354 7.5%
Total 49,141,705 23,143,297 33,428,988 20,796,693 16,097,008 370,655 10.1%
1782 Revenue Expenditure Arrears Profit-
Account gross net gross net to state from s. rate
AAR782 313,679 81,435 95,527 60,660 215,750 25.5%
ABU782 169,403 82,509 101,884 93,391 78,005 13,200 -13.2%
ARW782 510,289 109,957 143,803 90,993 363,998 17.2%
AUS782 7,465,558 5,113,864 5,140,813 2,070,453 2,367,639 59.5%
BDR782 16,765 47,976 47,974 31,211 n/a
BIB782 146,394 36,263 55,028 43,038 90,875 925 -18.7%
BPF782 31,478 31,479 14,171 9,823 17,307 68.8%
BPFAU782 32,103 32,103 3,450 3,450 28,653 89.3%
BPFIN782 38,755 38,753 3,769 3,762 34,986 90.3%
BRA782 261,493 52,795 65,471 33,586 193,910 36.4%
DSR782 9,788,332 2,457,811 9,193,262 6,697,617 595,063 -172.5%
ERL782 284,828 75,071 114,916 58,748 172,794 4,450 21.7%
FRE782 1,018,761 233,230 287,892 206,060 728,481 11.6%
FRU7821
FRU7822
3,362
5,163
3,364
5,158
12,735
4,767
12,735
3,984
11,500
1,250
} -96.2%
GSP782 2,237,358 960,573 1,314,344 1,151,258 922,178 -19.9%
INB7821 207,486 420 179,289 34,960 26,250 4.1%INB7822 193,441 81,788 43,878 43,869 152,563 5,975
INT782 160,107 49,076 222,817 213,408 10,552 76,777 -334.9%
ITH782 288,006 151,221 167,826 70,285 124,671 6,475 53.5%
JOB782 333,799 92,406 98,638 65,331 233,495 29.3%
KOE782 1,691,867 518,431 716,322 505,910 972,924 2.4%
Table VII-18: Revenue, Expenditure and Profit Rate by Account (Database) [2/3]
See comment on page 350.
Appendix 350
1782 Revenue Expenditure Arrears Profit-
Account gross net gross net to state from s. rate
KOR782 3,926,171 331,742 735,951 143,198 3,191,507 56.8%
LAU782 59,122 31,666 79,054 62,867 8,766 30,750 -98.5%
LEN782 1,219,994 298,515 315,157 177,219 901,992 40.6%
LSN7821 1,203,001 348,679 841,513 659,865 361,504 } -19.0%LSN7822 678,893 613,265 532,989 484,767 221,584 77,384
MOU7821 579,797 52,824 410,535 146,323 169,260 } 15.6%MOU7822 399,981 247,420 107,088 107,085 291,632
MUS782 212,197 93,766 156,880 138,821 76,958 24,325 -48.1%
NID782 488,757 108,791 146,808 72,019 339,288 33.8%
NY0782 307,726 185,050 287,740 238,695 49,979 30,044 -29.0%
PUL782 1,076,852 655,896 594,099 449,116 482,753 31.5%
ROC782 1,873,832 647,513 1,558,168 1,032,941 315,625 -59.5%
ROM782 2,222,963 468,012 1,057,256 446,640 1,191,057 29,236 4.6%
SDI782 30,669,117 8,304,215 16,903,166 4,242,632 13,765,951 48.9%
SIG7821 13,514 4,988 35,444 29,636 23,750 } -148.8%SIG7822 17,092 13,882 17,308 17,308 5,766 8,250
SLS782 33,528 25,904 21,715 21,715 11,813 16.2%
STI782 792,299 498,161 647,421 492,159 143,089 1.2%
THU782 362,631 112,554 148,927 127,079 234,051 22,200 -12.9%
TOR782 895,236 226,276 306,658 232,879 597,424 12,225 -2.9%
TRA7821 112,452 8,331 111,292 33,604 1,250 } -14.7%TRA7822 130,582 89,318 78,442 78,441 76,824 27,150
UMG782 183,630 183,536 26,908 26,907 156,722 85.3%
UNT782 8,549 8,549 16,473 16,472 9,750 -92.7%
WED782 694,904 280,394 219,760 84,490 482,185 7,426 69.9%
WEW782 684,089 138,307 80,913 77,624 605,206 2,033 43.9%
WSR782 5,340,936 1,266,422 4,688,408 3,873,243 652,527 -205.8%
YVE782 1,429,474 465,405 614,942 441,126 802,977 5.2%
ZEU782 278,398 82,651 247,980 247,980 30,418 -200.0%
ZOD782 521,404 521,347 129,095 129,099 392,311 75.2%
ZOF7821 627,876 19,631 499,694 100,765 126,250 } 12.3%ZOF7822 515,299 229,543 117,774 117,775 415,362 20,300
ZOW782 835,098 835,105 153,825 153,827 681,273 81.6%
Total 83,593,822 27,605,366 49,917,958 26,225,611 34,112,147 477,836 5.0%
Table VII-18: Revenue, Expenditure and Profit Rate by Account (Database)
Source: Database (unweighted).
The Profit Rate was calculated as net revenue minus net expenditure, expressed as a share of net 
revenue. For accounts with a handover during the sample year, the profit was calculated over both 
ledgers. Please note that the overall profitability shown here is not weighted, nor does it include 
Summary Accounts. It is therefore different from the figures used in the text, which are more accurate.
Appendix 351
Grain Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782
Account A ll G ra in Spelt Oats W heat Rye Corn Mischel Barley M ill Reiter Peas M ille t O ther
AAR7321 gross
net
sold
412'440
0
97'468
291*480
42*924
94'080
47'040
6720
3*808
15*120 5*040
3'696
AAR7322 gross 435'071 309*106 95'998 5*264 19*313 1*008 4'382
net 138'887 72'562 53*158 4*256 4*193 1'008 3*710
sold 6'720 6720
ABU7321 gross
net
sold
194'080
0
2'030
19*158 174*922
2*030
ABU7322 gross
net
287'684  
162*115
72*988
50*498
312
208
1*874 212'509 
1*354 110*055
sold 0
ARW 7321 gross
net
sold
998'760
0
222*768
770*280
132'720
181*440
77*616
45'360
9744
1*680
2*688
ARW 7322 gross
net
sold
997'203
258*003
1*344
787*931
174'899
840
156*142
63742
504
49*882
16*114
3*248
3*248
BHB7321 gross
net
sold
53*424
0
11*452
20'160 16*128 11*760
11’452
5*376
BHB7322 gross 363*608 104*832 113*204 21*182 26*950 46'466 4*508 46*466
net 340*018 99'624 104'804 21*182 22750 44'268 3*122 44'268
sold 123*116 19*320 13*440 44'268 1*820 44'268
BIB732 gross
net
sold
43*120
43'120
2'093
15*232
15*232
746
3752
3752
88
1*064
1*064
42
23'072
23'072
1*218
BRA732 gross
net
sold
510*808
85*768
93'191
394*030
54*670
40*943
111*657 
27*657 
50*568
2748
1*068
2*352
2*352
1*680
21
21
ERL732 gross
net
sold
295*435
86*275
72*408
27*986
12*026
9'576
26*607
3759
5*544
215*866
56'266
46'536
24'976 
14'224 
10*752
FRE732 gross 1*565*879 1*036*938 342*181 12'873 141*652 5*166 854 1*176 8*400 469 42 16*128
net 409*227 204'498 138*901 7*161 40*012 2*646 336 1*176 3*360 7 42 11'088
sold 99*876 24*864 48'972 5*292 18*228 2*520
GSP732 gross 2'463'517 1*984*556 389'697 16*135 60704 1*554 5*607 3*024 1*442 686 112
net 1*204*021 963*116 192*969 16*135 19*376 1*554 5*607 3*024 1*442 686 112
sold 120*309 14798 59*080 16*135 15*778 1*554 7*728 3*024 1*708 392 112
INB732 gross
net
sold
590*030
220*430
95*886
427*672
152*152
50*022
162*358
68*278
45*864
IN T732 gross
net
sold
223*923
6*944
0
177*814
2*254
41*202
1’722
2*107
2'016
1*428 1*372
952
ITH 732 gross
net
sold
728*728
337*288
0
329'868
212'268
398*692
124*852
168
168
JOB732 gross
net
sold
500*892
141'540
58*800
403'43 8 
100*366 
33*600
81*088
32*368
25'200
15*834
8'274
504
504
28
28
KOE732 gross 1'468'264 830*592 151*984 138*880 297*304 42*000 2'408 56 5*040
net 418*768 160*832 75*824 92*904 73*864 7'840 2*408 56 5*040
sold 16'405 5*362 2*681 7'427 781 154
KOR732 gross
net
sold
786*128
696’206
25'200
462'658
462*658
223'132 
223*132
87*290
9*744
25*200
10'920
672
2*128
Table VII-19: Grain Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782 [1/4, continued overleaf]
See comment on page 354.
Appendix 352
Account_________  A ll G ra in  Spelt Oats W heat Rye C orn  Mischel Barley M ill  R e iter Peas M ille t O ther
LA U732 gross
net
sold
88'181
65'973
0
55'742
34-994
20-538
20-538
4'159
4’159
708
708
133
133
2756
796
3*030
3'030
1-615
1-615
LEN732 gross 1'539'496 1'050'896 264-936 111-888 111-104 672
net 192'416 94*416 39-816 36'568 20’944 672
sold 16'191 7'543 4’953 2'223 1-474
LSN7321 gross 225'650 158-901 37'023 29726
net 0
sold 153'952 127'598 6’694 19'660
LSN7322 gross 123'725 59'801 43’977 19'742 123 82
net 107'203 46'566 40-689 19742 123 82
sold 0
M O U 732 gross 197'571 99'839 44'679 53'053
net 82'649 44'765 17-502 20’382
sold 53'324 34-147 7'395 11782
M US733 gross 274-585 243'793 25'524 3'941 950 188 188
net 148'643 125'171 18'205 3-941 950 188 188
sold 15-531 14780 563 188
N ID 732 gross 576-695 28’686 219-163 213-010 18-074 78'890 182 18-690
net 129-479 6'846 49'483 40-474 8'834 15'890 182 7'770
sold 95-480 42'490 3 1'262 7'140 3'528 11'060
N Y 0 7 3 2 gross 20'164 4’414 13-510 2'240
net 10-084 3’238 5'110 1736
sold 686 686
RO M 732 gross 199-314 51’415 58'246 53’174 34794 1-685
net 75'865 24’937 13'640 18’479 17-125 1-685
sold 66-618 29'513 3’845 10'225 23-035
SIG732 gross 20*776 10-584 7'812 1-092 1-092 196
net 11-508 5'544 4-452 840 504 168
sold 7'588 4'004 1-568 1-008 1-008
STI732 gross 1-006-159 575-638 399'665 10'584 15-862 4'410
net 704-935 433'510 242-585 10-584 13-846 4'410
sold 330*932 171-878 143-248 8'820 5-264 1-722
TH U732 gross 478-387 264'712 190'043 12'404 11-228
net 164-731 84'952 67'403 6'188 6*188
sold 145'600 133'224 6'188 6'188
TOR732 gross 1'059*674 775'467 179'172 3'360 76-076 11-424 3-192 623 1-155 9705
net 350*042 212-667 101-892 3'360 18784 4’704 3’192 623 1-155 4'165
sold 33-068 10-388 2’520 11-088 5'376 3'696
TRA732 gross 269-675 183-470 64-512 812 6'559 11-480 2*506 336
net 170-079 87710 64-512 812 4-095 10-444 2’506
sold 59-490 25'557 26’422 1-932 4718 861
YV E732 gross 300-139 111-493 142-338 14-088 32721
net 88-291 36733 36-162 T i l l 7'525
sold 56-602 25-004 21-641 1-659 8799
ZOF732 gross 1-063-328 829'304 217-168 7'840 7'336 1-680
net 315'280 230-328 75'824 5'600 3'528
sold 12-737 9'251 2'961 280 140 105
total gross 20’362'511 12'349’647 4768743 950796 1'064'904 410’503 474-466 165'675 18-053 55708 82'899 13'942 101-064
total net 7'165'785 3'976’036 2'026'111 372'843 293-506 133-127 174-578 69-705 9705 30'154 64741 8'902 74-058
total sold 2'096'863 583-625 974'901 137'560 123-530 3748 131-672 60’688 3'955 19'957 55'328 0 59’395
sold as %  o f  net 29.3% 14.7% 48.1% 36.9% 42.1% 2.4% 75.4% 87.1% 43.0% 66.2% 85.5% 0.0% n.a.
Table VII-19: Grain Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782 [2/4, continued overleaf]
See comment on page 354.
Appendix 353
Account A ll G ra in_____ Spelt Oats W heat_____ Rye Corn Mischel Barley M ill Reiter Peas M ille t O ther
AAR782 gross
net
sold
539'154  
144*354 
73'486
361*382
75*782
34*104
145*842
55*122
35*588
7*672
4*312
784
15*967
4*207
1*876
1*036
826
6'416
3'896
2*184
ABU782 gross 379'205 100'268 208 1*666 277*063
net 174'089 53'622 208 1*458 118*801
sold 1'380 521 859
ARW 782 gross 1'196’895 911*421 223'566 56*931 4*977
net 277*732 185*269 73*101 16*114 3*248
sold 143'73I 95*193 40*229 6*629 1*680
BIB782 gross 288*346 200*428 58'372 16*755 12*791
net 64'497 23*871 25'943 9*999 4'684
sold 1'278 321 512 287 158
BRA782 gross 512*505 411*716 97'356 949 2*352 133
net 111'825 75*716 32*676 949 2*352 133
sold 74*879 50*904 23'975
ERL782 gross 306*380 29*246 24*119 168 225'463 27*384
net 92*180 12*446 3*959 168 59*143 16'464
sold 55*318 8*232 1*656 35*553 9'877
FRE782 gross 1'691'340 1*119*087 372*043 12*376 153*090 5*362 280 1*176 12*082 11 15*834
net 406*812 205*503 132*475 7*336 40*530 3*346 280 1*176 7*042 11 9*114
sold 159*306 55*048 75'600 3'654 19796 420 4*788
GSP782 gross 2'082'143 1*719*011 303'702 15*610 24*612 1*666 13*321 588 2*821 700 112
net 973*294 785*554 165*277 13*160 5*096 1*666 1*393 392 644 112
sold 162*862 252 140*140 3'234 16*366 1'666 392 112 588 112
INB7821 gross 328*440 263*760 64'680
net 0
sold 58*324 38*878 19'446
INB7822 gross 382*193 302'421 79'772
net 162'953 120*057 42'896
sold 0
IN T782 gross 220*490 168*434 47*646 3*024 938 448
net 7'466 3'458 606 2*016 938 448
sold 0
ITH 782 gross 632*044 440*370 191*506 168
net 348*292 238*938 109*186 168
sold 14'851 14*851
JOB782 gross 582*901 467*835 95'312 19*194 518 42
net 175*501 123*435 43*232 8'274 518 42
sold 52'570 33*768 17*640 1*162
KOE782 gross 2'303'134 1*290*569 250*044 320*475 384*269 44*063 1*416 j 2*299
net 662*184 215'360 118*740 164*750 131*216 25'482 1*416 5'220
sold 16'667 6'083 2'306 3*207 4*313 758
K.OR782 gross 4*252*931 1*385*475 48*720 2*815*208 3'346 182
net 479'619 90'255 19*894 367*693 1*596 182
sold 0
LAU782 gross 76'370 37*898 26*516 7*182 28 1*764
net 47*530 24*178 14*756 5'502 28 1*764
sold 28*560 13*440 11*760 1*680
LEN782 gross 2'302'175 1*740*796 293*751 127*103 140'525
net 401*396 191*420 117*104 65*848 27'024
sold 18*309 8*687 5*805 2*584 1*233
LSN7821 gross 98*311 57'047 22*852 11*508 6*905
net 0
sold 58*883 40*504 5*278 11*248 1*853
Table VII-19: Grain Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782 [3/4, continued overleaf]
See comment on page 354.
Appendix 354
Account_________  A ll G ra in_____ Spelt Oats W heat_____ Rye C orn  Mischel Barley M ill  Reiter Peas M ille t O ther
LSN7822 gross 
net 
sold
135'510 64'952 45'964 13'042 11'443 110 
118*988 51*718 42'676 13*042 11*443 110 
0
M OU7821 gross 
net 
sold
113*875 55*178 27'730 30*967 
0
50*058 28’976 8*293 12*789
M O U 7822 gross 
net 
sold
120'948 57'078 31*170 32*700 
77'453 42*087 16*601 18*765 
0
M US782 gross 
net 
sold
378*714 328*916 39*438 8'176 1*736 224 224 
161'294 133*672 20'622 4'816 1*736 224 224 
20*160 16'800 3'360
N ID 782  gross 
net 
sold
567*207 46'144 178*367 227*045 20'398 95’253 
163'671 22'624 70*847 41*909 10*318 17'973 
129*248 21*798 64'386 32*340 9*212 1*512
N Y 0 7 8 2  gross 
net 
sold
25*461 5*558 17*292 2*611 
13'297 4*321 6*571 2*405 
928 928
RO M 782 gross 
net 
sold
201*903 50'614 63*767 60*737 26*785 
78*810 27*448 15*080 21*865 14*417 
38*937 15'215 3*190 11*820 8*712
SIG7821 gross 
net 
sold
13*216 6*384 6*160 672 
2*128 1*008 1*120 
4*204 1*883 1*666 655
SIG7822 gross 
net 
sold
30*351 14*759 12*781 1*562 937 312 
17'857 8*512 6*534 1*562 937 312 
0
STI782 gross 
net 
sold
1*101*531 681*513 387*265 11*207 17*136 4*410 
745*539 467*985 248*161 11*207 13*776 4*410 
299'509 155*148 130*746 8*365 3*731 1*519
TH U 782 gross 
net 
sold
636*591 391*437 245*154 
188*031 110*877 77'154 
46*288 20'006 26*282
TO R782 gross 
net 
sold
1'425'127 1*120*364 168*228 3*360 113*274 7*189 4'872 1*995 5*845 
386*131 224'420 116*400 3*360 30*954 3*829 3'192 1*155 2*821 
124'852 88'200 7*336 21*560 2*856 1*680 700 2'520
TRA7821 gross 
net 
sold
204*176 164'640 32*816 336 1*484 3'458 1*442 
0
80*836 53'501 21'557 1*481 2*860 1*439
TRA7822 gross 
net 
sold
321'717 231*686 75*754 840 2*975 7*942 2*520 
204*957 125*846 64'834 840 2’975 7*942 2*520 
0
Y V E 782 gross 
net 
sold
304*371 95*445 163*849 10*962 12*891 21*224 
109*491 43*197 45*409 5'922 7*515 7*448 
53*071 20*874 20*160 5*117 1*379 5*541
ZOF7821 gross 
net 
sold
664*888 554*400 103*040 5*488 1*960 
1'568 1*568 
10*367 8'568 1*652 147
ZOF7822 gross 
net 
sold
1'424'153 1*153*337 257*176 7'497 6*143 
621'076 471*039 136*397 7'497 6'143 
0
total gross 
total net 
total sold 
sold as %  o f net
25'844'691 15*514*182 4*320*390 3'981'353 1*086*080 277'063 428*616 153*646 18'144 24*655 18'816 14*427 37*072 
7*420*011 3*924*777 1'927'913 838*375 351*554 118*801 130*801 79*255 8'041 17*088 10*416 9*387 18*569 
1'778*858 685*782 772*597 98*122 116*474 859 56*548 30*602 2*520 7'375 1*680 4*788 4*312 
24.0%  17.5% 40.1%  11.7% 33.1% 0.7%  43.2%  38.6% 31.3% 43.2% 16.1% 51.0% n.a.
Table VII-19: Grain Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782
Source: Database: gross stands for gross revenue (i.e. revenue including inventory arrears), net for net 
revenue, sold for the amount of grain sold (which was recorded as an expenditure in grain); the letter 
after the column others describes which grain types the column refers to, with P  for Paschi, W for 
Wiki, and L for Lentils; for account abbreviations, see p. 324; for assumptions on price conversion see 
Section VII-13.
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Wine Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782
Account W ine Account Wine Account W ine
BIB732 gross
net
sold
3731
3731
1*253
FRE732 gross
net
sold
38'034
7*974
GSP732 gross
net
sold
33*686
10*974
11*758
INT732 gross
net
sold
10*844
1*545
10*844
KOE732 gross
net
sold
37*511
17*471
5*994
LEN732 gross
net
sold
585
585
LSN7322 gross
net
sold
36*131
36*131
MOU732 gross
net
sold
3*062 
3'062
STI732 gross
net
sold
14*898
14*898
TOR732 gross
net
sold
12*586
7*158
WED732 gross
net
sold
163*870
43*237
38*278
WEW732 gross
net
sold
332*163
81*538
34*996
AAR782 gross
net
sold
FRE782 gross
net
sold
16*814
4*498
GSP782 gross
net
sold
71*256
16*363
2'265
INT782 gross
net
sold
4*910
ITH782 gross
net
sold
3*633
509
3*124
KOE782 gross
net
sold
40*032
13*371
LSN7822 gross
net
sold
37*341 
37*341 
8*114
MOU7822 gross
net
sold
3*469
3'469
NY0782 gross
net
sold
23*408
23*408
ROM782 gross
net
sold
64*502
64*502
41*968
STI782 gross
net
sold
36*227
36*227
TOR782 gross
net
sold
9*551
5*376
WED782 gross 286*853
net 121*467
sold 56*041
WEW782 gross 295*466
net 60*748
sold 1*440
YVE782 gross 8*101
net 8*101
sold 1'906
Summary for 1732
total gross 687*101
total net 228*304
total sold 92*278
sold as % of net 40.4%
Summary for 1782
total gross 901*563
total net 395*380
total sold 114*858
sold as % of net 29.0%
Table VII-20: Wine Revenue in Litres, 1732 and 1782
Source: Database: gross stands for gross revenue, net for net revenue, sold for the amount of grain 
sold (which was recorded as an expenditure in wine, see also Table VII-14); for account abbreviations, 
see p. 324. Please note that the amount of wine sold is not necessarily identical with the amount for 
which prices were registered (shown in Table VII-14).
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Relative Changes in Grain Revenue, 1732-1782 (kg, meal, Bz and ltr)
Spelt
Wheat
Oats
Rye
Mischel
Com
Barley
Wiki
Paschi
Mill
Peas
Reiter
Millet
Lentils
all grain
1732 1782
kg kg
2,225,716 2,393,869
449,941 825,655
1,610,418 1,582,085
296,162 357,575
255,226 220,760
121,337 84,503
51,540 52,349
6,215 5,253
43,543 7,443
71,102 36,588
10,013 8,154
11,201 6,677
1,729 909
87 87
5,154,231 5,581,908
1732 1782
Bz Bz
1,949,533 2,812,122
738,403 1,408,806
777,949 1,302,957
235,014 417,330
276,199 486,552
52,994 47,048
65,199 160,723
6,233 8,026
38,632 6,661
54,410 32,498
6,962 10,833
5,602 3,704
1,285 917
54 128
4,208,470 6,698,304
1732 1782
meal meal
4,833,718 5,198,904
1,471,539 2,700,316
5,782,838 5,681,098
796,616 961,805
720,698 623,375
364,369 253,759
150,497 152,858
19,924 16,840
139,588 23,859
213,515 109,871
31,440 25,603
33,637 20,051
6,119 3,218
274 274
14,564,770 15,771,831
change change change 1732 1782
kg, meal Bz price stable p stable p
7.6% 44.2% 55.6% 1,975,592 2,124,848
83.5% 90.8% 57.1% 556,695 1,021,552
-1.8% 67.5% 64.4% 900,773 884,925
20.7% 77.6% 64.7% 231,508 279,514
-13.5% 76.2% 37.5% 237,516 205,442
-30.4% -11.2% 39.8% 58,376 40,655
1.6% 146.5% 45.3% 47,975 48,727
-15.5% 28.8% 93.4% 7,178 6,067
-82.9% -82.8% 27.7% 38,447 6,572
-48.5% -40.3% 1.2% 56,654 29,153
-18.6% 55.6% 51.6% 10,434 8,497
-40.4% -33.9% 136.8% 5,158 3,074
-47.4% -28.6% 40.5% 1,523 801
0.0% 137.0% 136.8% 91 91
8.3% 59.2% 60.9% 4,127,920 4,659,919
1732 1782
ltr ltr
5,495,596 5,678,097
576,848 695,196
2,928,019 3,179,428
402,942 610,375
336,932 482,313
170,585 194,740
93,709 125,131
9,912 17,864
69,447 68,091
99,960 108,738
12,838 11,107
15,748 12,511
2,216 1,970
112 112
10,214,863 11,185,675
change: 12.9%
Table VII-21: Relative Changes in Grain Revenue, 1732-1782 (kg, meal, Bz and ltr)
Source: Database and extended database (values including grain sales), meal stands for 1,000 calories (kcal). Nutritional values and weights are calculated with figures from 
Table VII-12 and Table VII-13, based on Fluckiger Strebel (2002): table 45. The column change price shows the change in the weighted price for each grain for the canton as a 
whole (see Table VII-13). The change in kg and meal is identical, since they are both based on the same series (grain revenue in litre), stablep shows the value in litre converted 
by the stable price for each grain type (see Table VII-13). The change in price for all grain is expressed as the arithmetic mean of all grain prices.
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vii-16 The Categorisation of Salt Transactions
Monopoly Profit, Current and Inventory Transactions
Salt trade was a government monopoly. Although officially it was not taxed, the state 
made a profit by selling salt more expensively than it was able to purchase it abroad 
or produce it at home. The salt accounts did calculate the profit on salt trade, but this 
was only for informative purposes and was not accounted for separately. The 
government accounts also recorded proceeds from selling salt, alongside expenses for 
purchasing salt, which included transport and handling cost, as well as maintenance. 
If salt sales were to be simply classified as inventory transactions, this would be 
inaccurate. In that case, the purchasing price of salt would be significantly smaller 
than the price it was sold for, which also had to cover all other expenses. The result 
would be a distortion towards inventory revenue. I have therefore divided the revenue 
from salt sales and the expenditure for purchases into three components: monopoly 
profit, current and inventory transactions. In practice, this meant a deduction for 
monopoly and inventory change from salt transactions; the remainder was classified 
as current salt revenue and expenditure.
The profit that the Bernese government stated in its salt accounts was calculated as 
the difference between all revenue and expenditure for each type of salt. This figure 
included changes in the salt inventory. For 1732, the profit rate was 19.2%, for 1782 
it was 20%. These figures are roughly in line with the overall profit rate for the whole 
century, which was 21.12%.8711 deducted salt profit from total revenue for salt sales. 
Changes in the stock of salt can be calculated from the government salt inventory. 
They were classified as inventory transactions (as revenue if the inventory was 
reduced, as expenditure if the stock increased).
Salt Prices
The government converted all salt transactions into Bernese Crowns, but did not use 
the same price for all conversions. While prices for inventory valuation changed little, 
there was a major difference between the price that the government paid for salt and 
what it obtained on the domestic market. The price difference contributed towards the 
state’s monopoly profit from salt trade.
871 StABE B V 481 -  B V 578. The profit was calculated in the accounts as the difference between 
revenue from grain sales and expenditure (grain purchase, transport and maintenance) for the same 
year. This excluded changes in inventory, which should be considered to calculate the true profit rate. 
However, since these changes cancelled each other out over a long time period, this matters little for a 
long-term analysis. In both 1732 and 1782, inventory changes were not important. I have calculated the 
profit rate as profits divided by revenue. The figure of 21.12% is the profit rate of all accumulated 
profits and salt sales. Based on yearly profit rates, the mean profit rate was 21.34%, with a standard 
deviation of 6.09 (%) and a variability of 28.53%.
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Price at...
Bz per Barrel (Fass)
1732 1732 1732 
Burgundy Bavaria Tyrolia
1732
Lorraine
Bz per Centner
1732
Sea-Salt
1732
Roche
Opening Balance 214.36 326.77 275.00 49.67 53.63
Inventory 196.83 289.50 329.63 54.89
Purchase (all) 204.46 289.83 320.88
Purchase (Salt only) 184.58 129.98 106.32
Sale 379.28 381.50 414.48 75.44 80.57 68.17
Price at...
1782
Burgundy
1782
Bavaria
1782
Tyrolia
Bz per Centner
1782
Lorraine
1782
Sea-Salt
1782
Roche
1782
Mixed
Opening Balance 44.79 44.01 55.54 47.26 73.44 59.32 54.49
Inventory 47.94 41.35 53.85 46.58 73.44 55.61 54.03
Purchase (all) 47.02 49.20 57.80 50.90
Purchase (Salt only) 42.21 37.15 33.58 38.10
Sale 75.18 79.67 75.36 83.82 76.10
Table VII-22: Prices for Different Types of Salt Recorded in Salt Trade Accounts (SDI) 1732 and 
1782
Sources: St ABE B V 513 (SDI732) and StABE B V 563a (SDI782). Prices for Burgundy, Bavaria and 
Tyrolia in 1732 are per barrel (Fass), all others in Bz per Centner. Purchase (all) is for the total cost of 
purchase (including transportation and handling), Purchase (Salt only) is the price paid for salt alone.
The profitability of the salt trade as a commercial activity (see Figure 111-30) should 
not be confused with the ‘profitability’ of the salt trade account for the sate, which 
depended to a large extent on changes in the salt inventory. In years when the 
inventory increased, the state spent more on its salt account. Figure VII-12 shows the 
distinction between total revenue of the salt account, expenditure, with one series 
including, the other excluding assignations. For revenue, only in 1750 and 1753 did 
the Salzdirektion receive any assignations.
m Bz
* -  Total Revenues (excl. Assignations) 
♦ Revenues (incl. Assignations)
-a— Expenditures (excL Assignations) 
-©— Expenditures (incL Assignations)
o oo
Figure VII-12: Total Revenue and Expenditure (including/excluding Assignations), Salt Trade, 
1700-1797
See figure Figure 111-27 for details.
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vii-17 The Structure of a Bailiffs Account (Aarberg 1782)
Revenue and expenditure of a Bernese account using grain and monetary transactions 
followed the scheme of Figure VII-13, where the size of each field is purely abstract.
Exp
Grain
Net Expenditure Grain Sales Arrears
Money
Net Expenditure Arrears
Rev Net Revenue Inventory Arrears Net Revenues Assignations Grain Sale Proceeds
Figure VII-13: Revenue and Expenditure of a Bernese Account (Scheme)
Revenue consisted of inventory arrears in grain (the opening balance), net revenue in 
both grain and money, assignations (transfers payments from other accounts) and the 
proceeds from grain sales. Expenditure included grain sales in kind (inventory 
adjustment), net expenditure in grain and money, as well as arrears in grain and 
money. The difference between the inventory arrears at the beginning of the period 
and the final arrears in grain constituted the inventory change. Together with the 
arrears in money they made up the profit of an office. This figure was identical to the 
difference between net revenue and net expenditure. For the concrete example of 
Aarberg bailiff accounts in 1782, the situation is shown in Figure VII-14.872
Rev
Exp
□  N et Exp (m)
□  N et Rev (m)
B  N et Exp (g) 
O  N et R ev (g)
8 8 S 8
D Grain Sale (g) 
3  Assignation (m)
□  Arrears (m)
H  Grain Sale (m)
□  Arrears (g) 
13 Inventory (g)
50 100 150 200 250 300 ,000 Bz
Figure VII-14: Gross and Net Revenue and Expenditure, Aarberg 1782
Source: StABE B VII 862 (database). Rev is for revenue, Exp for expenditure; (m) for transactions 
recorded in monetary values, (g) for transactions recorded in kind as grain. Only striped areas are net 
transactions.
Only 26.0% of the recorded revenue consisted of net transactions, along with 19.6% 
of expenditure. Grain sales accounted for 11.1% of transactions, both for revenue and 
expenditure. The profit rate -  net revenue minus net expenditure as a share of net 
revenue -  was a staggering 25.3%. Roughly 30% of this profit had the form of an 
increase in public granaries; the rest went to the Deutsch Standesrechnung as the 
bailiffs monetary arrears for this year.
872 The number of transactions in the database is 237. O f these, 56 are sums, which were only used to 
check the accuracy of the data. The 181 remaining transactions, recorded net revenue (31), net 
expenditure (140), grain sales (6), assignations (3) and arrears (1).
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vii-18 Functional Breakdown of Revenue and Expenditure
All Transactions
1732
Rev Exp
1782
Rev Exp
Defence 612,894 1,009,816 724,683 3,247,327
Foreign Affairs 13,193 110,988 3,767 575,002
Judiciary and Police 82,218 102,164 82,055 616,618
Finance and Taxation 19,477,122 10,083,294 25,049,375 11,815,412
General Administration 10,497 2,811,797 40,817 3,396,472
Economy 0 3,173,750 4,242,768 2,853,028
Domain and Production 1,277,713 1,493,339 2,022,990 1,533,829
Education 0 578,562 0 844,715
Public Health 0 170,458 824 488,802
Welfare 11,680 1,044,201 50,133 1,779,769
Environment and Traffic 0 395,707 0 350,255
Culture 0 1,823 0 100
Religion 0 1,761,165 0 2,647,663
Current Transactions
1732 1782
Rev Exp Rev Exp
0 556,872 0 2,860,871
13,193 110,988 3,767 575,002
82,218 102,164 82,055 616,618
12,368,790 2,148,317 19,414,097 3,981,604
10,497 2,811,797 40,817 3,396,472
3,878,538 3,173,750 3,878,538 2,853,028
1,277,713 1,484,965 2,022,990 1,533,829
0 578,562 0 844,715
0 170,458 824 488,802
11,680 1,044,201 50,133 1,779,769
0 388,630 0 96,627
0 1,823 0 100
0 1,721,240 0 2,647,663
Table VII-23: Functional Breakdown of Revenue and Expenditure (Database)
Source: Database. All values are in Batzen (Bz).
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vii-1 9  Comparative Figures on Expenditure
The following figures are from the European State Finance Database and Komer 
(1995a): 401. Population estimates are from various sources indicated in Table 
VII-24. Please note that most of the data has high margins of error, which makes 
these figures rough estimates at best. For the city republics, reliable population 
estimates were not available.
R ev Year Population Y ear R ev/C ap Source (population)
B E R N 17 1732 317,000 1732 53.63
B E R N 22 1782 388,000 1782 56.70
V en ice 118 1783 2,853,000 c. 1790 41.36 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
M ilan 7 1700* 125,000 c. 1700 56.00 Bairoch/Batou/Chevre (1988): 45
4 1800* 135,000 c. 1800 29.63 Bairoch/Batou/Chevre (1988): 45
S ic ily 27 1,450,000 18.62 calculated from:
1,240,000 c. 1721 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
1,660,000 c. 1790 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
G enoa 27 611,500 44.15 calculated from:
620,000 c. 1721 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
603,000 c. 1790 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
Piedm ont 45 1,723,500 26.11 calculated from:
1,100,000 c. 1700 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 353
2,347,000 c. 1790 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
Bavaria 41 1700* 1,450,000 1771 28.28 Lee (1975): 316
73 1800* 1,252,000 1794 58.31 Lee (1975): 316
Lombardy 49 1700* 1,180,000 41.53 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
66 1800* 1,180,000 55.93 Beloch (1937-1961): Vol. 3, 365
Denmark 86 1700* 777,000 1735 110.68 Helleiner (1967): 46
360 1800* 926,000 1800 388.77 Helleiner (1967): 46
P m ssia 112 1700* 1,340,500 83.55 calculated from:
1,067,000 1688 Behre (1905): 197-198
1,614,000 1713 Behre (1905): 197-198
485 1800* 6,221,000 1800 77.96 Behre (1905): 462 (appendix 5)
U td Provinces 439 1795 2,047,000 1816 214.46 Mitchell (2003): 6
France 3000 1790s 26,000,000 1789 115.38 Helleiner (1967): 67
Britain 8500 1790s 10,500,000 1801 809.52 Mitchell (2003): 8
*) -  Assumption
Table VII-24: Expenditure, Population and Expenditure per Capita for European States
Sources: State Finance Database and Komer (1995a): 401. Rev is for Revenue in tonnes of fine silver. 
The value for Milan is for the city only; Lombardy is for the territory of the Duchy of Milan under 
Austrian rule. If no year is indicated for revenue, the assumption is that Komer’s figure is for the 
whole century. If two figures were stated, I assumed the first for the early century (c. 1700) the latter 
for the late century (c. 1800). Population figures for more than one year were calculated as means.
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Structure of Expenditure
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Figure VII-15: Bernese Expenditure Compared to Other European State (Full List) [cont’d 
overleaf]
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Figure VII-15: Bernese Expenditure Compared to Other European State (Full List)
Sources: ESFDB and Komer (1995a) and Database (for Bern figures). This figure contains the
complete list of data selected for Figure IV-15. See comments there.
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vii- 2 0  Communal Finance
Data on communal finances has not been recorded systematically and has been 
largely ignored by historiography. Table VII-25 collects some figures available from 
secondary literature. The sample is not representative.
Commune Tax (Bz/cap) Year(s) Population Type Comments
Aarberg 5.00 1772 Small City 1 daily wage of unskilled labourer
Worb (Viertelgemeinde) 6.02 1745-1760 768 Village Net revenue only (11 accounts)
7.78 1761-1773 772 Village Net revenue only (12 accounts)
6.26 1776-1794 1,221 Village Net revenue only (16 accounts)
Langnau 6.21 1763 2,894 Village Poverty relief revenue only
Menziken 6.40 1773/74 1,098 Village Without poverty relief (?)
Table VII-25: Communal Tax Burden in Bz per Capita (Yearly Figures)
See Table IV-10 in the main text.
Most population estimates are from the Bemhist database (http://www.bemhist.ch); 
see Pfister, C. (1995) for details.
For Aarberg, see Bartlome (1999). It was a small city and residence to the bailiff with 
privileges vis a vis of its hinterland. By closing the right to citizenship, it managed to 
avoid paying poverty relief for many of its inhabitants: only 4 out o f440 citizens 
qualified as poor in 1764. The city also had its own funds, which covered some 40% 
of communal revenue in 1772; only 2.5% of revenue came from direct taxes. The 
average yearly tax burden was equivalent to one day’s wage of an unskilled 
labourer.873
on  A
For Worb: Holenstein (2005) plus transcripts of his primary sources. Worb was a 
Twingherrschaft owned by the von Graffenried family. For the communal district of 
Worb [ Viertelsgemeinde], only the net revenue was considered (i.e. revenue from 
interests on funds was excluded). The tax rate for each Los (voting shares in the 
communal assembly, based on property), was fixed periodically; all non-owners of 
Loses had to pay taxes on their immobile property, residents an additional flat fee. 
Population estimates are from Bemhist (parish of Worb, of which according to H.R. 
Schmidt half lived in the communal district). If interest payments are included, the 
respective figures are 6.92 Bz (1745-60); 8.49 Bz (1761-73) and 6.73 Bz (1776-94).
For Langnau: Bietenhard (1988). Langnau was a village with market right. The data 
is only on revenue for poverty relief, which was arguably the most important part of 
communal revenue in this case. Data on population is from Berhnist. For landowners, 
property was taxed at a rate of 0.05% (per Lb 1,000), mobile property at 0.08%; 
citizens without landed property paid a rate of 0.22% to cover for the fact that they 
did not provide any poverty relief in kind. Residents (i.e. non-citizens) paid a rate of 
0.24% and an additional flat fee of 75 Bz/year. From the 530 households in Langnau,
873 According to Ebener (1999): 178, the daily wage of an unskilled labourer was 5 Bz in the 1780s (5- 
6 Bz in the 1730s).
874 Historisches Archiv Worb, F, 33,2 (Sackelmeisterrechnungen 1770-1791) and HEV Worb B 12-6 
und B 12-7 (Sackelmeisterrechnungen 1745-1772 und 1791-1794). Thanks to Andre Holenstein for 
letting me use this data.
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only 315 paid taxes (340 if  we include Bietenhard’s error margin). For those 
households that paid taxes, the yearly average was 38.825 Bz, with averages ranging 
in the different districts from 33.375 to 47.8 Bz. If non-taxpayers are included, the 
average household paid 23.075 Bz, with a range per district from 19.475 Bz to 27.65 
Bz.
For Menziken: Steiner (1956): 171. Menziken was a village in the county of Lenzburg 
(Argovia). Data on communal revenue for 1773/74 contain less than 3% of total 
expenditure for poverty relief. It is therefore likely that poverty relief was recorded in 
a separate account. Another possibility is that Menziken had little poverty. As a 
population estimate, I used the average of the figures for 1764 and 1798, assuming a 
constant distribution between the two districts Menziken D orf and Menziken Burg.
vii-2 1  Appendix to Chapter V
Results of the Holding Period Return (HPR) Regression Analysis
X-Variable: HPR English funds of Bern, 1723-1798 
Y-Variable: HPR Virtual Consol (3%-annuities), 1723-1798
Coefficients Std Error tStat P-value
Intercept 0.0059764 0.0050807 1.1762956 0.2432985
X Variable 1 0.9701984 0.0587158 16.523621 2.251E-26
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8882768
R Square 0.7890357
Adjusted R Square 0.7861457
Standard Error 0.0423481
Observations 75
Table VI1-26: Results of HPR Regression, Bernese Funds in England and Virtual Consols
Consols were perpetual and redeemable (consolidated) annuities. For the time before prices 
for 3%-Consols are available (1753), I have used a Virtual Consol in analogy to Neal, who 
extrapolated back until 1726 with 3%-Bank annuities, and until 1723 with South Sea 
annuities: Neal (1990): 127 (note 16); Neal does not use the term Virtual Consol.
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